Pub Date : 2023-09-26DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2258157
Andreas Dür, Scott Michael Hamilton, Dirk De Bièvre
How do actors react to the politicisation of trade policy? This special issue aims to tackle this question, considering a broad set of actors including members of parliament, political parties, regional and national governments, interest groups, and the European Commission. To set the stage for the contributions to the special issue, in this introduction, we first conceptualise politicisation as the combination of high salience and high contestation. We then present existing research on the politicisation of trade policy, highlighting the relative scarcity of work on reactions to politicisation. The introduction also offers a typology of strategies available to actors in response to politicisation, which distinguishes between dodging, free riding, confronting, and bandwagoning. These strategies differ with respect to the position taken by actors relative to contestation and by their level of activity. Finally, we summarise the main lessons learned from the special issue.
{"title":"Reacting to the politicization of trade policy","authors":"Andreas Dür, Scott Michael Hamilton, Dirk De Bièvre","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2258157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2258157","url":null,"abstract":"How do actors react to the politicisation of trade policy? This special issue aims to tackle this question, considering a broad set of actors including members of parliament, political parties, regional and national governments, interest groups, and the European Commission. To set the stage for the contributions to the special issue, in this introduction, we first conceptualise politicisation as the combination of high salience and high contestation. We then present existing research on the politicisation of trade policy, highlighting the relative scarcity of work on reactions to politicisation. The introduction also offers a typology of strategies available to actors in response to politicisation, which distinguishes between dodging, free riding, confronting, and bandwagoning. These strategies differ with respect to the position taken by actors relative to contestation and by their level of activity. Finally, we summarise the main lessons learned from the special issue.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134957858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-22DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2258164
Geoffrey Dudley, Andrew Gamble
The Westminster Model (WM) remains dominant in UK post-Brexit policy-making, with few signs that the UK Government is willing to cede power to the devolved administrations and external interests. Despite the plebiscitary vote for Brexit in the 2016 Referendum, the implementation of that change has been dependent on the vagaries of the WM, and a succession of internal crises within the governing Conservative Party. The case studies in the special issue illustrate how the consequent problems of complexity and capacity are compounded by the dilemma of tracking EU legislation while attempting to demonstrate that the UK has ‘taken back control’ and is delivering a ‘Global Britain’ strategy. This results in UK Brexit policy-making progressing in an ad hoc and unpredictable manner. The evidence from the case studies suggests that the UK will not become a rule taker but will increasingly seek to preserve or reclaim as much as possible of the benefits that it enjoyed as a full member state. This will not remove all the costs associated with Brexit, but over time it might significantly reduce them. The resulting compromise will not satisfy either Brexit purists or Remainers, but it is likely to become the agreed framework within which Governments operate.
{"title":"Brexit and UK policy-making: an overview","authors":"Geoffrey Dudley, Andrew Gamble","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2258164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2258164","url":null,"abstract":"The Westminster Model (WM) remains dominant in UK post-Brexit policy-making, with few signs that the UK Government is willing to cede power to the devolved administrations and external interests. Despite the plebiscitary vote for Brexit in the 2016 Referendum, the implementation of that change has been dependent on the vagaries of the WM, and a succession of internal crises within the governing Conservative Party. The case studies in the special issue illustrate how the consequent problems of complexity and capacity are compounded by the dilemma of tracking EU legislation while attempting to demonstrate that the UK has ‘taken back control’ and is delivering a ‘Global Britain’ strategy. This results in UK Brexit policy-making progressing in an ad hoc and unpredictable manner. The evidence from the case studies suggests that the UK will not become a rule taker but will increasingly seek to preserve or reclaim as much as possible of the benefits that it enjoyed as a full member state. This will not remove all the costs associated with Brexit, but over time it might significantly reduce them. The resulting compromise will not satisfy either Brexit purists or Remainers, but it is likely to become the agreed framework within which Governments operate.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136011277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-22DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2247430
Sara Wallace Goodman
When the European Union is not in active crisis, do we characterise it as experiencing a period of stability? What can scholars learn by studying the EU as it toggles in between the two? This special issue presents some of the best papers from the European Union Studies Association’s 2022 conference in Miami, Florida. Two themes structure this collection. First, by temporally and conceptually locating the EU between stability and crisis, we see these contributions on EU policy, institutional evolution, financial resilience, and identity formation as a substantive reflection of the variety of emergent and ongoing challenges that comprise everyday uncertainty. Second, in showcasing contributions that study the EU in a variety of ways – as both a political actor and context, or site, of politics, this special issue aims to encourage a widening of the EU studies field.
