Pub Date : 2022-08-21DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2112064
Gregory H. Winger
Abstract This study examines the integration of cybersecurity within the U.S.-Philippine alliance. The growth of new forms of international conflict, like cybersecurity, occur below the threshold of a traditional armed attack and pose a direct challenge to security alliances designed to rebuff conventional military threats. Using a process-tracing approach, this article investigates the evolution of cybersecurity within the U.S.-Philippine relationship and how it has met this new challenge. It finds that despite mutual concern over cybersecurity, divergent approaches to the digital domain as a policy area has stymied alliance development. This finding highlights how issues like elite political discord, different threat perceptions, and divergent institutional preferences can hinder cyber cooperation between partners and stymie alliance development.
{"title":"Cybersecurity in the U.S.-Philippine alliance: mission seep","authors":"Gregory H. Winger","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2112064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2112064","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study examines the integration of cybersecurity within the U.S.-Philippine alliance. The growth of new forms of international conflict, like cybersecurity, occur below the threshold of a traditional armed attack and pose a direct challenge to security alliances designed to rebuff conventional military threats. Using a process-tracing approach, this article investigates the evolution of cybersecurity within the U.S.-Philippine relationship and how it has met this new challenge. It finds that despite mutual concern over cybersecurity, divergent approaches to the digital domain as a policy area has stymied alliance development. This finding highlights how issues like elite political discord, different threat perceptions, and divergent institutional preferences can hinder cyber cooperation between partners and stymie alliance development.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"1365 - 1393"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49117775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-14DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2111455
Thomas Furse
Abstract Political economy impacts and influences a state's military strategy. This article focuses on how the integration of the US political economy in the Indo-Pacific drives US Navy officers and the broader national security state to establish the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Investigating the strategic thought of senior Naval officers shows that they think far beyond military threats and engage with the United States and the Indo-Pacific political economy. Even as the US Navy competes with China's military, its FOIP strategy benefits corporate elites in both China and the US, whose cooperation creates a mutually supportive economic relationship. This argument leads to the finding that the US hegemony in the region is a strategy that avoids a bipolar 'New Cold War' of an entirely de-coupled US and China. The FOIP supported by the US Navy continues to integrate China into regional and global economies, even as it attempts to push back against China by gathering allies and partners. The emphasis on international political economy highlights how the region is a network of 'patchwork' relations, where states rely on one another for economic prosperity. Through investigating speeches and strategic papers from US Naval officials, this paper demonstrates how the US competes and cooperates with China in the context of relations in the region that are in constant flux.
{"title":"The political economy of US maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific","authors":"Thomas Furse","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2111455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2111455","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Political economy impacts and influences a state's military strategy. This article focuses on how the integration of the US political economy in the Indo-Pacific drives US Navy officers and the broader national security state to establish the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Investigating the strategic thought of senior Naval officers shows that they think far beyond military threats and engage with the United States and the Indo-Pacific political economy. Even as the US Navy competes with China's military, its FOIP strategy benefits corporate elites in both China and the US, whose cooperation creates a mutually supportive economic relationship. This argument leads to the finding that the US hegemony in the region is a strategy that avoids a bipolar 'New Cold War' of an entirely de-coupled US and China. The FOIP supported by the US Navy continues to integrate China into regional and global economies, even as it attempts to push back against China by gathering allies and partners. The emphasis on international political economy highlights how the region is a network of 'patchwork' relations, where states rely on one another for economic prosperity. Through investigating speeches and strategic papers from US Naval officials, this paper demonstrates how the US competes and cooperates with China in the context of relations in the region that are in constant flux.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"662 - 690"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45803051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-12DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2110609
Chietigj Bajpaee
Abstract The year 2022 marks three decades of India’s ‘Look East’ Policy (renamed the ‘Act East’ Policy in 2014). The policy emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War amid efforts by New Delhi to revive the importance of Southeast Asia (and later East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region) in India’s foreign policy agenda. While the policy has proven to be resilient as a core component of India’s foreign policy agenda, looking ahead it faces three key challenges: domestically, India’s reform agenda failing to match the country’s foreign policy aspirations; regionally, the principle of ‘ASEAN centrality’ coming under growing scrutiny; and globally, an international order in flux amid a more pronounced rivalry between the United States and China (which has been exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine). Addressing these issues will be key to maintaining the relevance of India’s ‘Act East’ Policy as it enters its next phase.
