Pub Date : 2023-10-30DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2271504
Toni Rodon, Jonathan Kent
ABSTRACTThis article examines whether the spatial segregation of immigrant groups conditions the relationship between the share of migrants and attitudes towards EU integration. Do varying degrees of clustering of migrants in space diminish, mitigate or exacerbate the effect of immigration on EU attitudes? We combine data from the European Social Survey with fine-grain spatial segregation measures captured by the D4I project across four European Union countries. We find that those who live in regions with a greater share of migrants from Eastern Europe have more positive attitudes towards the EU but that this positive influence diminishes in highly segregated areas. The analysis also shows that the effect is primarily driven by the working class. Our findings have important implications as they show that the joint consideration of both the levels and the distribution of migrants in space is crucial to understanding the relationship between immigration and attitudes towards the EU.KEYWORDS: EU integrationimmigrationspatial segregationsocial classEastern Europe AcknowledgmentsWe want to thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful insights. We also want to thank Dominik Schraff, Sofia Vasilopoulou, Mads Dagnis Jensen and Anders Ejrnæs for their comments and suggestions, as well as all attendees on the workshop ‘Regional Inequality and Political Discontent in Europe’, which took place in Copenhagen on 13-14 October 2022.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 If we use Bayesian multi-level models, the findings are consistent.2 Including fixed effects for countries, in lieu of random intercepts, had no substantive effect on the findings.3 If we add other regional-level control variables, such as population density and unemployment (see Table C.2), or if we run the models with country FEs, results remain robust.Additional informationFundingThis research was funded, in part, by the “la Caixa” Foundation, under Grant HR19-00336.Notes on contributorsToni RodonToni Rodon is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Catalonia, Spain.Jonathan KentJonathan Kent is an academic guest in the Social Networks Lab at ETH Zürich, Switzerland.
{"title":"Geographies of EU dissatisfaction: Does spatial segregation between natives and migrants erode the EU project?","authors":"Toni Rodon, Jonathan Kent","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2271504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2271504","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis article examines whether the spatial segregation of immigrant groups conditions the relationship between the share of migrants and attitudes towards EU integration. Do varying degrees of clustering of migrants in space diminish, mitigate or exacerbate the effect of immigration on EU attitudes? We combine data from the European Social Survey with fine-grain spatial segregation measures captured by the D4I project across four European Union countries. We find that those who live in regions with a greater share of migrants from Eastern Europe have more positive attitudes towards the EU but that this positive influence diminishes in highly segregated areas. The analysis also shows that the effect is primarily driven by the working class. Our findings have important implications as they show that the joint consideration of both the levels and the distribution of migrants in space is crucial to understanding the relationship between immigration and attitudes towards the EU.KEYWORDS: EU integrationimmigrationspatial segregationsocial classEastern Europe AcknowledgmentsWe want to thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful insights. We also want to thank Dominik Schraff, Sofia Vasilopoulou, Mads Dagnis Jensen and Anders Ejrnæs for their comments and suggestions, as well as all attendees on the workshop ‘Regional Inequality and Political Discontent in Europe’, which took place in Copenhagen on 13-14 October 2022.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 If we use Bayesian multi-level models, the findings are consistent.2 Including fixed effects for countries, in lieu of random intercepts, had no substantive effect on the findings.3 If we add other regional-level control variables, such as population density and unemployment (see Table C.2), or if we run the models with country FEs, results remain robust.Additional informationFundingThis research was funded, in part, by the “la Caixa” Foundation, under Grant HR19-00336.Notes on contributorsToni RodonToni Rodon is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Catalonia, Spain.Jonathan KentJonathan Kent is an academic guest in the Social Networks Lab at ETH Zürich, Switzerland.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"98-100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136068255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-24DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2270573
Laura Pierret, David Howarth
