{"title":"Missing persons: Young children's talk about absent members of their social network","authors":"Qianru Yang, Kathryn A. Leech, P. Harris","doi":"10.1111/mila.12379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12379","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12379","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48691548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What is the experience of someone who is “colour-blind” like? This paper presents the results of a study that uses qualitative research methods to better understand the lived experience of colour blindness. Participants were asked to describe their experiences of a variety of coloured stimuli, both with and without EnChroma glasses—glasses which, the manufacturers claim, enhance the experience of people with common forms of colour blindness. More generally, the paper provides a case study in the nascent field of experimental philosophy of experience.
{"title":"What is it like to be colour‐blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience","authors":"K. Allen, P. Quinlan, James Andow, E. Fischer","doi":"10.1111/mila.12370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12370","url":null,"abstract":"What is the experience of someone who is “colour-blind” like? This paper presents the results of a study that uses qualitative research methods to better understand the lived experience of colour blindness. Participants were asked to describe their experiences of a variety of coloured stimuli, both with and without EnChroma glasses—glasses which, the manufacturers claim, enhance the experience of people with common forms of colour blindness. More generally, the paper provides a case study in the nascent field of experimental philosophy of experience.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46164560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interpersonal trust in children's testimonial learning","authors":"M. Koenig, P. Li, Benjamin McMyler","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12361","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12361","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47004784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disgust and the logic of contamination: Biology, culture, and the evolution of norm (over)compliance","authors":"I. Wiegman, Bob Fischer","doi":"10.1111/MILA.12368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MILA.12368","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MILA.12368","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41625447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent’s action, the agent’s intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy doesn’t preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful consideration of the empirical evidence (from neuroimaging to psychopathology) and philosophical analysis of the commitments of rationalism versus sentimentalism in ethics.
{"title":"Moral Rationalism on the Brain","authors":"Joshua May","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/psefm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/psefm","url":null,"abstract":"I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent’s action, the agent’s intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy doesn’t preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful consideration of the empirical evidence (from neuroimaging to psychopathology) and philosophical analysis of the commitments of rationalism versus sentimentalism in ethics.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47931439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The limits of moral dumbfounding","authors":"D. Wylie","doi":"10.1111/mila.12391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12391","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12391","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46817915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Proponents of the higher-order (HO) theory of consciousness (e.g., Lau and Rosenthal) have recently appealed to brain lesion evidence to support their thesis that mental states are conscious when and only when represented by other mental states. This article argues that this evidence fails to support HO theory, doing this by first determining what kinds of conscious deficit should result when HO state-producing areas are damaged, then arguing that these kinds of deficit do not occur in the studies to which HO theorists appeal. The article also develops an apparatus that can be used to evaluate whether other lesion evidence confirms or disconfirms HO theory.
高阶意识理论(high -order theory of consciousness, HO)的支持者(如Lau和Rosenthal)最近求助于脑损伤证据来支持他们的论点，即当且仅当其他精神状态代表精神状态时，精神状态才是有意识的。本文认为，这一证据不能支持HO理论，首先确定当HO状态产生区域受到破坏时，会产生什么样的意识缺陷，然后论证这些缺陷在HO理论家所呼吁的研究中没有发生。本文还开发了一种仪器，可用于评估其他病变证据是否证实或不证实HO理论。
{"title":"Underwhelming force: Evaluating the neuropsychological evidence for higher‐order theories of consciousness","authors":"Benjamin Kozuch","doi":"10.1111/mila.12363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12363","url":null,"abstract":"Proponents of the higher-order (HO) theory of consciousness (e.g., Lau and Rosenthal) have recently appealed to brain lesion evidence to support their thesis that mental states are conscious when and only when represented by other mental states. This article argues that this evidence fails to support HO theory, doing this by first determining what kinds of conscious deficit should result when HO state-producing areas are damaged, then arguing that these kinds of deficit do not occur in the studies to which HO theorists appeal. The article also develops an apparatus that can be used to evaluate whether other lesion evidence confirms or disconfirms HO theory.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12363","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44549885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Funding information H2020 European Research Council, Grant/Award Number: 818633 I argue that assertoric content functions as a means for us to track the responsibilities undertaken by communicators, and that distinctively assertoric commitments are distinguished by being generated directly in virtue of the words the speaker uses. This raises two questions: (a) Why are speakers responsible for the content thus generated? (b) Why is it important for us to distinguish between commitments in terms of their manner of generation? I answer the first question by developing a novel responsibility based metasemantics. I answer the second by reference to the conflicting pressures governing the resources we have available for appraising speech.
{"title":"Assertoric content, responsibility, and metasemantics","authors":"Andrew Peet","doi":"10.1111/mila.12372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12372","url":null,"abstract":"Funding information H2020 European Research Council, Grant/Award Number: 818633 I argue that assertoric content functions as a means for us to track the responsibilities undertaken by communicators, and that distinctively assertoric commitments are distinguished by being generated directly in virtue of the words the speaker uses. This raises two questions: (a) Why are speakers responsible for the content thus generated? (b) Why is it important for us to distinguish between commitments in terms of their manner of generation? I answer the first question by developing a novel responsibility based metasemantics. I answer the second by reference to the conflicting pressures governing the resources we have available for appraising speech.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/mila.12372","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44130529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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