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Experience in Descartes 对笛卡尔的体验
3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2250178
Vili Lähteenmäki
ABSTRACT I will focus on Anik Waldow’s reading of Descartes as contributing towards a specific form of human experience and the related capacity for self-determination. I discuss how this notion of experience relates to what is often taken to be the crux of Descartes’s Meditations. I conclude by noting that three elements are central to Waldow’s interpretation: Descartes’s intellectual metaphysical pursuit for epistemic certainty about essences of things, the specific kind of experience of our selves that arises out of the embodied state of the mind revealing ourselves as both active and passive, and a resulting new capacity for self-determination. The moral of Waldow’s reading is that we should not read the Meditations as an account of what the mind is but as an account of what the mind can do and how we can upraise ourselves not as metaphysicians but in our interactions with the world and others.
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引用次数: 0
Why Every Belief is a Choice: Descartes’ Doxastic Voluntarism Reconsidered 为什么每一种信仰都是一种选择:重新审视笛卡尔的武断唯意志论
3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2235369
Mark Boespflug
ABSTRACTDescartes appears to hold that everything we believe is the product of a voluntary choice. Scholars have been reluctant to take this particularly radical version of doxastic voluntarism as Descartes’ considered position. I argue that once Descartes’ compatibilist conception of free will as well as his position on the ‘freedom of indifference’ are taken into account, the primary motivations for the rejection of the aforementioned radical version of doxastic voluntarism lose their force. Consequently, we may take Descartes at his word when he maintains that everything we believe, we believe freely – even if we cannot believe anything we wish.KEYWORDS: Descartesdoxastic voluntarismvoluntary beliefwillassentepistemic deontologism Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. As will be seen below, however, it is a matter of dispute whether Descartes means to be articulating a voluntarist position in the Fourth Meditation. Some scholars directly challenge this interpretation of the Fourth Meditation (O’Hear Citation1979). Others argue that Descartes endorsed the less extreme indirect version of voluntarism (Newman Citation2015; Cottingham Citation2008, ch. 11)—which, in spite of the name, amounts to a rejection of the view that belief is under the voluntary control of the will.2. I will follow that portion of the literature that refrains from drawing a distinction between assent, belief and judgment in Descartes. Della Rocca (Citation2006) makes this explicit. Schuessler (Citation2013, 150) uses the three terms interchangeably. Though Newman (Citation2015, 63) appears to understand judgment to be a discrete concept from belief and assent, he claims that the latter two notions are interchangeable. Cottingham (Citation2008, ch. 11) uses belief and assent interchangeably.3. Though Williams (Citation1978) and Alston (Citation1988) are most explicit about this, their influential interpretations have been taken up by a number of Descartes scholars. Alston, it should be noted, only mentions Descartes in passing.4. Newman (Citation2015, 65); Cottingham (Citation2008, 225-7) seems to reject this as a possibility as well. See also Grant (Citation1976).5. Vitz (Citation2010); Davies (Citation2001); Schuessler (Citation2013).6. Cottingham (Citation2008, ch. 8); Newman (Citation2015); Carriero (Citation2009, ch. 4); Kenny (Citation1973).7. Direct doxastic voluntarism can come in a variety of strengths—from holding that we may exercise direct control over some very specific subset of our beliefs to holding that we exercise direct control over all of our beliefs. Descartes, I argue, falls on the latter end of the spectrum.8. I am thinking here of the seminal attacks on doxastic voluntarism by Alston (Citation1988) and Williams (Citation1970). While there is a great deal of philosophically valuable material in both works, there are also systemic deficiencies such that even if one grants the premises of the argumen
德拉·罗卡(Citation2006, 153);科廷厄姆(Citation2008, 222)。这一观点的当代表达见于Steup (Citation2000、Citation2008、Citation2012、Citation2017)和Sharon Ryan (Citation2003、Citation2015)。许多作者指出,这完全不符合学术的判断概念,因此应该被视为第四次冥想中最有趣的发展之一(Lennon引文2014,173;然而,正如Nuchelmans (Citation1983, 47-55)所指出的,就斯多葛派哲学而言,这并不是特别新颖,笛卡尔当然很欣赏斯多葛派哲学(Rutherford Citation2014)。对于斯多葛派来说,判断或相信是意志的功能(例如,爱比克泰德(citation2004,1))。虽然这似乎是一种相当有力的方式,但这似乎是笛卡尔的框架所要求的。例如,德拉·罗卡(Della Rocca)显然正是以这种方式解释笛卡尔:“笛卡尔将信仰与普通行为同化:相信我愚蠢的朋友锁上了冰柜和用斧头开锁都是同一意义上的行为:它们是智力和意志、表征状态和非表征状态的适当结合的结果”(Citation2006, 124)。如果说笛卡尔的意思是我们有间接控制,但他只是没有现成的概念来充分阐明这一立场,这并不是一个有希望的策略。主张专制控制的中心是由间接手段组成的,至少早在14世纪,著名的英国多米尼加人罗伯特·霍尔科特就在学术哲学中阐述了这一观点。参见Boespflug (Citation2018)。这是Williams (Citation1970)描述直接控制的方法。阿尔斯通(Citation1988, 260)的表述方式与此类似。关于这一点的进一步讨论见Alston (Citation1988, 269)。这是阿尔斯通的例子(Citation1988, 263)。阿尔斯通(Citation1988, 261)和威廉姆斯(Citation1970)也是如此。Plantinga (citation1993,23)也可能这样解释笛卡尔,尽管它不太清楚。威尔逊的一些言论表明了这一立场。鉴于她采取笛卡尔的立场,她提出异议,“我们不能只是决定相信或同意某事,然后立即相信或同意它”(Citation1978, 145)。尽管威廉姆斯的著名文章《决定去相信》(Deciding to Believe)被普遍认为未能证明随意相信在形而上学上是不可能的,但许多作者认为,威廉姆斯关于信仰具有真理目标的主张确实抓住了信仰本质中一些重要的东西,这与信仰可能是自愿的观点存在矛盾(Citation1970)。Alston (Citation1988)采用了一种与Williams截然不同的方法来论证武断的唯意志论是错误的。阿尔斯顿试图表明,这仅仅是一个偶然的心理事实,人们不能随意相信。Schuessler (Citation2013, 374-5)注意到了这一点。的确,与Williams相比,Alston对不同种类的寄生虫控制更为敏感,并且处理了许多种类的寄生虫控制。然而,他似乎从来没有提到笛卡尔的观点,即经院哲学家的观点,或者约翰·亨利·纽曼(他引用了他的观点)。然而,重要的是要注意,仅仅因为我不能自愿相信美国是英国的殖民地,这并不一定意味着我相信它不是英国的殖民地不在我的专制控制范围内(请原谅三重否定)。毕竟,我无法用笔挖出自己的眼睛,并不意味着我缺乏对不这么做的自主控制。这只是说,专制强迫可能与专制自由或自愿控制完全相容。有些人会说它确实是。例如,参见Steup (Citation2000, Citation2008)。值得注意的是,即使笛卡尔的唯意志论在某种意义上是受限制的,即有些命题我们无法同意,但在某种意义上,它是不受限制的,即我们最终相信的一切都是自愿的。德拉·罗卡(Citation2006, 154);Ragland (Citation2006),未发表手稿;帕特森(Citation2011);科廷厄姆(Citation1986, 83, Citation2008, 348-9);纽曼(citation), 2015, 68).25。此外,正如几位当代实用主义者所指出的那样,相信可能是真的通常对一个人最有实际的好处(Rinard Citation2017;MacGuire and Wood Citation2020)。因此,可能是正确的信念也可能是最实际有益的。实用主义立场的一个重大困难是存在着自我欺骗的产物;这些似乎不太可能是真的,但实际上是有益的。这是一个需要实用主义者作出相当大的反应的问题。 无论如何,无论现场是否清晰明了,认为意志在这种情况下是无关紧要的,似乎是一种误导。更重要的是,我可以自由地相信,例如,我和我的身体是混合在一起的,至少不是最低的等级。我自己的感觉是,我们应该把完全的冷漠、清晰和清晰视为占据规范性和相应的心理光谱的两端:在清晰和不同感知的范式情况下,我应该选择哪个选项是完全明显的——心理确定性由此产生;而在冷漠的范式情况下,选择是绝对的——也许暂停同意是心理上的结果。在后一种情况下,我们就像布里丹的驴夹在两堆干草之间。但是,既然对笛卡尔来说,清晰、清晰和冷漠都是有等级之分的,那么很难说清楚二者的起点和终点在哪里。然而,似乎很清楚的是,笛卡尔给了我们令人信服的理由,让我们认为他不赞同对立决定论。36. Ragland对Lex Newman (Citation2015)的间接唯意志论解读笛卡尔的相关问题以及一些潜在的解决方案进行了深刻的讨论。尤其是奥迪(Citation2001)。Davies, (Citation2001,第5章);Vitz (Citation2010);Schuessler (Citation2013)。应该指出的是,Schuessler的治疗方法为笛卡儿的随机控制概念增加了许多复杂的细微差别。例如,他坚持认为,第一冥想中所涉及的怀疑控制仅仅是间接的,是由“怀疑技术”产生的。同样,Schuessler也在笛卡尔哲学的其他维度中隔离了其他类型的控制(173)。但他最终声称,“我们因此可以自信地给笛卡儿戴上一种专制控制的守门人模型”(157)。维茨(Citation2010)提供了一个类似的图景:笛卡尔认为“人们有能力通过意志行为直接暂停或保留判断”。我们把这称为消极的DDV(直接随机意志论)。维茨还坚持认为,几乎没有文本证据证明笛卡尔认为“人们有能力通过意志行为直接形成判断”。称之为正DDV '(108)。因此,意志在本质上起着消极的作用。虽然它能够通过停止获取信念而将自己插入到信念形成的过程中,但它并不相应地能够导致信念的形成。40.尽管我承认,笛卡尔是否认为人有能力暂停对清晰而独特的感知的判断尚不清楚。此外,除了Schuessler (Citation2013)之外,上述作者可能对间接手段更加敏感,这些间接手段可能用于产生怀疑的心态,例如,第一次冥想。41。尽管维茨声称,几乎没有文本证据表明笛卡尔认为“人们有能力通过意志行为直接形成判断”(Citation2010, 115-6),但维茨几乎没有说什么来关闭这种直接阅读笛卡尔应该如何解释的可能
