We think FMP is false, as not every fiction is closed under conditional elimination.
If you achieve both steps, then, because (2) is a conditional and (1) is its antecedent, f's closure under FMP-LOCALf ensures that the consequent is also true-in-f. And since the consequent is that every proposition is true, it follows that f is a universal fiction.
Ricksand (2020) raises three objections to our proposal. Here, we take the opportunity to reply to these concerns, thereby clarifying and expanding on our argument.
Before turning to Ricksand's objections, it is useful to discuss the background dialectic. Doing so will clarify our ecumenical approach and serve as a foundation for our replies.
There are (at least!) two substantive difficulties one faces when following our recipe. The first concerns ensuring that (1) and (2) are part of f's content. Addressing this requires saying something about the broader question of how to make a particular proposition true in a given fiction.
This is a hoary, difficult matter, to which there is no straightforward answer. One naïve idea is that saying makes it so; roughly, if some statement is explicitly made in a fiction (for example, by the fiction's narrator), then the expressed proposition is true in that fiction. Philosophers and literary theorists have roundly (and rightly) rejected this stipulatory account, as, for example, any fiction featuring an unreliable narrator is a counterexample. A second, related notion is intentionalism: if the (or an) author of fiction f intends that p is true-in-f, then p is true-in-f. This approach has also been largely rejected, running into numerous apparent counterexamples (see, for example, Lewis 1978, though see also, Stock 2017).
Another way of being part of f's content is to be imported, that is, a proposition brought into the fiction from the outside. However, what (if any) propositions should be imported is another controversial matter.3 Yet another way is to be implied; that is, if p is a logical consequence of some proposition that is true-in-f, then p is true-in-f. This is especially unhelpful, since not only does it move the bubble in the carpet (since it requires that we already know some of f's content), but it is not clear which notion of logical consequence we should employ.
We mention these to highlight that there is no good general story about how to guarantee that a proposition is true in particular fiction. This makes addressing the first issue extremely difficult, as it is hard to know whether one has succeeded in making (1) and (2) true in f.4
The second difficulty concerns ensuring that f is governed by FMP-LOCALf. As before, there is a lurking larger problem: namely, settling what (if any) principle
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