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Slurs in quarantine 隔离中的诽谤
IF 2 3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS Pub Date : 2023-12-05 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12492
Bianca Cepollaro, Simone Sulpizio, Claudia Bianchi, Isidora Stojanovic
We investigate experimentally whether the perceived offensiveness of slurs survives when they are reported, by comparing Italian slurs and insults in base utterances (Y is an S), direct speech (X said: “Y is an S”), mixed quotation (X said that Y is “an S”), and indirect speech (X said that Y is an S). For all strategies, reporting decreases the perceived offensiveness without removing it. For slurs, but not insults, indirect speech is perceived as more offensive than direct speech. Our hypothesis is that, because slurs constitute hate speech, speakers employ quotation marks to signal their dissociation from slur use.
通过比较意大利语的侮辱性和侮辱性在基本话语(Y是一个S)、直接话语(X说:“Y是一个S”)、混合引语(X说Y是一个S)和间接话语(X说Y是一个S)中的表现,我们通过实验调查了侮辱性的感知冒犯性在被报道后是否存在。对于所有策略,报道都减少了感知冒犯性,而没有消除它。对于诽谤,而不是侮辱,间接言语被认为比直接言语更具攻击性。我们的假设是,因为辱骂构成仇恨言论,说话者使用引号来表示他们与辱骂的使用分离。
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引用次数: 0
How words matter: A psycholinguistic argument for meaning revision 词语的重要性:意义修正的心理语言学论证
3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12494
Steffen Koch
Linguistic interventions aim to change our linguistic practices. A commonly discussed type of linguistic intervention is meaning revision, which seeks to associate existing words with new or revised meanings. But why does retaining old words matter so much? Why not instead introduce new words to express the newly defined meanings? Drawing on relevant psycholinguistic research, this paper develops an empirically motivated, general, and practically useful pro tanto reason to retain rather than replace the original word during the process of conceptual improvement.
语言干预旨在改变我们的语言实践。一种常被讨论的语言干预类型是意义修正,它试图将现有的单词与新的或修订的意义联系起来。但为什么保留旧词如此重要呢?为什么不引入新词来表达新定义的含义呢?在相关的心理语言学研究的基础上,本文提出了在概念改进过程中保留而不是取代原词的经验动机、一般的和实际有用的支持理由。
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引用次数: 0
Core morality? Or merely core agents and social beings? A response to Spelke's what babies know 核心道德?或者仅仅是核心代理人和社会存在?对斯佩克的“婴儿知道什么”的回应
3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS Pub Date : 2023-11-03 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12487
J. Kiley Hamlin
Spelke's What babies know describes the remarkably sophisticated mental lives of infants through the theoretical framework of core knowledge. To Spelke, young infants possess six independent core domains, two of which allow them to reason about the social world: the core agent and the core social being systems. Critically, Spelke argues that these core systems fail to communicate prior to 10 months, resulting in an inability to understand social goals. In this commentary, I review evidence that, contrary to Spelke's claims, young infants show robust understanding of social goals and intentions, consistent with claims of an early emerging moral core.
斯佩克的《婴儿知道什么》通过核心知识的理论框架描述了婴儿非常复杂的心理生活。换句话说,幼儿拥有六个独立的核心领域,其中两个允许他们对社会世界进行推理:核心代理人和核心社会存在系统。重要的是,Spelke认为这些核心系统在10个月前无法进行沟通,导致玩家无法理解社交目标。在这篇评论中,我回顾了与Spelke的说法相反的证据,年幼的婴儿表现出对社会目标和意图的强大理解,这与早期出现的道德核心的说法一致。
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引用次数: 0
Core knowledge, language learning, and the origins of morality and pedagogy: Reply to reviews of What babies know 核心知识,语言学习,道德和教育学的起源:回复“婴儿知道什么”的评论
3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS Pub Date : 2023-11-03 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12490
Elizabeth S. Spelke
The astute reviews by Hamlin and by Revencu and Csibra provide compelling arguments and evidence for the early emergence of moral evaluation, communication, and pedagogical learning. I accept these conclusions but not the reviewers' claims that infants' talents in these domains depend on core systems of moral evaluation or pedagogical communication. Instead, I suggest that core knowledge of people as agents and as social beings, together with infants' emerging understanding of their native language, support learning about people as moral agents, moral patients, communicators, and teachers. These issues are open, however, and our competing views invite further testing.
