Anna McCaghren Fleming, Matthew D. Montgomery, Natalie C. Rogol
Approval of the Supreme Court recently hit its lowest point in decades. Calls for reforming the Court have gained traction as a result. In this study, we look at how media framing can influence public support for two specific reforms: Court packing and term limits. In a survey experiment, we provide respondents with either a pro-, anti-, or mixed-valence framed message about one of these two reforms. We find support for the proposition that media messages have the power to decrease support for reform but not to increase support for reform. Additionally, we theorize that highlighting the conflict surrounding the Court activates ideological considerations individuals hold toward the Court. In support of this theory, we find that discussing either Court packing or term limits decreases specific support of the high Court among Democrats and increases specific support among Republicans across all conditions.
{"title":"Reforming the Bench: Public Support for Supreme Court Institutional Change","authors":"Anna McCaghren Fleming, Matthew D. Montgomery, Natalie C. Rogol","doi":"10.1093/psquar/qqae009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqae009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Approval of the Supreme Court recently hit its lowest point in decades. Calls for reforming the Court have gained traction as a result. In this study, we look at how media framing can influence public support for two specific reforms: Court packing and term limits. In a survey experiment, we provide respondents with either a pro-, anti-, or mixed-valence framed message about one of these two reforms. We find support for the proposition that media messages have the power to decrease support for reform but not to increase support for reform. Additionally, we theorize that highlighting the conflict surrounding the Court activates ideological considerations individuals hold toward the Court. In support of this theory, we find that discussing either Court packing or term limits decreases specific support of the high Court among Democrats and increases specific support among Republicans across all conditions.","PeriodicalId":51491,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140077273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Former presidents are not resigned to quiet anonymity but instead can remain prominent political actors long after exiting the White House. From Jimmy Carter's personal diplomacy to Donald Trump's caustic social media posts, ex-presidents continue to exercise considerable political power despite lacking any official role or governing authority. We argue that this continued post-presidential influence is an outgrowth of the informal powers of the presidency. A president's rhetorical prowess and ability to command national attention do not dissipate upon exiting office but instead form the basis for post-presidential influence. To test this theory, we conducted two survey experiments of former presidents as elite cue givers. We found that although effects are not uniform, statements attributed to former presidents can substantively alter the policy preferences of recipients. However, these effects appear to be highly individualistic and largely tied to copartisan recipients.
{"title":"The Rhetorical Post-presidency: Former Presidents as Elite Cue Givers","authors":"Gregory H. Winger, Alex Oliver","doi":"10.1093/psquar/qqae013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqae013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Former presidents are not resigned to quiet anonymity but instead can remain prominent political actors long after exiting the White House. From Jimmy Carter's personal diplomacy to Donald Trump's caustic social media posts, ex-presidents continue to exercise considerable political power despite lacking any official role or governing authority. We argue that this continued post-presidential influence is an outgrowth of the informal powers of the presidency. A president's rhetorical prowess and ability to command national attention do not dissipate upon exiting office but instead form the basis for post-presidential influence. To test this theory, we conducted two survey experiments of former presidents as elite cue givers. We found that although effects are not uniform, statements attributed to former presidents can substantively alter the policy preferences of recipients. However, these effects appear to be highly individualistic and largely tied to copartisan recipients.","PeriodicalId":51491,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140077926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite longstanding scholarly interest in international institutions, remarkably little research has been conducted in variation in performance across organizations. In this essay, I review Ranjit Lall's book, which aims to fill that gap. Lall argues that the chief impediment to high-functioning international organizations (IOs) are member-states with particularistic interests that attempt to capture the institutions. The solution, he maintains, is to bolster the de facto autonomy of the bureaucrats who staff these institutions by forging operational alliances with nonstate stakeholders and mandating that they perform functions that are difficult for members to monitor. I evaluate Lall's argument and evidence. I then discuss a set of additional issues that are related to the performance of international institutions. First, why do stakeholders often continue to support those organizations that perform poorly? Second, what mechanisms exist for improving the performance of ailing IOs? Third, how does the widely documented backlash against globalization that has transpired during the past few decades bear on IOs? Fourth, Lall and others tout the benefits of well-performing IOs, but such institutions, nonetheless, can have costly and unanticipated side effects that merit greater scrutiny. Finally, formal international institutions have been key features of world politics. However, additional research is needed on whether and, if so, why they have become less important aspects of global governance.
