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Evolutionary implementation with partially effective institutions 部分有效制度下的渐进式实施
IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.004
Ratul Lahkar
We consider large population models of a public goods game and a tragedy of the commons. A planner applies externality pricing in these models. However, institutions in society are only partially effective. Hence, the externality price does not compel agents to internalize externalities fully. The resulting externality-adjusted game with partially effective institutions is a potential game. Evolutionary dynamics converge to its Nash equilibrium. More effective institutions bring this Nash equilibrium closer to the original Pareto efficient state. We trace the effectiveness of institutions to a primeval Tullock contest over natural resources in society. The society’s institutional structure arises from the contest’s Nash equilibrium. The institutional structure is more inclusive if natural resources in the contest are less appropriable. Institutions are then also more effective in implementing externality pricing.
我们考虑公共物品博弈和公地悲剧的大人口模型。计划者在这些模型中应用外部性定价。然而,社会制度只是部分有效。因此,外部性价格并不能迫使代理人完全内部化外部性。由此产生的经外部性调整的、具有部分有效制度的博弈是一种潜在博弈。进化动力学趋于纳什均衡。更有效的制度使纳什均衡更接近最初的帕累托有效状态。我们把制度的有效性追溯到原始的图洛克(Tullock)对社会自然资源的争夺。社会的制度结构源于竞争的纳什均衡。如果竞争中的自然资源不那么适宜,制度结构就更具包容性。这样,机构在实施外部性定价方面也会更有效。
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引用次数: 0
Optimal top-n policy 最优顶优先策略
IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.001
Isa Hafalir , Siqi Pan , Kentaro Tomoeda
A widely adopted affirmative action policy in the university sector is the “top-n” policy, where the universities guarantee admission to students in the top n fraction of their class from every high school. The efficacy of the top-n policy in university integration has been questioned because students strategically relocate to low-achieving high schools. We show that when minorities are less likely to strategize than others, the policy can even segregate minorities from the target university, compared to the school-blind policy. A suitably chosen eligibility requirement, featuring the minimum time students must spend at a high school in order to be eligible for top-n admissions, can restore the efficacy of this policy. However, the most stringent requirement is not always optimal. The optimal requirement depends on the original distribution of students across high schools.
大学部门广泛采用的平权行动政策是“top-n”政策,即大学保证从每所高中录取班级前n名的学生。由于学生们战略性地转移到成绩较差的高中,大学整合政策的有效性受到了质疑。我们表明,当少数族裔比其他人更不可能制定策略时,与不考虑学校的政策相比,该政策甚至可以将少数族裔从目标大学隔离开来。一个适当选择的资格要求,包括学生必须在高中度过的最低时间,才能有资格进入顶级录取,可以恢复这一政策的效力。然而,最严格的要求并不总是最佳的。最优需求取决于高中学生的原始分布。
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引用次数: 0
With a little help from my friends: Essentiality vs opportunity in group criticality 在我朋友的帮助下:在群体临界性中,必要性vs机会
IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.004
M. Aleandri, M. Dall’Aglio
We define a notion of the criticality of a player for simple monotone games based on cooperation with other players, either to form a winning coalition or to break a winning one, with an essential role for all the players involved. We compare it with the notion of differential criticality given by Beisbart that measures power as the opportunity left by other players.
We prove that our proposal satisfies an extension of the strong monotonicity introduced by Young, assigns no power to null players, does not reward free riders, and can easily be computed from the minimal winning and blocking coalitions. An application to the Italian elections is presented.
Our analysis shows that the measures of group criticality defined so far cannot weigh essential players while only remaining an opportunity measure. We propose a group opportunity test to reconcile the two views.
对于基于与其他玩家合作的简单单调游戏,我们定义了玩家的重要性概念,无论是形成胜利联盟还是打破胜利联盟,所有参与者都扮演着重要角色。我们将其与Beisbart提出的差分临界性概念进行比较,该概念将权力衡量为其他参与者留下的机会。我们证明了我们的建议满足Young引入的强单调性的扩展,不给零参与者分配权力,不奖励搭便车者,并且可以很容易地从最小获胜和阻塞联盟中计算出来。提出了意大利选举的申请。我们的分析表明,到目前为止,定义的群体临界性的措施不能衡量重要的球员,而只是一个机会的衡量。我们提出一个群体机会测试来调和这两种观点。
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引用次数: 0
Condorcet domains on at most seven alternatives 孔多塞域在最多七个备选项上
IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.002
Dolica Akello-Egwel , Charles Leedham-Green , Alastair Litterick , Klas Markström , Søren Riis
A Condorcet domain is a collection of linear orders which avoid Condorcet’s paradox for majority voting. We have developed a new algorithm for complete enumeration of all maximal Condorcet domains and, using a supercomputer, obtained the first enumeration of all maximal Condorcet domains on n7 alternatives.
