Journal of Risk and Insurance最新文献

Low insurance take-up in low-income populations is not easily explained by the standard single-period expected utility model of insurance that overlooks the relevance of time preference when liquidity is constrained. We design field survey instruments to elicit quasi-hyperbolic time preferences, as well as prospect theory risk preferences, and use them to examine whether time preferences explain health insurance behavior of low-income Filipinos. Consistent with theory, those with stronger parameterized time preference are less likely to insure and the partial association is most pronounced at low wealth where liquidity is most likely to be constrained. Among those with better understanding of insurance, lower take-up is also associated with present bias. We do not find that insurance is significantly associated with risk preferences.

Analyzing major US property–liability insurers, we find that their cost of equity capital is negatively associated with their underwriting performance, but not with their investment performance. We provide cross-sectional evidence that the difference is attributable, at least in part, to investor learning about opaque insurer liabilities. We also find that capital market and product market imperfections are important determinants of insurers' cost of equity capital. Overall, our evidence contributes to the important literature examining insurers' cost of equity capital, and it suggests that opaque liabilities are a distinguishing feature of insurers in determining their cost of equity capital.

Typical Variable Annuity products combine complex baseline contracts at substantial fees with optional guarantees. We argue this product design aligns with the benefits of bundling to the provider, to the extent that the baseline option features can reduce total replication value. This is possible due to market frictions, and particularly taxation rules, affecting policyholder exercise behavior. We demonstrate the relevance of this mechanism in the context of popular withdrawal guarantees, both theoretically and empirically. Specifically, we show that in the presence of personal taxes, adding on a common death benefit at baseline may decrease the total contract value to the provider.

Little academic work has examined the labor supply response to pension incentives at the intensive margin. We explore this issue using individual-level administrative and pension data for Philadelphia city employees, where workers have some choice about whether or not to perform overtime, which is pensionable. We document large variations across workers in the incentives to do overtime provided by pension rules. Although standard regressions show that worker overtime is positively associated with own expected pension compensation, a robust nonparametric approach that exploits the discontinuities in expected wages due to pensions shows that the elasticity of worker labor supply to expected pension compensation is likely zero: Our standard regression results are likely the consequence of the rule by which overtime is allocated in Philadelphia. We estimate that this rule adds 4% to pension costs and raises total compensation costs by around 0.7% of payroll, and examine the implications for pension underfunding.

Many regulated health insurance markets include risk adjustment (aka risk equalization) to mitigate selection incentives for insurers. Empirical studies on the design and evaluation of risk-adjustment algorithms typically focus on mandatory health insurance schemes. This paper considers risk adjustment in the context of voluntary health insurance, as found in Chile, Ireland, and Australia. In addition to the challenge of mitigating selection by insurers, regulators of these voluntary schemes have to deal with selection by consumers in and out of the market. A strategy for mitigating selection by consumers is to apply some form of risk rating. Our paper shows how risk adjustment and risk rating interact: (1) risk rating reduces the need for risk adjustment and (2) risk adjustment reduces premium variation across rating factors, thereby increasing incentives for consumers to select in and out of the market.

This paper tests the claim that insurers often engage in risk-shifting years before the materialization of a failure. It compares the mechanisms of insurance insolvency across different jurisdictions, using a first-of-its-kind international database assembled by the authors, merging individual financial data together with information on impairments over the last 30 years in four of the largest insurance markets in the world (France, Japan, the UK, and the United States). Results show evidence that low profitability is a leading indicator of failures. Further, there is an asymmetry between life insurance, where bond investment is highly significant, and nonlife insurance sectors, where operating inefficiency plays a larger role. Moreover, this paper highlights differences across countries: a stronger reaction to operating inefficiency in nonlife insurance in France and a less positive impact of bond investment in life insurance in Japan. Both results are linked to differences in the functioning of insurance markets.

Catastrophic events affect many people simultaneously. We exploit earthquake claim characteristics to test for racial discrimination in the adjudication of insurance claims. Using data from the Oklahoma Department of Insurance, the US Geological Survey, and the US census, we study eight earthquakes between 2010 and 2016 that were linked to oil and gas drilling activities. We test whether claim resolutions differ among zip-code areas with different racial compositions, all else equal. We find evidence that claims from areas with higher percentages of Black population were less likely to result in payment, and when those claims did get paid, payments were lower in those areas. We further investigate the mechanisms through which such discrimination may exist. We do not find evidence that the percentages of Black, Native, or Asian population in an area are associated with the filing of marginal claims. We do find that areas with higher percentages of Hispanic population file fewer marginal claims.

This paper offers a systematic treatment of risk-sharing rules for insurance losses, based on a list of relevant properties. A number of candidate risk-sharing rules are considered, including the conditional mean risk-sharing rule proposed in Denuit and Dhaene and the newly introduced quantile risk-sharing rule. Their compliance with the proposed properties is established. Then, methods for building new risk-sharing rules are discussed. The results derived in this paper are helpful in the development of peer-to-peer insurance (or crowdsurance), as well as to manage contingent risk funds where a given budget is distributed among claimants.

In this paper, we first construct a cyber risk consciousness score using a text mining algorithm, applied to annual reports of large- and mid-cap US banks and insurers from 2011 to 2018. We next categorize the firms' cyber risk management based on keywords to study determinants and value-relevance. Our results show an increasing cyber risk consciousness, regardless of the industry. In addition, for the entire sample we find that firms belonging to the banking industry, with a higher cyber risk consciousness score and a higher general risk awareness are more likely to implement cyber risk management, which also holds for both industries separately. We find the opposite in the case of profitable firms for the entire sample and the insurer subsample. Finally, we observe a significant positive relationship between cyber risk management and firm value measured by Tobin's Q for the entire sample and the subsamples of banks and insurers.