Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2264721
Rach Cosker-Rowland
We have controversial intuitions about the rightness of retributive punishment, keeping promises for its own sake, and pushing the heavy man off of the bridge in the footbridge trolley case. How do these intuitions relate to ethical theories? Should ethical theories aim to fit with and explain them? Or are only uncontroversial intuitions relevant to explanatory ethical theorising? I argue against several views that we might hold about the relationship between controversial intuitions and ethical theories. I then propose and defend the view that ethical theories should only aim to fit with and explain the intuitions that almost all people (who minimally understand the relevant issues) share. I argue that this view has interesting and important implications for ethical theorising and theorising about justice and equality.
{"title":"Ethical Theories and Controversial Intuitions","authors":"Rach Cosker-Rowland","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2264721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2264721","url":null,"abstract":"We have controversial intuitions about the rightness of retributive punishment, keeping promises for its own sake, and pushing the heavy man off of the bridge in the footbridge trolley case. How do these intuitions relate to ethical theories? Should ethical theories aim to fit with and explain them? Or are only uncontroversial intuitions relevant to explanatory ethical theorising? I argue against several views that we might hold about the relationship between controversial intuitions and ethical theories. I then propose and defend the view that ethical theories should only aim to fit with and explain the intuitions that almost all people (who minimally understand the relevant issues) share. I argue that this view has interesting and important implications for ethical theorising and theorising about justice and equality.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2263711
Marc Andree Weber
ABSTRACTUnknown peers create a problem for those epistemologists who argue that we should be conciliatory in cases of peer disagreement. The standard interpretation of ‘being conciliatory’ has it that we should revise our opinions concerning a specific subject matter whenever we encounter someone who is as competent and well informed as we are concerning this subject matter (and thus is our peer) and holds a different opinion. As a consequence, peers whom we have never encountered and who are hence unknown to us are not taken into account. This, however, appears odd; not only because it is an accidental matter which peers we happen to encounter and which not, but also because it would allow people to deliberately isolate themselves from any kind of intellectual exchange on the topic under consideration. The paper argues that we should take the problem of unknown peers seriously, and that disregarding the problem is an instance of the more general mistake of assuming that evidential quality and justified believability can be dealt with separately. Moreover, a solution to the problem of unknown peers is suggested.KEYWORDS: EpistemologyevidencedisagreementpeersEqual Weight Viewjustification AcknowledgementThe paper benefitted a lot from comments and impulses by Wolfgang Freitag (who also convinced me of the need to clarify how EW is to be defined), Sanford Goldberg, Jonathan Matheson, Christoph Schamberger, Nadja-Mira Yolcu, Elia Zardini, Q1 Alexandra Zinke, and several anonymous referees.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. For the purpose of the present paper, this rough characterization of epistemic peerhood suffices. See, e.g., Matheson (Citation2015, 24–25), Elga (Citation2007, 499, fn. 21), King (Citation2011), Vorobej (Citation2011), and my Weber (Citation2017b) for a more detailed discussion of the concept.2. See Lasonen-Aarnio (Citation2014, 317) and Rosenkranz and Schulz (Citation2015, 570–572).3. Analogously, it does not speak against the A-Variant that it is compatible with giving no weight to both one’s own view and that of one’s epistemic peer. For it does not follow that one could instead focus on first-order evidence alone, since one cannot consider first-order evidence withing interpreting it, which means that there must be at least one person to whose interpretation one gives more than zero weight. This person need not be oneself or one’s peer: arguably, giving no weight to both one’s own view and that of one’s epistemic peer is exactly what one should do if there is an epistemic superior regarding the matter under debate.4. A case in point is Kelly (Citation2010, 112).5. David Enoch also distinguishes what I call the A-, B-, and C-Variant and argues for the latter; see Enoch (Citation2010, 970–972).6. This position is usually called the Right Reasons View. For versions this view, see Kelly (Citation2005, 180) and Titelbaum (Citation2015). A strong externalist element is also p