We investigate properties of these domains and use this study to resolve several open questions regarding Condorcet domains, and propose several new conjectures. Following this we connect our results to other domain types used in voting theory, such a non-dictatorial and strategy-proof domains. All our data are made freely available on the web.
孔多塞域是避免孔多塞悖论的线性序列集合。本文提出了一种完全枚举所有极大孔多塞域的新算法,并利用超级计算机得到了n≤7个备选项上所有极大孔多塞域的第一个枚举。我们研究了这些域的性质,并利用这项研究解决了关于孔多塞域的几个悬而未决的问题,并提出了几个新的猜想。接下来,我们将我们的结果与投票理论中使用的其他域类型联系起来,例如非独裁和策略证明域。我们所有的数据都在网上免费提供。
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引用次数: 0
Robots and humans: The role of fiscal and monetary policies in an endogenous growth model 机器人与人类:财政和货币政策在内生增长模型中的作用
IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.005
Óscar Afonso , Elena Sochirca , Pedro Cunha Neves
In this paper we develop an endogenous growth model to analyze how fiscal and monetary policies can manage the macroeconomic effects of the robotization process. We consider that unskilled labor can be replaced by robots and that: (i) the government collects tax revenues to invest in social capital and compensate those who lose their jobs; (ii) there is monetary policy with cash-in-advance restrictions; (iii) social capital contributes to increasing technological-knowledge progress. Our results confirm that robotization stimulates economic growth, but contributes to widening wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. We show that, under specific circumstances, an expansionary monetary policy or a more progressive taxation can attenuate such widening effect. We also show that public investment in social capital and public transfers to those who lose their jobs play a crucial role in attenuating the negative consequences of rising unemployment caused by robotization.
在本文中,我们建立了一个内生增长模型来分析财政和货币政策如何管理机器人化过程的宏观经济效应。我们认为非技术劳动力可以被机器人取代,并且:(1)政府征收税收用于投资社会资本并补偿那些失去工作的人;(ii)存在限制预付现金的货币政策;(三)社会资本促进技术知识进步。我们的研究结果证实,机器人化刺激了经济增长,但也加剧了熟练工人和非熟练工人之间的工资不平等。我们表明,在特定情况下,扩张性货币政策或更累进的税收可以减弱这种扩大效应。我们还表明,对社会资本的公共投资和对失业者的公共转移在减轻机器人化造成的失业率上升的负面影响方面发挥了至关重要的作用。
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引用次数: 0
The morality of markets. A critique 市场的道德。批判
IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-12-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.12.003
Grégory Ponthière , Nicolas Stevens
Dewatripont and Tirole (2024) defend the morality of markets on the ground of an irrelevance result: the social production of moral actions is independent from competitive pressure on markets. No matter how strong competitive pressure is, markets perform well in diffusing signals about moral values and in coordinating suppliers of moral actions. In this article, we argue, on the contrary, that markets lead to a double crowding out of moral values: first, imperfect transmission of moral values on markets leads to an underproduction of moral actions despite the presence of highly ethical suppliers; second, competitive pressure on markets favors the eviction of highly ethical suppliers by less ethical suppliers. Furthermore, we highlight that this double crowding-out restricts the normative scope of the irrelevance result, and raises the question of what the division of moral labor should be between citizens, firms and States.
Dewatripont和Tirole(2024)基于一个无关的结果为市场的道德辩护:道德行为的社会生产独立于市场的竞争压力。无论竞争压力有多大,市场在传播道德价值观的信号和协调道德行为的提供者方面表现良好。在本文中,我们相反地认为,市场导致道德价值观的双重挤出:首先,道德价值观在市场上的不完美传递导致道德行为的生产不足,尽管存在高度道德的供应商;其次,市场上的竞争压力促使道德较差的供应商淘汰道德较高的供应商。此外,我们强调,这种双重挤出限制了不相关结果的规范范围,并提出了公民、公司和国家之间应该如何进行道德分工的问题。
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引用次数: 0
Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market 双边市场的稳定性与最优双拍卖设计
IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-11-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.003
Aditya Vikram
We investigate the stability of internet platform trading mechanisms using the notion of ex-ante incentive compatible core defined by Forges et al. (2002) in the context of an exchange economy. A mechanism can be blocked by a single buyer and seller pair if they can find an interim incentive-compatible trading mechanism that gives them higher ex-ante expected utilities. Standard double auction mechanisms like the trade reduction mechanism and McAfee double auction mechanism may not be single-buyer–single-seller (SBSS) ex-ante stable. We characterize interim incentive-compatible, interim individually-rational, symmetric and revenue-maximizing mechanisms that are SBSS ex-ante stable using methods in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
我们利用Forges等人(2002)在交换经济背景下定义的事前激励兼容核心概念来研究互联网平台交易机制的稳定性。如果一个买方和卖方能找到一个临时激励兼容的交易机制,给他们更高的事前预期效用,一个机制就可以被阻止。标准的双重拍卖机制,如贸易削减机制和McAfee双重拍卖机制,可能不是单买方-单卖方(SBSS)事前稳定的。我们使用Myerson和Satterthwaite(1983)的方法描述了临时激励兼容、临时个人理性、对称和收入最大化机制,这些机制是SBSS事前稳定的。
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引用次数: 0
Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets 动态匹配市场中的一致猜想
IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.002
Laura Doval , Pablo Schenone
We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they remain unmatched, which we refer to as the agent’s conjectures. A collection of conjectures, together with a pairwise stability and individual rationality requirement given the conjectures, defines a solution concept for the economy. We identify a sufficient condition — consistency — for a family of conjectures to lead to a nonempty solution (cf. Hafalir, 2008). As an application, we introduce two families of consistent conjectures and their corresponding solution concepts: continuation-value-respecting dynamic stability, and the extension to dynamic markets of the solution concept in Hafalir (2008), sophisticated dynamic stability.