{"title":"Between stability and crisis: everyday uncertainty in the European Union","authors":"Sara Wallace Goodman","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2247430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2247430","url":null,"abstract":"When the European Union is not in active crisis, do we characterise it as experiencing a period of stability? What can scholars learn by studying the EU as it toggles in between the two? This special issue presents some of the best papers from the European Union Studies Association’s 2022 conference in Miami, Florida. Two themes structure this collection. First, by temporally and conceptually locating the EU between stability and crisis, we see these contributions on EU policy, institutional evolution, financial resilience, and identity formation as a substantive reflection of the variety of emergent and ongoing challenges that comprise everyday uncertainty. Second, in showcasing contributions that study the EU in a variety of ways – as both a political actor and context, or site, of politics, this special issue aims to encourage a widening of the EU studies field.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"386 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136060373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-15DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2240374
Frédéric Mérand
ABSTRACTThe European Union is the only international organisation that has a parliament where taxation is debated and legislated on. Along with foreign affairs and defense, however, taxation is also one of the few policy areas that is subject to unanimity voting among member-states. This creates a responsiveness-responsibility dilemma that the European Commission has tried to navigate by constructing responsiveness to public demands for tax justice as a political imperative. In this article, I apply the concept of ‘political work' to analyse EU tax policy between 2014 and 2019 and show the ways in which the politics of responsiveness partly eroded the institutional constraints of responsibility vis-à-vis member states. As I document, the Commission’s political work was initially successful but then lost momentum, as a handful of governments managed to veto efforts in the Council and push the issue to the OECD, where it was stalled by the United States until the election of Joe Biden.KEYWORDS: European Unionglobal corporate taxationdigital taxationtax evasionpolitical work AcknowledgmentsA first version of this paper was presented at the two ‘Responsibility and Responsiveness in EU Economic Governance’ workshops organised at the Université libre de Bruxelles in September 2022 and February 2023. The author would like to thank the organisers of the workshop and special issue (Amandine Crespy, Tiago Moreira Ramalho, and Vivien Schmidt) as well as the discussants (Lucy Kinsky, Cornel Ban) and two anonymous reviewers commissioned by the Journal of European Public Policy for their constructive comments. Above all, he is grateful to the Commission officials who agreed to be observed and answer his numerous questions over the course of almost five years.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 I thank a reviewer for helping me clarify this point.2 I thank a reviewer for alerting me to this window of opportunity.Additional informationNotes on contributorsFrédéric MérandFrédéric Mérand is Professor of Political Science at Université de Montréal. He has published ‘Political work in the stability and growth pact’, Journal of European Public Policy 29(6): 846–864.
