Pub Date : 2022-05-13DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2075439
Kai He
Abstract Challenging a popular view that China’s rise will lead the United States and China to fall into the ‘Thucydides trap’—a possible hegemonic war between the two—this paper proposes an ‘institutional peace’ argument, suggesting that the ongoing international order transition will be different from previous order transitions in history. Instead of using military means to change the international order, China and the United States have relied on various institutional balancing strategies to compete with one another for an advantageous position in the future international order. The discussion on the institutional competition between China and the US around the AIIB and the ARF-related multilateral security architecture supports the ‘institutional peace’ argument: institutional competition in the form of institutional balancing strengthens the dynamics and utility of international institutions, encourages states to offer new public goods, and could lead to a more peaceful order transition in the international system. However, this institutional peace argument is constrained by two caveats: the continued validity of the MAD nuclear deterrence and a limited degree of ideological antagonism between the US and China.
{"title":"China’s rise, institutional balancing, and (possible) peaceful order transition in the Asia pacific","authors":"Kai He","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2075439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075439","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Challenging a popular view that China’s rise will lead the United States and China to fall into the ‘Thucydides trap’—a possible hegemonic war between the two—this paper proposes an ‘institutional peace’ argument, suggesting that the ongoing international order transition will be different from previous order transitions in history. Instead of using military means to change the international order, China and the United States have relied on various institutional balancing strategies to compete with one another for an advantageous position in the future international order. The discussion on the institutional competition between China and the US around the AIIB and the ARF-related multilateral security architecture supports the ‘institutional peace’ argument: institutional competition in the form of institutional balancing strengthens the dynamics and utility of international institutions, encourages states to offer new public goods, and could lead to a more peaceful order transition in the international system. However, this institutional peace argument is constrained by two caveats: the continued validity of the MAD nuclear deterrence and a limited degree of ideological antagonism between the US and China.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"1105 - 1134"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42803160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-12DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2075442
Bhubhinda Singh
Abstract East Asia is usually associated with war and conflict. This applies to its historical past, as well as to the present post-Cold War period. In fact, this pessimism on the region has hardened with the worsening structural US-China competition since 2010. Challenging this prevailing view, this special issue argues that the concepts of peace and peaceful change are critical elements to explain East Asian regional dynamics in the post-Cold War period. It poses the following questions: (a) how could peace and peaceful change be analysed conceptually at the regional level?; (b) what type of peace and peaceful change notions are applicable to East Asia?; (c) what are the sources and mechanisms of regional peace in East Asia and its sub-regions and how have the sources and mechanisms changed over the post-Cold War period?; (d) how has the worsening US-China structural competition affected the prospects of peace in East Asia?; and (e) how do the middle powers, namely Japan, South Korea, Australia and Indonesia, contribute to peace and peaceful change in the region? The special issue is the first attempt to systematically apply the concepts of peace and peaceful change on East Asia. The articles identify the sources and mechanisms of peace and peaceful change, apply an eclectic conceptual approach that combines traditional and non-traditional IR theories; and assess the prospects of peace in East Asia in the context of the worsening structural tensions presented by the US-China competition.
{"title":"Special issue on the ‘sources of peace and peaceful change in East Asia’1","authors":"Bhubhinda Singh","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2075442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075442","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract East Asia is usually associated with war and conflict. This applies to its historical past, as well as to the present post-Cold War period. In fact, this pessimism on the region has hardened with the worsening structural US-China competition since 2010. Challenging this prevailing view, this special issue argues that the concepts of peace and peaceful change are critical elements to explain East Asian regional dynamics in the post-Cold War period. It poses the following questions: (a) how could peace and peaceful change be analysed conceptually at the regional level?; (b) what type of peace and peaceful change notions are applicable to East Asia?; (c) what are the sources and mechanisms of regional peace in East Asia and its sub-regions and how have the sources and mechanisms changed over the post-Cold War period?; (d) how has the worsening US-China structural competition affected the prospects of peace in East Asia?; and (e) how do the middle powers, namely Japan, South Korea, Australia and Indonesia, contribute to peace and peaceful change in the region? The special issue is the first attempt to systematically apply the concepts of peace and peaceful change on East Asia. The articles identify the sources and mechanisms of peace and peaceful change, apply an eclectic conceptual approach that combines traditional and non-traditional IR theories; and assess the prospects of peace in East Asia in the context of the worsening structural tensions presented by the US-China competition.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"995 - 1009"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45602986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-11DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2075445
T. J. Pempel
Abstract For forty years, the East Asian regional order has delivered widespread peace and prosperity. That order faces possible upending by an economically and militarily more powerful China and a decreasingly robust and engaged United States. While accepting the possibility that such structural shifts could upend the regional order, this paper contends that three powerful counterweights are working to counter disruptive conflicts and to foster peaceful change, namely strong and rising economic interdependence, expanding institutionalization, and active preservation efforts by number of other Asian states, particularly the region’s middle powers. This article analyzes the contribution of these three forces to creating the existing order and to their roles in its continuation.