{"title":"Unknown Peers","authors":"Marc Andree Weber","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2263711","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2263711","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTUnknown peers create a problem for those epistemologists who argue that we should be conciliatory in cases of peer disagreement. The standard interpretation of ‘being conciliatory’ has it that we should revise our opinions concerning a specific subject matter whenever we encounter someone who is as competent and well informed as we are concerning this subject matter (and thus is our peer) and holds a different opinion. As a consequence, peers whom we have never encountered and who are hence unknown to us are not taken into account. This, however, appears odd; not only because it is an accidental matter which peers we happen to encounter and which not, but also because it would allow people to deliberately isolate themselves from any kind of intellectual exchange on the topic under consideration. The paper argues that we should take the problem of unknown peers seriously, and that disregarding the problem is an instance of the more general mistake of assuming that evidential quality and justified believability can be dealt with separately. Moreover, a solution to the problem of unknown peers is suggested.KEYWORDS: EpistemologyevidencedisagreementpeersEqual Weight Viewjustification AcknowledgementThe paper benefitted a lot from comments and impulses by Wolfgang Freitag (who also convinced me of the need to clarify how EW is to be defined), Sanford Goldberg, Jonathan Matheson, Christoph Schamberger, Nadja-Mira Yolcu, Elia Zardini, Q1 Alexandra Zinke, and several anonymous referees.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. For the purpose of the present paper, this rough characterization of epistemic peerhood suffices. See, e.g., Matheson (Citation2015, 24–25), Elga (Citation2007, 499, fn. 21), King (Citation2011), Vorobej (Citation2011), and my Weber (Citation2017b) for a more detailed discussion of the concept.2. See Lasonen-Aarnio (Citation2014, 317) and Rosenkranz and Schulz (Citation2015, 570–572).3. Analogously, it does not speak against the A-Variant that it is compatible with giving no weight to both one’s own view and that of one’s epistemic peer. For it does not follow that one could instead focus on first-order evidence alone, since one cannot consider first-order evidence withing interpreting it, which means that there must be at least one person to whose interpretation one gives more than zero weight. This person need not be oneself or one’s peer: arguably, giving no weight to both one’s own view and that of one’s epistemic peer is exactly what one should do if there is an epistemic superior regarding the matter under debate.4. A case in point is Kelly (Citation2010, 112).5. David Enoch also distinguishes what I call the A-, B-, and C-Variant and argues for the latter; see Enoch (Citation2010, 970–972).6. This position is usually called the Right Reasons View. For versions this view, see Kelly (Citation2005, 180) and Titelbaum (Citation2015). A strong externalist element is also p","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"6 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2278832
Maria Baghramian
The introduction to the special issue on the Ethics and Politics of Disagreement provides a history of the Robert Papazian and PERITIA IJPs Essay prizes, announces the winners of the 2023 prizes, provides a brief overview of the articles in this special issue and highlights some of their connections, and concludes with an announcement of a new IJPS essay prize.
{"title":"Introduction: The Ethics and Politics of Disagreement","authors":"Maria Baghramian","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2278832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2278832","url":null,"abstract":"The introduction to the special issue on the Ethics and Politics of Disagreement provides a history of the Robert Papazian and PERITIA IJPs Essay prizes, announces the winners of the 2023 prizes, provides a brief overview of the articles in this special issue and highlights some of their connections, and concludes with an announcement of a new IJPS essay prize.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"492 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135949914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2263712
Manuel Almagro Holgado, Neftalí Villanueva Fernández
