Perspectives on neoliberal political-economic practice often frame its dominance in terms of harms to 'society'. Prominently, Wendy Brown (2019, 52) offers an account of the 'neoliberal revolution', claiming that, when 'the social vanishes from our ideas, speech, and experience', commonality disappears, democracy diminishes, and authoritarianism prevails. The paper considers this understanding to argue for the importance of political articulations of 'society', which reveal complexities that elude nostalgic accounts of how the social has been lost. Making this case, it works through real-world invocations of social commonality in the name of social cohesion. Social cohesion illustrates the multiplicity of objectives invoking 'society', ranging from the production of pro-social subjects to the pursuit of resilience against shifting scenarios of social collapse. On this basis the paper problematises perspectives that either treat the social as an artefact of administrative practice or that prioritize experiences of moral purpose and commonality. It argues that such positions risk mythologizing 'society' if they don't attend to the complex circumstances of its political articulation.
{"title":"Why Neoliberalism Doesn't Spell the Death of Society: Commonality, Regulation, and the Politics of Social Cohesion.","authors":"Jan Dobbernack","doi":"10.1111/1468-4446.70031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.70031","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Perspectives on neoliberal political-economic practice often frame its dominance in terms of harms to 'society'. Prominently, Wendy Brown (2019, 52) offers an account of the 'neoliberal revolution', claiming that, when 'the social vanishes from our ideas, speech, and experience', commonality disappears, democracy diminishes, and authoritarianism prevails. The paper considers this understanding to argue for the importance of political articulations of 'society', which reveal complexities that elude nostalgic accounts of how the social has been lost. Making this case, it works through real-world invocations of social commonality in the name of social cohesion. Social cohesion illustrates the multiplicity of objectives invoking 'society', ranging from the production of pro-social subjects to the pursuit of resilience against shifting scenarios of social collapse. On this basis the paper problematises perspectives that either treat the social as an artefact of administrative practice or that prioritize experiences of moral purpose and commonality. It argues that such positions risk mythologizing 'society' if they don't attend to the complex circumstances of its political articulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":51368,"journal":{"name":"British Journal of Sociology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145132444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the 1990s, high-income individuals have increasingly sorted into the Democratic Party as a result of their socially liberal views. There is evidence that over time high-income Democrats have also liberalized in their economic attitudes, but the motivations behind this purported support remain unclear. This study uses a forced-choice conjoint experiment with an oversample of high-income respondents and takes the novel approach of pairing the experiment with cognitive interviews in order to explore why high-income Democrats support redistributive policies. Results show that the redistributive preferences of high-income Democrats look very similar to those of other Democrats. They prefer policies proposed by their own party. They want policies that are racially "fair," and sometimes define this to mean favoring Black recipients. Most of all, however, they are driven by a commitment to "fiscal populism," the idea that (increased) government spending should be funded by the most elite members of society.
{"title":"Why Do High-Income Democrats Support Redistribution? The Roles of Partisanship, Racial Attitudes and Fiscal Populism.","authors":"Karyn Vilbig","doi":"10.1111/1468-4446.70032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.70032","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Since the 1990s, high-income individuals have increasingly sorted into the Democratic Party as a result of their socially liberal views. There is evidence that over time high-income Democrats have also liberalized in their economic attitudes, but the motivations behind this purported support remain unclear. This study uses a forced-choice conjoint experiment with an oversample of high-income respondents and takes the novel approach of pairing the experiment with cognitive interviews in order to explore why high-income Democrats support redistributive policies. Results show that the redistributive preferences of high-income Democrats look very similar to those of other Democrats. They prefer policies proposed by their own party. They want policies that are racially \"fair,\" and sometimes define this to mean favoring Black recipients. Most of all, however, they are driven by a commitment to \"fiscal populism,\" the idea that (increased) government spending should be funded by the most elite members of society.</p>","PeriodicalId":51368,"journal":{"name":"British Journal of Sociology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145132370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The most recent British census was the first to elicit transgender identity. The 2021 Census of England and Wales asked 'Is the gender you identify with the same as your sex registered at birth?'. It is has been argued that this formulation confused a substantial number of respondents who erroneously answered in the negative. The 2022 Census of Scotland asked a clearer question, 'Do you consider yourself to be trans, or have a trans history?' Comparison between the results provides further evidence that the Census of England and Wales overestimated the transgender population, and also raises the possibility that it undercounted the non-binary component of this population.
{"title":"Comparing Transgender Identities in the Census of Scotland and the Census of England and Wales.","authors":"Michael Biggs","doi":"10.1111/1468-4446.70030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.70030","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The most recent British census was the first to elicit transgender identity. The 2021 Census of England and Wales asked 'Is the gender you identify with the same as your sex registered at birth?'. It is has been argued that this formulation confused a substantial number of respondents who erroneously answered in the negative. The 2022 Census of Scotland asked a clearer question, 'Do you consider yourself to be trans, or have a trans history?' Comparison between the results provides further evidence that the Census of England and Wales overestimated the transgender population, and also raises the possibility that it undercounted the non-binary component of this population.</p>","PeriodicalId":51368,"journal":{"name":"British Journal of Sociology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145092925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paradox of inequality posits that individuals in high-inequality societies paradoxically exhibit stronger meritocratic beliefs, perceiving their societies as systems that reward individuals based on ability and effort rather than social background or connections. This study presents an explanation from the perspective of critical sociology of education, complementing prior research that offers community contextual and psychosocial insights. By analysing the ISSP 2019 dataset, which includes 29 countries or regions, we find that in countries or regions with high income inequality, education serves to legitimise inequality and diminishes individuals' awareness of the structural factors contributing to inequality. Conversely, in those with low inequality, while basic education also functions to legitimise inequality, advanced stages of education possess an enlightening character that enables individuals to be more aware of the structural factors that lead to inequality. Generally, by estimating the interactions between education and country-level income inequality, this study elucidates the factors contributing to the paradox of inequality and reconciles the persistent argument between legitimisation and enlightenment theories of education.
{"title":"Does Education Legitimise Inequality? Comparative Analysis of Income Inequality, Education, and Meritocratic Beliefs.","authors":"Cheng Liu, Jingjing Wang","doi":"10.1111/1468-4446.70029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.70029","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The paradox of inequality posits that individuals in high-inequality societies paradoxically exhibit stronger meritocratic beliefs, perceiving their societies as systems that reward individuals based on ability and effort rather than social background or connections. This study presents an explanation from the perspective of critical sociology of education, complementing prior research that offers community contextual and psychosocial insights. By analysing the ISSP 2019 dataset, which includes 29 countries or regions, we find that in countries or regions with high income inequality, education serves to legitimise inequality and diminishes individuals' awareness of the structural factors contributing to inequality. Conversely, in those with low inequality, while basic education also functions to legitimise inequality, advanced stages of education possess an enlightening character that enables individuals to be more aware of the structural factors that lead to inequality. Generally, by estimating the interactions between education and country-level income inequality, this study elucidates the factors contributing to the paradox of inequality and reconciles the persistent argument between legitimisation and enlightenment theories of education.</p>","PeriodicalId":51368,"journal":{"name":"British Journal of Sociology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2025-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145058627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}