Pub Date : 2022-07-07DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221112394
Lauren Ratliff Santoro
Scholars interested in understanding if and to what extent social environments influence individual political behavior are plagued by the reality that individuals construct their social environments. Though there is acknowledgement that this construction is determined by homophily – likes associating with likes – the extent to which political beliefs drive environment selection is yet untested. This paper seeks to understand the extent to which political beliefs inform individuals’ decisions on which social environments to select into. To do so, I follow individuals as they select into social environments across their first year in a university setting – first contacting them before they are embedded in a new social environment, tracking their selections into friendships and groups, and observing how their attitudes change over a year and a half period. Results demonstrate that political beliefs can be significant predictors of selection into non-political social contexts, especially for those with the strongest beliefs about politics.
{"title":"Do Political Beliefs Drive Environment Selection?","authors":"Lauren Ratliff Santoro","doi":"10.1177/1532673X221112394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221112394","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars interested in understanding if and to what extent social environments influence individual political behavior are plagued by the reality that individuals construct their social environments. Though there is acknowledgement that this construction is determined by homophily – likes associating with likes – the extent to which political beliefs drive environment selection is yet untested. This paper seeks to understand the extent to which political beliefs inform individuals’ decisions on which social environments to select into. To do so, I follow individuals as they select into social environments across their first year in a university setting – first contacting them before they are embedded in a new social environment, tracking their selections into friendships and groups, and observing how their attitudes change over a year and a half period. Results demonstrate that political beliefs can be significant predictors of selection into non-political social contexts, especially for those with the strongest beliefs about politics.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46034456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-02DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221112390
Christopher Altamura, B. Oliver
Researchers remain divided over the cause of Bernie Sanders’ strong appeal in recent Democratic primaries, alternately positing identity or ideology as decisive drivers of Sanders support. Using data from 2020 Nationscape, we conduct linear probability models that show how identity, ideology, and their interaction all explain Sanders support. Demographically, we find that Sanders voters are disproportionately young, Hispanic, and Independent. Sanders voters also differ significantly from other Democratic primary voters across several ideology variables, and are especially supportive of policies that were central to Sanders’ campaign, such as providing government-run health insurance to all Americans. Finally, we demonstrate that age cohort, the most important predictor of Sanders support, has an effect that is highly dependent upon key ideology variables. Overall, those who did not vote for Sanders in the 2020 Democratic primary are quite demographically and ideologically distinct from those voters that “felt the Bern.”
{"title":"Who Feels the Bern? An Analysis of Support for Bernie Sanders in the 2020 Democratic Primary","authors":"Christopher Altamura, B. Oliver","doi":"10.1177/1532673X221112390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221112390","url":null,"abstract":"Researchers remain divided over the cause of Bernie Sanders’ strong appeal in recent Democratic primaries, alternately positing identity or ideology as decisive drivers of Sanders support. Using data from 2020 Nationscape, we conduct linear probability models that show how identity, ideology, and their interaction all explain Sanders support. Demographically, we find that Sanders voters are disproportionately young, Hispanic, and Independent. Sanders voters also differ significantly from other Democratic primary voters across several ideology variables, and are especially supportive of policies that were central to Sanders’ campaign, such as providing government-run health insurance to all Americans. Finally, we demonstrate that age cohort, the most important predictor of Sanders support, has an effect that is highly dependent upon key ideology variables. Overall, those who did not vote for Sanders in the 2020 Democratic primary are quite demographically and ideologically distinct from those voters that “felt the Bern.”","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47999195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221087159
Eric R. Hansen
Why do some members of Congress vote more on the extremes of their party than others? I argue that lawmakers representing more homogeneously white districts have greater electoral incentive to moderate their voting records, since the two parties compete more for support of white voters than for the support of minority voters. I provide evidence using roll-call votes from the U.S. House and Senate. I find members representing more homogeneously white districts have more moderate voting records, a finding that holds for Democrats and Republicans. I explore two potential mechanisms: legislator responsiveness and electoral punishment. While legislators do not seem to adjust their voting behavior in response to short-term changes in district racial composition, more homogeneously white districts are found to assess larger vote share penalties on more extreme candidates in general elections. The findings have implications for our understanding of race, representation, and electoral accountability.
