{"title":"Recognition and the perception–cognition divide","authors":"Greyson Abid","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12362","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12362","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46331505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Debate on the nature of representation in cognitive systems tends to oscillate between robustly realist views and various anti-realist options. I defend an alternative view, deflationary realism, which sees cognitive representation as an offshoot of the extended application to cognitive systems of an explanatory model whose primary domain is public representation use. This extended application, justified by a common explanatory target, embodies idealisations, partial mismatches between model and reality. By seeing representation as part of an idealised model, deflationary realism avoids the problems with robust realist views, whilst keeping allegiance to realism.
{"title":"Deflationary realism: Representation and idealisation in cognitive science","authors":"Dimitri Coelho Mollo","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12364","url":null,"abstract":"Debate on the nature of representation in cognitive systems tends to oscillate between robustly realist views and various anti-realist options. I defend an alternative view, deflationary realism, which sees cognitive representation as an offshoot of the extended application to cognitive systems of an explanatory model whose primary domain is public representation use. This extended application, justified by a common explanatory target, embodies idealisations, partial mismatches between model and reality. By seeing representation as part of an idealised model, deflationary realism avoids the problems with robust realist views, whilst keeping allegiance to realism.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12364","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48373410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What is the relationship between imitation and culture? This article charts how definitions of imitation have changed in the last century, distinguishes three senses of “culture” used by contemporary evolutionists (Culture1 – Culture3), and summarises current disagreement about the relationship between imitation and culture. I trace the roots of this disagreement to ambiguities in the distinction between imitation and emulation, and to confusion between two projects that motivate research on cultural evolution – the anthropocentric project and the cultural selection project. Combing out these tangles and highlighting research on neonatal imitation in monkeys and humans, I argue that the relationship between imitation and culture goes both ways. Imitation gives cultural evolution an inheritance mechanism for communicative and gestural skills (but not technological skills), and cultural selection yields the cognitive mechanisms that make imitation possible.
{"title":"Imitation and culture: what gives?","authors":"C. Heyes","doi":"10.31234/OSF.IO/BFCX9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/OSF.IO/BFCX9","url":null,"abstract":"What is the relationship between imitation and culture? This article charts how definitions of imitation have changed in the last century, distinguishes three senses of “culture” used by contemporary evolutionists (Culture1 – Culture3), and summarises current disagreement about the relationship between imitation and culture. I trace the roots of this disagreement to ambiguities in the distinction between imitation and emulation, and to confusion between two projects that motivate research on cultural evolution – the anthropocentric project and the cultural selection project. Combing out these tangles and highlighting research on neonatal imitation in monkeys and humans, I argue that the relationship between imitation and culture goes both ways. Imitation gives cultural evolution an inheritance mechanism for communicative and gestural skills (but not technological skills), and cultural selection yields the cognitive mechanisms that make imitation possible.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42701110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to what is perhaps the dominant picture of reference, what a referential term refers to in a context is determined by what the speaker intends for her audience to identify as the referent. I argue that this sort of broadly Gricean view entails, counterintuitively, that it is impossible to knowingly use referential terms in ways that one expects or intends to be misunderstood. After exploring several possible responses—each of which ultimately proves unsatisfactory—I sketch an alternative which can better account for such opaque uses of language, or what I call ‘sneaky reference’. I close by reflecting on the ramifications of these arguments for the theory of meaning more broadly, as opposed to just the theory of reference.
{"title":"Speaker's reference, semantic reference, sneaky reference","authors":"E. Michaelson","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12349","url":null,"abstract":"According to what is perhaps the dominant picture of reference, what a referential term refers to in a context is determined by what the speaker intends for her audience to identify as the referent. I argue that this sort of broadly Gricean view entails, counterintuitively, that it is impossible to knowingly use referential terms in ways that one expects or intends to be misunderstood. After exploring several possible responses—each of which ultimately proves unsatisfactory—I sketch an alternative which can better account for such opaque uses of language, or what I call ‘sneaky reference’. I close by reflecting on the ramifications of these arguments for the theory of meaning more broadly, as opposed to just the theory of reference.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12349","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46604103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can young children such as 3-year-olds represent the world objectively? Some prominent developmental psychologists — such as Perner and Tomasello — assume so. I argue that this view is susceptible to a prima facie powerful objection: To represent objectively, one must be able to represent not only features of the entities represented but also features of objectification itself, which 3-year-olds cannot do yet. Drawing on Burge's work on perceptual constancy, I provide a response to this objection and motivate a distinction between three different kinds of objectivity. This distinction helps advance current research on both objectivity and teleological action explanations in young children.
