Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121891
C. Bennett
ABSTRACT In pursuit of a theory of expressive reasons, I focus on the practical rationality of actions such as welcoming, thanking, congratulating, saluting – I label them ‘expressive actions.’ How should we understand the kinds of practical reasons that count in favour of expressive actions? This question is related to the question of how to understand non-instrumental fittingness-type reasons for emotion. Expressive actions often are and should be expressions of emotion. It seems to be an important feature of such actions that the reasons that count in favour of the action are entangled with reasons of fittingness that count in favour of the relevantly connected emotion. But how should we understand this entanglement? I argue that the relevant category of reasons cannot be captured on approaches standard in normative theory. I develop a theory of sui generis expressive reasons. I argue that we have reason to perform actions that mark certain situations that contain some significant value or disvalue, independently of any reason to alter those situations. This is the role of expressive actions. Sui generis reasons for expressive actions are entangled with reasons for relevantly connected emotions because (some) emotions have the same role of marking extraordinary situations.
{"title":"Could There Be Expressive Reasons? A Sketch of A Theory","authors":"C. Bennett","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2121891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121891","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In pursuit of a theory of expressive reasons, I focus on the practical rationality of actions such as welcoming, thanking, congratulating, saluting – I label them ‘expressive actions.’ How should we understand the kinds of practical reasons that count in favour of expressive actions? This question is related to the question of how to understand non-instrumental fittingness-type reasons for emotion. Expressive actions often are and should be expressions of emotion. It seems to be an important feature of such actions that the reasons that count in favour of the action are entangled with reasons of fittingness that count in favour of the relevantly connected emotion. But how should we understand this entanglement? I argue that the relevant category of reasons cannot be captured on approaches standard in normative theory. I develop a theory of sui generis expressive reasons. I argue that we have reason to perform actions that mark certain situations that contain some significant value or disvalue, independently of any reason to alter those situations. This is the role of expressive actions. Sui generis reasons for expressive actions are entangled with reasons for relevantly connected emotions because (some) emotions have the same role of marking extraordinary situations.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"298 - 319"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42455489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121890
Edgar Phillips
ABSTRACT Time passed after the commission of a wrong can affect how we respond to its agent now. Specifically it can introduce certain forms of complexity or ambivalence into our blaming responses. This paper considers how and why time might matter in this way. I illustrate the phenomenon by looking at a recent real-life example, surveying some responses to the case and identifying the relevant forms of ambivalence. I then consider a recent account of blameworthiness and its development over time that purports to account for this ambivalence. Blameworthiness, on this account, consists in a psychological flaw; time matters because it brings the possibility of change in the agent, and ambivalence arises because it is hard to know to the extent of such change. This account, I argue, mischaracterises responses to the case and misidentifies the source of their ambivalence. Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of emotion, I sketch an alternative approach. Our responses, I suggest, make sense within processes through which we address wrongdoing. Time matters because these processes take time and because time’s having passed raises the question whether and how the wrong has been addressed. Unaddressed wrongs can elicit ambivalence of a specific form.
{"title":"Addressing the Past: Time, Blame and Guilt","authors":"Edgar Phillips","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2121890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121890","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Time passed after the commission of a wrong can affect how we respond to its agent now. Specifically it can introduce certain forms of complexity or ambivalence into our blaming responses. This paper considers how and why time might matter in this way. I illustrate the phenomenon by looking at a recent real-life example, surveying some responses to the case and identifying the relevant forms of ambivalence. I then consider a recent account of blameworthiness and its development over time that purports to account for this ambivalence. Blameworthiness, on this account, consists in a psychological flaw; time matters because it brings the possibility of change in the agent, and ambivalence arises because it is hard to know to the extent of such change. This account, I argue, mischaracterises responses to the case and misidentifies the source of their ambivalence. Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of emotion, I sketch an alternative approach. Our responses, I suggest, make sense within processes through which we address wrongdoing. Time matters because these processes take time and because time’s having passed raises the question whether and how the wrong has been addressed. Unaddressed wrongs can elicit ambivalence of a specific form.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"219 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49012322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2138259
Ashley Shaw, M. Baghramian
ABSTRACT This introduction provides brief outlines of the articles collected in this special issue of the International Journal of Philosophical Studies on the topic of Ethics and Emotions. It also announces the winners of the 2021 Robert Papazian and PERITIA prizes.