ABSTRACTAvoiding moral hazard is a recurrent argument of those seeking to limit the development of European financial support mechanisms. Germany has been the traditional leader of this coalition of actors in the European Union (EU). However, in reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic, Germany supported an EU response which included grants and massive debt issuance. What was previously presented as unacceptable – because of moral hazard – became appropriate. This contribution seeks to explain why the German government ceased to emphasise the moral hazard problem in EU economic governance. We argue that the answer is not because of a challenge to the relevance of moral hazard per se, or because the Germans lost interest in the moral hazard problem, but rather because German policymakers were discursively constrained by one of the dominant meanings of moral hazard they had previously imposed – which lost its relevance in the context of a symmetric exogenous shock.KEYWORDS: Germanymoral hazardCovid-19 pandemicNext Generation European Union (NGEU)Euro area crisisresponsibilitytext analysisdiscursive constraint AcknowledgmentsThe authors benefitted from the helpful feedback from academic colleagues participating in a number of workshops and conferences (at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Trier University, the European University Institute, the 2022 EUSA conference and the 2023 CES conference). The authors have notably been inspired by the friendly guidance and encouragement of professors Amandine Crespy and Vivien Schmidt, and Tiago Moreira Ramalho. Three anonymous reviewers provided very helpful and detailed comments and constructive criticism. A number of expert interviewees provided invaluable information and advice.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The empirical literature in neoclassical economics also distinguishes between two different types of moral hazard: ex ante moral hazard refers to actions that increase the probabilities of outcomes; ex post moral hazard refers to actions that increase the costs of outcomes. This distinction is worth mentioning because it provides a reminder that, in the academic literature, moral hazard is not restricted to cases of endogenous shocks.2 Other German institutions — notably the Bundestag — are of analytical interest and should be analysed in future research.3 The data were collected in mid-January 2022. The corpus of press documents is composed of speeches, interviews, guest contributions, declarations, and press releases (expressing an opinion).4 The press documents are available on the respective institutional websites and personal webpages.5 Keywords search to filter by topic: Eurozone crisis [Eurozone crisis, Euro crisis, Euro area crisis, debt crisis]; Covid-19 crisis [corona, covid].6 List of proxies based on synonymous and antonymous concepts: incentive (anreiz in German) [wrong, weaken, adverse, reduce, misguided, false, disincentives, for exces
David Howarth，卢森堡大学政治学研究所政治学(欧盟研究)正教授。
{"title":"To play or not to play the ‘moral hazard card’: Germany and the European Union’s response to the Covid-19 crisis","authors":"Laura Pierret, David Howarth","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2270573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2270573","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAvoiding moral hazard is a recurrent argument of those seeking to limit the development of European financial support mechanisms. Germany has been the traditional leader of this coalition of actors in the European Union (EU). However, in reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic, Germany supported an EU response which included grants and massive debt issuance. What was previously presented as unacceptable – because of moral hazard – became appropriate. This contribution seeks to explain why the German government ceased to emphasise the moral hazard problem in EU economic governance. We argue that the answer is not because of a challenge to the relevance of moral hazard per se, or because the Germans lost interest in the moral hazard problem, but rather because German policymakers were discursively constrained by one of the dominant meanings of moral hazard they had previously imposed – which lost its relevance in the context of a symmetric exogenous shock.KEYWORDS: Germanymoral hazardCovid-19 pandemicNext Generation European Union (NGEU)Euro area crisisresponsibilitytext analysisdiscursive constraint AcknowledgmentsThe authors benefitted from the helpful feedback from academic colleagues participating in a number of workshops and conferences (at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Trier University, the European University Institute, the 2022 EUSA conference and the 2023 CES conference). The authors have notably been inspired by the friendly guidance and encouragement of professors Amandine Crespy and Vivien Schmidt, and Tiago Moreira Ramalho. Three anonymous reviewers provided very helpful and detailed comments and constructive criticism. A number of expert interviewees provided invaluable information and advice.