{"title":"JENNIFER C. LENA Entitled: Discriminating Tastes and the Expansion of the Arts. Princeton University Press, 2019, xiv + 231 pp., $29.95 cloth.","authors":"C. THI NGUYEN","doi":"10.1111/jaac.12732","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jaac.12732","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51571,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM","volume":"78 2","pages":"257-261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jaac.12732","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123298463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>We think FMP is false, as not every fiction is closed under conditional elimination.</p><p>If you achieve both steps, then, because (2) is a conditional and (1) is its antecedent, <i>f</i>'s closure under FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> ensures that the consequent is also true-in-<i>f</i>. And since the consequent is that every proposition is true, it follows that <i>f</i> is a universal fiction.</p><p>Ricksand (<span>2020</span>) raises three objections to our proposal. Here, we take the opportunity to reply to these concerns, thereby clarifying and expanding on our argument.</p><p>Before turning to Ricksand's objections, it is useful to discuss the background dialectic. Doing so will clarify our ecumenical approach and serve as a foundation for our replies.</p><p>There are (at least!) two substantive difficulties one faces when following our recipe. The first concerns ensuring that (1) and (2) are part of <i>f</i>'s content. Addressing this requires saying something about the broader question of how to make a particular proposition true in a given fiction.</p><p>This is a hoary, difficult matter, to which there is no straightforward answer. One naïve idea is that <i>saying makes it so</i>; roughly, if some statement is explicitly made in a fiction (for example, by the fiction's narrator), then the expressed proposition is true in that fiction. Philosophers and literary theorists have roundly (and rightly) rejected this stipulatory account, as, for example, any fiction featuring an unreliable narrator is a counterexample. A second, related notion is intentionalism: if the (or an) author of fiction <i>f</i> intends that <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>, then <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>. This approach has also been largely rejected, running into numerous apparent counterexamples (see, for example, Lewis <span>1978</span>, though see also, Stock <span>2017</span>).</p><p>Another way of being part of <i>f</i>'s content is to be imported, that is, a proposition brought into the fiction from the outside. However, what (if any) propositions should be imported is another controversial matter.<sup>3</sup> Yet another way is to be implied; that is, if <i>p</i> is a logical consequence of some proposition that is true-in-<i>f</i>, then <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>. This is especially unhelpful, since not only does it move the bubble in the carpet (since it requires that we already know some of <i>f</i>'s content), but it is not clear which notion of logical consequence we should employ.</p><p>We mention these to highlight that there is no good general story about how to guarantee that a proposition is true in particular fiction. This makes addressing the first issue extremely difficult, as it is hard to know whether one has succeeded in making (1) and (2) true in <i>f</i>.<sup>4</sup></p><p>The second difficulty concerns ensuring that <i>f</i> is governed by FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub>. As before, there is a lurking larger problem: namely, settling what (if any) principle
我们认为FMP是错误的，因为不是每个小说都在条件消除下关闭。如果您实现了这两个步骤，那么，由于(2)是一个条件，而(1)是它的前提，f在FMP-LOCALf下的闭包确保了结果在f中也是真实的。既然结论是每个命题都为真，那么就可以得出f是一个普遍虚构。里克桑德(2020)对我们的提议提出了三点反对意见。在此，我们借此机会对这些关切作出答复，从而澄清和扩大我们的论点。在讨论里克桑的反对意见之前，讨论一下背景辩证法是有用的。这样做将澄清我们的普世做法，并作为我们答复的基础。在遵循我们的食谱时，人们(至少!)会面临两个实质性的困难。第一个问题是确保(1)和(2)是f内容的一部分。要解决这个问题，就需要讨论一个更广泛的问题，即如何在给定的小说中证明一个特定的命题是正确的。这是一个古老而困难的问题，没有直接的答案。naïve的一种观点是，说的就是这样;粗略地说，如果某个陈述是在小说中明确提出的(例如，由小说的叙述者)，那么所表达的命题在该小说中是正确的。哲学家和文学理论家已经全面地(而且正确地)拒绝了这种规定性的描述，例如，任何以不可靠的叙述者为特征的小说都是一个反例。第二个相关的概念是意向性:如果小说f的作者(或作者)想要p在f中为真，那么p在f中为真。这种方法也在很大程度上遭到了拒绝，遇到了许多明显的反例(例如，参见Lewis 1978，尽管也参见Stock 2017)。另一种成为f内容一部分的方式是输入，也就是说，一个命题从外部被带入小说。然而，应该引进什么(如果有的话)命题是另一个有争议的问题另一种方式是暗示;也就是说，如果p是某个命题在f中为真的逻辑推论，那么p在f中为真。这尤其没有帮助，因为它不仅移动了地毯上的气泡(因为它要求我们已经知道f的一些内容)，而且不清楚我们应该使用哪个逻辑结果概念。