ABSTRACTThis paper addresses the question of who should be trusted as an expert and when, particularly in the context of public deliberation. Trust in experts is crucial in making decisions about public policies that involve complex information beyond the expertise of most people. However, fruitful deliberation also requires being able to resist misinformation campaigns, no matter how widespread these might be; being able, in general, to evaluate the evidence at our disposal and form our own opinions. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on this apparent tension between epistemic deference and epistemic independence. The paper has two goals. First, it aims at providing a more nuanced understanding of the question of who should be trusted as an expert by examining cases in which seemingly factual claims are made in public settings by experts. Second, it emphasizes the need to pay attention to the conditions under which we actually trust each other. We suggest that fostering trust in science may be better approached by modifying the conditions under which scientific dialogue takes place, rather than trying to convince the public to trust experts, or blaming them for not doing so.KEYWORDS: Trustdistrustexpertsdisagreementscience communication AcknowledgmentsWe thank Manuel de Pinedo for his comments on a previous version of this article. We also thank the participants of the workshop (No) more stories: The new challenges of science communication, led by Ophelia Deroy, and organized by the Center of Advanced Studies’ Research Group Challenges and norms of science communication (University of Munich).Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. See Kappel (Citation2020) for a recent discussion of what we should do, epistemically speaking, when we learn that others don’t trust the ones we do trust.2. Recent literature has started to explore not only the characteristics of experts, but also the heterogeneity of non-experts and how this heterogeneity impacts the context of science communication (see Pérez-González and Jiménez-Buedo Citation2023).3. The effectiveness of these strategies is limited. Research has shown that we tend to underestimate our own biases compared to those of others, known as the ‘bias blind spot’, which can hinder our ability to recognize our own biases. Additionally, some scholars have recently argued that there is no circumstance under which introspection can be reliable to detect our biases (see, for instance, Kelly Citation2023).Additional informationFundingThe publication of this work was made possible with funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 870883. This work was also partially funded by the Spanish Ministry of Universities and Next-Generation EU, the Spanish Ministry of Science [PID2019-109764RB-I00, PID2022-140562NB-I00], Junta de Andalucía [B-HUM-459-UGR18], the BBVA Foundation [BBVA2021-EQUIPOS, AYUDAS F
摘要本文探讨了在公共审议的背景下，谁应该被信任为专家以及何时被信任的问题。在公共政策决策中，对专家的信任至关重要，因为公共政策涉及的复杂信息超出了大多数人的专业知识范围。然而，富有成效的审议还需要能够抵制错误信息运动，无论这些运动有多普遍;一般来说，能够评估我们掌握的证据并形成我们自己的观点。本文的目的是反思这种认知服从和认知独立之间明显的紧张关系。本文有两个目标。首先，它旨在通过审查专家在公共场合提出看似事实的主张的案例，对谁应该被信任作为专家的问题提供更细致入微的理解。其次，它强调需要关注我们真正相互信任的条件。我们建议，培养对科学的信任可能更好的方法是修改进行科学对话的条件，而不是试图说服公众信任专家，或者指责他们没有这样做。关键词:信任不信任专家分歧科学传播致谢感谢Manuel de Pinedo对本文前一版本的评论。我们也感谢研讨会的参与者(No)更多的故事:科学传播的新挑战，由Ophelia Deroy领导，由慕尼黑大学高级研究中心“科学传播的挑战和规范”研究小组组织。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。参见Kappel (Citation2020)最近的一个讨论，从认识论上讲，当我们知道别人不信任我们信任的人时，我们应该怎么做。最近的文献不仅开始探讨专家的特征，而且还探讨了非专家的异质性以及这种异质性如何影响科学传播的背景(见Pérez-González和jimsamunez - buedo Citation2023)。这些策略的有效性是有限的。研究表明，与他人的偏见相比，我们往往会低估自己的偏见，这被称为“偏见盲点”，它会阻碍我们识别自己偏见的能力。此外，一些学者最近认为，在任何情况下，内省都不能可靠地检测我们的偏见(例如，参见Kelly Citation2023)。本研究的发表得到了欧盟地平线2020研究与创新计划的资助，资助协议编号870883。这项工作也得到了西班牙大学和下一代欧盟部、西班牙科学部[PID2019-109764RB-I00, PID2022-140562NB-I00]、Junta de Andalucía [b - humi -459- ugr18]、BBVA基金会[BBVA2021-EQUIPOS, AYUDAS FUNDACION BBVA2021，项目:OPIDPOLA]和格拉纳达大学资助的FiloLab卓越小组的部分资助。
{"title":"Disagreeing with Experts","authors":"Manuel Almagro Holgado, Neftalí Villanueva Fernández","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2263712","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2263712","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper addresses the question of who should be trusted as an expert and when, particularly in the context of public deliberation. Trust in experts is crucial in making decisions about public policies that involve complex information beyond the expertise of most people. However, fruitful deliberation also requires being able to resist misinformation campaigns, no matter how widespread these might be; being able, in general, to evaluate the evidence at our disposal and form our own opinions. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on this apparent tension between epistemic deference and epistemic independence. The paper has two goals. First, it aims at providing a more nuanced understanding of the question of who should be trusted as an expert by examining cases in which seemingly factual claims are made in public settings by experts. Second, it emphasizes the need to pay attention to the conditions under which we actually trust each other. We suggest that fostering trust in science may be better approached by modifying the conditions under which scientific dialogue takes place, rather than trying to convince the public to trust experts, or blaming them for not doing so.KEYWORDS: Trustdistrustexpertsdisagreementscience communication AcknowledgmentsWe thank Manuel de Pinedo for his comments on a previous version of this article. We also thank the participants of the workshop (No) more stories: The new challenges of science communication, led by Ophelia Deroy, and organized by the Center of Advanced Studies’ Research Group Challenges and norms of science communication (University of Munich).Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. See Kappel (Citation2020) for a recent discussion of what we should do, epistemically speaking, when we learn that others don’t trust the ones we do trust.2. Recent literature has started to explore not only the characteristics of experts, but also the heterogeneity of non-experts and how this heterogeneity impacts the context of science communication (see Pérez-González and Jiménez-Buedo Citation2023).3. The effectiveness of these strategies is limited. Research has shown that we tend to underestimate our own biases compared to those of others, known as the ‘bias blind spot’, which can hinder our ability to recognize our own biases. Additionally, some scholars have recently argued that there is no circumstance under which introspection can be reliable to detect our biases (see, for instance, Kelly Citation2023).Additional informationFundingThe publication of this work was made possible with funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 870883. This work was also partially funded by the Spanish Ministry of Universities and Next-Generation EU, the Spanish Ministry of Science [PID2019-109764RB-I00, PID2022-140562NB-I00], Junta de Andalucía [B-HUM-459-UGR18], the BBVA Foundation [BBVA2021-EQUIPOS, AYUDAS F","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2264723
Ruth Weintraub
This paper is not concerned with the (amply discussed) question as to the rational response to peer disagreement. Instead, it addresses a (considerably less often debated) problem to which many views about the (epistemic) significance of disagreement are vulnerable (to some extent or another): self-undermining. I reject several answers that have been proposed in the literature, defend one that has been offered (by meeting objections to it), and show that in its light, the prevalent assumption that the ‘equal-weight view’, a prominent view about disagreement, rationally requires us to suspend judgement about contentious matters, is seen to be too pessimistic.
{"title":"Who’s Afraid of Disagreement about Disagreement?","authors":"Ruth Weintraub","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2264723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2264723","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is not concerned with the (amply discussed) question as to the rational response to peer disagreement. Instead, it addresses a (considerably less often debated) problem to which many views about the (epistemic) significance of disagreement are vulnerable (to some extent or another): self-undermining. I reject several answers that have been proposed in the literature, defend one that has been offered (by meeting objections to it), and show that in its light, the prevalent assumption that the ‘equal-weight view’, a prominent view about disagreement, rationally requires us to suspend judgement about contentious matters, is seen to be too pessimistic.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"345 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2265230
Sophie Juliane Veigl
Fundamental disagreement is at the core of many debates surrounding epistemic relativism. Proponents of epistemic relativism argue that certain disagreements are irresolvable because proponents base their views on fundamentally different epistemic principles and, thus, fundamentally different epistemic systems. Critics of epistemic relativism argue that this analysis is wrong since the particular epistemic principles in question are most of the time derived from or instances of the same, more basic, epistemic principle. With regard to the individuation of epistemic systems, there is, thus, an impasse within the epistemic relativism literature. It is the aim of this article to employ the recently developed notion of ‘situated judgments’ as well as the concepts of ‘world-traveling’ and ‘epistemic friction’ to provide an epistemic agent-based, dynamic account of disagreeing and thereby also contribute to the question of how to individuate an epistemic system.