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The empirical literature in neoclassical economics also distinguishes between two different types of moral hazard: ex ante moral hazard refers to actions that increase the probabilities of outcomes; ex post moral hazard refers to actions that increase the costs of outcomes. This distinction is worth mentioning because it provides a reminder that, in the academic literature, moral hazard is not restricted to cases of endogenous shocks.2 Other German institutions — notably the Bundestag — are of analytical interest and should be analysed in future research.3 The data were collected in mid-January 2022. The corpus of press documents is composed of speeches, interviews, guest contributions, declarations, and press releases (expressing an opinion).4 The press documents are available on the respective institutional websites and personal webpages.5 Keywords search to filter by topic: Eurozone crisis [Eurozone crisis, Euro crisis, Euro area crisis, debt crisis]; Covid-19 crisis [corona, covid].6 List of proxies based on synonymous and antonymous concepts: incentive (anreiz in German) [wrong, weaken, adverse, reduce, misguided, false, disincentives, for exces","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135273130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2269194
Teresa Völker
Previous research has shown how terrorist attacks attract media attention and influence public opinion and decision-makers. However, we lack a comparative assessment of the extent to which extremist ideologies matter and how they matter. Therefore, this paper compares mass media debates over extreme right and Islamist terrorist attacks. Theoretically, it innovates by linking research on discursive critical junctures and issue-specific discursive opportunity structures, emphasising the systematic differences between the two ideologies. Empirically, the study is based on an original, large-scale content analysis of mass media debates on all seven fatal attacks in Germany since 2015 (N = 9047). It combines relational quantitative content analysis with frame and network analyses. The results show how ideologies behind terrorist attack shape political reactions and the framing of the key security threat. Notably, both types of attacks provide favourable conditions for the far right, and political elites play a central role in the diffusion of far-right frames. In contrast, victims and ethnic or religious minorities have little voice in public debates. Overall, the study contributes to a better understanding of the impact of terrorist attacks on Western democracies by emphasising the impact of ideology and distorted threat perceptions in public debates.
{"title":"How terrorist attacks distort public debates: a comparative study of right-wing and Islamist extremism","authors":"Teresa Völker","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2269194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2269194","url":null,"abstract":"Previous research has shown how terrorist attacks attract media attention and influence public opinion and decision-makers. However, we lack a comparative assessment of the extent to which extremist ideologies matter and how they matter. Therefore, this paper compares mass media debates over extreme right and Islamist terrorist attacks. Theoretically, it innovates by linking research on discursive critical junctures and issue-specific discursive opportunity structures, emphasising the systematic differences between the two ideologies. Empirically, the study is based on an original, large-scale content analysis of mass media debates on all seven fatal attacks in Germany since 2015 (N = 9047). It combines relational quantitative content analysis with frame and network analyses. The results show how ideologies behind terrorist attack shape political reactions and the framing of the key security threat. Notably, both types of attacks provide favourable conditions for the far right, and political elites play a central role in the diffusion of far-right frames. In contrast, victims and ethnic or religious minorities have little voice in public debates. Overall, the study contributes to a better understanding of the impact of terrorist attacks on Western democracies by emphasising the impact of ideology and distorted threat perceptions in public debates.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135778284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2269207
Lisa Dellmuth
Climate change, health pandemics, structural decline, and more – the challenges of solving political problems are daunting, particularly when the political institutions addressing them are not trusted. This article tests the economic theory that residents of high-income regions are more likely to trust political institutions, given their positive experiences with services and opportunities, against the rival argument that predicts a negative effect of regional disadvantage within a country on political trust. Using European Values Study and World Values Survey (2017–2020) data, combined with socioeconomic data for 606 regions in 42 countries, this paper analyses samples of regions both in and outside the EU. The results suggest that people living in wealthy EU regions – both in absolute and relative terms – trust national government more and the EU less. In the global sample, the evidence is more variegated and corroborates economic theory only in democracies. The article sketches implications for regional inequality, political trust, and legitimacy research.