我们提到这些是为了强调，在特定的小说中，没有好的一般故事来保证一个命题是真的。这使得解决第一个问题极其困难，因为很难知道一个人是否成功地使f.4中的(1)和(2)为真。第二个困难涉及确保f由FMP-LOCALf管理。和以前一样，还有一个潜在的更大的问题:即解决构成虚构真理逻辑的原则(如果有的话)。至少乍一看，并非所有小说的内容都遵循同样的逻辑原则。例如，Priest的《Sylvan’s Box》和Bradbury的《A Sound of Thunder》是不一致的，但它们的内容并不受爆炸原理的支配(否则它们也会是普遍的)。类似地，像《银翼杀手》这样本质上不完整的小说似乎违反了这样的原则，即如果(P或Q)在f中是真实的，那么P在f中是真实的，或者Q在f中是真实的这些问题导致一些人，如Routley(1979,10)认为虚构的真理没有统一的逻辑如果Routley是正确的，那么证明f的内容遵守FMP-LOCALf就变得更加困难了(这也解释了为什么我们需要诉诸局部原则，而不是全局原则)。鉴于这些实质性的分歧，在我们对普遍小说的论证中，我们希望避免承诺任何特定的观点，并尽可能少地做出有争议的假设。因此，为了确保(1)和(2)是f的内容的一部分，我们建议在f中包含表达相关命题的显式语句。这是因为，虽然我们认为说并不总是如此，但它通常是这样的。也就是说，如果虚构f包含一个表达命题p的显式陈述，那么，其他条件不变，p在f中为真。因此，包含这些显式陈述是使(1)和(2)成为f内容的一部分的一种相当无争议的方法需要强调的是，我们并不认为这是唯一的方法，只是争议最小的方法。我们在第二个问题上的策略也是统一的。具体来说，我们建议在f的内容中包含一个“无害的”条件句和先行词。总之，这些有力地表明(尽管没有严格限定)相关的推论也是真实的。反过来，这意味着f的内容在FMP-LOCALf下是封闭的。否认这一结局就需要否认结果的虚构真相，这是“完全难以置信的”(2017,78)。 例如，在我们的《不可能先生》中，我们包括:(i)如果不可能先生是国王的火枪手，那么他为国王工作;(ii)不可能先生是火枪手的一员;直观的结果是(iii)不可能的先生为国王工作也是虚构的。这强烈地表明，不可能先生在FMP-LOCALMI下是封闭的，因为否认这一点似乎需要否认(iii)的(极其可信的)虚构真理。和以前一样，我们不认为这是保证FMP-LOCALf对f为真的唯一方法，但我们相信，这是一种相当无争议的方法，与关于虚构真理逻辑的各种观点兼容。我们将首先承认，这两种解决方案都不是无可争议的(什么哲学论证是无可争议的?)这些策略也不是解决这两个问题的唯一途径。但对于上述两个潜在的一般性问题，它们可能是最好的答案，而不是提供深刻而有争议的答案。如果一个人有一个完整的故事，关于虚构真理的充分必要条件，以及虚构真理的逻辑，那么你可能会做得更好。然而，这并不是我们的目标。我们想要创造出一种能够在理论上保持中立的通用小说。背景讨论结束后，我们转向里克桑的反对意见。作为回答，我们提供了一些“无害的”条件句和先行句不一致的例子，尽管结果句相当平凡。例如，我们的《Clara’s Crazy Caper》(2017,78)包含了条件句(i)，如果正好吃了三根胡萝卜而不是恰好吃了三根胡萝卜，那么就已经吃了一些胡萝卜，以及矛盾句(ii)，正好吃了三根胡萝卜而不是恰好吃了三根胡萝卜。和前面一样，我们非常直观地认为，在这种设置下，这使得(iii)一些胡萝卜被消耗掉是真正的ccc。因此，同样的论点适用:要么反对者同意结果是小说内容的一部分，在这种情况下，他们必须接受内容受不受限制的FMP-LOCALCCC管辖，要么他们必须接受“完全不可信”的结果，即(iii)在ccc中不真实。这至少使反对者承担举证责任。在这里，里克桑德反对说，“不清楚为什么这个例子……会给反对者带来问题。”如果反对意见“包括断然否认当[先行词]不一致时，FMP-LOCAL的实例可以是虚构的真实的，那么提供另一个[先行词]不一致的例子就很难构成反对意见，因为这是反对者不会接受的那种情况”(2020,236)。作为回答，首先要注意的是，问题不在于FMP-LOCAL的实例是否为虚构的真;重要的是它是否真实，而不是在相关的小说中。相反，Ricksand的反对者必须“断然否认”任何条件和相关的不一致先行词的虚构真理的实例都需要虚构的结果真理。这种断然否认看起来极难维持。例如，假设(i) ((P&P)→((P&P) &Q))， (ii) (P&P)和(iii) Q都是真在f。因为(i)和(ii)自相矛盾而否认(iii)在f中为真看起来很荒谬。然而，这正是里克桑的反对者所致力于的。至少，这个反对者承担了举证的责任，来解释为什么我们应该接受这个强烈违反直觉的结果。而且，在此之前，我们有足够的理由认为f在FMP-LOCALf下是关闭的。瑞克桑的第二个反对意见与我们对另一种通用小说配方的讨论有关根据这种说法，一个人可以通过讲一个明确包含诸如“一切都是真的”这样的陈述的故事来制造一个普遍的虚构。这意味着每个命题都是真实的。我们对这种替代配方有很大的担忧(2017,74 - 75)。我们通过一个类比来说明我们的担忧:“每个人都是奸诈的”是真实的，例如，歌剧并不意味着“奥巴马是奸诈的”是真实的。这似乎是因为，
{"title":"Defending Explosive Universal Fictions","authors":"NATHAN WILDMAN, CHRISTIAN FOLDE","doi":"10.1111/jaac.12721","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jaac.12721","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We think FMP is false, as not every fiction is closed under conditional elimination.</p><p>If you achieve both steps, then, because (2) is a conditional and (1) is its antecedent, <i>f</i>'s closure under FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> ensures that the consequent is also true-in-<i>f</i>. And since the consequent is that every proposition is true, it follows that <i>f</i> is a universal fiction.</p><p>Ricksand (<span>2020</span>) raises three objections to our proposal. Here, we take the opportunity to reply to these concerns, thereby clarifying and expanding on our argument.</p><p>Before turning to Ricksand's objections, it is useful to discuss the background dialectic. Doing so will clarify our ecumenical approach and serve as a foundation for our replies.</p><p>There are (at least!) two substantive difficulties one faces when following our recipe. The first concerns ensuring that (1) and (2) are part of <i>f</i>'s content. Addressing this requires saying something about the broader question of how to make a particular proposition true in a given fiction.</p><p>This is a hoary, difficult matter, to which there is no straightforward answer. One naïve idea is that <i>saying makes it so</i>; roughly, if some statement is explicitly made in a fiction (for example, by the fiction's narrator), then the expressed proposition is true in that fiction. Philosophers and literary theorists have roundly (and rightly) rejected this stipulatory account, as, for example, any fiction featuring an unreliable narrator is a counterexample. A second, related notion is intentionalism: if the (or an) author of fiction <i>f</i> intends that <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>, then <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>. This approach has also been largely rejected, running into numerous apparent counterexamples (see, for example, Lewis <span>1978</span>, though see also, Stock <span>2017</span>).