{"title":"The Commissioner vs the states: responsiveness and responsibility in European tax governance","authors":"Frédéric Mérand","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2240374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2240374","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe European Union is the only international organisation that has a parliament where taxation is debated and legislated on. Along with foreign affairs and defense, however, taxation is also one of the few policy areas that is subject to unanimity voting among member-states. This creates a responsiveness-responsibility dilemma that the European Commission has tried to navigate by constructing responsiveness to public demands for tax justice as a political imperative. In this article, I apply the concept of ‘political work' to analyse EU tax policy between 2014 and 2019 and show the ways in which the politics of responsiveness partly eroded the institutional constraints of responsibility vis-à-vis member states. As I document, the Commission’s political work was initially successful but then lost momentum, as a handful of governments managed to veto efforts in the Council and push the issue to the OECD, where it was stalled by the United States until the election of Joe Biden.KEYWORDS: European Unionglobal corporate taxationdigital taxationtax evasionpolitical work AcknowledgmentsA first version of this paper was presented at the two ‘Responsibility and Responsiveness in EU Economic Governance’ workshops organised at the Université libre de Bruxelles in September 2022 and February 2023. The author would like to thank the organisers of the workshop and special issue (Amandine Crespy, Tiago Moreira Ramalho, and Vivien Schmidt) as well as the discussants (Lucy Kinsky, Cornel Ban) and two anonymous reviewers commissioned by the Journal of European Public Policy for their constructive comments. Above all, he is grateful to the Commission officials who agreed to be observed and answer his numerous questions over the course of almost five years.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 I thank a reviewer for helping me clarify this point.2 I thank a reviewer for alerting me to this window of opportunity.Additional informationNotes on contributorsFrédéric MérandFrédéric Mérand is Professor of Political Science at Université de Montréal. He has published ‘Political work in the stability and growth pact’, Journal of European Public Policy 29(6): 846–864.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135395347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-15DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2258153
Anna Vlasiuk Nibe, Sophie Meunier, Christilla Roederer-Rynning
ABSTRACTIn March 2019 the European Union adopted the first pan-European investment screening framework, thus joining the bandwagon of growing investment screening mechanisms around the world. This article explores why the European screening framework was adopted swiftly and with no politicisation, even as the negotiations unfolded against the background of heightened politicisation of trade and investment policy. The paper develops three expectations: (1) converging member state preferences; (2) securitisation of investment policy; and (3) Commission entrepreneurship. It then explores them empirically through process-tracing, drawing on extensive interviews with the actors involved. We argue that the European Commission played a pivotal role. To avoid falling into another strand of politicisation and to defuse political mines, the Commission engaged in a ‘pre-emptive depoliticization’ strategy that shortened the policy process, limited the number of actors involved, and justified the policy options in a legalistic framing.KEYWORDS: Depoliticisation; European Commission; FDI; investment screening; ISM AcknowledgementsIn addition, the paper has been presented at the 17th Biennial EUSA Conference (Miami, May 2022), the conference ‘The Politics and Regulation of Investment Screening Mechanisms’ held at Princeton University in November 2022, and the 18th Biennial EUSA Conference (Pittsburgh, May 2023). We would like to thank Dirk De Bièvre and Andreas Dür for their helpful feedback during the work on the paper, the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments to the manuscript, as well as to all our interviewees for sharing their insights with us.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2019:079I:TOC2 Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain.3 Proposal for ensuring an improved level playing field in trade and investment attached to the Letter to the Commission by France, Germany and Italy, February 2017.4 10 MEPs from European People’s Party: Weber, Caspary, Saifi, I. Winkler, Cicu, Proust, Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Reding, Schwab, Szejnfeld, European People’s Party.5 For example EU’s laws in energy sector on certification of foreign-owned / controlled companies.6 Respective policy proposal was submitted in May 20217 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market {SWD(2021) 99 final} - {SWD(2021) 100 final} - {SEC(2021) 182 final}8 Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2022 on the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union’s public procurement and concession markets and