{"title":"Bureaucratic Autonomy and the Performance of International Institutions","authors":"Edward D Mansfield","doi":"10.1093/psquar/qqae017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqae017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Despite longstanding scholarly interest in international institutions, remarkably little research has been conducted in variation in performance across organizations. In this essay, I review Ranjit Lall's book, which aims to fill that gap. Lall argues that the chief impediment to high-functioning international organizations (IOs) are member-states with particularistic interests that attempt to capture the institutions. The solution, he maintains, is to bolster the de facto autonomy of the bureaucrats who staff these institutions by forging operational alliances with nonstate stakeholders and mandating that they perform functions that are difficult for members to monitor. I evaluate Lall's argument and evidence. I then discuss a set of additional issues that are related to the performance of international institutions. First, why do stakeholders often continue to support those organizations that perform poorly? Second, what mechanisms exist for improving the performance of ailing IOs? Third, how does the widely documented backlash against globalization that has transpired during the past few decades bear on IOs? Fourth, Lall and others tout the benefits of well-performing IOs, but such institutions, nonetheless, can have costly and unanticipated side effects that merit greater scrutiny. Finally, formal international institutions have been key features of world politics. However, additional research is needed on whether and, if so, why they have become less important aspects of global governance.","PeriodicalId":51491,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140261382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fred Greenstein famously presented Eisenhower's secretive “hidden hand” style as an alternative to Richard Neustadt's model of presidential leadership, which had emphasized the need for overt control over the legislative process. Yet both models assume that the most important component of presidential leadership is the ability to manipulate governing elites. This article shows that the 1956 Highway Act contradicts Greenstein's characterization of Eisenhower as a successful hidden-hand leader. Through archival research, I show that Eisenhower's role in the Highway Act—by far the most ambitious legislative program attempted during his administration—was a decisive leadership failure. This finding does not merely undercut Greenstein's assessment of Eisenhower's distinctive leadership style, however. It exposes problems that result from assuming that presidential success should be defined as the ability to control the political process by denying other political actors substantive input in decision-making and the ability to reach some decisions on their own. Greenstein and Neustadt—the originators of widely shared contemporary assumptions about the presidency—thus incorrectly theorized the presidency's place in the American constitutional system. By empowering independently elected legislators, the separation of powers incentivizes presidents with ambitious legislative agendas to accommodate the agency of other constitutional actors through a degree of transparency and deliberativeness. I conclude by sketching an alternative presidential leadership model to the one offered by Greenstein and Neustadt, one that accommodates rather than resists the Constitution's constraints.
