Pub Date : 2023-09-25DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2258093
Jonathan Matheson
ABSTRACTRecently, more attention has been paid to the nature and value of the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy. One underexplored issue concerns how epistemic autonomy is related to other intellectual virtues. Plausibly, epistemic autonomy is closely related to a number of intellectual virtues like curiosity, inquisitiveness, intellectual perseverance and intellectual courage to name just a few. Here, however, I will examine the relation between epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility. I will argue that epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility bear an interesting relationship to one another in that they are interconnected and mutually supporting intellectual virtues. In Sections 2 and 3 I will provide a brief overview of the predominant accounts of intellectual humility (Section 2) and epistemic autonomy (Section 3) in the literature. With an understanding of these intellectual virtues in hand, we will examine their relationship of mutual support in Section 4. Section 5 will explore a challenge to this relationship coming from the epistemology of disagreement, and Section 6 concludes.KEYWORDS: Intellectual humilityepistemic autonomyintellectual virtuedisagreement Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. See Ebels-Duggan (Citation2014), Grasswick (Citation2018), Matheson and Lougheed (Citation2021), Roberts and Wood (Citation2007), and Zagzebski (Citation2013, Citation2015).2. However, see Wright (Citationforthcoming).3. See also Roberts and Cleveland (Citation2016) and Tangney (Citation2009) for similar accounts.4. See also Porter and Schumann (Citation2018).5. Samuelson et al. (Citation2015) have a similar view. They characterize intellectual humility as ‘holding a belief with the merited firmness’ and as ‘believing in accordance with the evidence without claiming to know more (or less) than what the evidence merits’. A somewhat similar view is defended by Alan Hazlett (Citation2012). Hazlett’s view concerns proper meta-beliefs. On his account, intellectual humility is ‘a disposition not to adopt epistemically improper higher-order epistemic attitudes, and to adopt (in the right way, in the right situations) epistemically proper higher-order attitudes’ (220). See also Gregg and Mahadevan (Citation2014) who see intellectual humility as a realistic assessment of one’s epistemic capabilities and Lavelock et al. (Citation2017) who claim that intellectual humility, ‘involves having an accurate view of self, evidenced by honest self-evaluation and willingness to accept one’s strengths and weaknesses’.6. Battaly notes that a deficiency of intellectual interdependence need not come with an excess of epistemic autonomy. Instead, subjects may simply give up on projects whenever it would be appropriate to think with others.7. Nathan King (Citation2021) also gives an account of the virtue of epistemic autonomy along these same lines. According to King, epistemic autonomy requires thinking
摘要近年来，人们越来越关注知识自主这一智力美德的性质和价值。一个未被充分探讨的问题是认识自主与其他智力美德之间的关系。似乎，认知自主与许多智力美德密切相关，如好奇心、求知欲、智力毅力和智力勇气等等。然而，在这里，我将研究知识自主和知识谦卑之间的关系。我认为，知识自主和知识谦逊之间有着有趣的关系，因为它们相互联系，相互支持知识美德。在第2节和第3节中，我将简要概述文献中关于智力谦卑(第2节)和认知自主(第3节)的主要描述。有了对这些智力美德的理解，我们将在第4节中考察它们之间的相互支持关系。第5节将探讨来自分歧认识论对这种关系的挑战，第6节总结。关键词:知识分子谦逊;自主精神;知识分子美德;意见分歧;参见Ebels-Duggan (Citation2014)、Grasswick (Citation2018)、Matheson and Lougheed (Citation2021)、Roberts and Wood (Citation2007)以及Zagzebski (Citation2013、Citation2015)。然而，参见Wright(引文即将出版)。参见罗伯茨和克利夫兰(Citation2016)以及唐尼(Citation2009)。参见波特和舒曼(Citation2018)。Samuelson等人(Citation2015)也有类似的观点。他们将智力上的谦逊描述为“坚定地持有一种信念”和“根据证据相信，而不声称自己知道的比证据值得知道的更多(或更少)”。Alan Hazlett (Citation2012)也提出了类似的观点。Hazlett的观点涉及适当的元信念。在他看来，智力上的谦逊是“一种不采取认知上不恰当的高阶认知态度的倾向，而采取(以正确的方式，在正确的情况下)认知上适当的高阶态度”(220)。参见Gregg和Mahadevan (Citation2014)，他们认为智力上的谦逊是对一个人认知能力的现实评估，以及Lavelock等人(Citation2017)，他们声称智力上的谦逊“包括对自我的准确看法，通过诚实的自我评估和接受自己的优缺点的意愿来证明”。巴塔利指出，缺乏知识上的相互依赖并不一定伴随着过度的知识自主。相反，当需要与他人一起思考时，研究对象可能会简单地放弃项目。内森·金(Citation2021)也沿着同样的思路给出了认知自主的美德。根据King的观点，认知自主要求在适当依赖他人的同时自己思考(94)。这是遵循Matheson (Citation2022a)。这并不是说在某种意义上不存在智力美德的统一性。有关知识统一论文版本的有益讨论，请参见Wilson (Citation2021)。11.参见Matheson (Citation2022a, Citation2023)。