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引用次数: 0
Précis: Experience Embodied 精确:经验体现
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2250177
Anik Waldow
ABSTRACT This précis provides a summary of the major arguments of Experience Embodied together with an overview of the three parts and individual chapters. By examining the concept of experience in the theorizing of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Herder, and Kant, this book sets out to complicate one of the most firmly established narratives of early modern philosophy. In its traditional form, this narrative focuses on the distinction between rationalism and empiricism and possesses a strong epistemological focus. Through this, it fails to acknowledge that the concept of experience was discussed in a much broader philosophical context, which included moral, social, political, and historical considerations. Experience Embodied demonstrates that the six philosophers examined constructively engaged with the fact that experience affects body and mind, and shapes what we can think and do. More generally, the book shows that during the early modern period a positive conception of the mind’s embodiment and principal malleability through the influences of artifice and nature was not only available, but also frequently used to counterbalance standard claims about the negative impact of passions, instincts, and undesirable social influences.
摘要本报告概述了经验体现的主要论点,并概述了三个部分和各个章节。通过考察笛卡尔、洛克、休谟、卢梭、赫尔德和康德理论中的经验概念,本书试图使早期现代哲学中最牢固的叙事之一复杂化。在其传统形式中,这种叙述侧重于理性主义和经验主义之间的区别,并具有强烈的认识论焦点。通过这一点,它没有承认经验的概念是在更广泛的哲学背景下讨论的,其中包括道德、社会、政治和历史考虑。《经验的化身》表明,六位哲学家建设性地接受了这样一个事实,即经验影响身体和心灵,并塑造我们的思维和行为。更广泛地说,这本书表明,在现代早期,通过技巧和自然的影响,不仅可以获得关于心灵化身和主要延展性的积极概念,但也经常被用来平衡关于激情、本能和不良社会影响的负面影响的标准说法。
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引用次数: 0
Locke on Education, Persons, and Moral Agency 洛克论教育、人与道德能动性
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2250179
Ruth Boeker
ABSTRACT In her book Experience Embodied Anik Waldow devotes a chapter to ‘Locke’s Experimental Persons.’ Her chapter aims to show how Locke’s views on persons, personal identity, and moral agency in his Essay concerning Human Understanding build on his esteem-based approach to education that he develops in Some Thoughts concerning Education. After outlining main contributions that Waldow makes in her chapter, I turn to three issues that in my view deserve further consideration. First, I draw attention to the question of how Locke’s esteem-based education can be reconciled with his moral views in the Essay. I propose that the question of how children become persons or moral agents who see their actions bound by divine law is worth examining with more detail. Second, I contrast Waldow’s interpretation of what a Lockean action is with an alternative interpretation and show that this has implications for how we understand the role of consciousness in Locke’s account of persons and personal identity. Third, I take a closer look at Waldow’s view that consciousness has an epistemic function in Locke’s account of persons and personal identity and highlight advantages of also acknowledging a metaphysical function of consciousness.
