Pub Date : 2021-07-02DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1931417
Hipolitus Ringgi Wangge, S. Lawson
Abstract Pacific island countries have paid increasing attention to the situation in Indonesia’s easternmost provinces of Papua and West Papua (commonly referred to collectively as West Papua) in recent years, prompted mainly by continuing human rights abuses as well as the more general political and economic marginalization of indigenous West Papuan people since integration with Indonesia in 1969. This article addresses some key questions concerning Indonesia’s failure to deal effectively with the issue. Against a background of reactionary hypernationalism on the one hand, and a rhetorical anti-colonial internationalism on the other, domestic policy with respect to the treatment of indigenous West Papuans has, for the most part, seen a continuation of repressive authoritarian measures. And in responding to international criticisms, foreign policy has been poorly handled. There has been a lack of serious engagement with human rights issues as reflected in ongoing denial of abuses in the provinces and a generally reactive and defensive foreign policy approach. At a bureaucratic level, there is little coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries with responsibilities for West Papua, and therefore no effective basis on which to build a coherent policy response. Another problem consists in Indonesia’s often clumsy public diplomacy in the Pacific islands region. As a consequence, the West Papua issue continues to grow in prominence in Pacific regional politics and beyond.
{"title":"The West Papua issue in Pacific regional politics: explaining Indonesia’s foreign policy failure","authors":"Hipolitus Ringgi Wangge, S. Lawson","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2021.1931417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1931417","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pacific island countries have paid increasing attention to the situation in Indonesia’s easternmost provinces of Papua and West Papua (commonly referred to collectively as West Papua) in recent years, prompted mainly by continuing human rights abuses as well as the more general political and economic marginalization of indigenous West Papuan people since integration with Indonesia in 1969. This article addresses some key questions concerning Indonesia’s failure to deal effectively with the issue. Against a background of reactionary hypernationalism on the one hand, and a rhetorical anti-colonial internationalism on the other, domestic policy with respect to the treatment of indigenous West Papuans has, for the most part, seen a continuation of repressive authoritarian measures. And in responding to international criticisms, foreign policy has been poorly handled. There has been a lack of serious engagement with human rights issues as reflected in ongoing denial of abuses in the provinces and a generally reactive and defensive foreign policy approach. At a bureaucratic level, there is little coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries with responsibilities for West Papua, and therefore no effective basis on which to build a coherent policy response. Another problem consists in Indonesia’s often clumsy public diplomacy in the Pacific islands region. As a consequence, the West Papua issue continues to grow in prominence in Pacific regional politics and beyond.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"61 - 89"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09512748.2021.1931417","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44915361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-30DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1941209
Shogo Suzuki
Abstract China’s increasingly active economic diplomacy in recent years has often been deeply linked to its geostrategic interests. Japan is said to be watching this development with alarm. Analysts have often claimed that this has resulted in Sino-Japanese rivalry, where the Japanese see any gains made by China in zero-sum terms, and make concerted efforts to counter China’s growing influence. This article, however, is critical of such views. While elements of rivalry may indeed be visible in some aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, it would be premature to apply this perspective to economic statecraft, which is inherently multifaceted. This article claims that too much attention has been paid to the strategic aspects of Chinese economic statecraft at the expense of economic/commercial ones that could foster cooperative relations between Beijing and Tokyo. It argues that Japan does not hold a monolithic view that Chinese diplomatic activities in the economic realm are an axiomatic threat to Japanese security interests, and it remains premature to say that Japan and China are ‘rivals’ in the realm of economic statecraft. Future analysis in this area needs to pay greater attention to the complicating effects that economic interdependence can have in strategic policies.