{"title":"Sources of peace in East Asia: interdependence, institutions, and middle powers","authors":"T. J. Pempel","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2075445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2075445","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract For forty years, the East Asian regional order has delivered widespread peace and prosperity. That order faces possible upending by an economically and militarily more powerful China and a decreasingly robust and engaged United States. While accepting the possibility that such structural shifts could upend the regional order, this paper contends that three powerful counterweights are working to counter disruptive conflicts and to foster peaceful change, namely strong and rising economic interdependence, expanding institutionalization, and active preservation efforts by number of other Asian states, particularly the region’s middle powers. This article analyzes the contribution of these three forces to creating the existing order and to their roles in its continuation.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"35 1","pages":"1010 - 1027"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49007733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-03DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2070655
A. Feraru
Abstract This article provides a comprehensive understanding of the roles and functions of ASEAN’s human rights regime by building on widely documented, consistent findings relating to the purpose of the association and the nature of its human rights institutions. In particular, the paper starts by emphasizing that, despite continuing debate over the nature and achievements/failures of the regional grouping, scholarship tends to converge on the two important aspects: ASEAN’s normative framework and its long-standing practice of ‘quiet diplomacy’ are designed to reassure incumbent governments weary of unwanted interference in internal affairs; and regional human rights institutions are primarily ASEAN bodies. These findings are formulated as assumptions guiding the analysis of the association’s human rights rhetoric and practice, which centers on the evolution of intergovernmental consensus, the role of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in advancing this consensus, and an assessment of ASEAN responses to gross violations perpetrated or supported by governing elites. This latter examination details regional responses to the 2014 military coup in Thailand, Philippines’ brutal and largely extrajudicial ‘war on drugs’, the Rohingya genocide, and the 2021 military coup in Myanmar and ensuing violence.
{"title":"Charting the evolution of the ASEAN’s consensus on human rights, 2007–2021","authors":"A. Feraru","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2070655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2070655","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article provides a comprehensive understanding of the roles and functions of ASEAN’s human rights regime by building on widely documented, consistent findings relating to the purpose of the association and the nature of its human rights institutions. In particular, the paper starts by emphasizing that, despite continuing debate over the nature and achievements/failures of the regional grouping, scholarship tends to converge on the two important aspects: ASEAN’s normative framework and its long-standing practice of ‘quiet diplomacy’ are designed to reassure incumbent governments weary of unwanted interference in internal affairs; and regional human rights institutions are primarily ASEAN bodies. These findings are formulated as assumptions guiding the analysis of the association’s human rights rhetoric and practice, which centers on the evolution of intergovernmental consensus, the role of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in advancing this consensus, and an assessment of ASEAN responses to gross violations perpetrated or supported by governing elites. This latter examination details regional responses to the 2014 military coup in Thailand, Philippines’ brutal and largely extrajudicial ‘war on drugs’, the Rohingya genocide, and the 2021 military coup in Myanmar and ensuing violence.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42828050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-09DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2063367
Sung-han Kim, Sanghoon Kim
Abstract The concept of ‘revisionism’ has caught the attention of international relations scholars amid intensifying rivalry between the United States and China. It is a trademark of rising powers, and China was likewise expected to become a revisionist power, intent on changing the status quo. However, history tells us that not all rising powers necessarily become revolutionary states, seeking to overturn the prevailing order and replace it with another through hegemonic wars. This paper presents a novel understanding of revisionism by distinguishing between strategic ‘contestation’ and ‘challenge’. In the context of declining unipolarity, a dissatisfied rising power will contest the rules and principles of issue-specific regimes and demand legitimate adjustments that better reflect the new distribution of power. A challenge emerges when demands are rejected, and a contestation leads to ‘deconcentration’ and ‘delegitimation’ of the established order. The establishment of the AIIB can be examined as an example of contested multilateralism that falls short of a challenge. This paper concludes that China is ‘contesting’, not ‘challenging’ the liberal international order and suggests a set of countermeasures that the U.S. can think of: selective accommodation, reinforcement of alliances and partnerships, and overcoming domestic challenges such as populism that undermine the liberal values, constitutive of the liberal international order.
