Pub Date : 2024-05-23DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v27i3.3346
Joshua Stuchlik
The topic of murder was among Elizabeth Anscombe’s central preoccupations. Drawing on both her published writings and newly available archival resources, this paper reconstructs Anscombe’s theory of murder. I show that Anscombe was concerned to deny the semantic thesis that “murder” means “killing that is unjustified or impermissible” and I show how her theory surmounts three challenges that seem to support the semantic thesis. In doing so, I discuss her views on responsibility, the significance of the distinction between intention and foresight, and the concept of a title to kill.
{"title":"Elizabeth Anscombe on Murder","authors":"Joshua Stuchlik","doi":"10.26556/jesp.v27i3.3346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v27i3.3346","url":null,"abstract":"The topic of murder was among Elizabeth Anscombe’s central preoccupations. Drawing on both her published writings and newly available archival resources, this paper reconstructs Anscombe’s theory of murder. I show that Anscombe was concerned to deny the semantic thesis that “murder” means “killing that is unjustified or impermissible” and I show how her theory surmounts three challenges that seem to support the semantic thesis. In doing so, I discuss her views on responsibility, the significance of the distinction between intention and foresight, and the concept of a title to kill.","PeriodicalId":508700,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy","volume":"10 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141106557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-23DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v27i3.2005
Matthew Baddorf, Noah McKay
We introduce Imitationism, a new theory of collective virtue—that is, of virtues and vices held by collectives such as corporations and governments. This theory has the advantage of clearly explaining how collectives can have virtues in robustly nonreductive ways without appealing to group minds. We then use this theory to elucidate some examples of collective virtue and respond to some objections.
{"title":"A Theory of Collective Virtue","authors":"Matthew Baddorf, Noah McKay","doi":"10.26556/jesp.v27i3.2005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v27i3.2005","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce Imitationism, a new theory of collective virtue—that is, of virtues and vices held by collectives such as corporations and governments. This theory has the advantage of clearly explaining how collectives can have virtues in robustly nonreductive ways without appealing to group minds. We then use this theory to elucidate some examples of collective virtue and respond to some objections.","PeriodicalId":508700,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy","volume":"2 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141105234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-23DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v27i3.1969
Max Lewis
It is common to think that our intimates are required to help us. But it can be problematic to appeal to certain kinds of facts (e.g., previous favors or prudentially relevant facts) in order to entice them to help us—even when those facts provide them with sufficient or decisive reason to help us. This is puzzling because, in these cases, our intimates have sufficient or decisive reason to act in the way we are trying to entice them to act. Moreover, it generally seems more problematic to appeal to certain kinds of facts (e.g., previous favors or prudentially relevant facts) in order to entice our intimates to do things that help us than it is to appeal to these facts in order to entice nonintimates to perform the same actions. This too is puzzling because one is usually permitted to ask more from one's intimates than non-intimates. I argue that these enticements are intuitively problematic because they indicate that one violates a demand of good intimate relationships. In particular, they indicate that one violates a demand for a certain kind of doxastic partiality; that is, one should trust one's intimates to follow what one's intimates know are demands of good intimate relationships. More specifically, one fails to trust one's intimates to be sufficiently motivated to protect or promote one's needs, desires, interests, projects, and well-being for one's own sake. Making such requests of nonintimates is not usually intuitively problematic because one is not required to trust non-intimates to be motivated in this way.
{"title":"Doxastic Partiality and the Puzzle of Enticing Right Action","authors":"Max Lewis","doi":"10.26556/jesp.v27i3.1969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v27i3.1969","url":null,"abstract":"It is common to think that our intimates are required to help us. But it can be problematic to appeal to certain kinds of facts (e.g., previous favors or prudentially relevant facts) in order to entice them to help us—even when those facts provide them with sufficient or decisive reason to help us. This is puzzling because, in these cases, our intimates have sufficient or decisive reason to act in the way we are trying to entice them to act. Moreover, it generally seems more problematic to appeal to certain kinds of facts (e.g., previous favors or prudentially relevant facts) in order to entice our intimates to do things that help us than it is to appeal to these facts in order to entice nonintimates to perform the same actions. This too is puzzling because one is usually permitted to ask more from one's intimates than non-intimates. I argue that these enticements are intuitively problematic because they indicate that one violates a demand of good intimate relationships. In particular, they indicate that one violates a demand for a certain kind of doxastic partiality; that is, one should trust one's intimates to follow what one's intimates know are demands of good intimate relationships. More specifically, one fails to trust one's intimates to be sufficiently motivated to protect or promote one's needs, desires, interests, projects, and well-being for one's own sake. Making such requests of nonintimates is not usually intuitively problematic because one is not required to trust non-intimates to be motivated in this way.","PeriodicalId":508700,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy","volume":"13 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141106935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-14DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v26i3.3086
Thomas Carnes
Avia Pasternak’s account of permissible political rioting includes a constraint that insists only oppressed citizens, and not privileged citizens, are permitted to riot when rioting is justified. This discussion note argues that Pasternak’s account, with which I largely agree, should be expanded to admit the permissibility of privileged citizens rioting alongside and in solidarity with oppressed citizens. The permissibility of privileged citizens participating in riots when rioting is justified is grounded in the notions that it is sometimes necessary, in accordance with Pasternak’s necessity condition, and that it will oftentimes substantially improve the chances of successfully achieving the just aims the rioting seeks to achieve, in accordance with Pasternak’s success condition. Allowing for this improves Pasternak’s already strong account of permissible political rioting on its own terms.