{"title":"White Constituents and Congressional Voting","authors":"Eric R. Hansen","doi":"10.1177/1532673X221087159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221087159","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some members of Congress vote more on the extremes of their party than others? I argue that lawmakers representing more homogeneously white districts have greater electoral incentive to moderate their voting records, since the two parties compete more for support of white voters than for the support of minority voters. I provide evidence using roll-call votes from the U.S. House and Senate. I find members representing more homogeneously white districts have more moderate voting records, a finding that holds for Democrats and Republicans. I explore two potential mechanisms: legislator responsiveness and electoral punishment. While legislators do not seem to adjust their voting behavior in response to short-term changes in district racial composition, more homogeneously white districts are found to assess larger vote share penalties on more extreme candidates in general elections. The findings have implications for our understanding of race, representation, and electoral accountability.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47044758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-28DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221109534
Christin Bird, Zachary A. McGee
Significant changes to the federal judicial confirmation process have manifested over the past decade, including multiple procedural reforms in the United States Senate. We argue the “nuclear option,” the reduction of the vote-threshold required to proceed to a final confirmation vote on judicial nominees (i.e., to invoke cloture) from three-fifths to a simple majority, contributed to a renewed escalation of partisan confirmation battles on which the Federalist Society capitalized. Pundits and politicians alike show growing concern about the role of interest groups, especially those associated with the conservative legal movement, in judicial nominations. The intersection of these two sets of changes raises questions about the contemporary judicial nominations process. Utilizing a novel dataset of Federalist Society (FedSoc) affiliates drawn from event listings (1993–2020), we analyze the interactive role of FedSoc affiliation with Senate procedural changes to the judicial confirmation process. We find affiliation with the Federalist Society, after the initial nuclear option was implemented, increases the probability of a circuit court nominee’s confirmation by approximately 20%.
{"title":"Going Nuclear: Federalist Society Affiliated Judicial Nominees’ Prospects and a New Era of Confirmation Politics1","authors":"Christin Bird, Zachary A. McGee","doi":"10.1177/1532673X221109534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221109534","url":null,"abstract":"Significant changes to the federal judicial confirmation process have manifested over the past decade, including multiple procedural reforms in the United States Senate. We argue the “nuclear option,” the reduction of the vote-threshold required to proceed to a final confirmation vote on judicial nominees (i.e., to invoke cloture) from three-fifths to a simple majority, contributed to a renewed escalation of partisan confirmation battles on which the Federalist Society capitalized. Pundits and politicians alike show growing concern about the role of interest groups, especially those associated with the conservative legal movement, in judicial nominations. The intersection of these two sets of changes raises questions about the contemporary judicial nominations process. Utilizing a novel dataset of Federalist Society (FedSoc) affiliates drawn from event listings (1993–2020), we analyze the interactive role of FedSoc affiliation with Senate procedural changes to the judicial confirmation process. We find affiliation with the Federalist Society, after the initial nuclear option was implemented, increases the probability of a circuit court nominee’s confirmation by approximately 20%.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47785773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-22DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221106425
Adam J. Ramey, Jonathan Klingler, Gary E. Hollibaugh
For years, countless scholars have posited the role of constituency and party pressure on legislators’ roll call voting records. Indeed, though popular estimates of legislators’ preferences often come from roll call data (e.g., DW-NOMINATE scores), most scholars are careful to note that these are not necessarily measures of ideology per se but rather of legislators’ revealed preferences—that is, they reflect both legislators’ ideological commitments as well as the influence of party and constituency. In this paper, we offer fairly robust evidence that existing measures of legislator behavior may be closer to their preferences than once thought. Using a novel survey of former members of the House of Representatives, we leverage the severing of the electoral connection and lack of institutional party pressure to show that legislators’ preferences as measured by existing methods closely mirror their own perceptions of themselves.
