JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM最新文献

In recent work, Kendall Walton has abandoned his very influential account of the fictionality of p in a fictional work in terms of prescriptions to imagine emanating from it. He offers examples allegedly showing that a prescription to imagine p in a given work of fiction is not sufficient for the fictionality of p in that work. In this article, both in support and further elaboration of a constitutive-norms speech-act variation on Walton's account that I have defended previously, I critically discuss his objections. In addition to answering his concerns and developing the account further, I provide additional abductive support for its explanatory virtues vis-à-vis institutional accounts like Walton's and Gricean speech-act proposals.

This article explores the ontological nature of musical versions. I assume the widespread view that type/token ontologies offer the best explanation of the repeatable nature of works of music. However, I show that traditional type/token theories, which distinguish only between two levels of objects, face two problems when applied to the phenomenon of musical versions. First, they are not able to accommodate the familiar intuition of our musical practices that the work versioned is repeated in its versions’ performances. Second, they are not able to distinguish between two different phenomena of our practices: the phenomenon of a work's versions and the phenomenon of works inspired by, or derived from, other works. These undesirable consequences are entailed, under traditional two-level type/token theories, by the nature of types as ontologically thin entities. I defend that the hypothesis of nested types, a multiple-level type/token theory, can avoid these two problems while preserving the theoretical virtues of traditional two-level type/token theories and structural monism—the most widely shared view about the individuation of musical works, according to which musical works are individuated by one, and only one, sound structure.

Virtual worlds are notable for their realism, both for the sense of psychological immersion they provide and the apparent potential for users to perform activities and interact with objects and people “within” such worlds. This article asks whether the concept of “photographic transparency,” introduced by Kendall Walton to account for the inherent realism of photography, can be extended to account for the realism of virtual media. Specifically, I investigate whether virtual media allow for a kind of prosthetic seeing that enables users to see the real world in potentially expanded ways. The complications for the thesis of “virtual transparency” arise from the analysis of the objects and egos involved in virtual seeing. These complications show that virtual reality as a medium is not transparent, even though token uses may be.

Recent discussions of culinary authenticity have focused on the problematic sociopolitical implications of Euro-Americans seeking authenticity in food perceived as ethnic. This article seeks to rehabilitate the concept of culinary authenticity. First, the author relates the issue of culinary authenticity to other philosophical debates concerning authenticity, arguing that the concept of authenticity is value-neutral. Second, a general theory of culinary authenticity making use of the theoretical apparatus of Kendall Walton's “Categories of Art” is developed and defended against objections. Third, a variety of reasons that authenticity is valued are discussed, with an emphasis on aesthetic reasons. Ultimately, the author acknowledges that some ways of valuing culinary authenticity are objectionable but argues that this should not lead us to abandon our interest in authenticity altogether.

One of the oldest platitudes about beauty is that it is pleasant to perceive or experience. In this article, I take this platitude at face value and try to explain why experiences of beauty are seemingly always accompanied by pleasure. Unlike explanations that have been offered in the past, the explanation proposed is designed to suit a “realist” view on which beauty is an irreducibly evaluative property, that is, a value. In a nutshell, the explanation is that experiences of beauty are experiences in which it appears that something is beautiful, and that such experiences are identical to experiences of aesthetic pleasure.