{"title":"Rethinking the Basic Models of Presidential Leadership: Eisenhower, Greenstein, and Federal Highway Expansion","authors":"Charles U. Zug","doi":"10.1093/psquar/qqae004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqae004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Fred Greenstein famously presented Eisenhower's secretive “hidden hand” style as an alternative to Richard Neustadt's model of presidential leadership, which had emphasized the need for overt control over the legislative process. Yet both models assume that the most important component of presidential leadership is the ability to manipulate governing elites. This article shows that the 1956 Highway Act contradicts Greenstein's characterization of Eisenhower as a successful hidden-hand leader. Through archival research, I show that Eisenhower's role in the Highway Act—by far the most ambitious legislative program attempted during his administration—was a decisive leadership failure. This finding does not merely undercut Greenstein's assessment of Eisenhower's distinctive leadership style, however. It exposes problems that result from assuming that presidential success should be defined as the ability to control the political process by denying other political actors substantive input in decision-making and the ability to reach some decisions on their own. Greenstein and Neustadt—the originators of widely shared contemporary assumptions about the presidency—thus incorrectly theorized the presidency's place in the American constitutional system. By empowering independently elected legislators, the separation of powers incentivizes presidents with ambitious legislative agendas to accommodate the agency of other constitutional actors through a degree of transparency and deliberativeness. I conclude by sketching an alternative presidential leadership model to the one offered by Greenstein and Neustadt, one that accommodates rather than resists the Constitution's constraints.","PeriodicalId":51491,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140262201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The dramatic increase in anti-Asian racial violence in the United States during the pandemic has sparked debates on issues of domestic racial justice and deep-seated racism against Asian Americans. Political scientists, however, have paid relatively little attention to how growing anti-Asian racism might affect contemporary U.S.-China relations, especially by shaping foreign policy discourses and public opinion in China. In this article, I investigate the way the Chinese state media discuss the issue and how such top-down discourses shape mass political attitudes and foreign policy preferences in China. Analyzing the Chinese state media coverage of anti-Asian racial violence, I first find that Chinese official narratives frame the issue as a manifestation of both racially motivated American foreign policy and problems with American democracy. By conducting a nationwide survey experiment in China, I then examine the impact of such top-down political rhetoric on public support for hawkish foreign policies. I find that these political narratives significantly boost racialized and nationalist sentiments among the Chinese masses, which, in turn, garner greater public support for hawkish foreign policy. This article contributes to understanding the foreign policy implications of anti-Asian racism after the global pandemic and the potential racialization of Sino-American great-power competition.
{"title":"Anti-Asian Racism and the Rise of Hawkish Mass Opinion in China","authors":"D. G. Kim","doi":"10.1093/psquar/qqae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqae001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The dramatic increase in anti-Asian racial violence in the United States during the pandemic has sparked debates on issues of domestic racial justice and deep-seated racism against Asian Americans. Political scientists, however, have paid relatively little attention to how growing anti-Asian racism might affect contemporary U.S.-China relations, especially by shaping foreign policy discourses and public opinion in China. In this article, I investigate the way the Chinese state media discuss the issue and how such top-down discourses shape mass political attitudes and foreign policy preferences in China. Analyzing the Chinese state media coverage of anti-Asian racial violence, I first find that Chinese official narratives frame the issue as a manifestation of both racially motivated American foreign policy and problems with American democracy. By conducting a nationwide survey experiment in China, I then examine the impact of such top-down political rhetoric on public support for hawkish foreign policies. I find that these political narratives significantly boost racialized and nationalist sentiments among the Chinese masses, which, in turn, garner greater public support for hawkish foreign policy. This article contributes to understanding the foreign policy implications of anti-Asian racism after the global pandemic and the potential racialization of Sino-American great-power competition.","PeriodicalId":51491,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140261198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, we examine individual- and state-level voter confidence in Georgia from 2020 to 2022—an extremely contentious moment in Georgia politics. For the first time in 28 years, Georgia's electoral votes went to a Democrat, Joe Biden, in 2020. Then, in early January 2021, Democrats won both of Georgia's two U.S. Senate runoffs, giving their party majority control. In the wake of these surprising, historic, and consequential losses, Georgia Republicans’ voter confidence plummeted, and their party responded by passing comprehensive electoral reform in Senate Bill (SB) 202. Using survey data, we tracked voter confidence in Georgia before and after 2020, after passage of SB 202 in 2021, and after the 2022 midterm. Partisans’ voter confidence is greatly affected by the winner/loser effect in election outcomes. Also, SB 202 did boost Republicans’ confidence in Georgia's election system, which, in turn, increased their individual- and state-level voter confidence in the 2022 midterm. In contrast, Georgia Democrats overwhelmingly opposed SB 202; therefore, the bill did not have the same salutary effect on their voter confidence in the 2022 elections.