{"title":"Still the Same? Revealed Preferences and Ideological Self-Perception Among Former Members of Congress","authors":"Adam J. Ramey, Jonathan Klingler, Gary E. Hollibaugh","doi":"10.1177/1532673X221106425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221106425","url":null,"abstract":"For years, countless scholars have posited the role of constituency and party pressure on legislators’ roll call voting records. Indeed, though popular estimates of legislators’ preferences often come from roll call data (e.g., DW-NOMINATE scores), most scholars are careful to note that these are not necessarily measures of ideology per se but rather of legislators’ revealed preferences—that is, they reflect both legislators’ ideological commitments as well as the influence of party and constituency. In this paper, we offer fairly robust evidence that existing measures of legislator behavior may be closer to their preferences than once thought. Using a novel survey of former members of the House of Representatives, we leverage the severing of the electoral connection and lack of institutional party pressure to show that legislators’ preferences as measured by existing methods closely mirror their own perceptions of themselves.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45021601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-21DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221110038
S. Lindsay
Multiple theoretical orientations propose a link between economic anxiety and racial attitudes. This article explores this link using three studies. The first study uses observational data from the 2016 CCES and ANES to determine whether or not anticipating a loss in income in the coming year is associated with negative racial affect. The second study uses observational data from the 2020 CCES to determine whether or not perceiving a greater risk of personal discrimination is associated with racial resentment. The last uses an original survey experiment from the 2020 CCES to gain insight into how priming intergroup competition shapes whites’ racial attitudes. These studies find an association between perceived economic threat and negative racial attitudes. However, the way respondents perceive economic threats seems to be largely shaped by partisan identification with Republicans perceiving greater levels of threat. They also suggest that material and symbolic threats may be mutually reinforcing. These findings support the claim that racial attitudes are deeply connected to economic anxieties and provide insight into how party identification shapes our psychology.
{"title":"The Relationship Between Racial Attitudes and Perceived Economic Threat Among Whites: A Three Study Analysis","authors":"S. Lindsay","doi":"10.1177/1532673X221110038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221110038","url":null,"abstract":"Multiple theoretical orientations propose a link between economic anxiety and racial attitudes. This article explores this link using three studies. The first study uses observational data from the 2016 CCES and ANES to determine whether or not anticipating a loss in income in the coming year is associated with negative racial affect. The second study uses observational data from the 2020 CCES to determine whether or not perceiving a greater risk of personal discrimination is associated with racial resentment. The last uses an original survey experiment from the 2020 CCES to gain insight into how priming intergroup competition shapes whites’ racial attitudes. These studies find an association between perceived economic threat and negative racial attitudes. However, the way respondents perceive economic threats seems to be largely shaped by partisan identification with Republicans perceiving greater levels of threat. They also suggest that material and symbolic threats may be mutually reinforcing. These findings support the claim that racial attitudes are deeply connected to economic anxieties and provide insight into how party identification shapes our psychology.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44328383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-21DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221109516
Andy Ballard, Ryan DeTamble, Spencer Dorsey, M. Heseltine, Marcus Johnson
Civility in political discourse is often thought to be necessary for deliberation and a healthy democracy. However, incivility is on the rise in political discourse in the United States—even from members of Congress—suggesting that political incivility may in fact be a tool to be used strategically. When and why, then, do members of Congress use incivility in their rhetoric? We develop and test expectations for the usage of political incivility by members of Congress on Twitter, using every tweet sent by a member of Congress from 2009–2020 coded for the presence of uncivil rhetoric via a novel application of transformer models for natural language processing. We find that more ideologically extreme members, those in safer electoral situations, and those who are in a position of political opposition are more likely to use incivility in their tweets, and that uncivil tweets increase engagement with members’ messages.
{"title":"Incivility in Congressional Tweets","authors":"Andy Ballard, Ryan DeTamble, Spencer Dorsey, M. Heseltine, Marcus Johnson","doi":"10.1177/1532673X221109516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221109516","url":null,"abstract":"Civility in political discourse is often thought to be necessary for deliberation and a healthy democracy. However, incivility is on the rise in political discourse in the United States—even from members of Congress—suggesting that political incivility may in fact be a tool to be used strategically. When and why, then, do members of Congress use incivility in their rhetoric? We develop and test expectations for the usage of political incivility by members of Congress on Twitter, using every tweet sent by a member of Congress from 2009–2020 coded for the presence of uncivil rhetoric via a novel application of transformer models for natural language processing. We find that more ideologically extreme members, those in safer electoral situations, and those who are in a position of political opposition are more likely to use incivility in their tweets, and that uncivil tweets increase engagement with members’ messages.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49387375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-12DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221106431
Paul A. Djupe, Jacob R. Neiheisel
The anti-LGBTQ politics of the Religious Right has been implicated as one of the critical forces promoting the rise of disaffiliation from religion. The association seems plain given the rapid rise of the nones among younger cohorts of Americans – a group which also holds the most pro-LGBTQ attitudes. However, little work actually tests the link between shifting attitudes on same-sex marriage and declining religious behavior and affiliation. Drawing on the Portraits of American Life Panel study with waves in 2006 and 2012, we use appropriate measures to document the religious effects of changing views on same-sex marriage. We find that while shifting views did have a negative effect on church attendance and affiliation, these effects were not limited to shifts toward support for same-sex marriage and were not limited to liberals.