{"title":"Towards a Politicized Anatomy of Fundamental Disagreement","authors":"Sophie Juliane Veigl","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2265230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2265230","url":null,"abstract":"Fundamental disagreement is at the core of many debates surrounding epistemic relativism. Proponents of epistemic relativism argue that certain disagreements are irresolvable because proponents base their views on fundamentally different epistemic principles and, thus, fundamentally different epistemic systems. Critics of epistemic relativism argue that this analysis is wrong since the particular epistemic principles in question are most of the time derived from or instances of the same, more basic, epistemic principle. With regard to the individuation of epistemic systems, there is, thus, an impasse within the epistemic relativism literature. It is the aim of this article to employ the recently developed notion of ‘situated judgments’ as well as the concepts of ‘world-traveling’ and ‘epistemic friction’ to provide an epistemic agent-based, dynamic account of disagreeing and thereby also contribute to the question of how to individuate an epistemic system.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2264724
Niclas Rautenberg
ABSTRACTThis essay discusses the normative significance of the spatial dimension of conflict events. Drawing on qualitative interviews conducted with political actors – politicians, officials, and activists – and on Heidegger’s account of spatiality in Being and Time, I will argue that the experience of conflict space is co-constituted by the respective conflict participants, as well as the location where the conflict unfolds. Location and conflict parties’ (self-)understandings ‘open up’ a space that enables and constrains ways of seeing and acting. Yet, a purely transcendental phenomenology will remain oblivious to the quasi-transcendental, societal structures of power that shape a person’s conflict experience. To illuminate these facets of the phenomenon, phenomenology has to join forces with critical theory. Introducing Garland-Thomson’s feminist distinction of fit/misfit, I will illustrate how power shapes conflict space in manifold ways. The essay thereby fills a gap in the philosophical literature that rarely analyses political conflict as a phenomenon sui generis.KEYWORDS: Conflictspacecritical phenomenologyapplied phenomenologyHeideggerGarland-Thomson AcknowledgmentsFor comments on earlier drafts of this essay, I would like to thank Fabian Freyenhagen, Jörg Schaub, Matt Burch, Irene McMullin, Robin Celikates, Sean Irving, Felix Schnell, Johanna Amaya-Panche, Béatrice Han-Pile, Wayne Martin, and Timo Jütten. I owe special gratitude to Matt Burch, Fabian Freyenhagen, and Wayne Martin for inviting me to give guest lectures on the topic at their seminars. Their students’ feedback was much appreciated. Further, I received helpful comments at the 2022 conference of The British Society for Phenomenology, the ‘11th Congress for Practical Philosophy’ in Salzburg, the 2022 MANCEPT workshop ‘Equality and Space’, and the University of Essex’s SPAH Philosophy Colloquium. Research on the essay was funded by The German Academic Scholarship Foundation, the Consortium for the Humanities and the Arts South-East England, and the Royal Institute of Philosophy.