A number of ‘no-proposition’ approaches to the liar paradox find themselves implicitly committed to a moderate disquotational principle: the principle that if an utterance of the sentence ‘P ’ says anything at all, it says that P (with suitable restrictions). I show that this principle alone is responsible for the revenge paradoxes that plague this view. I instead propose a view in which there are several closely related language-world relations playing the ‘semantic expressing’ role, none of which is more central to semantic theorizing than any other. I use this thesis about language and the negative result about disquotation to motivate the view that people do say things with utterances of paradoxical sentences, although they do not say the proposition you’d always expect, as articulated with a disquotational principle. Consider a self-referential utterance, u, of the sentence ‘u is not true’. According to one widespread and appealing intuition when one makes a semantically paradoxical utterance such as u one simply does not succeed in saying anything. Call this the no proposition theory. No proposition theorists reject the disquotational assumption that utterances of ‘u is not true’ say that u is not true on the grounds that some utterances of ‘u is not true’ do not say anything at all. However, they may nonetheless subscribe to a qualified version of the principle that says that if an utterance of ‘u is not true’ says anything at all it says that u is not true. In this paper I shall show that such views are susceptible to a version of the revenge paradoxes. An examination of these paradoxes suggests a view in which paradoxical utterances such as u do say things, although they do not say what you might expect them to (in this case, that u is not true). I shall show, moreover, that this phenomena falls out of general considerations about the relation between language and the world, and is much more widespread than many have thought. In this paper we will be primarily be investigating the corner of philosophical space that accepts classical logic and that admits quantifiers that bind variables taking sentence position. Unless otherwise stated, that framework will be assumed throughout. 1 No Proposition Accounts of the Paradoxes The most straightforward version of the no proposition theory maintains that sentences like ‘u is not true’ are completely meaningless, and thus that any attempt to say something by making an utterance of this sentence would fail. Call this the non-contextual view. On the non-contextual view, then, all utterances of a paradoxical sentence are equally bad. ∗Thanks to ... 1Restrictions might exclude sentences which express different propositions in different contexts, such as sentences involving indexical expressions. 2Of course, neither of these assumptions are uncontentious; but see Prior [19] and Williamson [28] for a defense of the intelligibility of quantification into sentence position, and Williamson [29] for general
许多研究说谎者悖论的“无命题”方法发现自己隐含地遵循了一个适度的非引语原则:如果一个句子“P”的话语说了什么，它就说了P(在适当的限制下)。我指出，这一原则本身就是困扰这种观点的复仇悖论的原因。相反，我提出了一种观点，认为有几个密切相关的语言世界关系扮演着“语义表达”的角色，其中没有一个比其他任何一个对语义理论化更重要。我用这篇关于语言和反引的负面结果的论文来激发这样一种观点，即人们确实用矛盾句子的话语来表达事物，尽管他们说的不是你一直期望的命题，正如反引原则所表达的那样。考虑一句“u is not true”的自我指涉话语u。根据一种普遍而吸引人的直觉，当一个人说出像“u”这样语义矛盾的话语时，他根本说不出什么来。称之为无命题理论。没有命题理论家会拒绝不引用的假设，即" u不为真"的表述也就是说u不为真，因为一些" u不为真"的表述根本什么也没说。然而，他们可能仍然赞同这个原则的一个限定版本，即如果一个“u不为真”的话语说了什么，它就说明u不为真。在本文中，我将表明，这种观点容易受到复仇悖论的影响。对这些悖论的研究表明，一种观点认为，像u这样的悖论性话语确实说了一些事情，尽管它们并没有说出你可能期望它们说的话(在这种情况下，u不是真的)。此外，我将说明，这种现象不属于对语言与世界之间关系的一般考虑，而且比许多人想象的要广泛得多。在本文中，我们将主要研究哲学空间的角落，它接受经典逻辑，并承认量词绑定变量的句子位置。除非另有说明，否则将自始至终假定该框架。无命题论的最直接的版本认为，像" u不为真"这样的句子是完全没有意义的，因此，任何试图通过说出这个句子来表达某事的尝试都会失败。我们称之为非上下文视图。从非语境的观点来看，一个悖论句的所有话语都是同样糟糕的。由于……限制可能会排除在不同上下文中表达不同命题的句子，例如涉及索引表达式的句子。当然，这两种假设都不是毫无争议的;但请参阅Prior b[19]和Williamson[28]对句子位置的量化可解性的辩护，以及Williamson[29]对经典逻辑应用于说者悖论的一般方法论评论。关于放松经典命题逻辑的说谎者的最新方法，参见Field[8]。关于放松经典命题量词规则的方法的讨论，见Bacon, Hawthorne和Uzquiano b[2]。
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I present a biased look at data relating to the form, meaning, understanding, and acquisition of comparative sentences with more. I highlight two major points: (i) comparatives provide a potentially unique case study for examining the interplay of current ideas in formal semantics, generative syntax, and cognitive psychology; (ii) we can give unified explanations for the otherwise disparate phenomena observed here only by interpreting our semantic theory along explicitly cognitive lines. The upshot is not so much a rejection of more traditional views as providing a window on their scientific limitations.
{"title":"WHATmoreIS","authors":"Alexis Wellwood","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12121","url":null,"abstract":"I present a biased look at data relating to the form, meaning, understanding, and acquisition of comparative sentences with more. I highlight two major points: (i) comparatives provide a potentially unique case study for examining the interplay of current ideas in formal semantics, generative syntax, and cognitive psychology; (ii) we can give unified explanations for the otherwise disparate phenomena observed here only by interpreting our semantic theory along explicitly cognitive lines. The upshot is not so much a rejection of more traditional views as providing a window on their scientific limitations.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12121","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48438110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Provincialism in Pragmatics","authors":"Josh P. Armstrong","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12114","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12114","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42460690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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{"title":"Consciousness and Content in Perception","authors":"B. Brewer","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12091","url":null,"abstract":"Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":"31 1","pages":"41-54"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12091","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49431983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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