{"title":"Economic statecraft, interdependence, and Sino-Japanese ‘rivalry’","authors":"Shogo Suzuki","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2021.1941209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1941209","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract China’s increasingly active economic diplomacy in recent years has often been deeply linked to its geostrategic interests. Japan is said to be watching this development with alarm. Analysts have often claimed that this has resulted in Sino-Japanese rivalry, where the Japanese see any gains made by China in zero-sum terms, and make concerted efforts to counter China’s growing influence. This article, however, is critical of such views. While elements of rivalry may indeed be visible in some aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, it would be premature to apply this perspective to economic statecraft, which is inherently multifaceted. This article claims that too much attention has been paid to the strategic aspects of Chinese economic statecraft at the expense of economic/commercial ones that could foster cooperative relations between Beijing and Tokyo. It argues that Japan does not hold a monolithic view that Chinese diplomatic activities in the economic realm are an axiomatic threat to Japanese security interests, and it remains premature to say that Japan and China are ‘rivals’ in the realm of economic statecraft. Future analysis in this area needs to pay greater attention to the complicating effects that economic interdependence can have in strategic policies.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"971 - 994"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09512748.2021.1941209","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43936867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-29DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1934519
L. Hu
Abstract For the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South China Sea (SCS) disputes between China and Southeast Asian claimant states (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei) are a major concern. However, the dominant sceptics are pessimistic about ASEAN’s effectiveness in managing these disputes. This article contributes to the field by providing a systematic analysis on this topic, which is missing within the literature. Also, many of the arguments presented in this article challenge the dominant views and thus provide an alternative understanding of ASEAN’s effectiveness in managing the disputes. The arguments are as follows: First, ASEAN members do have shared interests and a common policy regarding managing the disputes. Second, China’s influence on individual ASEAN members is not as strong as the sceptics often argue. Third, the degree of ASEAN’s goal attainment is medium because it achieved essential goals while conceding important but non-essential ones. Fourth, compared with a legalistic and adversarial posturing approach, ASEAN’s approach is more effective in managing these disputes.
{"title":"Examining ASEAN’s effectiveness in managing South China Sea disputes","authors":"L. Hu","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2021.1934519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1934519","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract For the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South China Sea (SCS) disputes between China and Southeast Asian claimant states (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei) are a major concern. However, the dominant sceptics are pessimistic about ASEAN’s effectiveness in managing these disputes. This article contributes to the field by providing a systematic analysis on this topic, which is missing within the literature. Also, many of the arguments presented in this article challenge the dominant views and thus provide an alternative understanding of ASEAN’s effectiveness in managing the disputes. The arguments are as follows: First, ASEAN members do have shared interests and a common policy regarding managing the disputes. Second, China’s influence on individual ASEAN members is not as strong as the sceptics often argue. Third, the degree of ASEAN’s goal attainment is medium because it achieved essential goals while conceding important but non-essential ones. Fourth, compared with a legalistic and adversarial posturing approach, ASEAN’s approach is more effective in managing these disputes.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"119 - 147"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09512748.2021.1934519","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46855148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1924846
Kim Emmanuel
Abstract To date, perceptions of China's rise in relation to US hegemony in the international realm has not escaped scholarly scrutiny. For the period 1990–2019, the International Relations literature has made a somewhat copious contribution to the broader debates on the US and China. Within the Sino-Latin America Caribbean (LAC) discourse, the implications of China's ascent for US interests in the region is an underlying concern. The region is considered salient in broader power configurations as a result of its geostrategic positioning in relation to the US. However, perceptions pertaining to the triad of interests in the space account largely for powerful states in the dynamic. Despite the ambiguous perceptions associated with a rising China in the international realm and the Latin America Caribbean region's strategic position, rather than being preoccupied with ideas of the ‘China threat’, these states appear to have largely bypassed the more threatening rhetoric associated with China's rise in the period under scrutiny. In seeking to bring Latin America and Caribbean states into the discourse, the article examines how benign perceptions shaped the region's relationship with China. The argument is made that Latin America and Caribbean states sought to frame and navigate their relationship with China largely on the premise of economic opportunity amidst a firmly embedded US role inside the region which further repudiated ideas of the ‘China threat’ in the engagement. In unpacking the argument, the discussion seeks to show that more favourable images of China's economic ascent punctuated LAC states responses to China and that such states have been driven by a high level of economic pragmatism in the relationship. It also illustrates that the underlying hegemonic order has practical effects and more subtle manifestations inside LAC states which mitigated against perceptions of threat in China's rise in the region.