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. I am aware of the (ethical) tension in drawing on Heidegger’s work and critical theory. I do not, however, share the conviction that Heidegger’s appalling political positions necessarily render his philosophy invalid. Instead, one has to reflexively engage with his work and let it be interrogated by the theories and testimonies of people from marginalized groups. For a meditation on the role of the White philosopher, including my own, in tackling racism and other forms of oppression, see Rautenberg (Citation2023, 2–4).2. Similar approaches can be found in recent sociological research on space (e.g. Löw Citation2008). See also the ‘spatial turn’ in the field of peace and conflict studies (e.g. Björkdahl and Buckley-Zistel Citation2016; Björkdahl and Kappler Citation2017; Brigg and George Citation2020).3. For furt
摘要本文探讨了冲突事件空间维度的规范意义。根据对政治行动者——政治家、官员和活动家——进行的定性访谈，以及海德格尔在《存在与时间》中对空间性的描述，我将论证冲突空间的经验是由各自的冲突参与者以及冲突展开的地点共同构成的。地点和冲突各方的(自我)理解“打开”了一个空间，使人们能够看到和采取行动，也限制了他们的方式。然而，一个纯粹的先验现象学将仍然无视准先验的社会权力结构，它塑造了一个人的冲突经验。为了阐明现象的这些方面，现象学必须与批判理论结合起来。通过介绍Garland-Thomson的适合/不适合的女权主义区分，我将说明权力如何以多种方式塑造冲突空间。因此，这篇文章填补了哲学文献中很少将政治冲突作为一种特殊现象进行分析的空白。对于本文早期草稿的评论，我要感谢Fabian Freyenhagen, Jörg Schaub, Matt Burch, Irene McMullin, Robin Celikates, Sean Irving, Felix Schnell, Johanna Amaya-Panche, b<s:1> atrice Han-Pile, Wayne Martin和Timo j<e:1> tten。我要特别感谢Matt Burch、Fabian Freyenhagen和Wayne Martin邀请我在他们的研讨会上就这个主题做客座演讲。他们非常感谢学生们的反馈。此外，我还在2022年英国现象学学会会议、萨尔茨堡“第11届实践哲学大会”、2022年MANCEPT“平等与空间”研讨会以及埃塞克斯大学SPAH哲学研讨会上收到了有益的评论。这篇论文的研究是由德国学术奖学金基金会、英格兰东南部人文艺术联合会和皇家哲学研究所资助的。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。我意识到在借鉴海德格尔的作品和批判理论时的(伦理)张力。然而，我并不认为海德格尔骇人听闻的政治立场必然使他的哲学无效。相反，人们必须反射性地参与他的工作，并让它受到来自边缘群体的人的理论和证词的质疑。关于白人哲学家(包括我自己)在应对种族主义和其他形式的压迫方面的角色，请参见劳滕贝格(Citation2023, 2-4)。类似的方法可以在最近的空间社会学研究中找到(例如Löw Citation2008)。另见和平与冲突研究领域的“空间转向”(例如Björkdahl和Buckley-Zistel Citation2016;Björkdahl和Kappler Citation2017;布里格和乔治引文(2020)。进一步讨论，见Rautenberg (Citation2023, 3-4, fn)。1)。4。批评者可能会认为，13次访谈不足以让我的数据具有代表性。首先，我想说的是，这种定量的主张与定性研究非常不一致;由于我的方法的重点是对冲突经历进行丰富的描述，因此13次访谈足以达到预期的目标。话虽如此，我并不是说我的发现是最终的和全面的;相反，他们邀请进一步的研究和主体间确证(Gallagher和Zahavi Citation2010)。然而，与我的方法相反，Køster和Fernandez只对这些不变结构的模态感兴趣，而不是这些结构本身(Citation2023)。所有的名字都变了。为了尊重莫妮卡要求匿名的要求，进一步的信息仍未公开。我在这里遵循Wrathall和murphy对海德格尔关怀结构的解释(2013,20)。类似的解释可以在Blattner (Citation2019);德雷福斯(citation1991,244);郝格兰(Citation2013, 227-30)。参见Mulhall (Citation2005, 163-4)和Crowell (Citation2013, 179ff)的不同描述。在本章的其余部分，我将引用德文原文《Sein und Zeit》。在引用英文时，我引用了斯坦博翻译的《存在与时间》(Citation(1927) 1996)，首先注明了德文原文的页码，然后注明了英文译文的页码。Wrathall将这两种形式的去距离区分为“可用性差异”——使用对象的接近程度——和“重要程度差异”——重要或重要对象的接近程度(citation2017,230)。Cerbone批评海德格尔没有明确区分这两者，导致他认为在他对空间性的描述中存在有问题的模糊性(Citation2013, 139-41)。 事实上，最近的网络社交现象表明，数字世界并不总是缺乏直接的他人理解(移情)、具体化和肉体间性，也应该在空间方面加以考虑。例如，参见Ekdahl and Ravn (Citation2022)， Osler (Citation2021)， Osler and Krueger (Citation2022)。关于扔东西的其他解释，见(Dreyfus引文，1991;Mulhall Citation2005;Wrathall Citation2005;Wrathall and murphy引文(2013)。Crowell (Citation2003, 110-1)和Withy (Citation2011)认为，也存在着更基本的“此在”的纯粹存在感，即它被投入的“在那里”。虽然我同意Crowell和Withy关于抛掷性或真实性的观点，但在这里，我只需要关注抛掷性在具体情境中的衍生意义就足够了。在他后来的文章《建筑居住思维》(Citation(1951) 2001)中，海德格尔更加强调地将地点本身呈现为一个规范的实体。然而，考虑到关于海德格尔早期和晚期哲学之间兼容性的持续争论，以及晚期海德格尔是否仍然参与现象学项目的相关问题，我将把我的分析限制在他的早期阶段。这足以证明我想提出的观点。以批评家萨特和列维纳斯为首，海德格尔的本体论存在主义(Mitsein)及其相关的存在主义是否能为解释我们如何在生活世界中与具体的他人相遇提供必要的基础，存在着相当大的争论。我不同意这种观点;参见McMullin (Citation2013)的详细反驳。这也意味着，从规范上理解，空间并不具有某种形式的稳定完整性。地点，就像物理和建筑结构一样。但是在此体验空间作为规范性意味着它意识到发生在它可能获得的可能性范围内的变化，例如，当冲突参与者的构成发生变化时。这就是我所说的空间是一种动态现象。此外，我感谢Timo j<e:1> tten在一次谈话中问我，我的方法是否相当于一种隐喻性的空间感，我是否把对空间的体验视为对空间的体验。我喜欢这样认为，特别是因为这种理解与位置(物理)实体密切相关。从字面意义上讲，我们的住所在某个地方。Mensch后来关于这个问题的论文(Citation2012)对阿伦特的立场提出了更多的批评;不过，他的叙述对空间和地点缺乏更清晰的区分。本研究得到了东南英格兰人文与艺术协会(CHASE)的支持;英国皇家哲学研究所;德意志人民学院。
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Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2263709