{"title":"China’s contestation of the liberal international order","authors":"Sung-han Kim, Sanghoon Kim","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2063367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2063367","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The concept of ‘revisionism’ has caught the attention of international relations scholars amid intensifying rivalry between the United States and China. It is a trademark of rising powers, and China was likewise expected to become a revisionist power, intent on changing the status quo. However, history tells us that not all rising powers necessarily become revolutionary states, seeking to overturn the prevailing order and replace it with another through hegemonic wars. This paper presents a novel understanding of revisionism by distinguishing between strategic ‘contestation’ and ‘challenge’. In the context of declining unipolarity, a dissatisfied rising power will contest the rules and principles of issue-specific regimes and demand legitimate adjustments that better reflect the new distribution of power. A challenge emerges when demands are rejected, and a contestation leads to ‘deconcentration’ and ‘delegitimation’ of the established order. The establishment of the AIIB can be examined as an example of contested multilateralism that falls short of a challenge. This paper concludes that China is ‘contesting’, not ‘challenging’ the liberal international order and suggests a set of countermeasures that the U.S. can think of: selective accommodation, reinforcement of alliances and partnerships, and overcoming domestic challenges such as populism that undermine the liberal values, constitutive of the liberal international order.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42089357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-17DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2052744
Qisong He
Abstract As far as space technology cooperation is concerned, China and Russia took the Ukraine crisis in 2014 as the dividing line. The content and methods of cooperation between the two countries have undergone significant changes, making the cooperation from simple to complicated. Meanwhile, the space technology cooperation between China and Russia will definitely shape the structure of power in space geopolitics among China and Russia and US, which helps to create a balance of power and prevent the emergence of a Kindleberger trap in space geopolitics, but to a certain extent, will in turn restrict China-Russia space technology cooperation and have an important impact on China-Russia strategic partnership of coordination. The deepening of space technology cooperation between China and Russia may increasingly show the nature of power competition in space geopolitics.
{"title":"China-Russia technology cooperation in space: Mutually needed or mutually exclusive?","authors":"Qisong He","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2052744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2052744","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As far as space technology cooperation is concerned, China and Russia took the Ukraine crisis in 2014 as the dividing line. The content and methods of cooperation between the two countries have undergone significant changes, making the cooperation from simple to complicated. Meanwhile, the space technology cooperation between China and Russia will definitely shape the structure of power in space geopolitics among China and Russia and US, which helps to create a balance of power and prevent the emergence of a Kindleberger trap in space geopolitics, but to a certain extent, will in turn restrict China-Russia space technology cooperation and have an important impact on China-Russia strategic partnership of coordination. The deepening of space technology cooperation between China and Russia may increasingly show the nature of power competition in space geopolitics.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"897 - 926"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46916687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-03DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2046629
Jiyeol Kim, Arpit Raswant
Abstract This article examines how the Indo-Pacific powers, China and India, respond to international law and evaluates how effectively international law influences each state’s behavior. The role of norms and international legal regimes in the major Indo-Pacific flashpoints has become an inseparable justification of contestants’ claims over the years. We suggest that a state actor’s response to international law can be assessed using three criteria: the internalization, interpretation, and implementation of international law. The article investigates China and India as state actors and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as a case of international law. We assess these criteria by comparing the development of domestic laws by China and India in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (internalization), their declarations submitted to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provisions (interpretation), and their reaction to third-party arbitrations (implementation). By connecting the domestic and international legal actions of rising powers in the Indo-Pacific region, the article suggests that a state actor’s internalization, interpretation, and implementation of international law significantly indicate how international law impacts an individual state’s behavior in the international security arena. Thus, this article establishes critical connections between emerging security order, regional politics, and normative developments in the Indo-Pacific.