{"title":"Reinvigorating India’s ‘Act East’ Policy in an age of renewed power politics","authors":"Chietigj Bajpaee","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2110609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2110609","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The year 2022 marks three decades of India’s ‘Look East’ Policy (renamed the ‘Act East’ Policy in 2014). The policy emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War amid efforts by New Delhi to revive the importance of Southeast Asia (and later East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region) in India’s foreign policy agenda. While the policy has proven to be resilient as a core component of India’s foreign policy agenda, looking ahead it faces three key challenges: domestically, India’s reform agenda failing to match the country’s foreign policy aspirations; regionally, the principle of ‘ASEAN centrality’ coming under growing scrutiny; and globally, an international order in flux amid a more pronounced rivalry between the United States and China (which has been exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine). Addressing these issues will be key to maintaining the relevance of India’s ‘Act East’ Policy as it enters its next phase.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"631 - 661"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43794970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-23DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2090594
Leif-Eric Easley
Abstract By the time Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and President Park Geun-hye took office, Japan-South Korea relations were already experiencing a downturn over history issues and Lee Myung-bak’s unprecedented presidential visit to the disputed islets of Dokdo/Takeshima. Park’s refusal to hold a bilateral summit became the symbol of strained ties. Then on November 2, 2015 — 980 days after taking office — Park met Abe for bilateral talks in Seoul. On December 28, the two sides declared a rapprochement with an agreement supporting survivors of wartime brothels. Tensions worsened again during President Moon Jae-in’s term (2017–2022), contradicting the narrative that leaders had turned relations around in late 2015. Yet the diplomatic relationship was not on a downward spiral. Japanese and Korean policymakers managed to put a floor under their interactions owing to three stabilizing mechanisms that operated during both the Park and Moon administrations. First, political elites practiced mutual restraint to limit vicious cycles of nationalist recriminations. Second, Tokyo and Seoul carefully calibrated policies toward Beijing while avoiding divergence from each other. Third, reassuring the United States about the cost-effectiveness of its alliances involved trilateral cooperation that also helped stabilize Japan-South Korea relations.
{"title":"Stabilizing Japan–Korea relations: Restraining nationalism, appraising Beijing, reassuring Washington","authors":"Leif-Eric Easley","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2090594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2090594","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract By the time Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and President Park Geun-hye took office, Japan-South Korea relations were already experiencing a downturn over history issues and Lee Myung-bak’s unprecedented presidential visit to the disputed islets of Dokdo/Takeshima. Park’s refusal to hold a bilateral summit became the symbol of strained ties. Then on November 2, 2015 — 980 days after taking office — Park met Abe for bilateral talks in Seoul. On December 28, the two sides declared a rapprochement with an agreement supporting survivors of wartime brothels. Tensions worsened again during President Moon Jae-in’s term (2017–2022), contradicting the narrative that leaders had turned relations around in late 2015. Yet the diplomatic relationship was not on a downward spiral. Japanese and Korean policymakers managed to put a floor under their interactions owing to three stabilizing mechanisms that operated during both the Park and Moon administrations. First, political elites practiced mutual restraint to limit vicious cycles of nationalist recriminations. Second, Tokyo and Seoul carefully calibrated policies toward Beijing while avoiding divergence from each other. Third, reassuring the United States about the cost-effectiveness of its alliances involved trilateral cooperation that also helped stabilize Japan-South Korea relations.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41664554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-12DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2096681
Kim D. Reimann
Abstract Indigenous peoples in Southeast Asia have organized on issues that affect their rights at the local, national, regional and global level. This article argues that one important component of the rise of this activism is the presence of regional scalar bridging organizations that link activism across scales and support the growth of Indigenous movements by providing access to global and regional opportunities for action. In Southeast Asia, the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) and Tebtebba play this role through their presence in global political arenas and their many activities with partner organizations in the region. Drawing on social movement theory, this article outlines how regional social movement organizations potentially support global activism in the Global South by scale bridging in the areas of (1) resource mobilization, (2) creation of political spaces and opportunities and (3) the diffusion of ideas. To illustrate this, the case of Indigenous peoples activism on climate change in Southeast Asia is presented through an examination of the work done in these three areas by the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) and Tebtebba
