"This paper provides new estimates of the impact of immigration and trade on the U.S. labor market.... We examine the relation between economic outcomes for native workers and immigrant flows to regional labor markets.... We...use the factor proportions approach to examine the contributions of immigration and trade to recent changes in U.S. educational wage differentials and attempt to provide a broader assessment of the impact of immigration on the incomes of U.S. natives." Comments and discussion by John DiNardo, John M. Abowd, and others are included (pp. 68-85).
“这篇论文对移民和贸易对美国劳动力市场的影响提供了新的估计....我们研究了本地工人的经济结果与移民流向区域劳动力市场....之间的关系我们……使用因子比例法来检查移民和贸易对美国教育工资差异近期变化的贡献，并试图对移民对美国本地人收入的影响提供更广泛的评估。”包括John DiNardo, John M. Abowd和其他人的评论和讨论(第68-85页)。
{"title":"How much do immigration and trade affect labor market outcomes?","authors":"G. Borjas, Richard B. Freeman, Lawrence F. Katz","doi":"10.2307/2534701","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2534701","url":null,"abstract":"\"This paper provides new estimates of the impact of immigration and trade on the U.S. labor market.... We examine the relation between economic outcomes for native workers and immigrant flows to regional labor markets.... We...use the factor proportions approach to examine the contributions of immigration and trade to recent changes in U.S. educational wage differentials and attempt to provide a broader assessment of the impact of immigration on the incomes of U.S. natives.\" Comments and discussion by John DiNardo, John M. Abowd, and others are included (pp. 68-85).","PeriodicalId":51405,"journal":{"name":"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity","volume":"2 1","pages":"1-90"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87990747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:We evaluate the duration of the China trade shock and its impact on a wide range of outcomes over the period from 2000 to 2019. The shock plateaued in 2010, enabling analysis of its effects for nearly a decade past its culmination. Adverse impacts of import competition on manufacturing employment, overall employment-population ratios, and income per capita in more trade-exposed US commuting zones are present out to 2019. Over the full study period, greater import competition implies a reduction in the manufacturing employment-population ratio of 1.54 percentage points, which is 55 percent of the observed change in the value, and the absorption of 86 percent of this net job loss via a corresponding decrease in the overall employment rate. Reductions in population head counts, which indicate net out-migration, register only for foreign-born workers and the native born who are 25–39 years old, implying that exit from work is a primary means of adjustment to trade-induced contractions in labor demand. More negatively affected regions see modest increases in the uptake of government transfers, but these transfers primarily take the form of Social Security and Medicare benefits. Adverse outcomes are more acute in regions that initially had fewer college-educated workers and were more industrially specialized. Impacts are qualitatively—but not quantitatively—similar to those caused by the decline of employment in coal production since the 1980s, indicating that the China trade shock holds lessons for other episodes of localized job loss. Import competition from China induced changes in income per capita across local labor markets that are much larger than the spatial heterogeneity of income effects predicted by standard quantitative trade models. Even using higher-end estimates of the consumer benefits of rising trade with China, a substantial fraction of commuting zones appears to have suffered absolute declines in average real incomes.
{"title":"On the Persistence of the China Shock","authors":"David Autor, David Dorn, G. Hanson","doi":"10.1353/eca.2022.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2022.0005","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:We evaluate the duration of the China trade shock and its impact on a wide range of outcomes over the period from 2000 to 2019. The shock plateaued in 2010, enabling analysis of its effects for nearly a decade past its culmination. Adverse impacts of import competition on manufacturing employment, overall employment-population ratios, and income per capita in more trade-exposed US commuting zones are present out to 2019. Over the full study period, greater import competition implies a reduction in the manufacturing employment-population ratio of 1.54 percentage points, which is 55 percent of the observed change in the value, and the absorption of 86 percent of this net job loss via a corresponding decrease in the overall employment rate. Reductions in population head counts, which indicate net out-migration, register only for foreign-born workers and the native born who are 25–39 years old, implying that exit from work is a primary means of adjustment to trade-induced contractions in labor demand. More negatively affected regions see modest increases in the uptake of government transfers, but these transfers primarily take the form of Social Security and Medicare benefits. Adverse outcomes are more acute in regions that initially had fewer college-educated workers and were more industrially specialized. Impacts are qualitatively—but not quantitatively—similar to those caused by the decline of employment in coal production since the 1980s, indicating that the China trade shock holds lessons for other episodes of localized job loss. Import competition from China induced changes in income per capita across local labor markets that are much larger than the spatial heterogeneity of income effects predicted by standard quantitative trade models. Even using higher-end estimates of the consumer benefits of rising trade with China, a substantial fraction of commuting zones appears to have suffered absolute declines in average real incomes.","PeriodicalId":51405,"journal":{"name":"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity","volume":"14 1","pages":"381 - 476"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85214921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:A model of private and public behavior to mitigate disease transmission during the COVID-19 pandemic over the past year in the United States addresses two questions: What dynamics of infections and deaths should we expect to see from a pandemic? What are our options for mitigating the impact of a pandemic on public health? I find that behavior turns what would be a short and extremely sharp epidemic into a long, drawn-out one, with, at best, a modest impact on the long-run death toll from the disease. Absent the development of a technological solution, such as vaccines or life-saving therapeutics, additional public health interventions suffer from rapidly diminishing returns in improving long-run outcomes. In contrast, rapidly implemented nonpharmaceutical interventions, in combination with the rapid development of technological solutions, could have saved nearly 300,000 lives relative to what is now projected as of mid-June 2021 to occur over the long run.