2019年3月，欧盟通过了首个泛欧洲投资审查框架，从而加入了全球不断发展的投资审查机制的行列。本文探讨了为什么欧洲审查框架被迅速采用，而没有政治化，即使谈判是在贸易和投资政策政治化加剧的背景下展开的。本文提出了三个预期:(1)成员国偏好趋同;(2)投资政策证券化;(3)委托创业。然后，它通过过程追踪，利用对相关参与者的广泛采访，从经验上对它们进行了探索。我们认为欧盟委员会发挥了关键作用。为了避免陷入另一股政治化并消除政治地雷，委员会采取了“先发制人的非政治化”战略，缩短了政策过程，限制了所涉行为者的数量，并在法律框架内证明了政策选择的合理性。关键词:去政治化;欧洲委员会;外商直接投资;投资筛选;此外，该论文已在第17届EUSA双年会议(迈阿密，2022年5月)、2022年11月在普林斯顿大学举行的“投资筛选机制的政治和监管”会议和第18届EUSA双年会议(匹兹堡，2023年5月)上发表。我们要感谢Dirk De bi vre和Andreas d r在论文工作期间提供的有益反馈，感谢匿名审稿人对手稿的建设性意见，以及我们所有的受访者与我们分享他们的见解。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1欧洲议会和理事会2019年3月19日第(EU) 2019/452号条例，关于建立审查进入欧盟的外国直接投资框架https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2019:079I:TOC2奥地利、丹麦、芬兰、法国、德国、意大利、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、波兰、葡萄牙、西班牙。3法国、德国和意大利致欧盟委员会的信函中所附的关于确保改善贸易和投资公平竞争环境的建议。2017年2月10名欧洲人民党议员:Weber, Caspary, Saifi, I. Winkler, Cicu, Proust, Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Reding, Schwab, Szejnfeld，欧洲人民党。例如欧盟在能源领域关于外资控股公司认证的法律欧洲议会和理事会关于扭曲内部市场的外国补贴的条例提案{SWD(2021) 99 final} - {SWD(2021) 100 final} - {SEC(2021) 182 final}8欧洲议会和理事会2022年6月23日关于第三国经济运营商准入的条例(EU) 2022/1031，9 .向欧盟的公共采购和特许市场提供货物和服务，以及支持就欧盟经济经营者、货物和服务进入第三国的公共采购和特许市场进行谈判的程序欧洲议会和理事会关于保护欧盟及其成员国免受第三国市场经济胁迫的法规提案{SEC(2021) 418 final} - {SWD(2021) 371 final} - {SEC(2021) 372 final}补充信息本文已在Dirk De bi组织的“对跨大西洋地区贸易政策争论的反应”研讨会上发表。Andreas d r和Scott Hamilton将分别于2021年11月和2022年5月在安特卫普大学和萨尔茨堡大学进行研究，由让·莫内跨大西洋贸易政治网络通过欧盟伊拉斯谟+计划(资助号620450-EPP-1-2020-1-CA-EPPJMO-NETWORK)提供资金支持。这项研究是由丹麦独立研究基金(1028-00003B)资助的“选美比赛:外国投资在欧洲的政治变化”项目的一部分。作者简介anna Vlasiuk NibeAnna Vlasiuk NibeAnna Vlasiuk Nibe是南丹麦大学(丹麦)政治科学与公共管理系的博士候选人。Sophie Meunier，美国普林斯顿大学公共与国际事务学院高级研究学者。Christilla Roederer-Rynning是南丹麦大学(丹麦)政治科学与公共管理系比较欧洲政治学教授(担负特殊职责)。
{"title":"Pre-emptive depoliticisation: the European Commission and the EU foreign investment screening regulation","authors":"Anna Vlasiuk Nibe, Sophie Meunier, Christilla Roederer-Rynning","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2258153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2258153","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn March 2019 the European Union adopted the first pan-European investment screening framework, thus joining the bandwagon of growing investment screening mechanisms around the world. This article explores why the European screening framework was adopted swiftly and with no politicisation, even as the negotiations unfolded against the background of heightened politicisation of trade and investment policy. The paper develops three expectations: (1) converging member state preferences; (2) securitisation of investment policy; and (3) Commission entrepreneurship. It then explores them empirically through process-tracing, drawing on extensive interviews with the actors involved. We argue that the European Commission played a pivotal role. To avoid falling into another strand of politicisation and to defuse political mines, the Commission engaged in a ‘pre-emptive depoliticization’ strategy that shortened the policy process, limited the number of actors involved, and justified the policy options in a legalistic framing.KEYWORDS: Depoliticisation; European Commission; FDI; investment screening; ISM AcknowledgementsIn addition, the paper has been presented at the 17th Biennial EUSA Conference (Miami, May 2022), the conference ‘The Politics and Regulation of Investment Screening Mechanisms’ held at Princeton University in November 2022, and the 18th Biennial EUSA Conference (Pittsburgh, May 2023). We would like to thank Dirk De Bièvre and Andreas Dür for their helpful feedback during the work on the paper, the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments to the manuscript, as well as to all our interviewees for sharing their insights with us.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2019:079I:TOC2 Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain.3 Proposal for ensuring an improved level playing field in trade and investment attached to the Letter to the Commission by France, Germany and Italy, February 2017.4 10 MEPs from European People’s Party: Weber, Caspary, Saifi, I. Winkler, Cicu, Proust, Quisthoudt-Rowohl, Reding, Schwab, Szejnfeld, European People’s Party.5 For example EU’s laws in energy sector on certification of foreign-owned / controlled companies.6 Respective policy proposal was submitted in May 20217 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market {SWD(2021) 99 final} - {SWD(2021) 100 final} - {SEC(2021) 182 final}8 Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2022 on the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union’s public procurement and concession markets and","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135353273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-14DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2251525
