While we perceive events in our environment through multiple sensory systems, we nevertheless perceive all of these events as occupying a single unified timeline. Time, as we perceive it, is unified. I argue that existing accounts of the perceived unity of time fail. Instead, the perceived unity of time must be constructed by integrating our initially fragmented timekeeping capacities. However, existing accounts of multimodal integration do not tell us how this might occur. Something new is needed. I finish the paper by articulating the hurdles that must be overcome to provide an account of the perceived unity of time.
{"title":"The perceived unity of time","authors":"Gerardo Viera","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12331","url":null,"abstract":"While we perceive events in our environment through multiple sensory systems, we nevertheless perceive all of these events as occupying a single unified timeline. Time, as we perceive it, is unified. I argue that existing accounts of the perceived unity of time fail. Instead, the perceived unity of time must be constructed by integrating our initially fragmented timekeeping capacities. However, existing accounts of multimodal integration do not tell us how this might occur. Something new is needed. I finish the paper by articulating the hurdles that must be overcome to provide an account of the perceived unity of time.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12331","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43607827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Predicate nominals (e.g., ‘is a female’) seem to label or categorize their subjects, while their predicate adjective correlates (e.g, ‘is female’) merely attribute a property. Further, predicate nominals elicit essentializing inferential judgments about inductive potential as well as stable explanatory membership. Semantic data and research from developmental and cognitive psychology support that this distinction is robust and productive. I argue that while the difference between predicate nominals and predicate adjectives is elided by standard semantic theories, it ought not be. I then develop and defend a psychologically motivated semantic account that takes predicate nominals to involve attributing kind membership and to trigger a presupposition that underpins our essentialist judgments.
谓语主词（例如“is a female”）似乎是对其主语进行标记或分类，而其谓语-形容词相关词（例如，“is female（是女性）”）只是赋予一个属性。此外，谓语主格引发了关于归纳势的本质化推理判断以及稳定的解释隶属度。语义数据和来自发展和认知心理学的研究支持这种区别是有力的和富有成效的。我认为，虽然标准语义理论忽略了谓语主词和谓语形容词之间的区别，但它不应该被忽略。然后，我发展并捍卫了一种基于心理动机的语义解释，认为谓语主词涉及归因种类成员关系，并触发了一个支撑我们本质主义判断的预设。
{"title":"Essentializing Inferences","authors":"K. Ritchie","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/8mchf","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/8mchf","url":null,"abstract":"Predicate nominals (e.g., ‘is a female’) seem to label or categorize their subjects, while their predicate adjective correlates (e.g, ‘is female’) merely attribute a property. Further, predicate nominals elicit essentializing inferential judgments about inductive potential as well as stable explanatory membership. Semantic data and research from developmental and cognitive psychology support that this distinction is robust and productive. I argue that while the difference between predicate nominals and predicate adjectives is elided by standard semantic theories, it ought not be. I then develop and defend a psychologically motivated semantic account that takes predicate nominals to involve attributing kind membership and to trigger a presupposition that underpins our essentialist judgments.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43445355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Polysemy and thought: Toward a generative theory of concepts","authors":"Jake Quilty‐Dunn","doi":"10.1111/mila.12328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12328","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12328","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42587378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Correspondence Robyn Carston, Department of Linguistics, University College London, Chandler House, 2 Wakefield Street, London WC1N 1PF, UK. Email: robyn.carston@ucl.ac.uk Polysemy, understood as instances of a single linguistic expression having multiple related senses, is not a homogenous phenomenon. There are regular (apparently, rule-based) cases and irregular (resemblancebased) cases, which have different processing profiles. Although a primary source of polysemy is pragmatic inference, at least some cases become conventionalised and linguistically encoded. Three main issues are discussed: (a) the key differences between regular and irregular cases and the role, if any, of a “core meaning”; (b) the distinction between pragmatic polysemy and semantic polysemy; and (c) the role of syntactic meaning in both generating and constraining polysemy.
{"title":"Polysemy: Pragmatics and sense conventions","authors":"R. Carston","doi":"10.1111/mila.12329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12329","url":null,"abstract":"Correspondence Robyn Carston, Department of Linguistics, University College London, Chandler House, 2 Wakefield Street, London WC1N 1PF, UK. Email: robyn.carston@ucl.ac.uk Polysemy, understood as instances of a single linguistic expression having multiple related senses, is not a homogenous phenomenon. There are regular (apparently, rule-based) cases and irregular (resemblancebased) cases, which have different processing profiles. Although a primary source of polysemy is pragmatic inference, at least some cases become conventionalised and linguistically encoded. Three main issues are discussed: (a) the key differences between regular and irregular cases and the role, if any, of a “core meaning”; (b) the distinction between pragmatic polysemy and semantic polysemy; and (c) the role of syntactic meaning in both generating and constraining polysemy.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12329","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49455999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
surprised the world by defeating the world-champion Go player, Lee Sedol. AlphaGo exhibits a novel, surprising and valuable style of play and has been recognised as “ creative ” by the artificial intelligence (AI) and Go communities. This article examines whether AlphaGo engages in creative problem solving according to the standards of comparative psychology. I argue that AlphaGo displays one important aspect of creative problem solving (namely mental scenario building in the form of Monte Carlo tree search), while lacking another (domain generality). This analysis has consequences for how we think about creativity in humans and AI.
{"title":"Insightful artificial intelligence","authors":"Marta Halina","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12321","url":null,"abstract":"surprised the world by defeating the world-champion Go player, Lee Sedol. AlphaGo exhibits a novel, surprising and valuable style of play and has been recognised as “ creative ” by the artificial intelligence (AI) and Go communities. This article examines whether AlphaGo engages in creative problem solving according to the standards of comparative psychology. I argue that AlphaGo displays one important aspect of creative problem solving (namely mental scenario building in the form of Monte Carlo tree search), while lacking another (domain generality). This analysis has consequences for how we think about creativity in humans and AI.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12321","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45100696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most scientific theories of consciousness are challenging to apply outside the human case insofar as non-human systems (both biological and artificial) are unlikely to implement human architecture precisely, an issue I call the specificity problem . After providing some background on the theories of consciousness debate, I survey the prospects of four approaches to this problem. I then consider a fifth solution, namely the theory-light approach proposed by Jonathan Birch. I defend a modified version of this that I term the modest theoretical approach , argu-ing that it may provide insights into challenging cases that would otherwise be intractable.
{"title":"Non‐human consciousness and the specificity problem: A modest theoretical proposal","authors":"Henry Shevlin","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12338","url":null,"abstract":"Most scientific theories of consciousness are challenging to apply outside the human case insofar as non-human systems (both biological and artificial) are unlikely to implement human architecture precisely, an issue I call the specificity problem . After providing some background on the theories of consciousness debate, I survey the prospects of four approaches to this problem. I then consider a fifth solution, namely the theory-light approach proposed by Jonathan Birch. I defend a modified version of this that I term the modest theoretical approach , argu-ing that it may provide insights into challenging cases that would otherwise be intractable.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12338","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46672484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Normative inferentialism on linguistic understanding","authors":"Matej Drobňák","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12337","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12337","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44901158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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