在安妮克·沃尔多的著作《体验的体现》中,有一章专门讨论了“洛克的实验人物”。她的章节旨在展示洛克在《关于人类理解的文章》中关于人、个人身份和道德代理的观点是如何建立在他在《关于教育的一些思想》中发展起来的基于尊重的教育方法之上的。在概述了沃尔多在她的章节中所做的主要贡献之后,我转向我认为值得进一步考虑的三个问题。首先,我提请注意洛克的以尊重为基础的教育如何与他在《随笔》中的道德观相协调的问题。我认为,儿童如何成为看到自己的行为受到神圣律法约束的人或道德行为者,这个问题值得更详细地研究。其次,我将沃尔多对洛克行为的解释与另一种解释进行对比,并表明这对我们如何理解洛克对人格和人格同一性的描述中意识的作用有影响。第三,我将仔细研究Waldow的观点,即意识在洛克对人和个人同一性的描述中具有认知功能,并强调承认意识的形而上学功能的优势。
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引用次数: 0
The Theatre is the Opium of the People: A Voice of Dissent from Waldow’s Reading of Rousseau 戏剧是人民的鸦片:瓦尔多解读卢梭的异议之声
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2250181
Lilian Alweiss
ABSTRACT This paper questions Waldow reading of Rousseau’s ‘Letter to M D’Alembert’ [Letter]. It claims that Waldow fails to address the social and political argument that lies behind Rousseau’s critique of the theatre and, as a result, her conclusions are misplaced. First, Rousseau does not seek to quench critique rather his aim is to show that the theatre distracts us from our real concerns in life and thus quells discontent and, indeed, the possibility of dissent. Second, Rousseau does not refer to the naturally intact morals of the Genevans but argues that the Genevans are closer to the state of nature and thus less corrupt. Finally, his account of the state of nature in the Letter is not at odds with his own views about the state of nature. Just as in his other writings, he uses the state of nature as a heuristic device to justify his claim that social relations give rise to vice and virtue. It is a necessary fiction that provides us with the principle of hope that things could be otherwise.
摘要本文对瓦尔多对卢梭《致达朗贝尔先生的信》的解读提出质疑。它声称沃尔多未能解决卢梭对戏剧的批评背后的社会和政治争论,因此,她的结论是错误的。首先,卢梭并没有试图平息批评,相反,他的目的是表明,戏剧分散了我们对生活中真正关心的事情的注意力,从而平息了不满,实际上,也平息了不同意见的可能性。其次,卢梭并没有提到日内瓦人的自然完整的道德,而是认为日内瓦人更接近自然状态,因此不那么腐败。最后,他在《信》中对自然状态的描述与他自己对自然状态的看法并不矛盾。就像在他的其他作品中一样,他用自然状态作为一种启发式的手段来证明他的主张,即社会关系会产生恶和美德。这是一种必要的虚构,它为我们提供了希望的原则,让我们相信事情可能不是这样。
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引用次数: 0
Anti-System in the Philosophical Practice of Francis Bacon 弗兰西斯·培根哲学实践中的反制度
3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2235370
Robert Miner
ABSTRACTIn this paper, I ask whether Francis Bacon constitutes a revealing exception to the modern predilection for ‘system.’ First, I consider evidence for reading Bacon as a philosopher strongly attracted toward the ideal of system. Second, I show how reflecting on Bacon’s philosophical practice can motivate an ‘anti-system‘ reading of his texts. In considering the small number of works in which Bacon explicitly discusses ‘system’ under that name (in particular, the Descriptio globi intellectualis), I clarify what is and is not meant by ‘philosophical system’ as distinct from other ideas of system (e.g. ‘system of the heavens’). Third, I draw from the Temporis Masculus Partum and Novum Organum to argue that Bacon’s