Tanya Heikkila, Andrea K. Gerlak, Betsy Smith
ABSTRACTA growing body of public policy and governance scholars recognise the importance of learning in supporting adaptive and responsive governance systems. Fostering learning within policy processes and governance systems, however, can be challenging. Collectively, we often ignore or misinterpret relevant policy information, or we may be incapable of translating new information into policy. Despite significant scholarly attention to learning, knowledge of the barriers to learning remains underdeveloped. To advance theoretical insights, this article integrates research on individual cognitive biases with literature on learning to identify barriers that can block learning or lead to non-learning in policy and governance processes. It also explores how these barriers can be mitigated or exacerbated by different governance contexts. Based on these insights, this paper provides guidance for researchers on how to empirically assess learning barriers across different governance contexts.KEYWORDS: Policy learningcollective learningpublic policygovernancecognitive biases AcknowledgementsWe are grateful for our colleagues who participated in the IWPP3 Workshop on Policy Learning in Budapest in 2022 and provided constructive suggestions on an earlier version of this manuscript. We also thank the anonymous reviewers for their excellent suggestions for improving this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingNo external funding was received for the research on this manuscript.Notes on contributorsTanya HeikkilaTanya Heikkila is a professor in the School of Public Affairs and co-directs the Center for Policy and Democracy at the University of Colorado Denver.Andrea K. GerlakAndrea K. Gerlak is a professor in the School of Geography, Development and Environment and the directs the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy at the University of Arizona.Betsy SmithBetsy Smith is a Ph.D. student in public affairs at the University of Colorado Denver.
越来越多的公共政策和治理学者认识到学习在支持适应性和响应性治理系统中的重要性。然而，在政策过程和治理系统中促进学习可能具有挑战性。总的来说，我们经常忽略或误解相关的政策信息，或者我们可能无法将新信息转化为政策。尽管学术界对学习给予了极大的关注，但对学习障碍的认识仍不发达。为了推进理论见解，本文将个人认知偏见研究与学习文献相结合，以确定在政策和治理过程中可能阻碍学习或导致不学习的障碍。本文还探讨了如何通过不同的治理环境减轻或加剧这些障碍。基于这些见解，本文为研究人员提供了如何在不同的治理环境中经验地评估学习障碍的指导。感谢我们的同事参加了2022年在布达佩斯举行的IWPP3政策学习研讨会，并为本文早期版本提供了建设性的建议。我们也感谢匿名审稿人对本文的改进提出的优秀建议。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。本论文的研究未收到外部资助。作者简介:坦尼亚·海克拉，公共事务学院教授，科罗拉多大学丹佛分校政策与民主中心联合主任。Andrea K. Gerlak是亚利桑那大学地理、发展与环境学院的教授，也是尤德尔公共政策研究中心的主任。贝琪·史密斯是丹佛科罗拉多大学公共事务专业的博士生。
{"title":"Diagnosing individual barriers to collective learning: how governance contexts shape cognitive biases","authors":"Tanya Heikkila, Andrea K. Gerlak, Betsy Smith","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2251525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2251525","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTA growing body of public policy and governance scholars recognise the importance of learning in supporting adaptive and responsive governance systems. Fostering learning within policy processes and governance systems, however, can be challenging. Collectively, we often ignore or misinterpret relevant policy information, or we may be incapable of translating new information into policy. Despite significant scholarly attention to learning, knowledge of the barriers to learning remains underdeveloped. To advance theoretical insights, this article integrates research on individual cognitive biases with literature on learning to identify barriers that can block learning or lead to non-learning in policy and governance processes. It also explores how these barriers can be mitigated or exacerbated by different governance contexts. Based on these insights, this paper provides guidance for researchers on how to empirically assess learning barriers across different governance contexts.KEYWORDS: Policy learningcollective learningpublic policygovernancecognitive biases AcknowledgementsWe are grateful for our colleagues who participated in the IWPP3 Workshop on Policy Learning in Budapest in 2022 and provided constructive suggestions on an earlier version of this manuscript. We also thank the anonymous reviewers for their excellent suggestions for improving this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingNo external funding was received for the research on this manuscript.Notes on contributorsTanya HeikkilaTanya Heikkila is a professor in the School of Public Affairs and co-directs the Center for Policy and Democracy at the University of Colorado Denver.Andrea K. GerlakAndrea K. Gerlak is a professor in the School of Geography, Development and Environment and the directs the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy at the University of Arizona.Betsy SmithBetsy Smith is a Ph.D. student in public affairs at the University of Colorado Denver.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134913636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-10DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2255658