</p><p>Another way of being part of <i>f</i>'s content is to be imported, that is, a proposition brought into the fiction from the outside. However, what (if any) propositions should be imported is another controversial matter.<sup>3</sup> Yet another way is to be implied; that is, if <i>p</i> is a logical consequence of some proposition that is true-in-<i>f</i>, then <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>. This is especially unhelpful, since not only does it move the bubble in the carpet (since it requires that we already know some of <i>f</i>'s content), but it is not clear which notion of logical consequence we should employ.</p><p>We mention these to highlight that there is no good general story about how to guarantee that a proposition is true in particular fiction. This makes addressing the first issue extremely difficult, as it is hard to know whether one has succeeded in making (1) and (2) true in <i>f</i>.<sup>4</sup></p><p>The second difficulty concerns ensuring that <i>f</i> is governed by FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub>. As before, there is a lurking larger problem: namely, settling what (if any) principle","PeriodicalId":51571,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM","volume":"78 2","pages":"238-242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jaac.12721","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116211602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The 2021 John Fisher Memorial Prize","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jaac.12727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12727","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51571,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM","volume":"78 2","pages":"141"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jaac.12727","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134809682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THIERRY DE DUVE. Aesthetics at Large: Volume One: Art, Ethics, Politics. University of Chicago Press, 2019, 248 pp., 17 b&w illus., $35.00 paper.","authors":"ERIN BRADFIELD","doi":"10.1111/jaac.12722","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jaac.12722","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51571,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM","volume":"78 2","pages":"251-253"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jaac.12722","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130882092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiction Is Always (Or Never) Unlimited: A Reply to Wildman and Folde","authors":"MARTIN RICKSAND","doi":"10.1111/jaac.12728","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jaac.12728","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51571,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM","volume":"78 2","pages":"235-238"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jaac.12728","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130949736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues against a widespread view that links musical Platonism and Aristotelianism with opposite ways of individuating musical works. This view assumes that Platonism is bound to individuate works of music in sonicist and noncontextualist terms, while Aristotelianism is tied to instrumentalist and contextualist accounts on work-individuation. I argue that this assumption is wrong. I provide an argument that shows that the differences between musical Platonism and Aristotelianism concern the existence conditions of musical works qua types, but not their identity conditions. Assuming that the existence and individuation conditions of types are given by their associated properties, I defend that the disagreement between Platonism and Aristotelianism is about the principle of instantiation of properties, regardless if these properties are monadic (sonicism and noncontextualism) or relational (instrumentalism and contextualism).