{"title":"Privileged Citizens and the Right to Riot","authors":"Thomas Carnes","doi":"10.26556/jesp.v26i3.3086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v26i3.3086","url":null,"abstract":"Avia Pasternak’s account of permissible political rioting includes a constraint that insists only oppressed citizens, and not privileged citizens, are permitted to riot when rioting is justified. This discussion note argues that Pasternak’s account, with which I largely agree, should be expanded to admit the permissibility of privileged citizens rioting alongside and in solidarity with oppressed citizens. The permissibility of privileged citizens participating in riots when rioting is justified is grounded in the notions that it is sometimes necessary, in accordance with Pasternak’s necessity condition, and that it will oftentimes substantially improve the chances of successfully achieving the just aims the rioting seeks to achieve, in accordance with Pasternak’s success condition. Allowing for this improves Pasternak’s already strong account of permissible political rioting on its own terms.","PeriodicalId":508700,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy","volume":"56 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139776915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-14DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v26i3.1770
Taylor Cyr, Neal Tognazzini
This paper explores what the metaphysics of time travel might teach us about moral responsibility. We take our cue from a recent paper by Yishai Cohen, who argues that if time travel is metaphysically possible, then one of the most influential theories of moral responsibility (i.e., Fischer and Ravizza’s) is false. We argue that Cohen’s argument is unsound but that Cohen’s argument can serve as a lens to bring reasons-responsive theories of moral responsibility into sharper focus, helping us to better understand actual-sequence theories of moral responsibility more generally and showing how actual-sequence theorists should respond to a recent criticism.
{"title":"What Time Travel Teaches Us about Moral Responsibility","authors":"Taylor Cyr, Neal Tognazzini","doi":"10.26556/jesp.v26i3.1770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v26i3.1770","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores what the metaphysics of time travel might teach us about moral responsibility. We take our cue from a recent paper by Yishai Cohen, who argues that if time travel is metaphysically possible, then one of the most influential theories of moral responsibility (i.e., Fischer and Ravizza’s) is false. We argue that Cohen’s argument is unsound but that Cohen’s argument can serve as a lens to bring reasons-responsive theories of moral responsibility into sharper focus, helping us to better understand actual-sequence theories of moral responsibility more generally and showing how actual-sequence theorists should respond to a recent criticism.","PeriodicalId":508700,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy","volume":"62 49","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139778714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-14DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v26i3.2370
Nikolas Kirby
This paper offers a targeted five-point critique of the current debate about the problem of basic equality. First, it argues that the debate should be refocussed away from any particular concept(ion) of basic equality to a more agnostic proposition about the possibility of establishing equality in any basic moral property. Second, it re-articulates the problem in terms of grounding relations rather than supervenience. Third, it argues that proponents of predominant approach to solving this problem have failed to properly distinguish between two different non-scalar properties defined in terms of scalar properties: ‘range properties’ and ‘bare properties’. Once disambiguated it is clear as to why such an approach must fail. However, this critique does direct our attention to a possible alternative strategy, that is, grounding our equality upon a ‘relative property’.
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Pub Date : 2024-02-14DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v26i3.2719
Aaron Salomon
I argue that, in order to address the ideal world problem while remaining faithful to our concept of morality, Contractualists should no longer determine which actions I must perform by seeing whether they accord with certain principles for the general regulation of behavior. Instead, I argue, Contractualists should determine whether it is right or wrong for me to perform an action by evaluating any maxim that might be reflected by my action. I call the resulting view “Maxim Contractualism.” It states that an agent’s action is morally required just in case any maxim that he might adopt that involves not performing that action is one that someone could reasonably reject. Finally, I argue that, although Act Contractualism also provides us with the materials to solve the Ideal World Problem, it is a worse solution because it cannot account for the fact that, sometimes, what would happen if I performed an action over time is relevant to whether I am permitted to perform that action right here, right now.