{"title":"China’s rise in Latin America and the Caribbean 1990–2019: navigating perceptions in the relationship","authors":"Kim Emmanuel","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2021.1924846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1924846","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract To date, perceptions of China's rise in relation to US hegemony in the international realm has not escaped scholarly scrutiny. For the period 1990–2019, the International Relations literature has made a somewhat copious contribution to the broader debates on the US and China. Within the Sino-Latin America Caribbean (LAC) discourse, the implications of China's ascent for US interests in the region is an underlying concern. The region is considered salient in broader power configurations as a result of its geostrategic positioning in relation to the US. However, perceptions pertaining to the triad of interests in the space account largely for powerful states in the dynamic. Despite the ambiguous perceptions associated with a rising China in the international realm and the Latin America Caribbean region's strategic position, rather than being preoccupied with ideas of the ‘China threat’, these states appear to have largely bypassed the more threatening rhetoric associated with China's rise in the period under scrutiny. In seeking to bring Latin America and Caribbean states into the discourse, the article examines how benign perceptions shaped the region's relationship with China. The argument is made that Latin America and Caribbean states sought to frame and navigate their relationship with China largely on the premise of economic opportunity amidst a firmly embedded US role inside the region which further repudiated ideas of the ‘China threat’ in the engagement. In unpacking the argument, the discussion seeks to show that more favourable images of China's economic ascent punctuated LAC states responses to China and that such states have been driven by a high level of economic pragmatism in the relationship. It also illustrates that the underlying hegemonic order has practical effects and more subtle manifestations inside LAC states which mitigated against perceptions of threat in China's rise in the region.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"946 - 970"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09512748.2021.1924846","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43426288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-26DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1931418
Jeonghye Kim
Abstract This article examines the role of international intervention for refugee protection by conducting a within-case analysis of two similar groups in China: Vietnamese and North Korean refugees. It argues that states make refugee policy decisions based on cost-benefit calculations, but this self-centered behavior can be mitigated by international intervention. Without amending national laws and official policies, the international community can improve refugee protection in authoritarian regimes through external assistance and support that shares and reduces the burden on host states and persuades state behavior toward refugees. The evidence of this study further suggests that international intervention matters, but the formats of intervention are even more critical to improving a state’s refugee protection, especially in dealing with a powerful authoritarian state like China in the context of the Post-Cold War era. More specifically, positive inducements are preferable than sanctions and criticism to address China’s human rights violations regarding North Korean refugees because the strategies help China to leverage its power in the Korean peninsula and the Asian region more broadly by providing them enough political coverage to save its face from allies and constituents and maintain close diplomatic relationships with its all neighbors, including the two Koreas.
{"title":"The role of international intervention in managing refugee crises: lessons from Vietnamese and North Korean refugee cases in China","authors":"Jeonghye Kim","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2021.1931418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1931418","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the role of international intervention for refugee protection by conducting a within-case analysis of two similar groups in China: Vietnamese and North Korean refugees. It argues that states make refugee policy decisions based on cost-benefit calculations, but this self-centered behavior can be mitigated by international intervention. Without amending national laws and official policies, the international community can improve refugee protection in authoritarian regimes through external assistance and support that shares and reduces the burden on host states and persuades state behavior toward refugees. The evidence of this study further suggests that international intervention matters, but the formats of intervention are even more critical to improving a state’s refugee protection, especially in dealing with a powerful authoritarian state like China in the context of the Post-Cold War era. More specifically, positive inducements are preferable than sanctions and criticism to address China’s human rights violations regarding North Korean refugees because the strategies help China to leverage its power in the Korean peninsula and the Asian region more broadly by providing them enough political coverage to save its face from allies and constituents and maintain close diplomatic relationships with its all neighbors, including the two Koreas.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"90 - 118"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09512748.2021.1931418","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42041614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-24DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1928737
T. Huynh
Abstract South Korea's reluctant response to the U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy so far has failed to send a clear-cut signal to regional countries. Despite upholding multilateralism as the cornerstone of its middle power diplomacy, South Korea has not worked in line with Indo-Pacific second-size powers given Seoul's relatively vague response to the Indo-Pacific structure. With foreign policy shifts from Trump to Biden, South Korea may be well-positioned to communicate its policies with a more nuanced response to the Indo-Pacific. To leverage Seoul's middle power standing and its commitment to multilateralism, the Moon Jae-in administration can be expected to reflect on clearer definitions of what 'Indo-Pacific' means and come up with a more comprehensive understanding of multilateral cooperation in the region so as not to mistake 'Indo-Pacific' for its security connotation. As for South Korea, pursuing a three-headed strategy, for example, continuing to position itself in the Indo-Pacific region as a balancer, enhancing ties with like-minded middle powers, and deepening the South Korea-ASEAN relationship, could accommodate Seoul's interests and concerns amid the U.S.–China strategic competition and the COVID-19 pandemic.