{"title":"Contextualizing Platonism and Decontextualizing Aristotelianism in the Ontology of Music","authors":"NEMESIO GARCÍA-CARRIL PUY","doi":"10.1111/jaac.12714","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jaac.12714","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article argues against a widespread view that links musical Platonism and Aristotelianism with opposite ways of individuating musical works. This view assumes that Platonism is bound to individuate works of music in sonicist and noncontextualist terms, while Aristotelianism is tied to instrumentalist and contextualist accounts on work-individuation. I argue that this assumption is wrong. I provide an argument that shows that the differences between musical Platonism and Aristotelianism concern the existence conditions of musical works qua types, but not their identity conditions. Assuming that the existence and individuation conditions of types are given by their associated properties, I defend that the disagreement between Platonism and Aristotelianism is about the principle of instantiation of properties, regardless if these properties are monadic (sonicism and noncontextualism) or relational (instrumentalism and contextualism).</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":51571,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM","volume":"78 2","pages":"183-196"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jaac.12714","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131773047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"RACHEL ZUCKERT. Herder's Naturalist Aesthetics. Cambridge University Press, 2019, xii + 266 pp., $99.99 cloth.","authors":"TIMOTHY M. COSTELLOE","doi":"10.1111/jaac.12729","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jaac.12729","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51571,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM","volume":"78 2","pages":"243-246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jaac.12729","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133667091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Richard Shusterman, ed. Bodies in the Streets: The Somaesthetics of City Life. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2019, xii + 321 pp., 27 illus., $144.00 cloth.","authors":"CURTIS L. CARTER","doi":"10.1111/jaac.12730","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jaac.12730","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51571,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM","volume":"78 2","pages":"264-267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jaac.12730","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132078294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jaac.12717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12717","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51571,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM","volume":"78 2","pages":"271-272"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jaac.12717","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134809681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues that architecture makes possible a unique form of aesthetic experience, one involving what I will call, departing from a Kantian perspective, embodied free play. I argue that architecture's purpose is to encourage, cultivate, and enable human activities while also becoming crystallizations of those very activities. I will show that the living system of such interaction is called “place,” as I explore the role of artifacts, movement, activities, and the environment in place creation. I show that when the embodied activities and design of a place harmonize, a fullness of free play is made possible and daily living can involve aesthetic experience.
{"title":"Architecture and Embodied Free Play","authors":"EMILY HODGES","doi":"10.1111/jaac.12718","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jaac.12718","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>This article argues that architecture makes possible a unique form of aesthetic experience, one involving what I will call, departing from a Kantian perspective, embodied free play. I argue that architecture's purpose is to encourage, cultivate, and enable human activities while also becoming crystallizations of those very activities. I will show that the living system of such interaction is called “place,” as I explore the role of artifacts, movement, activities, and the environment in place creation. I show that when the embodied activities and design of a place harmonize, a fullness of free play is made possible and daily living can involve aesthetic experience.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":51571,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM","volume":"78 2","pages":"219-234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jaac.12718","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115474396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"艺术学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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