{"title":"Behavior and the Dynamics of Epidemics","authors":"A. Atkeson","doi":"10.1353/eca.2021.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2021.0008","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:A model of private and public behavior to mitigate disease transmission during the COVID-19 pandemic over the past year in the United States addresses two questions: What dynamics of infections and deaths should we expect to see from a pandemic? What are our options for mitigating the impact of a pandemic on public health? I find that behavior turns what would be a short and extremely sharp epidemic into a long, drawn-out one, with, at best, a modest impact on the long-run death toll from the disease. Absent the development of a technological solution, such as vaccines or life-saving therapeutics, additional public health interventions suffer from rapidly diminishing returns in improving long-run outcomes. In contrast, rapidly implemented nonpharmaceutical interventions, in combination with the rapid development of technological solutions, could have saved nearly 300,000 lives relative to what is now projected as of mid-June 2021 to occur over the long run.","PeriodicalId":51405,"journal":{"name":"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity","volume":"32 1","pages":"67 - 88"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80056794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:In the spring of 2020, the initial surge of COVID-19 infections and deaths was flattened using a combination of economic shutdowns and noneconomic non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). The possibility of a second wave of infections and deaths raises the question of what interventions can be used to significantly reduce deaths while supporting, not preventing, economic recovery. We use a five-age epidemiological model combined with sixty-six-sector economic accounting to examine policies to avert and to respond to a second wave. We find that a second round of economic shutdowns alone are neither sufficient nor necessary to avert or quell a second wave. In contrast, noneconomic NPIs, such as wearing masks and personal distancing, increasing testing and quarantine, reintroducing restrictions on social and recreational gatherings, and enhancing protections for the elderly together can mitigate a second wave while leaving room for an economic recovery.
{"title":"Policies for a Second Wave","authors":"D. Baqaee, E. Farhi, M. Mina, J. Stock","doi":"10.1353/eca.2020.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2020.0013","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:In the spring of 2020, the initial surge of COVID-19 infections and deaths was flattened using a combination of economic shutdowns and noneconomic non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). The possibility of a second wave of infections and deaths raises the question of what interventions can be used to significantly reduce deaths while supporting, not preventing, economic recovery. We use a five-age epidemiological model combined with sixty-six-sector economic accounting to examine policies to avert and to respond to a second wave. We find that a second round of economic shutdowns alone are neither sufficient nor necessary to avert or quell a second wave. In contrast, noneconomic NPIs, such as wearing masks and personal distancing, increasing testing and quarantine, reintroducing restrictions on social and recreational gatherings, and enhancing protections for the elderly together can mitigate a second wave while leaving room for an economic recovery.","PeriodicalId":51405,"journal":{"name":"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity","volume":"52 1","pages":"385 - 443"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86683221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:Many business sectors and households face an unprecedented loss of income in the current COVID-19 recession, triggering financial distress, separations, and bankruptcy. Rather than stimulating demand, government policy's main aim should be to provide insurance to firms and workers to avoid undue scarring that will hamper a recovery once the pandemic is past. We develop a corporate finance framework to guide interventions in credit markets to avoid such scarring. We emphasize three main results. First, policy should inject liquidity into small and medium-sized firms that are liquidity constrained and for which social costs of bankruptcy are high. Second, large firms for whom solvency is the dominant issue require a more nuanced approach. Debt overhang creates a distortion, leading these firms to fire workers, forgo expenditures that maintain enterprise value, and delay filing for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy longer than is socially efficient. Government resources toward reducing the legal and financial costs of bankruptcy are unambiguously beneficial. Policies that reduce funding costs are only socially desirable if the pandemic is expected to be short-lived and if bankruptcy costs are high. Last, transfers necessary to avoid bankruptcy allow borrowers to continue paying their mortgages or credit card bills and ultimately benefit owners of assets such as real estate or credit card receivables. Taxes to fund transfers should be raised from these asset owners.