{"title":"Ethics and the Emotions: An Introduction to the Special Issue","authors":"Ashley Shaw, M. Baghramian","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2138259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2138259","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This introduction provides brief outlines of the articles collected in this special issue of the International Journal of Philosophical Studies on the topic of Ethics and Emotions. It also announces the winners of the 2021 Robert Papazian and PERITIA prizes.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"193 - 201"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48405838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121896
Pilar Lopez-Cantero
ABSTRACT A common approach in the philosophy of love defines love as caring about one another and promoting one another's interests, aims and values. The view faces several problems and has been re-formulated to avoid them. However, here I argue that a larger re-formulation of the definition of love is needed in order to accommodate three instances of what I call 'non-harmonious' relationships. I identify three types of non-harmonious love (featuring problematic interests, opposing interests and neutral interests the lovers do not care about) and ultimately claim that our definition of love must incorporate conflict and self-interest, and we should then abandon the excessive focus on the sharing of values.
{"title":"Non-harmonious love","authors":"Pilar Lopez-Cantero","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2121896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121896","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A common approach in the philosophy of love defines love as caring about one another and promoting one another's interests, aims and values. The view faces several problems and has been re-formulated to avoid them. However, here I argue that a larger re-formulation of the definition of love is needed in order to accommodate three instances of what I call 'non-harmonious' relationships. I identify three types of non-harmonious love (featuring problematic interests, opposing interests and neutral interests the lovers do not care about) and ultimately claim that our definition of love must incorporate conflict and self-interest, and we should then abandon the excessive focus on the sharing of values.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"276 - 297"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49529760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2125150
J. Mosquera, K. Jylhä
ABSTRACT Climate change evokes different emotions in people. Recently, climate emotions have become a matter of normative scrutiny in the public debate. This phenomenon, which we refer to as the normativization of climate emotions, manifests at two levels. At the individual level, people are faced with affective dilemmas, situations where they are genuinely uncertain about what is the right way to feel in the face of climate change. At the collective level, the public debate reflects disagreement about which emotions are appropriate to feel in the climate context. The aim of this paper is to examine the normative reasons in favour of different climate emotions by combining normative criteria from philosophy and psychology, such as rationality-based and consequentialist ones. We conclude that these criteria provide partial reasons for or against different climate emotions and that the suitability of each criterion will depend on various considerations, including the specific object that the emotion is directed to. We suggest that emotional disagreement in climate contexts may generate distrust, potentially hindering cooperation for climate action. We propose that we can ease challenges like this if we come to terms with the complex nature of climate emotions and their normative justification.
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Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2079146
A. Aliyev
ABSTRACT A considerable number of philosophers are attracted to what might be called ‘causal type-abstractionism’ – the view that photographs, symphonies, models of cars, novels, flags, and other multiply instantiable entities that are, or at least seem to be, artifacts are a particular kind of abstracta, namely causally efficacious types. Despite its popularity, however, causal type-abstractionism faces a problem: Given some plausible assumptions, it commits us to a seemingly unpalatable consequence – that there is widespread type-causal overdetermination, or, in other words, a multitude of situations where one and the same effect has two or more distinct independently sufficient causes, at least one of which involves type causation. Recently, a powerful solution to this problem has been offered by Tim Juvshik. Drawing upon the literature on mental causation, he argues that the foregoing consequence could be avoided without abandoning causal type-abstractionism – if we adopt a particular treatment of causes based on Stephen Yablo’s principle of proportionality. My primary goal in this essay is to show that the given solution fails. Additionally, I aim to sketch a solution that, I think, provides a promising type-abstractionist way to resolve the problem being discussed.