{"title":"Indo-Pacific Powers: Internalization, Interpretation, and Implementation of International Law","authors":"Jiyeol Kim, Arpit Raswant","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2046629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2046629","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines how the Indo-Pacific powers, China and India, respond to international law and evaluates how effectively international law influences each state’s behavior. The role of norms and international legal regimes in the major Indo-Pacific flashpoints has become an inseparable justification of contestants’ claims over the years. We suggest that a state actor’s response to international law can be assessed using three criteria: the internalization, interpretation, and implementation of international law. The article investigates China and India as state actors and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as a case of international law. We assess these criteria by comparing the development of domestic laws by China and India in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (internalization), their declarations submitted to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provisions (interpretation), and their reaction to third-party arbitrations (implementation). By connecting the domestic and international legal actions of rising powers in the Indo-Pacific region, the article suggests that a state actor’s internalization, interpretation, and implementation of international law significantly indicate how international law impacts an individual state’s behavior in the international security arena. Thus, this article establishes critical connections between emerging security order, regional politics, and normative developments in the Indo-Pacific.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"871 - 896"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42652212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-10DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2035426
Yuko Kasuya, B. Reilly
Abstract A ‘majoritarian turn’ identified by scholars of Asian democracy in the 1990s saw the rise of mixed-member majoritarian electoral systems and more centripetal party competition across both Northeast and Southeast Asia. In this paper, we argue that since the 2000s, the institutional pendulum has shifted, with more consensual approaches to democracy appearing to better represent key identity cleavages of gender, ethnicity, and territory—a trend evident not just in East Asia but South Asia as well. This new ‘Asian model’ typically involves increasing the proportional components of existing electoral formulas and grafting gender quotas, multiethnic party lists, and quasi-federal elements onto ostensibly majoritarian state structures. We show that these reforms have, as intended, mostly increased female and ethnic minority representation and decentralized governance structures. At the same time, however, these de jure changes are not associated with de facto political development in terms of greater democratic quality, counter to theoretical expectations. Indeed, democracy has declined across most of Asia at the same time as its democratic institutions have become more consensual.
{"title":"The shift to consensus democracy and limits of institutional design in Asia","authors":"Yuko Kasuya, B. Reilly","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2035426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2035426","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A ‘majoritarian turn’ identified by scholars of Asian democracy in the 1990s saw the rise of mixed-member majoritarian electoral systems and more centripetal party competition across both Northeast and Southeast Asia. In this paper, we argue that since the 2000s, the institutional pendulum has shifted, with more consensual approaches to democracy appearing to better represent key identity cleavages of gender, ethnicity, and territory—a trend evident not just in East Asia but South Asia as well. This new ‘Asian model’ typically involves increasing the proportional components of existing electoral formulas and grafting gender quotas, multiethnic party lists, and quasi-federal elements onto ostensibly majoritarian state structures. We show that these reforms have, as intended, mostly increased female and ethnic minority representation and decentralized governance structures. At the same time, however, these de jure changes are not associated with de facto political development in terms of greater democratic quality, counter to theoretical expectations. Indeed, democracy has declined across most of Asia at the same time as its democratic institutions have become more consensual.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"844 - 870"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46613702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-04DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2034918
Soon-ok Shin
Abstract North Korea is a de facto nuclear weapon state, having undertaken six tests between 2006 and 2017. Throughout a series of nuclear crises, since the early 1990s, Pyongyang has not only emphasised its sovereign right to explore nuclear options as an inevitable response to a hostile United States, but has at the same time consistently embraced an anti-nuclear stance, maintaining a commitment to the ‘denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula’. This nuclear posture – ‘arm, to disarm’ – stressing the inevitability of nuclear-arming while at the same time pledging a normative anti-nuclear commitment to denuclearisation, contains seemingly irreconcilable elements. This challenges rationalist IR theories, which are unable adequately to explain the DPRK’s position, characterising it as either a tactical diversion to disguise realist motivations or a negotiation leverage to induce economic and strategic concessions. This article offers an alternative analysis, seeking to decode the DPRK’s seemingly contradictory nuclear posture by arguing that its anti-nuclear posture has deep Cold War roots aimed at hedging its security inferiority vis-à-vis nuclear-armed enemies. It focuses on the Cold War security nexus in East Asia and examines how Pyongyang’s engagement in the anti-nuclear movement evolved to shape its seemingly irreconcilable ‘arm, to disarm’ nuclearism.