Hamlin、Revencu和Csibra的敏锐评论为道德评价、沟通和教学学习的早期出现提供了令人信服的论据和证据。我接受这些结论,但不同意评论者的说法,即婴儿在这些领域的才能取决于道德评价或教学交流的核心系统。相反,我认为人作为代理人和社会存在的核心知识,加上婴儿对母语的逐渐理解,有助于将人作为道德代理人、道德病人、沟通者和教师来学习。然而,这些问题是公开的,我们相互竞争的观点需要进一步的检验。
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引用次数: 0
Emotions in time: The temporal unity of emotion phenomenology 时间中的情感:情感现象学的时间统一性
3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12489
Kris Goffin, Gerardo Viera
According to componential theories of emotional experience, emotional experiences are phenomenally complex in that they consist of experiential parts, which may include cognitive appraisals, bodily feelings, and action tendencies. These componential theories face the problem of emotional unity: Despite their complexity, emotional experiences also seem to be phenomenologically unified. Componential theories have to give an account of this unity. We argue that existing accounts of emotional unity fail and that instead emotional unity is an instance of experienced causal‐temporal unity. We propose that felt emotional unity arises from our experience of the temporal‐causal order of the world.
根据情绪体验的组成理论,情绪体验是非常复杂的,因为它们由经验部分组成,其中可能包括认知评价、身体感受和行动倾向。这些组成理论面临着情感统一性的问题:尽管它们很复杂,但情感体验在现象学上似乎也是统一的。组份理论必须说明这种统一性。我们认为,现有的关于情感统一的解释是失败的,相反,情感统一是经验因果-时间统一的一个实例。我们认为,感觉情感的统一源于我们对世界的时间-因果秩序的经验。
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引用次数: 0
Kinds in the cognitive sciences: Reply to Weiskopf, Sullivan, and Robins 认知科学中的种类:回复Weiskopf, Sullivan和Robins
3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12486
Muhammad Ali Khalidi
In this response to three critiques of my book, Cognitive ontology , I expand on some of its main themes. First, I demarcate the domain of cognition to support my claim that it is properly investigated from Marr's computational level. Then, I defend the claim that cognitive kinds ought to be individuated externalistically, by contrast with neural kinds, which are often individuated internalistically. This implies that the relationship between the cognitive sciences is one of delivering mutual constraints, which is a more productive research strategy than the search for “neural correlates” of cognitive constructs.
在对我的书《认知本体论》的三个批评的回应中,我扩展了它的一些主要主题。首先,我划分了认知领域,以支持我的主张,即从Marr的计算水平对其进行了适当的研究。然后,我为认知类型应该是外在个体化的这一主张辩护,而神经类型通常是内在个体化的。这意味着认知科学之间的关系是一种相互约束的关系,这是一种比寻找认知结构的“神经相关性”更有成效的研究策略。
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引用次数: 0
Kinding memory: Commentary on Muhammad Ali Khalidi's Cognitive ontology 记忆:穆罕默德·阿里·卡利迪的认知本体论述评
3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12477
Sarah K. Robins
My commentary focuses on Khalidi's defense of episodic memory as a cognitive kind. His argument relies on merging two distinct accounts of episodic memory—the phenomenal and the etiological. I suggest that Khalidi's framework can be used to carve the contemporary memory literature differently. On this view, the phenomenal account supports constructive episodic simulation as a cognitive kind, the etiological account supports event memory as a cognitive kind, and episodic memory ceases to be. The question for Khalidi is, then, how to evaluate this alternative proposal—and more broadly how to adjudicate between competing and overlapping accounts of cognitive kinds.