{"title":"Objectivity, perceptual constancy, and teleology in young children","authors":"U. Peters","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12344","url":null,"abstract":"Can young children such as 3-year-olds represent the world objectively? Some prominent developmental psychologists — such as Perner and Tomasello — assume so. I argue that this view is susceptible to a prima facie powerful objection: To represent objectively, one must be able to represent not only features of the entities represented but also features of objectification itself, which 3-year-olds cannot do yet. Drawing on Burge's work on perceptual constancy, I provide a response to this objection and motivate a distinction between three different kinds of objectivity. This distinction helps advance current research on both objectivity and teleological action explanations in young children.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12344","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46673946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Local theories of consciousness state that one is conscious of a feature if it is adequately represented and processed in sensory brain areas, given some background conditions. We challenge the core prediction of local theories based on recently discovered long-lasting postdictive effects demonstrating that features can be represented for hundreds of milliseconds in perceptual areas without being consciously perceived. Unlike previous empirical data aimed against local theories, proponents of local theories cannot explain these effects away by conjecturing that subjects are phenomenally conscious of features that they cannot report. Only a strong and counterintuitive version of this claim can account for long-lasting postdictive effects. Although possible, we argue that adopting this strong version of the “overflow hypothesis” would have the effect of nullifying the weight of the evidence taken to support local theories of consciousness in the first place. We also discuss several alternative explanations that proponents of local theories could offer.
{"title":"A new empirical challenge for local theories of consciousness","authors":"M. Michel, Adrien Doerig","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12319","url":null,"abstract":"Local theories of consciousness state that one is conscious of a feature if it is adequately represented and processed in sensory brain areas, given some background conditions. We challenge the core prediction of local theories based on recently discovered long-lasting postdictive effects demonstrating that features can be represented for hundreds of milliseconds in perceptual areas without being consciously perceived. Unlike previous empirical data aimed against local theories, proponents of local theories cannot explain these effects away by conjecturing that subjects are phenomenally conscious of features that they cannot report. Only a strong and counterintuitive version of this claim can account for long-lasting postdictive effects. Although possible, we argue that adopting this strong version of the “overflow hypothesis” would have the effect of nullifying the weight of the evidence taken to support local theories of consciousness in the first place. We also discuss several alternative explanations that proponents of local theories could offer.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12319","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47047780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Intuitions play an important role in the debate on the causal status of high-level properties. For instance, Kim has claimed that his “ exclusion argument ” relies on “ a perfectly intuitive … understanding of the causal relation. ” We report the results of three experiments examining whether laypeople really have the relevant intuitions. We find little support for Kim's view and the principles on which it relies. Instead, we find that laypeople are willing to count both a multiply realized property and its realizers as causes, and regard the systematic overdetermination implied by this view as unproblematic.
{"title":"Experiments on causal exclusion","authors":"Thomas Blanchard, Dylan Murray, T. Lombrozo","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12343","url":null,"abstract":"Intuitions play an important role in the debate on the causal status of high-level properties. For instance, Kim has claimed that his “ exclusion argument ” relies on “ a perfectly intuitive … understanding of the causal relation. ” We report the results of three experiments examining whether laypeople really have the relevant intuitions. We find little support for Kim's view and the principles on which it relies. Instead, we find that laypeople are willing to count both a multiply realized property and its realizers as causes, and regard the systematic overdetermination implied by this view as unproblematic.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12343","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48424808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Going on as one ought: Kripke and Wittgenstein on the normativity of meaning","authors":"Hannah Ginsborg","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12342","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12342","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48797871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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