{"title":"Arm, to disarm: North Korea’s Cold War anti-nuclearism","authors":"Soon-ok Shin","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2034918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2034918","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract North Korea is a de facto nuclear weapon state, having undertaken six tests between 2006 and 2017. Throughout a series of nuclear crises, since the early 1990s, Pyongyang has not only emphasised its sovereign right to explore nuclear options as an inevitable response to a hostile United States, but has at the same time consistently embraced an anti-nuclear stance, maintaining a commitment to the ‘denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula’. This nuclear posture – ‘arm, to disarm’ – stressing the inevitability of nuclear-arming while at the same time pledging a normative anti-nuclear commitment to denuclearisation, contains seemingly irreconcilable elements. This challenges rationalist IR theories, which are unable adequately to explain the DPRK’s position, characterising it as either a tactical diversion to disguise realist motivations or a negotiation leverage to induce economic and strategic concessions. This article offers an alternative analysis, seeking to decode the DPRK’s seemingly contradictory nuclear posture by arguing that its anti-nuclear posture has deep Cold War roots aimed at hedging its security inferiority vis-à-vis nuclear-armed enemies. It focuses on the Cold War security nexus in East Asia and examines how Pyongyang’s engagement in the anti-nuclear movement evolved to shape its seemingly irreconcilable ‘arm, to disarm’ nuclearism.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"813 - 843"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46882602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-31DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2033820
H. Envall, T. Wilkins
Abstract This article revisits the conceptualisation of (regional) order in International Relations (IR) theory to illuminate key aspects of Japan’s order-building role in the Indo-Pacific. The framework is based upon a multi-dimensional understanding of regional order-building allowing for an examination of Japan’s vision for a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) policy ‘vision’, the challenges it faces as a secondary power, and its conduct as an emerging entrepreneurial power in the Indo-Pacific. The article’s central argument is that Japan’s order-building should be understood in the context of the country’s deeper strategic situation and, in particular, its position as a secondary, but still highly influential, power. This has implications for understanding Japan’s approach to international order and how it might deploy norm entrepreneurship in shaping the new Indo-Pacific order.
{"title":"Japan and the new Indo-Pacific order: the rise of an entrepreneurial power","authors":"H. Envall, T. Wilkins","doi":"10.1080/09512748.2022.2033820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2033820","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article revisits the conceptualisation of (regional) order in International Relations (IR) theory to illuminate key aspects of Japan’s order-building role in the Indo-Pacific. The framework is based upon a multi-dimensional understanding of regional order-building allowing for an examination of Japan’s vision for a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) policy ‘vision’, the challenges it faces as a secondary power, and its conduct as an emerging entrepreneurial power in the Indo-Pacific. The article’s central argument is that Japan’s order-building should be understood in the context of the country’s deeper strategic situation and, in particular, its position as a secondary, but still highly influential, power. This has implications for understanding Japan’s approach to international order and how it might deploy norm entrepreneurship in shaping the new Indo-Pacific order.","PeriodicalId":51541,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"691 - 722"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46143122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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