我的评论集中在Khalidi对情景记忆作为一种认知类型的辩护上。他的论点基于对情景记忆的两种截然不同的描述——现象性和病因性。我认为可以用Khalidi的框架来雕刻当代记忆文学。在这种观点下,现象解释支持建设性情景模拟作为一种认知类型,病因解释支持事件记忆作为一种认知类型,情景记忆不再存在。那么,Khalidi面临的问题是,如何评估这种替代方案,以及更广泛地说,如何在相互竞争和重叠的认知类型描述之间做出裁决。
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引用次数: 0
Computation as the boundary of the cognitive 计算作为认知的边界
3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12479
Daniel Weiskopf
Khalidi identifies cognition with Marrian computation. He further argues that Marrian levels of inquiry should be interpreted ontologically as corresponding to distinct semi‐closed causal domains. But this counterintuitively places the causal domain of representations outside of cognition proper. A closer look at Khalidi's account of concepts shows that these allegedly separate Marrian domains are more tightly integrated than he allows. Theories of concepts converge on algorithmic‐representational models rather than computational ones. This suggests that we should reject the wholesale identification of cognition with computation.
Khalidi将认知等同于马里安计算。他进一步认为,应该从本体论上解释玛丽安层次的探究,对应于不同的半封闭因果域。但这种反直觉的做法将表征的因果领域置于认知本身之外。仔细看一下Khalidi对概念的描述,就会发现这些据称是分开的马里安领域比他所认为的更紧密地结合在一起。概念理论集中于算法表征模型,而不是计算模型。这表明我们应该拒绝将认知与计算混为一谈。
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引用次数: 0
Who's in and who's out of the cognitive kinding game? Comments on Muhammad Ali Khalidi's Cognitive ontology: Taxonomic practices in the mind‐brain sciences 谁在认知类型游戏中,谁在游戏之外?穆罕默德·阿里·卡利迪的认知本体论:心脑科学的分类学实践
3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS Pub Date : 2023-10-18 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12475
Jacqueline A. Sullivan
Muhammad Ali Khalidi contends that because cognitive science casts a wider net than neuroscience in searching for the causes of cognition, it is in the superior position to discover “real” cognitive kinds. I argue that while Khalidi identifies appropriate norms for individuating cognitive kinds, these norms ground his characterization of taxonomic practices in cognitive science, rather than the other way around. If we instead treat Khalidi's norms not as descriptively accurate characterizations of taxonomic practices in cognitive science, but as a set of best practices for kinding cognition, is cognitive science in and neuroscience definitively out of the cognitive kinding game?
穆罕默德·阿里·卡利迪认为,因为认知科学在寻找认知的原因方面比神经科学撒下了更广泛的网,所以它在发现“真正的”认知类型方面处于优越的地位。我认为,虽然Khalidi确定了对认知类型进行个体化的适当规范,但这些规范是他在认知科学中对分类学实践进行表征的基础,而不是相反。如果我们不把哈利迪的规范作为认知科学中分类实践的准确描述,而是作为一组对认知进行分类的最佳实践,那么认知科学和神经科学是否就完全退出了认知分类的游戏?
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引用次数: 0
Names are not (always) predicates 名称不(总是)是谓词
3区 心理学 Q1 LINGUISTICS Pub Date : 2023-10-17 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12484
Laura Delgado
A main selling point of predicativism is that, in addition to accounting for predicative uses of proper names, it can successfully account for their referential uses while treating them as predicates, thus providing a uniform semantics for proper names. The strategy is to postulate an unpronounced determiner that is realised with names when they appear to function as singular terms, making them effectively a concealed determiner phrase. I argue against the thesis that names are really predicates in referential uses. I discuss four different environments where names do not behave like the determiner phrases that are thought to embed them.
谓词主义的一个主要卖点是,除了考虑专名的谓词用途外,它还可以成功地考虑它们的引用用途,同时将它们视为谓词,从而为专名提供统一的语义。该策略是假设一个不发音的限定词,当名字作为单数术语出现时,就会实现这个限定词,使它们有效地成为一个隐藏的限定词短语。我反对这样一种观点,即名称在指称用途中实际上是谓词。我将讨论四种不同的环境,在这些环境中,名称的行为不像嵌入它们的限定词短语那样。
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Mind & Language
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