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Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2057683
J. Wretzel
References Berg, A., and A. Long Chu. 2018. “Wanting Bad Things.” The Point, July 18. https://thepoint mag.com/dialogue/wanting-bad-things-andrea-long-chu-responds-amia-srinivasan/ Green, L. 2000. “Pornographies.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (1): 27–52. doi:10.1111/ 1467-9760.00091. Langton, R. 1993. “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (4): 293–330. Lewis, S. 2021. [Twitter], September 7. https://twitter.com/reproutopia/status/ 1435279635961552903?s=20&fbclid=IwAR1EFOpACZUnd7nOZuwjRvCDEmHmgnOYwjdBsWphG3no4Ee1pBFgsgzybA Rooney, S. 2021. Beautiful World, Where Are You. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Srinivasan, A. 2021. [Twitter], September 9. https://twitter.com/amiasrinivasan/status/ 1435963635654750216?s=20&fbclid=IwAR3c`AGMXs0DngTKrQ720SYXvIvv XdMnByyIPf2tdVLURSyTspp6JcrASmeY
{"title":"Hegel’s Century: Alienation and Recognition in a Time of Revolution","authors":"J. Wretzel","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2057683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2057683","url":null,"abstract":"References Berg, A., and A. Long Chu. 2018. “Wanting Bad Things.” The Point, July 18. https://thepoint mag.com/dialogue/wanting-bad-things-andrea-long-chu-responds-amia-srinivasan/ Green, L. 2000. “Pornographies.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (1): 27–52. doi:10.1111/ 1467-9760.00091. Langton, R. 1993. “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (4): 293–330. Lewis, S. 2021. [Twitter], September 7. https://twitter.com/reproutopia/status/ 1435279635961552903?s=20&fbclid=IwAR1EFOpACZUnd7nOZuwjRvCDEmHmgnOYwjdBsWphG3no4Ee1pBFgsgzybA Rooney, S. 2021. Beautiful World, Where Are You. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Srinivasan, A. 2021. [Twitter], September 9. https://twitter.com/amiasrinivasan/status/ 1435963635654750216?s=20&fbclid=IwAR3c`AGMXs0DngTKrQ720SYXvIvv XdMnByyIPf2tdVLURSyTspp6JcrASmeY","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"184 - 188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48715428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2057684
Ronald Loeffler
The last three decades have seen a renaissance in Anglo-American philosophy of efforts to think of human reasoning as constitutively social and, indeed, discursive. This approach does not see reason primarily as an organ for an individual’s solitary explanations and predictions of events in the environment and for making solitary plans and decisions accordingly – thus enhancing the individual’s chances to do well – and only derivatively also as an organ that enables rational social interaction with other reasoning individuals. Rather the other way around. Reason is seen as primarily and constitutively an organ for linguistic communication, for the interpersonal pooling of information, and for cooperation, and only derivatively also as an organ for an individual’s solitary, internalized ratiocinations. Surely one way to reason is to reason in dialogue with others, when we make plans for joint actions, give reasons by making claims, ask for reasons by posing questions, and critically query each other’s claims or decisions and the reasons given for them. And according to the view in question, such cooperative and discursive reasoning is the original mode of reasoning, from which other modes, such as reasoning in foro interno, derive. Using a term coined by Dorit Bar-On, Ladislav Koreň, in his excellent book, calls this view ‘language rationalism.’ (4) Koreň’s point of entry is the observation that key contemporary ‘language rationalists,’ such as Robert Brandom, Huw Price, and John McDowell, building on classical works by figures such as Wittgenstein, Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Dummett, and Donald Davidson, proceed largely in armchair fashion, mainly ignoring empirical work on human (and primate) social cognition, discursive abilities, and reasoning. This, in Koreň’s words,
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Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2057682
Annabel Barry
{"title":"The Right to Sex","authors":"Annabel Barry","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2057682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2057682","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"180 - 184"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43538140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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