{"title":"Indigenous peoples activism on climate change in Southeast Asia: the role of regional scalar bridging organizations","authors":"Kim D. Reimann","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2096681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2096681","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Indigenous peoples in Southeast Asia have organized on issues that affect their rights at the local, national, regional and global level. This article argues that one important component of the rise of this activism is the presence of regional scalar bridging organizations that link activism across scales and support the growth of Indigenous movements by providing access to global and regional opportunities for action. In Southeast Asia, the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) and Tebtebba play this role through their presence in global political arenas and their many activities with partner organizations in the region. Drawing on social movement theory, this article outlines how regional social movement organizations potentially support global activism in the Global South by scale bridging in the areas of (1) resource mobilization, (2) creation of political spaces and opportunities and (3) the diffusion of ideas. To illustrate this, the case of Indigenous peoples activism on climate change in Southeast Asia is presented through an examination of the work done in these three areas by the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) and Tebtebba","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42366740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-30DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2091648
S. Dossi, Giuseppe Gabusi
Abstract This article argues that a peculiar pattern of dependent asymmetry – ‘dual dependence’, i.e. a combination of internal and external dependence – has come to characterize the structure of China-Myanmar relations since the late 1980s. The hypothesis we present is that shifts in this pattern of dependent asymmetry account for fluctuations in China-Myanmar relations between 2011 and 2021. We test this hypothesis against empirical evidence from what we identify as two shifts in the structure of bilateral relations: for each, we trace how structural changes were perceived in Naypyitaw and Beijing, and how such perceptions oriented an adjustment in their respective policies. Myanmar’s reduced external dependence on China in 2011–2012 expanded the set of the potential courses of action available to Myanmar’s decision-makers and reduced the set of those available to China; conversely, the opposite happened in 2017–2018, following Myanmar’s return to full-fledged external dependence on China. The paper finally speculates that the military coup in 2021 could well represent a third shift in the structure of bilateral relations, further strengthening Myanmar’s external dependence on China and constraining the military government’s room of manoeuvre.
{"title":"Of constraints and opportunities. Dependent asymmetry in China-Myanmar relations, 2011–2021","authors":"S. Dossi, Giuseppe Gabusi","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2091648","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2091648","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article argues that a peculiar pattern of dependent asymmetry – ‘dual dependence’, i.e. a combination of internal and external dependence – has come to characterize the structure of China-Myanmar relations since the late 1980s. The hypothesis we present is that shifts in this pattern of dependent asymmetry account for fluctuations in China-Myanmar relations between 2011 and 2021. We test this hypothesis against empirical evidence from what we identify as two shifts in the structure of bilateral relations: for each, we trace how structural changes were perceived in Naypyitaw and Beijing, and how such perceptions oriented an adjustment in their respective policies. Myanmar’s reduced external dependence on China in 2011–2012 expanded the set of the potential courses of action available to Myanmar’s decision-makers and reduced the set of those available to China; conversely, the opposite happened in 2017–2018, following Myanmar’s return to full-fledged external dependence on China. The paper finally speculates that the military coup in 2021 could well represent a third shift in the structure of bilateral relations, further strengthening Myanmar’s external dependence on China and constraining the military government’s room of manoeuvre.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"1306 - 1336"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48450473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-18DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441
Bhubhinda Singh
Abstract Northeast Asia is usually associated with conflict and war. Challenging this prevailing view, this article shows that the sub-region has achieved minimal peace since its peaceful transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. The questions posed are: (a) what factors are responsible for Northeast Asia’s minimal peace?; and (b) how will these factors respond to the worsening US-China competition since 2010? This article’s argument is two-fold. First, Northeast Asia’s minimal peace is explained by three realist-liberal factors: America’s hegemony; strong economic interdependence among the Northeast Asian states; and a stable institutional structure in East Asia, including Northeast Asia. These factors kept a stable balance of power, ensured development and prosperity, and mitigated the political and strategic tensions between the states. Second, Northeast Asia’s minimal peace would be durable to counter the negative effects of the Sino-US competition in the coming decades. While the economic interdependence and institutional building factors have shown resilience, the US hegemony faces a robust challenge from China. Nevertheless, the US hegemony is durable because of America’s enduring relative strategic and economic advantages over China, the expanded role of America’s regional allies to preserve US preponderance and China’s problems in building an alternative regional order.
