Funding information Central European University ERC Starting, Grant/Award Number: 679092; SENSE OF COMMITMENT ERC Synergy, Grant/Award Number: 609819, SOMICS Can commitments be generated without promises or gestures conventionally interpreted as such? We hypothesized that people believe that commitments are in place when one agent has led a recipient to rely on her to do something, even without a commissive speech act or any action conventionalized as such, and this is mutual knowledge. To probe this, we presented participants with online vignettes describing everyday situations in which a recipient's expectations were frustrated by one's behavior. Our results show that moral judgments differed significantly according to whether the recipient's reliance was mutually known, irrespective of whether this was verbally acknowledged.
{"title":"Perceiving commitments: When we both know that you are counting on me","authors":"F. Bonalumi, J. Michael, C. Heintz","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12333","url":null,"abstract":"Funding information Central European University ERC Starting, Grant/Award Number: 679092; SENSE OF COMMITMENT ERC Synergy, Grant/Award Number: 609819, SOMICS Can commitments be generated without promises or gestures conventionally interpreted as such? We hypothesized that people believe that commitments are in place when one agent has led a recipient to rely on her to do something, even without a commissive speech act or any action conventionalized as such, and this is mutual knowledge. To probe this, we presented participants with online vignettes describing everyday situations in which a recipient's expectations were frustrated by one's behavior. Our results show that moral judgments differed significantly according to whether the recipient's reliance was mutually known, irrespective of whether this was verbally acknowledged.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12333","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49333483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Weak\u0000 neo‐Whorfianism\u0000 and the philosophy of time","authors":"H. Dyke","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12339","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12339","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43518104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology and epistemology of visual perception.
{"title":"Do we see facts?","authors":"A. Vernazzani","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12336","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology and epistemology of visual perception.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12336","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45025045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Context as knowledge","authors":"T. Huvenes, Andreas Stokke","doi":"10.1111/mila.12351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12351","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12351","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43570574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Historical linguistics has revealed several pathways of language change that may guide our understanding of the evolution of mental-state attribution. In particular, it has been established that verbs of saying are often exapted for attributing a variety of mental states, including beliefs and intentions. For example, there are quite a few languages in which the literal translation of, “Boris said, ‘I will win the elections’,” may be used to convey that Boris thinks that he will win the elections or intends to win the elections. The objective of this paper is to analyse the pragmatic shifts underlying this pathway, and thus present the first articulate account of the evolution of belief/intention
历史语言学揭示了语言变化的几种途径，这些途径可以指导我们理解心理状态归因的演变。特别是，已经确定的说法动词通常用于归因于各种心理状态，包括信仰和意图。例如，在相当多的语言中，“Boris said， ' I will win the elections '”的直译可以用来表达Boris认为他会赢得选举或打算赢得选举。本文的目的是分析这一途径背后的语用转变，从而首次清晰地描述信念/意图的演变
{"title":"First saying, then believing: The pragmatic roots of folk psychology","authors":"B. Geurts","doi":"10.1111/mila.12345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12345","url":null,"abstract":"Historical linguistics has revealed several pathways of language change that may guide our understanding of the evolution of mental-state attribution. In particular, it has been established that verbs of saying are often exapted for attributing a variety of mental states, including beliefs and intentions. For example, there are quite a few languages in which the literal translation of, “Boris said, ‘I will win the elections’,” may be used to convey that Boris thinks that he will win the elections or intends to win the elections. The objective of this paper is to analyse the pragmatic shifts underlying this pathway, and thus present the first articulate account of the evolution of belief/intention","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12345","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63428456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Normative folk psychology and decision theory","authors":"Joe E. Dewhurst, C. Burr","doi":"10.1111/mila.12347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12347","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12347","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47548266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We represent shape in both sight and touch, but how do these abilities relate to one another? This issue has been discussed in the context of Molyneux’s question of whether someone born blind could, upon being granted sight, identify shapes visually. Some have suggested that we might look to real-world cases of sight restoration to illuminate the relation between visual and tactual shape representations. Here I argue that newly sighted perceivers should not be relied on in this way because they are unlikely to form the kinds of shape representations responsible for cross-modal recognition in normally sighted perceivers. I then argue that the available evidence makes a compelling case for the type identity view, on which the visual and tactual representations responsible for cross-modal recognition are type-identical.
{"title":"Representing shape in sight and touch","authors":"E. J. Green","doi":"10.1111/mila.12352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12352","url":null,"abstract":"We represent shape in both sight and touch, but how do these abilities relate to one another? This issue has been discussed in the context of Molyneux’s question of whether someone born blind could, upon being granted sight, identify shapes visually. Some have suggested that we might look to real-world cases of sight restoration to illuminate the relation between visual and tactual shape representations. Here I argue that newly sighted perceivers should not be relied on in this way because they are unlikely to form the kinds of shape representations responsible for cross-modal recognition in normally sighted perceivers. I then argue that the available evidence makes a compelling case for the type identity view, on which the visual and tactual representations responsible for cross-modal recognition are type-identical.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12352","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44170375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Spatial experience and olfaction: A role for naïve topology","authors":"Bartek Chomanski","doi":"10.1111/mila.12354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12354","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12354","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48315089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Correspondence Richard Heersmink, Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy, La Trobe University, Plenty Rd, Kingsbury Dr. Bundoora, Melbourne, VIC 3086, Australia. Email: r.heersmink@latrobe.edu.au In this paper, I describe how artifacts and autobiographical memory are integrated into new systemic wholes, allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and detailed manner. After discussing some empirical work on lifelogging technology, I elaborate on the dimension of autobiographical dependency, which is the degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a personal experience. When this dependency is strong, we integrate information in the embodied brain and in an object to reconstruct an autobiographical memory. In such cases, autobiographical memory is extended or distributed.
{"title":"Extended mind and artifactual autobiographical memory","authors":"Richard Heersmink","doi":"10.1111/mila.12353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12353","url":null,"abstract":"Correspondence Richard Heersmink, Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy, La Trobe University, Plenty Rd, Kingsbury Dr. Bundoora, Melbourne, VIC 3086, Australia. Email: r.heersmink@latrobe.edu.au In this paper, I describe how artifacts and autobiographical memory are integrated into new systemic wholes, allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and detailed manner. After discussing some empirical work on lifelogging technology, I elaborate on the dimension of autobiographical dependency, which is the degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a personal experience. When this dependency is strong, we integrate information in the embodied brain and in an object to reconstruct an autobiographical memory. In such cases, autobiographical memory is extended or distributed.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12353","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45793219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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