American Journal of Bioethics最新文献

This paper argues that bioethics as a field should broaden its scope to include the ethics of war, focusing on war's public health effects. The "Introduction" section describes the bioethics literature on war, which emphasizes clinical and research topics while omitting public health. The section, "War as a public health crisis" demonstrates the need for a public health ethics approach by framing war as a public health crisis. The section, "Bioethics principles for war and public health" proposes six bioethics principles for war that address its public health dimensions: health justice, accountability, dignified lives, public health sustainability, nonmaleficence, and public health maximization. The section, "Justifying and applying bioethical principles" shows how these principles inform ethical analysis, including just war theory and military ethics. The section, "From principles to practice" envisions ways in which bioethicists can promote these principles in practice through research, teaching, and service. The "Conclusion" section urges bioethicists to engage with war as a public health crisis, including calling attention to war's impact on civilians, especially women, children, and other vulnerable groups.

When is it ethically permissible for clinicians to surgically intervene into the genitals of a legal minor? We distinguish between voluntary and nonvoluntary procedures and focus on nonvoluntary procedures, specifically in prepubescent minors ("children"). We do not address procedures in adolescence or adulthood. With respect to children categorized as female at birth who have no apparent differences of sex development (i.e., non-intersex or "endosex" females) there is a near-universal ethical consensus in the Global North. This consensus holds that clinicians may not perform any nonvoluntary genital cutting or surgery, from "cosmetic" labiaplasty to medicalized ritual "pricking" of the vulva, insofar as the procedure is not strictly necessary to protect the child's physical health. All other motivations, including possible psychosocial, cultural, subjective-aesthetic, or prophylactic benefits as judged by doctors or parents, are seen as categorically inappropriate grounds for a clinician to proceed with a nonvoluntary genital procedure in this population. We argue that the main ethical reasons capable of supporting this consensus turn not on empirically contestable benefit-risk calculations, but on a fundamental concern to respect the child's privacy, bodily integrity, developing sexual boundaries, and (future) genital autonomy. We show that these ethical reasons are sound. However, as we argue, they do not only apply to endosex female children, but rather to all children regardless of sex characteristics, including those with intersex traits and endosex males. We conclude, therefore, that as a matter of justice, inclusivity, and gender equality in medical-ethical policy (we do not take a position as to criminal law), clinicians should not be permitted to perform any nonvoluntary genital cutting or surgery in prepubescent minors, irrespective of the latter's sex traits or gender assignment, unless urgently necessary to protect their physical health. By contrast, we suggest that voluntary surgeries in older individuals might, under certain conditions, permissibly be performed for a wider range of reasons, including reasons of self-identity or psychosocial well-being, in keeping with the circumstances, values, and explicit needs and preferences of the persons so concerned. Note: Because our position is tied to clinicians' widely accepted role-specific duties as medical practitioners within regulated healthcare systems, we do not consider genital procedures performed outside of a healthcare context (e.g., for religious reasons) or by persons other than licensed healthcare providers working in their professional capacity.

Much of the debate over the definition and criteria for determining our death has focused on disagreement over the correct biological account of death, i.e., what it means for any organism to die. In this paper, we argue that this exclusive focus on the biology of death is misguided, because it ignores ethical and social factors that bear on the acceptability of criteria for determining our death. We propose that attention shift from strictly biological considerations to ethical and social considerations that bear on the determination of what we call "civil death." We argue for acceptance of a neurological criterion for determining death on grounds that it is the most reasonable way to synthesize biological, ethical, and social considerations about our death..

Clinical researchers should help respect the autonomy and promote the well-being of prospective study participants by helping them make voluntary, informed decisions about enrollment. However, participants often exhibit poor understanding of important information about clinical research. Bioethicists have given special attention to "misconceptions" about clinical research that can compromise participants' decision-making, most notably the "therapeutic misconception." These misconceptions typically involve false beliefs about a study's purpose, or risks or potential benefits for participants. In this article, we describe a misconception involving false beliefs about a study's potential benefits for non-participants, or its expected social value. This social value misconception can compromise altruistically motivated participants' decision-making, potentially threatening their autonomy and well-being. We show how the social value misconception raises ethical concerns for inherently low-value research, hyped research, and even ordinary research, and advocate for empirical and normative work to help understand and counteract this misconception's potential negative impacts on participants.

Efforts to revise the Uniform Determination of Death Act in order to align law with medical practice have failed. Medical practice must now align with the law. People who are not dead under the law that defines death should not be declared dead. There is no compelling reason to continue the practice of declaring legally living persons to be dead.

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, shortages of scarce healthcare resources consistently presented significant moral and practical challenges. While the importance of vaccines as a key pharmaceutical intervention to stem pandemic scarcity was widely publicized, a sizable proportion of the population chose not to vaccinate. In response, some have defended the use of vaccination status as a criterion for the allocation of scarce medical resources. In this paper, we critically interpret this burgeoning literature, and describe a framework for thinking about vaccine-sensitive resource allocation using the values of responsibility, reciprocity, and justice. Although our aim here is not to defend a single view of vaccine-sensitive resource allocation, we believe that attending critically with the diversity of arguments in favor (and against) vaccine-sensitivity reveals a number of questions that a vaccine-sensitive approach to allocation should answer in future pandemics.