参见希尔斯(Citation2009)、马西森(Citation2022b)和扎格布斯基(Citation2007)。有关这一点的更多信息，请参见Fricker (Citation2006)， Goldberg (Citation2021)， Nickel (Citation2001)和Nguyen (Citation2018)以及Matheson (Citation2022a)。参见Ballantyne (Citation2021, 5-6)和Leary and Terry (Citation2012)。关于认知自主、独立思考和搭便车之间关系的广泛讨论，见Matheson(引文即将出版)。与此相关的“搭便车”的感觉是一种不愿参与探究的愿望，即使一个人有能力做得很好，并且不比别人少承担投入智力工作的责任。16. Alfano et al. (citation, 2017,25)。参见Hannon (Citation2021)和Whitcomb等人(Citation2017)。参见Ballantyne (Citation2021)、Lockheart等人(Citation2016)和Sloman and Rabb (Citation2016)。参见Matheson (Citation2022b)了解更多关于这一点的信息。有关摘要，请参阅Frances and Matheson (Citation2018)和Matheson (Citation2015).20。参见Beebe and Matheson (Citation2022)。参见Enoch (Citation2010)， Foley (Citation2001)和Wedgwood (Citation2010)。虽然从坚定的角度来看，也许可以采取平行的行动，但我在这里的重点只是和解的观点。特别感谢Nathan Ballantyne, Heather Battaly, James Beebe, Adam Green, Michael Hannon, Casey Johnson, Jason Kawall, Justin McBrayer, Thi Nguyen, Jamie Watson, Dennis Whitcomb和Sarah Wright对本文版本的有益讨论和评论。 本研究由约翰邓普顿基金会资助，资助编号为61802。作者简介jonathan Matheson是北佛罗里达大学的哲学教授。他的研究兴趣主要集中在认识论，关注与分歧和认识论自治有关的问题。他是《分歧的认识论意义》(帕尔格雷夫)和《为什么不独立思考是可以的》(劳特利奇)的作者。
{"title":"Epistemic Autonomy and Intellectual Humility: Mutually Supporting Virtues","authors":"Jonathan Matheson","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2258093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2258093","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTRecently, more attention has been paid to the nature and value of the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy. One underexplored issue concerns how epistemic autonomy is related to other intellectual virtues. Plausibly, epistemic autonomy is closely related to a number of intellectual virtues like curiosity, inquisitiveness, intellectual perseverance and intellectual courage to name just a few. Here, however, I will examine the relation between epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility. I will argue that epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility bear an interesting relationship to one another in that they are interconnected and mutually supporting intellectual virtues. In Sections 2 and 3 I will provide a brief overview of the predominant accounts of intellectual humility (Section 2) and epistemic autonomy (Section 3) in the literature. With an understanding of these intellectual virtues in hand, we will examine their relationship of mutual support in Section 4. Section 5 will explore a challenge to this relationship coming from the epistemology of disagreement, and Section 6 concludes.KEYWORDS: Intellectual humilityepistemic autonomyintellectual virtuedisagreement Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. See Ebels-Duggan (Citation2014), Grasswick (Citation2018), Matheson and Lougheed (Citation2021), Roberts and Wood (Citation2007), and Zagzebski (Citation2013, Citation2015).2. However, see Wright (Citationforthcoming).3. See also Roberts and Cleveland (Citation2016) and Tangney (Citation2009) for similar accounts.4. See also Porter and Schumann (Citation2018).5. Samuelson et al. (Citation2015) have a similar view. They characterize intellectual humility as ‘holding a belief with the merited firmness’ and as ‘believing in accordance with the evidence without claiming to know more (or less) than what the evidence merits’. A somewhat similar view is defended by Alan Hazlett (Citation2012). Hazlett’s view concerns proper meta-beliefs. On his account, intellectual humility is ‘a disposition not to adopt epistemically improper higher-order epistemic attitudes, and to adopt (in the right way, in the right situations) epistemically proper higher-order attitudes’ (220). See also Gregg and Mahadevan (Citation2014) who see intellectual humility as a realistic assessment of one’s epistemic capabilities and Lavelock et al. (Citation2017) who claim that intellectual humility, ‘involves having an accurate view of self, evidenced by honest self-evaluation and willingness to accept one’s strengths and weaknesses’.6. Battaly notes that a deficiency of intellectual interdependence need not come with an excess of epistemic autonomy. Instead, subjects may simply give up on projects whenever it would be appropriate to think with others.7. Nathan King (Citation2021) also gives an account of the virtue of epistemic autonomy along these same lines. According to King, epistemic autonomy requires thinking ","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135864102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-25DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2258831