我们为研究匹配是一对一和不可逆的双面动态匹配市场的稳定性概念提供了一个框架。该框架的核心是代理人预期如果他们不匹配,将会出现的一系列匹配,我们称之为代理人的猜想。一系列的猜想,加上给定猜想的成对稳定性和个体理性要求,定义了经济的解决方案概念。我们确定了一个充分条件--一致性--使一系列猜想产生一个非空解决方案(参见 Hafalir, 2008)。作为应用,我们介绍了两个一致猜想族及其相应的解概念:尊重延续值的动态稳定性,以及 Hafalir (2008) 中的解概念在动态市场中的扩展,即复杂的动态稳定性。
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引用次数: 0
Inequality and bipolarization-reducing mixed taxation 不平等和两极化--减少混合税收
IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.001
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
Progressive income and commodity tax structures have been examined independently in terms of their ability to reduce income inequality and bipolarization. Rather than focusing on income and commodity taxes in isolation, this paper studies mixed tax systems, which subject both income and consumption to taxation. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of these systems that ensure a reduction in income inequality and bipolarization for both exogenous and endogenous income scenarios. Commodity taxation is “superfluous” in the case of exogenous income, as any post-tax income distribution achievable through a mixed tax system can be replicated by income taxation alone. In contrast, when income is endogenous, there are cases where relying solely on income taxation is ineffective, while mixed tax structures have equalizing and depolarizing potential.
累进所得税和商品税结构在减少收入不平等和两极分化方面的能力一直受到单独研究。本文没有孤立地关注所得税和商品税,而是研究了对收入和消费都征税的混合税制。本文提供了这些制度结构的必要条件和充分条件,以确保在外生性和内生性收入情景下减少收入不平等和两极化。在收入外生的情况下,商品税是 "多余的",因为通过混合税制实现的任何税后收入分配都可以仅通过所得税来复制。相反,在收入内生的情况下,单纯依靠所得税是无效的,而混合税制结构则具有均衡和去极化的潜力。
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引用次数: 0
Project selection with partially verifiable information 利用部分可核实信息选择项目
IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-11-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.10.003
Sumit Goel , Wade Hann-Caruthers
We study a principal–agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. The principal must choose exactly one of N projects, each defined by the utility it provides to the principal and to the agent. The agent knows all the utilities, and the principal can commit to a mechanism (without transfers) that maps the agent’s report about the utilities to a chosen project. Unlike the typical literature, which assumes the agent can lie arbitrarily, we examine the principal’s problem under partial verifiability constraints. We characterize the class of truthful mechanisms under a family of partial verifiability constraints and study the principal’s problem for the specific cases of no-overselling and no-underselling. Our results suggest significant benefits for the principal from identifying or inducing such partial verifiability constraints, while also highlighting the simple mechanisms that perform well.
我们研究的是一个信息不对称的委托代理项目选择问题。委托人必须从 N 个项目中准确地选择一个,每个项目由它为委托人和代理人提供的效用所决定。代理人知道所有的效用,而委托人可以承诺采用一种机制(无需转让),将代理人关于效用的报告映射到所选项目上。与假定代理人可以任意撒谎的典型文献不同,我们研究的是部分可验证性约束下的委托人问题。我们描述了一系列部分可验证性约束条件下的真实机制,并研究了无过度销售和无遗漏销售等特定情况下的委托人问题。我们的结果表明,识别或诱导这类部分可验证性约束对委托人大有裨益,同时也强调了表现良好的简单机制。
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引用次数: 0
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Mathematical Social Sciences
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