{"title":"Winners, Losers, and Voter Confidence in Response to Partisan Electoral Reform","authors":"M. Hood, Seth C. McKee","doi":"10.1093/psquar/qqae012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqae012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, we examine individual- and state-level voter confidence in Georgia from 2020 to 2022—an extremely contentious moment in Georgia politics. For the first time in 28 years, Georgia's electoral votes went to a Democrat, Joe Biden, in 2020. Then, in early January 2021, Democrats won both of Georgia's two U.S. Senate runoffs, giving their party majority control. In the wake of these surprising, historic, and consequential losses, Georgia Republicans’ voter confidence plummeted, and their party responded by passing comprehensive electoral reform in Senate Bill (SB) 202. Using survey data, we tracked voter confidence in Georgia before and after 2020, after passage of SB 202 in 2021, and after the 2022 midterm. Partisans’ voter confidence is greatly affected by the winner/loser effect in election outcomes. Also, SB 202 did boost Republicans’ confidence in Georgia's election system, which, in turn, increased their individual- and state-level voter confidence in the 2022 midterm. In contrast, Georgia Democrats overwhelmingly opposed SB 202; therefore, the bill did not have the same salutary effect on their voter confidence in the 2022 elections.","PeriodicalId":51491,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140264261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article advances a novel theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of international and domestic conflicts, especially in the twenty-first century. I argue that nationalism plays a major role in the rise of these conflicts. Yet, nationalism is not monolithic. I distinguish among five types of nationalism (satisfied; stateless; consolidating; irredentist; populist). The variations in the type of nationalism explain variations in peace and conflict in different parts of the world. The explanation of the variations of types of nationalism, in turn, is based on the combined effect of variations in state capacity (i.e., the functioning of state institutions) and national congruence (i.e., the congruence between national identities and state borders). Variations in these two independent variables account for both civil and international wars as well as for peaceful states and for domestic polarization. Thus, national congruence and high capacity produce satisfied nationalism and a peaceful state. In contrast, national incongruence and low capacity lead to stateless nationalism and, thus, to civil wars in failed states. High capacity and national incongruence, especially external incongruence, produce irredentist nationalism of revisionist states, leading to war-prone interstate conflicts. High capacity and declining congruence generate nationalist populism and societal polarization. Thus, the theory developed here explains the recent rise of nationalist populism (and the related domestic polarization) in quite a few democracies in comparison with other types of nationalism and the conflicts they generate.
{"title":"Nationalism and Conflict: How Do Variations of Nationalism Affect Variations in Domestic and International Conflict?","authors":"Benjamin Miller","doi":"10.1093/psquar/qqae014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqae014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article advances a novel theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of international and domestic conflicts, especially in the twenty-first century. I argue that nationalism plays a major role in the rise of these conflicts. Yet, nationalism is not monolithic. I distinguish among five types of nationalism (satisfied; stateless; consolidating; irredentist; populist). The variations in the type of nationalism explain variations in peace and conflict in different parts of the world. The explanation of the variations of types of nationalism, in turn, is based on the combined effect of variations in state capacity (i.e., the functioning of state institutions) and national congruence (i.e., the congruence between national identities and state borders). Variations in these two independent variables account for both civil and international wars as well as for peaceful states and for domestic polarization. Thus, national congruence and high capacity produce satisfied nationalism and a peaceful state. In contrast, national incongruence and low capacity lead to stateless nationalism and, thus, to civil wars in failed states. High capacity and national incongruence, especially external incongruence, produce irredentist nationalism of revisionist states, leading to war-prone interstate conflicts. High capacity and declining congruence generate nationalist populism and societal polarization. Thus, the theory developed here explains the recent rise of nationalist populism (and the related domestic polarization) in quite a few democracies in comparison with other types of nationalism and the conflicts they generate.","PeriodicalId":51491,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140079392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The relationship between violence and democracy is an enduring theme in political science. We know that civil war, revolution, and state repression are much less likely under democratic rule, but how do we get from such violence to democracy? We draw upon Sarah Zukerman Daly's book, Violent Victors: Why Bloodstained Parties Win Postwar Elections, to explore these questions. Daly addresses the enigma of belligerent parties, often marred by heinous atrocities, emerging victorious in postwar elections. She shows how such violent victors triumph by playing on their capacity to provide security. We broaden out from Daly's focus on postwar democratization to consider the prospects for democracy in the wake of state repression and revolution. Our review finds that voters may be less forgiving of violent state repression compared with civil war violence; political parties emerging from civil wars and state repression face cognate yet distinct challenges; and social revolutionary violence poses more serious and durable threats to democratization than violence from civil wars and state repression. These findings underscore the need for a wider research agenda that investigates the diverse forms of social and political violence and their implications for democracy.