Tobias Böhmelt, Lawrence Ezrow
{"title":"Policy issue salience and legislative output of populist governments: evidence from immigration policies","authors":"Tobias Böhmelt, Lawrence Ezrow","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2255658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2255658","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136072980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-07DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2255226
David Gazsi
{"title":"EU sectoral integration in the Eastern Neighbourhood: the case of Frontex-Moldova relations in border management","authors":"David Gazsi","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2255226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2255226","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44886623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-07DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2255223
Jon Pierre, Daniel Carelli, B. G. Peters
{"title":"The four worlds of politics and administration in the EU: how institutional arrangements shape the struggle against antimicrobial resistance","authors":"Jon Pierre, Daniel Carelli, B. G. Peters","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2255223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2255223","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49321806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-04DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2251812
Ioannis Vergioglou
ABSTRACT Extensive research has focused on political movements against regional integration and globalisation to understand the causes and consequences of their political success in developed democracies. However, studies on the effectiveness of large-scale institutional efforts to hinder this political development have been limited. My paper investigates the electoral effects of one of the largest investment subsidy programs in the world, the European regional investment policy. Even though it distributes billions of Euros each year to foster economic and social cohesion, it is unclear whether these fiscal transfers produce any tangible electoral effects. I argue that, in this case, supranational institutions have been successful in taking credit, making heavily targeted regions infertile grounds for the electoral success of eurosceptic parties. Leveraging the NUTS-level election dataset (EU-NED) and regression discontinuity models, this paper is the first to investigate the causal link between investment subsidies for less developed regions and electoral support for eurosceptic parties in national and European elections. The analysis shows that high fiscal transfers to less developed regions cause lower levels of Eurosceptic voting.
{"title":"Electoral effects of investment subsidies in national and European elections","authors":"Ioannis Vergioglou","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2251812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2251812","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Extensive research has focused on political movements against regional integration and globalisation to understand the causes and consequences of their political success in developed democracies. However, studies on the effectiveness of large-scale institutional efforts to hinder this political development have been limited. My paper investigates the electoral effects of one of the largest investment subsidy programs in the world, the European regional investment policy. Even though it distributes billions of Euros each year to foster economic and social cohesion, it is unclear whether these fiscal transfers produce any tangible electoral effects. I argue that, in this case, supranational institutions have been successful in taking credit, making heavily targeted regions infertile grounds for the electoral success of eurosceptic parties. Leveraging the NUTS-level election dataset (EU-NED) and regression discontinuity models, this paper is the first to investigate the causal link between investment subsidies for less developed regions and electoral support for eurosceptic parties in national and European elections. The analysis shows that high fiscal transfers to less developed regions cause lower levels of Eurosceptic voting.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"2123 - 2142"},"PeriodicalIF":4.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43288309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：