{"title":"Are Shifts in Same-Sex Marriage Attitudes Associated With Declines in Religious Behavior and Affiliation?","authors":"Paul A. Djupe, Jacob R. Neiheisel","doi":"10.1177/1532673X221106431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221106431","url":null,"abstract":"The anti-LGBTQ politics of the Religious Right has been implicated as one of the critical forces promoting the rise of disaffiliation from religion. The association seems plain given the rapid rise of the nones among younger cohorts of Americans – a group which also holds the most pro-LGBTQ attitudes. However, little work actually tests the link between shifting attitudes on same-sex marriage and declining religious behavior and affiliation. Drawing on the Portraits of American Life Panel study with waves in 2006 and 2012, we use appropriate measures to document the religious effects of changing views on same-sex marriage. We find that while shifting views did have a negative effect on church attendance and affiliation, these effects were not limited to shifts toward support for same-sex marriage and were not limited to liberals.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42936717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-03DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221106435
Jamie M. Wright, Scott Clifford, Elizabeth N. Simas
The Democratic and Republican parties have longstanding reputations for their abilities to competently handle particular issues. These reputations help to simplify voter decision-making. Voters need only to determine which issues are most important in an election, then support the party with the strongest reputation for handling those issues. As elite polarization has grown in recent decades, the parties’ reputations should be even clearer, facilitating their use in vote choice. However, the corresponding partisan polarization in the electorate should limit the breadth of issue ownership beliefs, as well as the impact of these beliefs on vote choice. In this manuscript, we use a novel survey experiment to prime the parties’ owned issues. Our results show that the prime causes a shift in intended vote choice among pure independents, but not among partisans. These findings suggest that polarization has not erased issue ownership, but that partisanship has narrowed its potential impact.
{"title":"The Limits of Issue Ownership in a Polarized Era","authors":"Jamie M. Wright, Scott Clifford, Elizabeth N. Simas","doi":"10.1177/1532673X221106435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221106435","url":null,"abstract":"The Democratic and Republican parties have longstanding reputations for their abilities to competently handle particular issues. These reputations help to simplify voter decision-making. Voters need only to determine which issues are most important in an election, then support the party with the strongest reputation for handling those issues. As elite polarization has grown in recent decades, the parties’ reputations should be even clearer, facilitating their use in vote choice. However, the corresponding partisan polarization in the electorate should limit the breadth of issue ownership beliefs, as well as the impact of these beliefs on vote choice. In this manuscript, we use a novel survey experiment to prime the parties’ owned issues. Our results show that the prime causes a shift in intended vote choice among pure independents, but not among partisans. These findings suggest that polarization has not erased issue ownership, but that partisanship has narrowed its potential impact.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46573404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221106432
Z. Scott, J. McDonald
Emotions are an important feature of representation, as they allow politicians to reflect the feelings of their constituents. Yet studies of elites’ use of emotions have been confined to examinations of strategic incentives. We build on these studies by incorporating elites’ group identities as a theoretical consideration. Our theory blends perspectives on the group identities of partisanship, gender, and race with political psychology research on emotions. We hypothesize that Republicans use more fear and disgust language than Democrats, that women candidates use more joy language than men candidates, and that Black candidates use less anger than white candidates. We test these hypotheses by applying emotional sentiment dictionaries to a corpus of primary candidates’ speeches. The evidence supports our claim that Republicans use more fear and that women use more joy, but we find no significant differences in the use of disgust and anger language by partisanship and race, respectively.
{"title":"Tell Us How You Feel: Emotional Appeals for Votes in Presidential Primaries","authors":"Z. Scott, J. McDonald","doi":"10.1177/1532673X221106432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221106432","url":null,"abstract":"Emotions are an important feature of representation, as they allow politicians to reflect the feelings of their constituents. Yet studies of elites’ use of emotions have been confined to examinations of strategic incentives. We build on these studies by incorporating elites’ group identities as a theoretical consideration. Our theory blends perspectives on the group identities of partisanship, gender, and race with political psychology research on emotions. We hypothesize that Republicans use more fear and disgust language than Democrats, that women candidates use more joy language than men candidates, and that Black candidates use less anger than white candidates. We test these hypotheses by applying emotional sentiment dictionaries to a corpus of primary candidates’ speeches. The evidence supports our claim that Republicans use more fear and that women use more joy, but we find no significant differences in the use of disgust and anger language by partisanship and race, respectively.","PeriodicalId":51482,"journal":{"name":"American Politics Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48626271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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