{"title":"Maxim and Principle Contractualism","authors":"Aaron Salomon","doi":"10.26556/jesp.v26i3.2719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v26i3.2719","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that, in order to address the ideal world problem while remaining faithful to our concept of morality, Contractualists should no longer determine which actions I must perform by seeing whether they accord with certain principles for the general regulation of behavior. Instead, I argue, Contractualists should determine whether it is right or wrong for me to perform an action by evaluating any maxim that might be reflected by my action. I call the resulting view “Maxim Contractualism.” It states that an agent’s action is morally required just in case any maxim that he might adopt that involves not performing that action is one that someone could reasonably reject. Finally, I argue that, although Act Contractualism also provides us with the materials to solve the Ideal World Problem, it is a worse solution because it cannot account for the fact that, sometimes, what would happen if I performed an action over time is relevant to whether I am permitted to perform that action right here, right now.","PeriodicalId":508700,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139777465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-14DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v26i3.2103
Jussi Suikkanen
Nonnaturalist realism is the view that normative properties are unique kind of stance-independent properties. It has been argued that such views fail to explain why two actions that are exactly alike otherwise must also have the same normative properties. Mark Schroeder and Knut Olav Skarsaune have recently suggested that nonnaturalist realists can respond to this supervenience challenge by taking the primary bearers of normative properties to be action kinds. This paper develops their response in two ways. First, it provides additional motivation for the previous claim about the bearers of normative properties by drawing from the work of H. A. Prichard. Second, and more importantly, it formulates a plausible metaphysical framework based on the contemporary trope theory to explain why action kinds would have their second-order properties, including their normative properties, necessarily.
非自然主义现实主义认为，规范属性是一种独特的与立场无关的属性。有人认为，这种观点无法解释为什么两个在其他方面完全相同的行为也必须具有相同的规范属性。马克-施罗德（Mark Schroeder）和克努特-奥拉夫-斯卡尔绍纳（Knut Olav Skarsaune）最近提出，非自然主义现实主义者可以通过把规范属性的主要承载者视为行动种类来回应这种超验性挑战。本文从两个方面发展了他们的回应。首先，本文通过借鉴普里查德（H. A. Prichard）的研究成果，为前面关于规范属性的承担者的主张提供了额外的动机。其次，更重要的是，本文在当代特例理论的基础上提出了一个可信的形而上学框架，以解释为什么行动种类必然具有其二阶属性，包括其规范属性。
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Pub Date : 2024-02-14DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v26i3.2741
Kyle Van Oosterum
What makes paternalism wrong? I give an indirect answer to that question by challenging a recent trend in the literature that I call the exclusionary strategy. The exclusionary strategy aims to show how some feature of the paternalizee’s normative situation morally excludes acting for the paternalizee’s well-being. This moral exclusion consists either in ruling out the reasons for which a paternalizer may act or in changes to the right-making status of the reasons that (would) justify paternalistic intervention. I argue that both versions of the exclusionary strategy fail to explain the wrongness of paternalism and that they struggle to accommodate the mainstream view that paternalism is only pro tanto wrong. Their failure consists either in being implausibly strong expressions of antipaternalism or in struggling to spell out the scope of exclusion in an uncomplicated way. After discouraging this exclusionary strategy, I suggest we can capture what is appealing about it—as well as avoiding its pitfalls—by sketching a philosophical model in which we compare the weights of reasons for and against paternalistically interfering. To precisify this sketch, I introduce some conceptual tools from the literature on practical reasoning—in particular, the concept of modifiers—and suggest that these tools offer a better starting point for figuring out what makes paternalism (pro tanto) wrong.
{"title":"Paternalism and Exclusion","authors":"Kyle Van Oosterum","doi":"10.26556/jesp.v26i3.2741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v26i3.2741","url":null,"abstract":"What makes paternalism wrong? I give an indirect answer to that question by challenging a recent trend in the literature that I call the exclusionary strategy. The exclusionary strategy aims to show how some feature of the paternalizee’s normative situation morally excludes acting for the paternalizee’s well-being. This moral exclusion consists either in ruling out the reasons for which a paternalizer may act or in changes to the right-making status of the reasons that (would) justify paternalistic intervention. I argue that both versions of the exclusionary strategy fail to explain the wrongness of paternalism and that they struggle to accommodate the mainstream view that paternalism is only pro tanto wrong. Their failure consists either in being implausibly strong expressions of antipaternalism or in struggling to spell out the scope of exclusion in an uncomplicated way. After discouraging this exclusionary strategy, I suggest we can capture what is appealing about it—as well as avoiding its pitfalls—by sketching a philosophical model in which we compare the weights of reasons for and against paternalistically interfering. To precisify this sketch, I introduce some conceptual tools from the literature on practical reasoning—in particular, the concept of modifiers—and suggest that these tools offer a better starting point for figuring out what makes paternalism (pro tanto) wrong.","PeriodicalId":508700,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy","volume":"613 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139837062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-14DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v26i3.2370
Nikolas Kirby
This paper offers a targeted five-point critique of the current debate about the problem of basic equality. First, it argues that the debate should be refocussed away from any particular concept(ion) of basic equality to a more agnostic proposition about the possibility of establishing equality in any basic moral property. Second, it re-articulates the problem in terms of grounding relations rather than supervenience. Third, it argues that proponents of predominant approach to solving this problem have failed to properly distinguish between two different non-scalar properties defined in terms of scalar properties: ‘range properties’ and ‘bare properties’. Once disambiguated it is clear as to why such an approach must fail. However, this critique does direct our attention to a possible alternative strategy, that is, grounding our equality upon a ‘relative property’.
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