{"title":"Violence and Democracy","authors":"Yeilim Cheong, Stephan Haggard","doi":"10.1093/psquar/qqae015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqae015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The relationship between violence and democracy is an enduring theme in political science. We know that civil war, revolution, and state repression are much less likely under democratic rule, but how do we get from such violence to democracy? We draw upon Sarah Zukerman Daly's book, Violent Victors: Why Bloodstained Parties Win Postwar Elections, to explore these questions. Daly addresses the enigma of belligerent parties, often marred by heinous atrocities, emerging victorious in postwar elections. She shows how such violent victors triumph by playing on their capacity to provide security. We broaden out from Daly's focus on postwar democratization to consider the prospects for democracy in the wake of state repression and revolution. Our review finds that voters may be less forgiving of violent state repression compared with civil war violence; political parties emerging from civil wars and state repression face cognate yet distinct challenges; and social revolutionary violence poses more serious and durable threats to democratization than violence from civil wars and state repression. These findings underscore the need for a wider research agenda that investigates the diverse forms of social and political violence and their implications for democracy.","PeriodicalId":51491,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140264480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the most controversial political demands to emerge from the mass protests of the summer of 2020 was the abolition of police departments and prisons. This review article takes stock of the rationale behind prison abolitionism and of the philosopher Tommie Shelby's The Idea of Prison Abolition, a recent effort to initiate a dialogue between Angela Davis, the intellectual vanguard of contemporary abolitionists, and Shelby's own style of liberal political philosophy in the tradition of John Rawls. Although it shares a name with the successful nineteenth century movement to end slavery, today's abolitionists have much broader and far-reaching aims. The antislavery movement claimed to be bringing liberal society in line with liberalism's own values by abolishing chattel slavery, but Shelby's argument reaffirms that the prison, for its part, actually has a deep conceptual and historical compatibility with liberalism. Prison abolitionists, conscious of the connections between liberalism and incarceration, therefore, level their attacks not only at imprisonment but against liberal society as a whole. The close entwinement of liberalism and incarceration and deep disagreements about the meaning of basic terms like reform and criminality mean that long-term collaboration between liberals and abolitionists is probably unrealistic, both theoretically and politically.
2020 年夏天的大规模抗议活动中出现的最具争议性的政治诉求之一是废除警察部门和监狱。这篇评论文章盘点了监狱废奴主义背后的理论依据，以及哲学家托米-谢尔比（Tommie Shelby）的《监狱废奴的理念》（The Idea of Prison Abolition）一书，该书是当代废奴主义者的思想先锋安吉拉-戴维斯（Angela Davis）与谢尔比本人秉承约翰-罗尔斯（John Rawls）传统的自由主义政治哲学风格之间展开对话的最新力作。虽然与十九世纪成功结束奴隶制的运动同名，但今天的废奴主义者有着更为广泛和深远的目标。反奴隶制运动声称要通过废除动产奴隶制，使自由主义社会与自由主义自身的价值观保持一致，但谢尔比的论点再次证实，监狱就其自身而言，实际上与自由主义在理念和历史上有着深刻的契合点。因此，意识到自由主义与监禁之间联系的监狱废奴主义者，他们的攻击不仅针对监禁，而且针对整个自由主义社会。自由主义与监禁的紧密联系，以及对改革和犯罪等基本术语含义的深刻分歧，意味着自由主义者与废狱主义者之间的长期合作在理论上和政治上可能都是不现实的。
{"title":"Prison Abolitionism and the Liberal Imagination","authors":"Jacob Abolafia","doi":"10.1093/psquar/qqae020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqae020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 One of the most controversial political demands to emerge from the mass protests of the summer of 2020 was the abolition of police departments and prisons. This review article takes stock of the rationale behind prison abolitionism and of the philosopher Tommie Shelby's The Idea of Prison Abolition, a recent effort to initiate a dialogue between Angela Davis, the intellectual vanguard of contemporary abolitionists, and Shelby's own style of liberal political philosophy in the tradition of John Rawls. Although it shares a name with the successful nineteenth century movement to end slavery, today's abolitionists have much broader and far-reaching aims. The antislavery movement claimed to be bringing liberal society in line with liberalism's own values by abolishing chattel slavery, but Shelby's argument reaffirms that the prison, for its part, actually has a deep conceptual and historical compatibility with liberalism. Prison abolitionists, conscious