doctrine of the ‘idols of the mind’ amounts to a thoroughgoing critique of system in philosophy. Fourth, I show how and why Bacon deploys the aphoristic form in Novum Organum as an alternative to system. I conclude by suggesting some ways in which an ‘anti-system’ reading of Bacon has the power to enhance our appreciation of other early modern authors who write philosophy without pretensions to system.KEYWORDS: BaconSystemAphorismMethod Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. In the second section of this paper, I acknowledge a sense in which Aristotle’s dialectical inquiries might reasonably count as a ‘system.’2. References to Bacon’s Advancement of Learning are to Bacon (Citation2000), cited in the text as ‘Advancement,’ accompanied by book, chapter and section number, and followed by page number. I have modernized most of the spellings.3. References to Bacon’s Valerius Terminus are to Bacon (Citation1864–74), The Works of Francis Bacon, edited by J. Spedding, R.L. Ellis and D.D. Heath, volume 3, cited in the text as ‘VT’ and followed by page number.4. Citations of Bacon’s De augmentis scientiarum, abbreviated to ‘DAS,’ are to Bacon (Citation1864–74), by book and chapter number, followed by one reference to page number in volume 1 (containing the Latin text) and another reference to page number in volume 4 (containing the English translation of Francis Headlam). The former references are useful not just for Bacon’s Latin, but also for Ellis’s suggestive footnotes.5. Jardine (Citation1974, 178n1). The ‘division/partition’ distinction is not, however, original to Melanchthon. As Vickers (Citation1968, 36) observes, it appears in both Cicero and Quintilian.6. Those who impose ‘system’ onto Bacon include his editors, early and recent. For James Spedding, the question is ‘how far, by what means, and with what motive, Bacon at one time wished to keep his system secret’ (Bacon Citation1864–74, vol. 1, 107). That Bacon has a system, he takes as beyond question. Graham Rees, the most recent editor of Bacon’s texts, seems equally convinced that Bacon has a ‘system.’ But the list of those who take for granted that Bacon has a system, never noticing the virtual absence of the term in his wri
在本文中,我提出了一个问题:弗朗西斯·培根是否构成了现代对“系统”偏爱的一个具有启发性的例外?首先,我认为有证据表明培根是一位被系统理想强烈吸引的哲学家。其次,我展示了反思培根的哲学实践如何激发对他的文本的“反系统”阅读。考虑到培根在少数著作中明确地以这个名字讨论了“系统”(特别是《全球知性描述》),我澄清了“哲学系统”与其他系统概念(例如“天堂系统”)不同的含义。第三,我从《男性产期》和《新事物》中得出结论,认为培根的“心灵偶像”学说是对哲学体系的彻底批判。第四,我展示了培根如何以及为什么在《新事物》中使用警句形式作为系统的替代品。最后,我提出了一些对培根的“反体系”阅读的方法,这些方法有能力增强我们对其他早期现代作家的欣赏,这些作家写哲学时不以体系为前提。关键词:培根系统格言方法披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。在本文的第二部分,我承认在某种意义上,亚里士多德的辩证研究可以合理地算作一个“系统”。参考培根的《学习的进步》(Citation2000),在文本中引用为“进步”,伴随着书,章节和节号,然后是页码。我把大部分拼写都现代化了。参考培根的Valerius Terminus是Bacon (Citation1864-74),弗朗西斯·培根的作品,由J. Spedding, R.L. Ellis和D.D. Heath编辑,卷3,在文本中引用为“VT”,后面是页码4。