Vlasta Sikimić
Throughout scientific history, there have been cases of mainstream science dismissing novel ideas of less prominent researchers. Nowadays, many researchers with different social and academic backgrounds, origins and gender identities work together on topics of crucial importance. Still, it is questionable whether the privileged groups consider the views of underprivileged colleagues with sufficient attention. To profit from the diversity of thoughts, the scientific community first has to be open to minority viewpoints and epistemically include them in mainstream research. Moreover, the idea of inclusive science poses stronger requirements than the paradigm of open science. We argue that the concept of integration of different opinions is insufficient because the process of integration assumes adjusting oneself to the majority view and fitting into the dominant paradigm while contributing only with smaller amendments. Epistemic inclusion, on the other hand, means dynamically changing the research paradigm during the interaction with diverse methods and hypotheses. The process of inclusion preserves marginalized views and increases epistemic justice.
{"title":"Epistemic Inclusion as the Key to Benefiting from Cognitive Diversity in Science","authors":"Vlasta Sikimić","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2258831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2258831","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout scientific history, there have been cases of mainstream science dismissing novel ideas of less prominent researchers. Nowadays, many researchers with different social and academic backgrounds, origins and gender identities work together on topics of crucial importance. Still, it is questionable whether the privileged groups consider the views of underprivileged colleagues with sufficient attention. To profit from the diversity of thoughts, the scientific community first has to be open to minority viewpoints and epistemically include them in mainstream research. Moreover, the idea of inclusive science poses stronger requirements than the paradigm of open science. We argue that the concept of integration of different opinions is insufficient because the process of integration assumes adjusting oneself to the majority view and fitting into the dominant paradigm while contributing only with smaller amendments. Epistemic inclusion, on the other hand, means dynamically changing the research paradigm during the interaction with diverse methods and hypotheses. The process of inclusion preserves marginalized views and increases epistemic justice.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135864980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-11DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2252763
Petr Spelda, Vit Stritecky, John Symons
Procedural justifications of democracy emphasize inclusiveness and respect and by doing so come into conflict with instrumental justifications that depend on voters’ competence. This conflict raises questions about jury theorems and makes their standing in democratic theory contested. We show that a type of no-regret learning called meta-induction can help to satisfy the competence assumption without excluding voters or diverse opinion leaders on an a priori basis. Meta-induction assigns weights to opinion leaders based on their past predictive performance to determine the level of their inclusion in recommendations for voters. The weighting minimizes the difference between the performance of meta-induction and the best opinion leader in hindsight. The difference represents the regret of meta-induction whose minimization ensures that the recommendations are optimal in supporting voters’ competence. Meta-induction has optimal truth-tracking properties that support voters’ competence even if it is targeted by mis/disinformation and should be considered a tool for supporting democracy in hyper-plurality.