{"title":"Regional inequalities and political trust in a global context","authors":"Lisa Dellmuth","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2269207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2269207","url":null,"abstract":"Climate change, health pandemics, structural decline, and more – the challenges of solving political problems are daunting, particularly when the political institutions addressing them are not trusted. This article tests the economic theory that residents of high-income regions are more likely to trust political institutions, given their positive experiences with services and opportunities, against the rival argument that predicts a negative effect of regional disadvantage within a country on political trust. Using European Values Study and World Values Survey (2017–2020) data, combined with socioeconomic data for 606 regions in 42 countries, this paper analyses samples of regions both in and outside the EU. The results suggest that people living in wealthy EU regions – both in absolute and relative terms – trust national government more and the EU less. In the global sample, the evidence is more variegated and corroborates economic theory only in democracies. The article sketches implications for regional inequality, political trust, and legitimacy research.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135945100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-14DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2268673
Laurie Durel, Laure Gosselin
ABSTRACTHow do discursive fields influence support for climate policies? The European Green Deal (EGD) has gained media attention in part because it was presented as a cross-sectorial strategy aiming to ‘transform the European economy’. Our analysis focuses on two specific policy proposals of the EGD: the carbon border adjustment mechanism and the reform for a greener Common Agricultural Policy. By comparing their discourse network structure, we aim to understand policy (dis)continuity introduced with the EGD. We use an original longitudinal dataset and discourse network analysis to map framing dynamics over time and understand how particular frames can gather support in policy networks. Our study shows that two elements favor policy change, namely the resonance of new frames with the discursive field and the presence of brokers connecting previously disconnected actors or coalitions. This paper is relevant for scholars interested in the discursive layer of policy networks as well as (dis)continuity in policy debates.KEYWORDS: Discoursepolicy networksdiscursive fieldframingclimate changeEuropean Green Deal AcknowledgmentsThe authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback that helped improve and refine our analysis and the paper. We presented previous versions of this paper at the 2022 International Studies Association Conference in Montreal, the 2022 Environmental Politics and Governance Conference in Pennsylvania, the 2022 American Political Science Association Conference in Montreal, the 2022 Earth System Governance Conference in Toronto, and a seminar of the Canada Research Chair in International Political Economy. We thank the participants and especially Jean-Frédéric Morin for their insightful comments. Finally, we would like to thank the three research assistants who helped with the data collection and coding process: Laurence Bolduc-Landry, Jeanne Desrosiers, and Naomi Laflamme. This work was conducted as part of the Frames in Production: Actors, Networks, Diffusion (FRAMENET), a collaborative research network across research institutions in Germany, Canada and the UK, funded by the Open Research Area (DFG, SSHRC, ESRC).Data availability statementThe data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author, LD, upon reasonable request.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For example, in 2006, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin suggested to implement a carbon border tax. In 2008, the EU adopted a directive providing that from 2012 onwards, the aviation sector would be included in the EU ETS. Therefore, all flights that landed or took off in the EU, regardless of their origin or destination, were subject to the directive (Wu & Salzman, Citation2014). In light of an important push back by some EU trading partners, the EU changed its regulation in order to cover only flights within the European Economic Area argui
{"title":"Timely climate proposals. Discourse networks and (dis)continuity in European policies","authors":"Laurie Durel, Laure Gosselin","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2268673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2268673","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTHow do discursive fields influence support for climate policies? The European Green Deal (EGD) has gained media attention in part because it was presented as a cross-sectorial strategy aiming to ‘transform the European economy’. Our analysis focuses on two specific policy proposals of the EGD: the carbon border adjustment mechanism and the reform for a greener Common Agricultural Policy. By comparing their discourse network structure, we aim to understand policy (dis)continuity introduced with the EGD. We use an original longitudinal dataset and discourse network analysis to map framing dynamics over time and understand how particular frames can gather support in policy networks. Our study shows that two elements favor policy change, namely the resonance of new frames with the discursive field and the presence of brokers connecting previously disconnected actors or coalitions. This paper is relevant for scholars interested in the discursive layer of policy networks as well as (dis)continuity in policy debates.KEYWORDS: Discoursepolicy networksdiscursive fieldframingclimate changeEuropean Green Deal AcknowledgmentsThe authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback that helped improve and refine our analysis and the paper. We presented previous versions of this paper at the 2022 International Studies Association Conference in Montreal, the 2022 Environmental Politics and Governance Conference in Pennsylvania, the 2022 American Political Science Association Conference in Montreal, the 2022 Earth System Governance Conference in Toronto, and a seminar of the Canada Research Chair in International Political Economy. We thank the participants and especially Jean-Frédéric Morin for their insightful comments. Finally, we would like to thank the three research assistants who helped with the data collection and coding process: Laurence Bolduc-Landry, Jeanne Desrosiers, and Naomi Laflamme. This work was conducted as part of the Frames in Production: Actors, Networks, Diffusion (FRAMENET), a collaborative research network across research institutions in Germany, Canada and the UK, funded by the Open Research Area (DFG, SSHRC, ESRC).Data availability statementThe data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author, LD, upon reasonable request.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For example, in 2006, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin suggested to implement a carbon border tax. In 2008, the EU adopted a directive providing that from 2012 onwards, the aviation sector would be included in the EU ETS. Therefore, all flights that landed or took off in the EU, regardless of their origin or destination, were subject to the directive (Wu & Salzman, Citation2014). In light of an important push back by some EU trading partners, the EU changed its regulation in order to cover only flights within the European Economic Area argui","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135767047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-11DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2266459
Ellis Aizenberg, Hannah Werner, Sharon van Geldere
Ideally, interest groups form a link between citizens and politics. However, this link is often flawed in practice. Many citizens also feel that the average citizen is not heard and that special interests exert undue influence on policymaking. One proposal to address this problem is the stimulation of so-called citizen lobby: Ordinary citizens can use lobbying strategies to achieve influence on decision-makers. This benefits both policymakers and citizens as it can empower citizens to make their voices heard and it can help policymakers to build perceived legitimacy among citizens that are dissatisfied with existing decision-making processes. Formal channels for citizen lobby often exist but remain underused. However, what happens when governments actively engage with citizen lobby? We conducted two survey experiments in the Netherlands (N = 1218) and showed that engagement with citizen lobby has no systematic effect on internal political efficacy but has robust positive effects on political support.
{"title":"Helping citizens to lobby themselves. Experimental evidence on the effects of citizen lobby engagement on internal efficacy and political support","authors":"Ellis Aizenberg, Hannah Werner, Sharon van Geldere","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2266459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2266459","url":null,"abstract":"Ideally, interest groups form a link between citizens and politics. However, this link is often flawed in practice. Many citizens also feel that the average citizen is not heard and that special interests exert undue influence on policymaking. One proposal to address this problem is the stimulation of so-called citizen lobby: Ordinary citizens can use lobbying strategies to achieve influence on decision-makers. This benefits both policymakers and citizens as it can empower citizens to make their voices heard and it can help policymakers to build perceived legitimacy among citizens that are dissatisfied with existing decision-making processes. Formal channels for citizen lobby often exist but remain underused. However, what happens when governments actively engage with citizen lobby? We conducted two survey experiments in the Netherlands (N = 1218) and showed that engagement with citizen lobby has no systematic effect on internal political efficacy but has robust positive effects on political support.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136098140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-11DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2256370
Jeremy Richardson, Berthold Rittberger
{"title":"Editorial announcement","authors":"Jeremy Richardson, Berthold Rittberger","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2256370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2256370","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136063032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2264891
Sofia Vasilopoulou, Liisa Talving
This article advances the literature on the spatial patterns of EU support by arguing that the relationship between regional inequality and EU trust is not linear. We posit that, to fully understand this relationship, we should systematically investigate three dimensions of regional inequality, i.e., regional wealth status, regional wealth growth, and regional wealth growth at different levels of wealth status. Using individual-level survey data for EU27 countries and the UK from 11 Eurobarometer waves (2015–2019), we show that a non-linear association exists whereby poor and rich European regions tend to trust the EU more compared to middle-income regions, and that within-region over-time growth is associated with higher levels of EU trust. We demonstrate that the association between growth and EU trust is more pronounced among poor and middle-income regions compared to rich regions. Our findings have implications about the nature of public Euroscepticism and the ways in which to address it.