引用培根的De augmentis scientiarum,缩写为“DAS”,是对培根(Citation1864-74)的引用,按书和章节编号,然后参考第一卷的页码(包含拉丁文本),另一个参考第四卷的页码(包含弗朗西斯·海德拉姆的英文翻译)。前面的参考文献不仅对培根的拉丁文有用,而且对埃利斯的暗示性脚注也有用。怡和(Citation1974, 1781)。然而,“划分/分割”的区别并不是梅兰希顿的独创。正如维克斯(引文1968,36)所观察到的,它出现在西塞罗和昆提连的著作中。那些把“系统”强加给培根的人包括他早期和最近的编辑们。对于James Spedding来说,问题是“培根曾经希望在多大程度上,以什么方式,以及出于什么动机,将他的体系保密”(Bacon Citation1864-74, vol. 1, 107)。培根有一套体系,他认为这是毋庸置疑的。最近的培根文本编辑格雷厄姆·里斯(Graham Rees)似乎同样相信培根有一套“体系”。但是,那些想当然地认为培根有一套体系的人,却从未注意到他的作品中几乎没有这个词,他们的名单很长。即使是埃利斯,尽管他的博学才华,也忍不住把这个词用在培根身上(例如,参见Bacon Citation1864-74, vol. 1, 23-24)。参考文献Novum Organum是指培根(Citation2004),在文本和注释中都以“NO”的形式引用,后面是书号和格言号,然后是页码。《NO》中的段落大多是我自己翻译的,尽管我偶尔也会使用培根(Citation1864-74)第1卷中的译文。这篇翻译是由埃利斯和斯佩丁委托并修改的,但实际的译者希望保持匿名;参见Spedding对Bacon的注解(Citation1864-74),卷1,xiv.8。《全球知识分子描述》的参考文献是《牛津弗朗西斯·培根哲学研究》第6卷《培根》(Citation1996),格雷厄姆·里斯编辑,1611 - 1619年,文中引用的是“DGI”,后面跟着页码。我偶尔会修改本卷中出现的效果图。我从与马克·乔丹的电子邮件通信中得到了这个提法,对他来说,这表明托马斯·阿奎那既不思考也不写一个系统。因此,尽管systema在培根的语料库中出现,但培根发表的作品中没有出现“system”或“systema”,这仍然是正确的。我并不是说培根的宇宙学推测与理解其思想的深层意图无关。Minkov Citation2018有许多有用的建议,可以帮助我们理解他恰当地称之为“培根的心理-政治宇宙论”的相关性,特别是在《论智慧》一书中。另一个证明培根意识到“天堂体系”和“哲学体系”之间的区别(但也有联系)的地方是《新事物》(Novum Organum)的第62句格言:“因为就像在天堂的现象上可以建立许多假设一样,同样(而且更多),许多不同的教条可以建立在哲学现象上”(NO . 1)。
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引用次数: 0
The Role of Philosophy in Hume’s Critique of Empire 哲学在休谟《帝国批判》中的作用
3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2235580
Elena Yi-Jia Zeng
The British Empire found itself in uncharted territory during the global competition over military and commercial hegemony in the eighteenth century. Many thinkers questioned the wisdom of empire by comparing Britain’s overseas expansion with the fate of ancient Rome and the government’s controversial colonial policy. David Hume distinguished himself from these critical voices by adopting a detached philosophical approach. His detachment nonetheless ended in scepticism. This article reconstructs Hume’s doubts about empire in order to illuminate the way philosophy interacts with practical political questions. Working at the intersection between political philosophy and epistemology, Hume demonstrates how scepticism shapes his remark on the perennial republican dilemma concerning the trade-off between empire and liberty. His philosophical approach shifts the focus of the debates from attempting to reconcile the two to diagnosing the crux of political instability in modern empires. I argue that Hume defended philosophy's use by highlighting the epistemological aspect of the problem. For him, ideational factors, such as extreme and false beliefs, could provoke public frenzy. This meant that popular politics posed a substantial challenge to modern imperial rule. Governing the passions for empire should therefore be made a matter of a national priority. By pinpointing in this way the role of the citizenry, Hume clarified how epistemic questions remained central to modern politics.