{"title":"No-Regret Learning Supports Voters’ Competence","authors":"Petr Spelda, Vit Stritecky, John Symons","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2252763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2252763","url":null,"abstract":"Procedural justifications of democracy emphasize inclusiveness and respect and by doing so come into conflict with instrumental justifications that depend on voters’ competence. This conflict raises questions about jury theorems and makes their standing in democratic theory contested. We show that a type of no-regret learning called meta-induction can help to satisfy the competence assumption without excluding voters or diverse opinion leaders on an a priori basis. Meta-induction assigns weights to opinion leaders based on their past predictive performance to determine the level of their inclusion in recommendations for voters. The weighting minimizes the difference between the performance of meta-induction and the best opinion leader in hindsight. The difference represents the regret of meta-induction whose minimization ensures that the recommendations are optimal in supporting voters’ competence. Meta-induction has optimal truth-tracking properties that support voters’ competence even if it is targeted by mis/disinformation and should be considered a tool for supporting democracy in hyper-plurality.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136023560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-10DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2245773
Dana Grabelsky
ABSTRACTIn this paper, I work towards a conceptualization of a new form of epistemic injustice – one that occurs within groups, as opposed to across groups – which I call ‘intra-group epistemic injustice’. Specifically, I focus on a case that occurs within the Jewish community, regarding what I and others see as the silencing of anti-Zionist Jews by Zionist Jews, via a conflation of Jewish identity with Zionism. Anti-Zionist Jews are accused by Zionist Jews of being ‘self-hating Jews’ or perhaps not even Jews at all, and as such, the former’s contributions to discussions of what it means to be Jewish are preemptively disregarded by the latter. Consequently, the harm of this epistemic injustice is that it effectively issues a denial of one’s identity as a Jew, which may amount to a nearly complete denial of one’s self.KEYWORDS: Epistemic injusticesocial identityJudaism, Zionism Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Even its categorization as a religion is subject to debate. See Leora Batnitzsky, ‘How Judaism Became a Religion’ (2011).2. Except perhaps in the case of Black American Jews, for whom the memory of slavery is much more recent.3. This internalization of stereotypes plays an important role in Tobi’s (Citation2023) parallel account of intra-group epistemic injustice as well. While we approach the concept from different perspectives (mine Jewish, and his post-colonial), there are important similarities, like the internalization of stereotypes just mentioned, which are worth analyzing in future writing on this subject.4. Another problematic source of support for Israel comes from evangelical Christian Zionists, who are only instrumentally invested in the Jews’ return to Israel to the extent that it fulfills the biblical prophecy required for the return of Christ. It is debatable whether this is a true instance of philosemitism, but I would argue that it functions similarly.5. I’m speaking here of political Zionism specifically, though of course there were other emergent strands of Zionist thought that did not require the establishment of a Jewish state, for which I do not have the space to go into here.6. Patricia Cohen, ‘Outspoken Political Scientist Denied Tenure at DePaul’, The New York Times, June 11, 2007.Additional informationNotes on contributorsDana GrabelskyDana Grabelsky is a doctoral candidate in philosophy at CUNY Graduate Center. She works primarily in social and political philosophy, with a focus on related issues in social epistemology and philosophy of language. Additionally, she has interests in philosophy of art (bad movies in particular).