{"title":"Euroscepticism as a syndrome of stagnation? Regional inequality and trust in the EU","authors":"Sofia Vasilopoulou, Liisa Talving","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2264891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2264891","url":null,"abstract":"This article advances the literature on the spatial patterns of EU support by arguing that the relationship between regional inequality and EU trust is not linear. We posit that, to fully understand this relationship, we should systematically investigate three dimensions of regional inequality, i.e., regional wealth status, regional wealth growth, and regional wealth growth at different levels of wealth status. Using individual-level survey data for EU27 countries and the UK from 11 Eurobarometer waves (2015–2019), we show that a non-linear association exists whereby poor and rich European regions tend to trust the EU more compared to middle-income regions, and that within-region over-time growth is associated with higher levels of EU trust. We demonstrate that the association between growth and EU trust is more pronounced among poor and middle-income regions compared to rich regions. Our findings have implications about the nature of public Euroscepticism and the ways in which to address it.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135302739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2263051
Juan J. Fernández, Tobias Wiß, Karen M. Anderson
What is the relationship between social policy reforms and issue salience in public opinion? Extensive research analyses policy feedbacks on policy preferences and the influence of policy preferences on policy change. Scant research, however, considers the link between reforms and issue salience – i.e., the perception of importance citizens attach to a topic. We address this gap in the literature through the comparative study of the salience of the ‘pension issue’. Drawing on a novel dataset covering 2010–2020 and 28 European countries, we argue that the passage of pension reforms shapes pension salience. Multilevel fixed effects models indicate that pension reforms that include either contracting or expansionary provisions are positively related to pension salience. In contrast, expansionary and contracting reforms, by themselves, are not robustly associated with pension salience.
{"title":"Issue salience and feedback effects: the case of pension reforms","authors":"Juan J. Fernández, Tobias Wiß, Karen M. Anderson","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2263051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2263051","url":null,"abstract":"What is the relationship between social policy reforms and issue salience in public opinion? Extensive research analyses policy feedbacks on policy preferences and the influence of policy preferences on policy change. Scant research, however, considers the link between reforms and issue salience – i.e., the perception of importance citizens attach to a topic. We address this gap in the literature through the comparative study of the salience of the ‘pension issue’. Drawing on a novel dataset covering 2010–2020 and 28 European countries, we argue that the passage of pension reforms shapes pension salience. Multilevel fixed effects models indicate that pension reforms that include either contracting or expansionary provisions are positively related to pension salience. In contrast, expansionary and contracting reforms, by themselves, are not robustly associated with pension salience.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135645266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2260810
Max Joosten
Recent years have seen a proliferation of research on the connection between voters and elites. One literature explores whether elites’ responsiveness is biased towards affluent voters, but does not allow for reverse causality. Another literature investigates voters’ responsiveness to elite cues but pays limited attention to potential inequality in such responsiveness. This study combines insights from both literatures by analysing income inequality in elite responsiveness to voters, and vice versa. It does so using detailed time-series data on citizens’ preferences and party positions towards government spending in the Netherlands. Empirical analyses reveal that there is no exclusive pro-middle or pro-rich bias in voter influence, while adaptation increases with income. The analysis has important implications for the study of representation and inequality and, more broadly, for the relationship between citizens and elites in established democracies.
{"title":"Who influences whom? Inequality in the mutual responsiveness between voters and elites","authors":"Max Joosten","doi":"10.1080/13501763.2023.2260810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2260810","url":null,"abstract":"Recent years have seen a proliferation of research on the connection between voters and elites. One literature explores whether elites’ responsiveness is biased towards affluent voters, but does not allow for reverse causality. Another literature investigates voters’ responsiveness to elite cues but pays limited attention to potential inequality in such responsiveness. This study combines insights from both literatures by analysing income inequality in elite responsiveness to voters, and vice versa. It does so using detailed time-series data on citizens’ preferences and party positions towards government spending in the Netherlands. Empirical analyses reveal that there is no exclusive pro-middle or pro-rich bias in voter influence, while adaptation increases with income. The analysis has important implications for the study of representation and inequality and, more broadly, for the relationship between citizens and elites in established democracies.","PeriodicalId":51362,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Public Policy","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135385412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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