{"title":"Minimal peace in Northeast Asia: a realist-liberal explanation","authors":"Bhubhinda Singh","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075441","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Northeast Asia is usually associated with conflict and war. Challenging this prevailing view, this article shows that the sub-region has achieved minimal peace since its peaceful transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. The questions posed are: (a) what factors are responsible for Northeast Asia’s minimal peace?; and (b) how will these factors respond to the worsening US-China competition since 2010? This article’s argument is two-fold. First, Northeast Asia’s minimal peace is explained by three realist-liberal factors: America’s hegemony; strong economic interdependence among the Northeast Asian states; and a stable institutional structure in East Asia, including Northeast Asia. These factors kept a stable balance of power, ensured development and prosperity, and mitigated the political and strategic tensions between the states. Second, Northeast Asia’s minimal peace would be durable to counter the negative effects of the Sino-US competition in the coming decades. While the economic interdependence and institutional building factors have shown resilience, the US hegemony faces a robust challenge from China. Nevertheless, the US hegemony is durable because of America’s enduring relative strategic and economic advantages over China, the expanded role of America’s regional allies to preserve US preponderance and China’s problems in building an alternative regional order.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"1049 - 1078"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44017588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-16DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2075443
T. V. Paul
Abstract East Asia offers a fertile ground for applying dominant theoretical perspectives in International Relations and understanding their relevance and limitations. As this region has seen much conflict and cooperation historically and is re-emerging as a key theater of great power competition in the 21st century even when states maintain high levels of economic interactions, our understanding of the regional order will be enhanced by the theoretical tools available in the larger mainstream IR perspectives. The existence of a peculiar regional order of no war, yet a number of simmering disputes (along with high levels of economic interdependence) can be characterized as cold peace which deserves an explanation. The paper applies two variants of realism—balance of power and hegemonic stability – and the key arguments in liberalism to analyze the cold peace in Northeast Asia and normal peace in Southeast Asia from a historical perspective. It finds both grand theoretical approaches have partial applications for understanding the East Asian order. A hybrid approach is more valuable to better explain regional order during diverse time periods and different sub-regions of East Asia. Although the presence of both hegemony and balance of power can prevent major wars for a period, they do not help resolve the pre-existing disputes. Deepened economic interdependence mitigates some spiraling tendencies as states fearful of losing too much economically do not escalate crises beyond a point.