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Pub Date : 2023-09-10DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2248044
J. M. Dieterle
ABSTRACTPaul-Mikhail Podosky introduces the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice and argues that non-human animals are often the subjects of such injustice. In this paper, I argue that although the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice is coherent, Podosky’s examples – including his primary case of non-human animals – are not instances of it. I attempt to show that an epistemology of ignorance serves as a better theoretical basis for Podosky’s argument. In the final section of the paper, I discuss a case that, at first glance, seems to be one of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice. However, I argue that ultimately an epistemology of ignorance gives us a better account of the case.KEYWORDS: Epistemic injusticehermeneutical injusticeepistemology of ignorancenon-human animals Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Correction StatementThis article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.Notes1. As Medina notes, Fricker acknowledges performatively-based epistemic injustices in (Citation2007, 160).2. Lopez (Citationforthcoming) argues that although non-human animals cannot be the subjects of testimonial or hermeneutical injustice, they can be the subjects of another kind of epistemic injustice. Lopez focuses on skill or ‘know-how’ knowledge, which both human and non-human animals possess. Non-human animals have interests in acquiring true beliefs about their environment, other members of their species, etc., and when this acquisition is disrupted, they can suffer from epistemic injustice. Lopez argues that this kind of epistemic injustice does not require that one must be invested in being recognized as a knower. Thus the harm here will be decidedly different from that Fricker discusses.3. Since I am attempting to determine whether Fricker’s notion of hermeneutical injustice can be expanded to include other-oriented hermeneutical injustice, I use Fricker’s account of what it means to be harmed in one’s capacity as a knower. But see Lopez (Citationforthcoming) for an argument that there are kinds of epistemic injustice that do not require that one be invested in being recognized as a knower. Importantly, hermeneutical injustice is not one of them.4. Mills notes that white ignorance is not confined to whites. See (Citation2007, 22ff).5. There are connections between white ignorance and testimonial injustice, too. Testimonial injustices can be the result of the biases and misunderstandings that are endemic to white ignorance.6. The case is based on Enduring Love, a novel by Ian McEwen.7. In Fricker (Citation2016), Fricker discusses the differences between white ignorance and hermeneutical injustice. She argues that there are two primary differences: (1) white ignorance is usually epistemically culpable but hermeneutical injustice is not; (2) white ignorance does not generally involve a lack of concepts, but hermeneutical in
{"title":"Other Oriented Hermeneutical Injustice, Affected Ignorance, or Human Ignorance?","authors":"J. M. Dieterle","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2248044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2248044","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTPaul-Mikhail Podosky introduces the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice and argues that non-human animals are often the subjects of such injustice. In this paper, I argue that although the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice is coherent, Podosky’s examples – including his primary case of non-human animals – are not instances of it. I attempt to show that an epistemology of ignorance serves as a better theoretical basis for Podosky’s argument. In the final section of the paper, I discuss a case that, at first glance, seems to be one of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice. However, I argue that ultimately an epistemology of ignorance gives us a better account of the case.KEYWORDS: Epistemic injusticehermeneutical injusticeepistemology of ignorancenon-human animals Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Correction StatementThis article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.Notes1. As Medina notes, Fricker acknowledges performatively-based epistemic injustices in (Citation2007, 160).2. Lopez (Citationforthcoming) argues that although non-human animals cannot be the subjects of testimonial or hermeneutical injustice, they can be the subjects of another kind of epistemic injustice. Lopez focuses on skill or ‘know-how’ knowledge, which both human and non-human animals possess. Non-human animals have interests in acquiring true beliefs about their environment, other members of their species, etc., and when this acquisition is disrupted, they can suffer from epistemic injustice. Lopez argues that this kind of epistemic injustice does not require that one must be invested in being recognized as a knower. Thus the harm here will be decidedly different from that Fricker discusses.3. Since I am attempting to determine whether Fricker’s notion of hermeneutical injustice can be expanded to include other-oriented hermeneutical injustice, I use Fricker’s account of what it means to be harmed in one’s capacity as a knower. But see Lopez (Citationforthcoming) for an argument that there are kinds of epistemic injustice that do not require that one be invested in being recognized as a knower. Importantly, hermeneutical injustice is not one of them.4. Mills notes that white ignorance is not confined to whites. See (Citation2007, 22ff).5. There are connections between white ignorance and testimonial injustice, too. Testimonial injustices can be the result of the biases and misunderstandings that are endemic to white ignorance.6. The case is based on Enduring Love, a novel by Ian McEwen.7. In Fricker (Citation2016), Fricker discusses the differences between white ignorance and hermeneutical injustice. She argues that there are two primary differences: (1) white ignorance is usually epistemically culpable but hermeneutical injustice is not; (2) white ignorance does not generally involve a lack of concepts, but hermeneutical in","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136072672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-05DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2248926
Esther K. H. Ng
ABSTRACT Pessimism over a democracy’s ability to produce good outcomes is as longstanding as democracy itself. On one hand, democratic theorists consider democracy to be the only legitimate form of government on the basis that it alone promotes or safeguards intrinsic values like freedom, equality, and justice. On the other, skepticism toward the ordinary citizen’s cognitive capacities remains a perennial concern. Qualms about the epistemic value of democracy have only been made more pertinent by a fundamental problem of deep epistemic disagreement which underlies the post-truth phenomenon. I argue that the democratic theorists who have sought to defend democracy on epistemic grounds have thus far neglected such deep and intractable disagreements. Without addressing this oversight, the epistemic democrat will find that collective decision-making processes quickly become paralyzed and will not be able to yield the epistemic benefits they promise. Hence, the work for epistemic democrats is to recognize and take into account the ramifications of epistemic disagreements so as to make a stronger case for epistemic democracy.