of the connections between liberalism and incarceration, therefore, level their attacks not only at imprisonment but against liberal society as a whole. The close entwinement of liberalism and incarceration and deep disagreements about the meaning of basic terms like reform and criminality mean that long-term collaboration between liberals and abolitionists is probably unrealistic, both theoretically and politically.","PeriodicalId":51491,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140079519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the violent January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, federal authorities have sought to hold participants and organizers accountable for their assault on American democracy. Troublingly, however, a substantial fraction of the public opposes the prosecution of participants in the assault on the Capitol and rejects charging former president Trump with crimes relating to the planning and execution of the attack. Why does a substantial fraction of the American public oppose accountability for perpetrators of the January 6 attack? In this article, we argue that racial attitudes play a central role in determining individuals' attitudes toward accountability for the Capitol attack. Elaborating on the theory of “racial spillover,” we argue that former president Trump's frequent use of racial rhetoric—which established a racialized identity and cemented a close relationship between negative racial attitudes and support for his presidency among members of the mass public—created conditions in which these attitudes were likely to “spill over” into the ostensibly non-racialized domain of attitudes toward holding perpetrators, planners, and inciters accountable for the attack. Because attitudes toward accountability for the Capitol attack are inextricable from Trump's racialized persona, we hypothesize that negative racial attitudes should be associated with increased opposition to accountability for those responsible for the attack. Using data from four original, nationally representative surveys fielded between 2021 and 2023, we find strong evidence for our racial spillover hypothesis and show that individuals with more negative racial attitudes are more opposed to accountability for those responsible for the Capitol attack.
{"title":"The New Racial Spillover: Donald Trump, Racial Attitudes, and Public Opinion Toward Accountability for Perpetrators and Planners of the January 6 Capitol Attack","authors":"Jesse H Rhodes, Tatishe M. Nteta","doi":"10.1093/psquar/qqae010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/psquar/qqae010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Since the violent January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, federal authorities have sought to hold participants and organizers accountable for their assault on American democracy. Troublingly, however, a substantial fraction of the public opposes the prosecution of participants in the assault on the Capitol and rejects charging former president Trump with crimes relating to the planning and execution of the attack. Why does a substantial fraction of the American public oppose accountability for perpetrators of the January 6 attack? In this article, we argue that racial attitudes play a central role in determining individuals' attitudes toward accountability for the Capitol attack. Elaborating on the theory of “racial spillover,” we argue that former president Trump's frequent use of racial rhetoric—which established a racialized identity and cemented a close relationship between negative racial attitudes and support for his presidency among members of the mass public—created conditions in which these attitudes were likely to “spill over” into the ostensibly non-racialized domain of attitudes toward holding perpetrators, planners, and inciters accountable for the attack. Because attitudes toward accountability for the Capitol attack are inextricable from Trump's racialized persona, we hypothesize that negative racial attitudes should be associated with increased opposition to accountability for those responsible for the attack. Using data from four original, nationally representative surveys fielded between 2021 and 2023, we find strong evidence for our racial spillover hypothesis and show that individuals with more negative racial attitudes are more opposed to accountability for those responsible for the Capitol attack.","PeriodicalId":51491,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140082459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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