Global Policy最新文献

This Special Section marks the tenth anniversary of the United Nations' 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Progress on the latter has been dismal, with only 17% of targets on track. The contributions to this Special Section explore the global governance of the SDGs as a Hybrid Institutional Complex (HIC): a global governance complex characterized by institutional diversity in that it combines formal intergovernmental organizations, informal intergovernmental institutions, public-private partnerships, multistakeholder initiatives, and private transnational institutions. The HIC framework suggests that this institutional diversity can offer governance benefits, such as good substantive fit for addressing complex transboundary SDG challenges and good political fit by including a broad swathe of actors relevant for goal attainment. Yet it also highlights governance risks, including individual institutions assuming governance tasks that they are poorly suited for and powerful actors cherry-picking goals and softer forms of governance that fit their interests. By applying the HIC concept to discrete dimensions of SDG governance and subfields, the contributions examine whether institutional diversity is driving or hindering progress. As we approach the 2030 deadline, they provide insights into the benefits and risks of HIC-based SDG governance, offering reflections on the remaining and post-2030 development agenda.

Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs), such as G20, G7, and BRICS, have become increasingly pivotal actors in global governance. By implication, they are afforded a key role in advancing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Without a permanent secretariat, however, IIGOs govern through orchestration, relying heavily on intermediary organizations. For instance, the G20 frequently enlists the OECD to provide analytical support and to implement its Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This article examines the dynamics between informal and formal international organizations, exploring how IIGOs choose specific intermediaries. Using the case of the G20 and a mixed-method approach, I examine how IIGOs select intermediaries to promote the SDGs. To do so, I extend Downie's (2022b) G20 orchestration dataset, providing a more comprehensive resource for global governance studies. I find that the G20 considers both goal alignment and the focality of the intermediaries, favoring intermediaries with common members and greater public attention. By shedding light on IIGO–intermediary dynamics, this research enhances understanding of institutional interactions within hybrid institutional complexes (HICs) and provides insights for strengthening international cooperation, which are particularly important to facilitating sustainable development.

This paper examines the interconnections between segments of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), bridging the traditional financial perspective with the sustainability-driven approach based on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) outlined in Agenda 2030. The analysis is endogenous, focusing on the shocks that emerge within the system composed of these segments. Utilizing daily data from six sustainable segments, each corresponding to different SDGs, alongside one traditional segment, spanning a sample period of approximately 14 years, the study reveals notable spillover effects. Specifically, the periods associated with the pandemic and the war in Ukraine were marked by a significant surge in information transmission across the segments. Furthermore, the findings indicate that sustainable segments exhibit a strong interdependence with their traditional counterparts, a dynamic that facilitates contagion risk and limits the effectiveness of portfolio diversification strategies.

Dominant theories stipulate that high levels of authority are a prerequisite for effective problem-solving by international organizations (IOs). How, then, can we explain that African health organizations possess relatively low levels of authority, yet their response to COVID-19 has been touted as a remarkable success? In this article, we explain how low-authority IOs can engage in effective problem-solving. By rethinking the conventional zero-sum relation between national sovereignty and an IO's problem-solving potential, we develop a novel framework that allows us to analyze diverse cooperation logics pursued by various organizational actors within an IO. Applying this framework to the response of ECOWAS and its sub-agency, the West African Health Organization (WAHO), to the COVID-19 pandemic reveals that problem-solving cooperation dominated over symbolic and autonomy-oriented cooperation logics. This prevalence of problem-solving did not derive from ECOWAS' authority over states, but emerged because its member states saw it as expedient to address these issues through the organization. Our analysis shows that low-authority IOs can problem-solve if member states consider them to be transmitters instead of constraints of national sovereignty, that is, as suppliers of organizational services that enhance state capacities.

There is growing concern that provisions in international investment treaties are being used to delay the critically needed transition away from fossil fuels. Although various procedural and substantive reforms have been pursued in recent years, these reforms have thus far failed to tackle the fundamental problems with investment treaties and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system associated with them. By way of an alternative approach, this article assesses the potential for “climate clubs” to act as a forum for the development of initiatives that range from providing a waiver agreement for ISDS related to fossil fuel assets, to a general ISDS waiver agreement, to a mutual agreement to terminate investment treaties. These initiatives could be implemented in an existing climate club, or a new club could be formed for this purpose.

In light of the United States' withdrawal from and re-entry into the Paris Agreement, climate relations between the European Union and China warrant closer inspection. As the second- and third-largest cumulative emitters after the United States, their cooperation has a global impact. This paper assesses the current state of their climate and environmental engagement and analyzes post-COVID-19 obstacles affecting this dimension of their relations. Based on interview data, we show that the increasing institutionalization of climate and environmental cooperation has not resulted in improved outcomes. Instead, such engagement remains limited to dialog for the sake of dialog rather than substantive collaboration. We identify four key obstacles to cooperation: perceptual, capacity-related, institutional, and interest-based. This paper addresses pertinent questions about the viability and practicality of joint climate action in the context of rising geopolitical tensions. Our findings contribute to scholarship on global climate governance and EU–China relations, and we propose an analytical framework to inform future research and policy debate.

Carbon pricing mechanisms have proliferated across the world and have become a cornerstone of global climate action. This study maps and analyzes existing global carbon pricing governance institutions and initiatives. It creates a unique dataset encompassing 55 institutions, governance initiatives, and 16 specific programs aimed at encouraging broader adoption and stronger integration of carbon pricing in global climate action. The analysis focuses on the following variables: governance functions, location of headquarters, geographic scope, membership composition, thematic focus, and the initiatives' relationships with the World Bank, United Nations, and the European Union. The analysis makes two significant contributions. First, it catalogs all major transnational carbon pricing governance initiatives, considerably expanding the scholarly understanding of how they operate and integrate into international climate policy. For example, the analysis shows that global carbon pricing governance is dominated by initiatives promoting voluntary carbon markets, with significant institutional overlap in governance functions and a high level of hybridization in terms of membership. The global diffusion of carbon pricing mechanisms further highlights the increasingly polycentric nature of global climate governance, leaving space for bottom-up, voluntary, and hybrid mechanisms. Second, a set of recommendations contributes to policymakers' strategic objective of promoting carbon pricing mechanisms.