{"title":"Cognitive Diversity or Cognitive Polarization? On Epistemic Democracy in a Post-Truth World","authors":"Esther K. H. Ng","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2248926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2248926","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Pessimism over a democracy’s ability to produce good outcomes is as longstanding as democracy itself. On one hand, democratic theorists consider democracy to be the only legitimate form of government on the basis that it alone promotes or safeguards intrinsic values like freedom, equality, and justice. On the other, skepticism toward the ordinary citizen’s cognitive capacities remains a perennial concern. Qualms about the epistemic value of democracy have only been made more pertinent by a fundamental problem of deep epistemic disagreement which underlies the post-truth phenomenon. I argue that the democratic theorists who have sought to defend democracy on epistemic grounds have thus far neglected such deep and intractable disagreements. Without addressing this oversight, the epistemic democrat will find that collective decision-making processes quickly become paralyzed and will not be able to yield the epistemic benefits they promise. Hence, the work for epistemic democrats is to recognize and take into account the ramifications of epistemic disagreements so as to make a stronger case for epistemic democracy.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43380029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-04DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2245769
Anita Välikangas
{"title":"The Limited Role of Social Sciences and Humanities in Interdisciplinary Funding: What are Its Effects?","authors":"Anita Välikangas","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2245769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2245769","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48216693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-13DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2237942
Tzu-wei Hung
ABSTRACT Although the relationship between prejudice and predictive coding has attracted more attention recently, many important issues remain to be investigated, such as why prejudice is so persistent and how to accommodate seemingly conflicting studies. In this paper, we offer an integrated framework to explain the functional-computational mechanism of prejudice. We argue that this framework better explains (i) why prejudice is somewhat immune to revision, (ii) how inconsistent processing (e.g. one’s moral belief and biased emotional reaction) may occur, (iii) the dispute over the content of ‘alief’ (unconscious belief), and (iv) conflicting data reported in disinformation studies. Finally, we briefly review the main intervention strategies and offer recommendations.
{"title":"Why Human Prejudice is so Persistent: A Predictive Coding Analysis","authors":"Tzu-wei Hung","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2237942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2237942","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Although the relationship between prejudice and predictive coding has attracted more attention recently, many important issues remain to be investigated, such as why prejudice is so persistent and how to accommodate seemingly conflicting studies. In this paper, we offer an integrated framework to explain the functional-computational mechanism of prejudice. We argue that this framework better explains (i) why prejudice is somewhat immune to revision, (ii) how inconsistent processing (e.g. one’s moral belief and biased emotional reaction) may occur, (iii) the dispute over the content of ‘alief’ (unconscious belief), and (iv) conflicting data reported in disinformation studies. Finally, we briefly review the main intervention strategies and offer recommendations.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48868264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-02DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2227945
Mohamed Fouz Mohamed Zacky, M. Moniruzzaman
{"title":"‘Islamic Epistemology’ in a Modern Context: Anatomy of an Evolving Debate","authors":"Mohamed Fouz Mohamed Zacky, M. Moniruzzaman","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2227945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2227945","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48406407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-01DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2023.2237921
M. Kiconco
{"title":"Reflexive Research Practice in Women’s Prison Research in Uganda","authors":"M. Kiconco","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2237921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2237921","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43849136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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