{"title":"Bolstering middle power standing: South Korea's response to U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy from Trump to Biden","authors":"T. Huynh","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2021.1928737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1928737","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract South Korea's reluctant response to the U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy so far has failed to send a clear-cut signal to regional countries. Despite upholding multilateralism as the cornerstone of its middle power diplomacy, South Korea has not worked in line with Indo-Pacific second-size powers given Seoul's relatively vague response to the Indo-Pacific structure. With foreign policy shifts from Trump to Biden, South Korea may be well-positioned to communicate its policies with a more nuanced response to the Indo-Pacific. To leverage Seoul's middle power standing and its commitment to multilateralism, the Moon Jae-in administration can be expected to reflect on clearer definitions of what 'Indo-Pacific' means and come up with a more comprehensive understanding of multilateral cooperation in the region so as not to mistake 'Indo-Pacific' for its security connotation. As for South Korea, pursuing a three-headed strategy, for example, continuing to position itself in the Indo-Pacific region as a balancer, enhancing ties with like-minded middle powers, and deepening the South Korea-ASEAN relationship, could accommodate Seoul's interests and concerns amid the U.S.–China strategic competition and the COVID-19 pandemic.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"32 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09512748.2021.1928737","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44525875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-13DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1924240
Shinae Hong
Abstract Over the past decade, the small state of Mongolia has emerged as an important player in Northeast Asia through its mediation efforts. Driven by a desire for regional and global influence and prestige, Mongolia has sought to locate itself as a neutral intermediary in regional conflicts—in particular the Korean peninsula’s peace process, by hosting the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue” starting in 2013. In this regional security dialogue initiative, Mongolia has proven itself to be a capable peace broker in easing tensions between the two parties, and, more crucially, it has made a constructive impact on the regional security architecture by building a functioning multilateral dialogue mechanism to support the Korean peninsula peace process after the halt of the six-party talks. Its success has been aided by its perceived impartiality in the conflict; its multilateral, activist, peace-oriented foreign policy portfolio; and its cordial external relations with regional countries, including both North and South Korea, and globally. This article seeks to contribute to the understanding of the varied abilities, strategies, and sources of advantage employed by small states to project power and raise their influence in regional affairs by exploring the case of Mongolia.
{"title":"Mediation and Mongolia’s foreign policy","authors":"Shinae Hong","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2021.1924240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1924240","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Over the past decade, the small state of Mongolia has emerged as an important player in Northeast Asia through its mediation efforts. Driven by a desire for regional and global influence and prestige, Mongolia has sought to locate itself as a neutral intermediary in regional conflicts—in particular the Korean peninsula’s peace process, by hosting the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue” starting in 2013. In this regional security dialogue initiative, Mongolia has proven itself to be a capable peace broker in easing tensions between the two parties, and, more crucially, it has made a constructive impact on the regional security architecture by building a functioning multilateral dialogue mechanism to support the Korean peninsula peace process after the halt of the six-party talks. Its success has been aided by its perceived impartiality in the conflict; its multilateral, activist, peace-oriented foreign policy portfolio; and its cordial external relations with regional countries, including both North and South Korea, and globally. This article seeks to contribute to the understanding of the varied abilities, strategies, and sources of advantage employed by small states to project power and raise their influence in regional affairs by exploring the case of Mongolia.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"765 - 788"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09512748.2021.1924240","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49339275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-06DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1908410
Johannes Plagemann
Abstract This article explores the consequences major power rivalries over connectivity investments have for small states in Asia and thereby contributes to a better understanding of small states’ strength and capabilities in an increasingly multipolar world. With reference to the literature on small states, field work, and interviews, the article explores Bangladesh’s remarkable success in reaping the benefits from relations with rivalling major powers over the past decade. Three explanatory factors stand out: first, Bangladesh’s ‘intrinsic’ value to major powers increased; second, its political leadership has been particularly adept in dealing with such major powers; and third, systemic factors – the number and kind of major powers with stakes in Bangladesh – has been beneficial. Thus, Bangladesh’s foreign policy responses suggest that the competitive nature of connectivity investments substantially improves the autonomy of recipient countries. Moreover, contrary to theoretical expectations, the intensification of major power rivalry so far has not constrained Bangladesh’s autonomy. Thus, the case study also exhibits infrastructure investments’ limitations as a power resource. Nonetheless, the potentially most beneficial cooperation schemes involving rivalling major powers have become less likely. Consequently, the case study dampens incipient hopes in turning competing connectivity schemes into major power positive-sum games.