在18世纪的全球军事和商业霸权竞争中,大英帝国发现自己处于一个未知的领域。许多思想家将英国的海外扩张与古罗马的命运和政府备受争议的殖民政策进行比较,质疑帝国的智慧。大卫休谟通过采用超然的哲学方法使自己与这些批评声音区别开来。然而,他的超然最终导致了怀疑。本文重构了休谟对帝国的质疑,以阐明哲学与现实政治问题的互动方式。在政治哲学和认识论的交叉点上,休谟展示了怀疑主义是如何塑造了他关于帝国与自由之间权衡的共和主义长期困境的评论。他的哲学方法将辩论的焦点从试图调和两者转移到诊断现代帝国政治不稳定的症结。我认为休谟通过强调问题的认识论方面来捍卫哲学的使用。对他来说,观念因素,如极端和错误的信念,可能会引起公众的愤怒。这意味着大众政治对现代帝国统治构成了实质性的挑战。因此,控制对帝国的热情应该成为国家的优先事项。通过这种方式精确地指出公民的角色,休谟澄清了认识论问题如何仍然是现代政治的核心。
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引用次数: 0
On Kant’s Janus-Faced Transcendental and Empirical Conception of the Human Being 论康德的两面性的先验和经验的人的概念
3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2250184
James R. O’Shea
There has been increased attention to the empirical and naturalistic dimensions of Kant’s philosophy in recent decades, across both his theoretical and practical philosophy. Anik Waldow’s impressively wide-ranging and carefully argued book, Experience Embodied: Early Modern Accounts of the Human Place in Nature (Waldow 2020), clearly demonstrates the fruits of this reoriented focus, not only in the case of Kant, but also in all the embodied agency-oriented conceptions of experience that she brings to light across the early modern period in the thought of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Herder, and Kant. Here, I focus on Waldow’s analysis of the a priori and empirical dimensions of Kant’s conception of the human agent. In particular, I set that analysis within the wider context of Kant’s multi-levelled and presuppositional conception of the sciences, both theoretical and practical, and consider some of the difficult questions that arise concerning Kant’s transcendental idealist conception of our freedom within nature.
近几十年来,康德哲学的经验主义和自然主义维度在他的理论和实践哲学中得到了越来越多的关注。Anik Waldow的著作《经验体现:人类在自然中的地位的早期现代描述》(Waldow 2020)内容广泛,论述细致,令人印象深刻,该书清楚地展示了这种重新定位的成果,不仅在康德的情况下,而且在她在笛卡尔、洛克、休谟、卢梭、赫尔德和康德的早期现代思想中所揭示的所有具体代理导向的经验概念中。在这里,我着重于瓦尔多对康德人类主体概念的先验和经验维度的分析。特别是,我将这种分析置于康德的多层次和预设的科学概念的更广泛的背景下,包括理论和实践,并考虑一些与康德关于我们在自然中自由的先验唯心主义概念有关的难题。
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引用次数: 0
A New Scene of Thought: On Waldow’s Experience Embodied 思想的新场景:论沃尔多的经验体现
IF 0.6 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2250180
Graham Clay
ABSTRACT In her book Experience Embodied, Anik Waldow challenges and reimagines the traditional interpretative approach to the concept of experience in the early modern period. Traditionally, commentators have emphasized early moderns’ views on the first-person perspective and eschewed the relevance of our embodiment to their epistemological outlooks. My focus here is on Waldow’s chapter on Hume, wherein she analyzes Hume’s account of our capacity for reflective moral judgment, arguing that he understands it as natural despite the countless ways in which our embodied social experiences impinge on it. After detailing Waldow’s contributions, I clarify, corroborate, and criticize them. Since I contend that Waldow is broadly successful in her interpretative efforts, I suggest that she undermines the traditional interpretative approach to experience in the early modern period, but not in the sense that she moves us away from the epistemological towards other lenses. Rather, Waldow should be understood as showing that, at least in the case of Hume’s metaethics, the epistemological is embodied, is social, and is both cognitive and sentimental.
在《体验的体现》一书中,安妮克·沃尔多对近代早期对体验概念的传统解释方式提出了挑战和重新构想。传统上,评论家强调早期现代人对第一人称视角的看法,并回避我们的化身与他们认识论观点的相关性。我在这里的重点是沃尔多关于休谟的那一章,她在其中分析了休谟对我们反思性道德判断能力的描述,认为他认为这是自然的,尽管我们的具体社会经验以无数种方式影响着它。在详细介绍了Waldow的贡献之后,我澄清、证实并批评了它们。因为我认为沃尔多在她的解释性努力上取得了广泛的成功,我认为她破坏了早期现代经验的传统解释性方法,但并不是说她把我们从认识论转向了其他视角。相反,沃尔多应该被理解为表明,至少在休谟的元伦理学的情况下,认识论是具体化的,是社会的,既是认知的,也是感性的。
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引用次数: 0
Reply to My Critics 回复批评我的人
3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2250185
Anik Waldow
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引用次数: 0
期刊
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
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