{"title":"Corporate Debt Overhang and Credit Policy","authors":"Markus K. Brunnermeier, A. Krishnamurthy","doi":"10.1353/eca.2020.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2020.0014","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Many business sectors and households face an unprecedented loss of income in the current COVID-19 recession, triggering financial distress, separations, and bankruptcy. Rather than stimulating demand, government policy's main aim should be to provide insurance to firms and workers to avoid undue scarring that will hamper a recovery once the pandemic is past. We develop a corporate finance framework to guide interventions in credit markets to avoid such scarring. We emphasize three main results. First, policy should inject liquidity into small and medium-sized firms that are liquidity constrained and for which social costs of bankruptcy are high. Second, large firms for whom solvency is the dominant issue require a more nuanced approach. Debt overhang creates a distortion, leading these firms to fire workers, forgo expenditures that maintain enterprise value, and delay filing for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy longer than is socially efficient. Government resources toward reducing the legal and financial costs of bankruptcy are unambiguously beneficial. Policies that reduce funding costs are only socially desirable if the pandemic is expected to be short-lived and if bankruptcy costs are high. Last, transfers necessary to avoid bankruptcy allow borrowers to continue paying their mortgages or credit card bills and ultimately benefit owners of assets such as real estate or credit card receivables. Taxes to fund transfers should be raised from these asset owners.","PeriodicalId":51405,"journal":{"name":"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity","volume":"164 1","pages":"447 - 502"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77815358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT:Early in 2020, the general expectation was that the coronavirus pandemic's effects would be more severe in developing countries than in advanced economies, on both the public health and economic fronts. Preliminary evidence as of July 2020 supports a more optimistic assessment. To date, most low- and middle-income countries have a significantly lower death toll per capita than richer countries, a pattern that can be partially explained by younger populations and limited obesity. On the economic front, emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) have seen massive capital outflows and large price declines for certain commodities, especially oil and nonprecious metals, but net capital outflows are in line with earlier commodity price shocks. While there is considerable heterogeneity in how specific countries will be affected in the short and medium run, we are cautiously optimistic that financial markets in the largest EMDEs, especially those not reliant on energy and metal exports, could recover quickly—assuming the disease burden is ultimately not as dire in these countries. In the long run, the highest costs may be due to the indirect effects of virus containment policies on poverty, health, and education as well as the effects of accelerating deglobalization on EMDEs. An important caveat is that there is still considerable uncertainty about the future course of the pandemic and the consequences of new waves of infections.
{"title":"The Effects of the Coronavirus Pandemic in Emerging Market and Developing Economies: An Optimistic Preliminary Account","authors":"P. Goldberg, T. Reed","doi":"10.1353/eca.2020.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2020.0009","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT:Early in 2020, the general expectation was that the coronavirus pandemic's effects would be more severe in developing countries than in advanced economies, on both the public health and economic fronts. Preliminary evidence as of July 2020 supports a more optimistic assessment. To date, most low- and middle-income countries have a significantly lower death toll per capita than richer countries, a pattern that can be partially explained by younger populations and limited obesity. On the economic front, emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) have seen massive capital outflows and large price declines for certain commodities, especially oil and nonprecious metals, but net capital outflows are in line with earlier commodity price shocks. While there is considerable heterogeneity in how specific countries will be affected in the short and medium run, we are cautiously optimistic that financial markets in the largest EMDEs, especially those not reliant on energy and metal exports, could recover quickly—assuming the disease burden is ultimately not as dire in these countries. In the long run, the highest costs may be due to the indirect effects of virus containment policies on poverty, health, and education as well as the effects of accelerating deglobalization on EMDEs. An important caveat is that there is still considerable uncertainty about the future course of the pandemic and the consequences of new waves of infections.","PeriodicalId":51405,"journal":{"name":"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity","volume":"53 1","pages":"161 - 235"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2021-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88765958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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