{"title":"Small states and competing connectivity strategies: what explains Bangladesh’s success in relations with Asia’s major powers?","authors":"Johannes Plagemann","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2021.1908410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1908410","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article explores the consequences major power rivalries over connectivity investments have for small states in Asia and thereby contributes to a better understanding of small states’ strength and capabilities in an increasingly multipolar world. With reference to the literature on small states, field work, and interviews, the article explores Bangladesh’s remarkable success in reaping the benefits from relations with rivalling major powers over the past decade. Three explanatory factors stand out: first, Bangladesh’s ‘intrinsic’ value to major powers increased; second, its political leadership has been particularly adept in dealing with such major powers; and third, systemic factors – the number and kind of major powers with stakes in Bangladesh – has been beneficial. Thus, Bangladesh’s foreign policy responses suggest that the competitive nature of connectivity investments substantially improves the autonomy of recipient countries. Moreover, contrary to theoretical expectations, the intensification of major power rivalry so far has not constrained Bangladesh’s autonomy. Thus, the case study also exhibits infrastructure investments’ limitations as a power resource. Nonetheless, the potentially most beneficial cooperation schemes involving rivalling major powers have become less likely. Consequently, the case study dampens incipient hopes in turning competing connectivity schemes into major power positive-sum games.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"736 - 764"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09512748.2021.1908410","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49143275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-05DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1917645
Ye Xue
Abstract This article focuses on how China views the normative structure of the international order. It integrates the Chinese cultural idea of guanxi into the established English School tradition in International Relations theory and argues that the norm of guanxi is an emerging pluralist primary institution. In this article, the author first presents the emergence of guanxi as a purposive norm in China’s foreign policy, and the interplay of this norm between China and other international actors. Second, the article scrutinizes the establishment of secondary institutions reflecting the norm of guanxi. Third, this article discusses how this primary institution has been consolidated at regional and global levels. In conclusion, this article briefly draws on two major developments of international politics: the cultural diversity of the international order and the emergence of a China-centred international society.
{"title":"China’s rise, Guanxi, and primary institutions","authors":"Ye Xue","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2021.1917645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1917645","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article focuses on how China views the normative structure of the international order. It integrates the Chinese cultural idea of guanxi into the established English School tradition in International Relations theory and argues that the norm of guanxi is an emerging pluralist primary institution. In this article, the author first presents the emergence of guanxi as a purposive norm in China’s foreign policy, and the interplay of this norm between China and other international actors. Second, the article scrutinizes the establishment of secondary institutions reflecting the norm of guanxi. Third, this article discusses how this primary institution has been consolidated at regional and global levels. In conclusion, this article briefly draws on two major developments of international politics: the cultural diversity of the international order and the emergence of a China-centred international society.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"1 - 31"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09512748.2021.1917645","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47909433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-06DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2021.1903534
See-won Byun
Abstract Why has China’s economic integration with Asia lagged in the northeast despite high expectations since the 1990s? China-centered integration in Asia is best understood at the Chinese subnational level. The interaction of central, local, and international interests under given structural and historical conditions produces distinct provincial trajectories of foreign economic engagement. While central state interests dictate policy choice under authoritarian rule, policy outcomes are shaped through local feedback effects and institutional innovations to manage transnational exchange. The Jilin-Northeast Asia case over the past two decades shows a negative orientation of such dynamics, stemming from a poor alignment of interests, the region’s structural constraints, and a socialist historical legacy. By tracing change and continuity on China’s late-developing, inland periphery, this study points to the subnational dimensions of cross-border integration obscured by conventional international relations scholarship, and presents the other side of China’s coastal success story. China’s ongoing plans for Asian integration are linked to the long-term development of China’s own regions rather than just aspirations abroad.
{"title":"Regional economic integration on China’s Inland periphery: the Jilin-Northeast Asia Case","authors":"See-won Byun","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2021.1903534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2021.1903534","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why has China’s economic integration with Asia lagged in the northeast despite high expectations since the 1990s? China-centered integration in Asia is best understood at the Chinese subnational level. The interaction of central, local, and international interests under given structural and historical conditions produces distinct provincial trajectories of foreign economic engagement. While central state interests dictate policy choice under authoritarian rule, policy outcomes are shaped through local feedback effects and institutional innovations to manage transnational exchange. The Jilin-Northeast Asia case over the past two decades shows a negative orientation of such dynamics, stemming from a poor alignment of interests, the region’s structural constraints, and a socialist historical legacy. By tracing change and continuity on China’s late-developing, inland periphery, this study points to the subnational dimensions of cross-border integration obscured by conventional international relations scholarship, and presents the other side of China’s coastal success story. China’s ongoing plans for Asian integration are linked to the long-term development of China’s own regions rather than just aspirations abroad.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"915 - 945"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/09512748.2021.1903534","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46974184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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