{"title":"Realism, liberalism and regional order in East Asia: toward a hybrid approach","authors":"T. V. Paul","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2075443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075443","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract East Asia offers a fertile ground for applying dominant theoretical perspectives in International Relations and understanding their relevance and limitations. As this region has seen much conflict and cooperation historically and is re-emerging as a key theater of great power competition in the 21st century even when states maintain high levels of economic interactions, our understanding of the regional order will be enhanced by the theoretical tools available in the larger mainstream IR perspectives. The existence of a peculiar regional order of no war, yet a number of simmering disputes (along with high levels of economic interdependence) can be characterized as cold peace which deserves an explanation. The paper applies two variants of realism—balance of power and hegemonic stability – and the key arguments in liberalism to analyze the cold peace in Northeast Asia and normal peace in Southeast Asia from a historical perspective. It finds both grand theoretical approaches have partial applications for understanding the East Asian order. A hybrid approach is more valuable to better explain regional order during diverse time periods and different sub-regions of East Asia. Although the presence of both hegemony and balance of power can prevent major wars for a period, they do not help resolve the pre-existing disputes. Deepened economic interdependence mitigates some spiraling tendencies as states fearful of losing too much economically do not escalate crises beyond a point.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"1028 - 1048"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42087693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-16DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2075440
Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers
Abstract Southeast Asia has gone through a remarkable transformation in recent decades and seen peaceful change since the end of the Cold War era despite great power interference and rivalry and ongoing territorial disputes including the South China Sea conflict. The region has transformed its image from the so-called Balkans of the East in the 1960s and 1970s to an economically competitive and peaceful region today. Despite these accomplishments, the record of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in maintaining regional peace and security has also been seriously challenged, particularly at the domestic and transnational level. The paper argues that the Southeast Asian experience of peaceful change calls for a different framework of analysis that goes beyond the traditional International Relations theories which do not provide a compelling answer to whether regional peace has prevailed. It reviews ASEAN’s approaches to managing peace and security in Southeast Asia and brings close attention to domestic and international dynamics. The paper claims that the Southeast Asian states’ approach to positive peace, reflected in the notion of comprehensive security and the building of national and regional resilience, is instructive in understanding peaceful transformations in the region.
{"title":"Keeping the peace in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the quest for positive peace","authors":"Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2075440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075440","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Southeast Asia has gone through a remarkable transformation in recent decades and seen peaceful change since the end of the Cold War era despite great power interference and rivalry and ongoing territorial disputes including the South China Sea conflict. The region has transformed its image from the so-called Balkans of the East in the 1960s and 1970s to an economically competitive and peaceful region today. Despite these accomplishments, the record of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in maintaining regional peace and security has also been seriously challenged, particularly at the domestic and transnational level. The paper argues that the Southeast Asian experience of peaceful change calls for a different framework of analysis that goes beyond the traditional International Relations theories which do not provide a compelling answer to whether regional peace has prevailed. It reviews ASEAN’s approaches to managing peace and security in Southeast Asia and brings close attention to domestic and international dynamics. The paper claims that the Southeast Asian states’ approach to positive peace, reflected in the notion of comprehensive security and the building of national and regional resilience, is instructive in understanding peaceful transformations in the region.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"1079 - 1104"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48407180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-16DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2075444
Sarah Teo
Abstract This paper argues that amid intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, middle powers in East Asia have contributed towards regional peaceful change through the exercise of good regional citizenship, a concept which draws on and modifies from the more commonly known good international citizenship which is closely associated with middle powers. Specifically, good regional citizenship involves proactively strengthening inclusive multilateralism, enhancing the rules-based order, and contributing to bridging efforts in East Asia. The paper examines the good regional citizenship of two middle powers, namely Australia and Indonesia. It finds that while both countries have exercised good regional citizenship, their specific strategies or the outcomes of their initiatives on regional dynamics have varied as a result of their relations with the respective major powers and their general foreign policy approaches. Australia’s good regional citizenship has supported the preservation of U.S. leadership in East Asia vis-à-vis the rise of other regional powers, while Indonesia’s good regional citizenship has helped to narrow the gaps among regional actors through mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
{"title":"Middle powers amid Sino-U.S. rivalry: assessing the ‘good regional citizenship’ of Australia and Indonesia","authors":"Sarah Teo","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2075444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075444","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper argues that amid intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, middle powers in East Asia have contributed towards regional peaceful change through the exercise of good regional citizenship, a concept which draws on and modifies from the more commonly known good international citizenship which is closely associated with middle powers. Specifically, good regional citizenship involves proactively strengthening inclusive multilateralism, enhancing the rules-based order, and contributing to bridging efforts in East Asia. The paper examines the good regional citizenship of two middle powers, namely Australia and Indonesia. It finds that while both countries have exercised good regional citizenship, their specific strategies or the outcomes of their initiatives on regional dynamics have varied as a result of their relations with the respective major powers and their general foreign policy approaches. Australia’s good regional citizenship has supported the preservation of U.S. leadership in East Asia vis-à-vis the rise of other regional powers, while Indonesia’s good regional citizenship has helped to narrow the gaps among regional actors through mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"1135 - 1161"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44534333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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