Duncan Pritchard
ABSTRACTThe axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understands this notion in terms of the existential importance of the topic of disagreement. It is argued that this account provides a straightforward explanation for the main features of deep disagreements. This proposal is then compared to the contemporary popular view that deep disagreements are essentially hinge disagreements – i.e. disagreements concerning clashes of one’s hinge commitments, in the sense described by the later Wittgenstein. It is claimed that hinge disagreements are only plausibly deep disagreements insofar as there can be a specific class of hinge commitments that are axiological in nature, thereby lending further support to the axiological account of deep disagreement.KEYWORDS: Deep disagreementepistemologyepistemology of disagreementhinge epistemologyWittgenstein Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. For discussion of this general idea, see Fogelin (Citation1985), Brenner and Godden (Citation2010), Pritchard (Citation2018c), Lavorerio (Citation2020), Ranalli (Citation2020), and Siegel (Citation2021). See also the related discussion of epistemic relativism in the context of hinge epistemology, such as Williams (Citation2007), Coliva (Citation2010), Pritchard (Citation2010, Citation2018c), Kusch (Citation2016), and Carter (Citation2017). For two recent critical discussions of the relationship between hinge disagreements and deep disagreements, see Ranalli (Citation2021) and Pritchard (Citationforthcoming-a).2. There is, of course, a wealth of philosophical material on the question of what, if anything, could appropriately perform the role of being of fundamental value in the sense that we are interested in. For a recent work that usefully engages with questions of this general kind, see Tiberius (Citation2018).3. See Pritchard (Citation2018a).4. The case is due to Christensen (Citation2007, 193) and is widely discussed in the epistemology of peer disagreement literature.5. For some prominent defences of (versions of) conciliationism, see Christensen (Citation2007), Elga (Citation2007), Feldman (Citation2007), and Cohen (Citation2013).6. I explore this point about reflection and non-conciliationism, along with some of its implications for the epistemology of disagreement, in Pritchard (Citation2018b, Citation2019). See also Pritchard (Citation2020, Citation2022c).7. Interestingly, this high level of conviction can go hand-in-hand with periods of anxiety about whether such conviction is warranted. I discuss this phenomenon as it manifests itself in the religious case in Pritchard (Citationforthcoming-b, Citationforthcoming-c).8. I offer my own reading of On Certainty in a number of places, but see especially Pritchard (Citation2015, part 2). For some of the main texts in this regard, see Strawson (Citation1985), McGinn (Citation1989), Williams (Citation1991), Moyal-Sharrock (Cita
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Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2263710
Aidan McGlynn
ABSTRACTDeep disagreements are those involving a disagreement about (relatively) fundamental epistemic principles. This paper considers the bearing of testimonial injustice, in Miranda Fricker’s sense, on the depth of disagreements, and what this can teach us about the nature and significance of deep disagreements. I start by re-evaluating T. J. Lagewaard’s recent argument that disagreements about the nature, scope, and impact of oppression will often be deepened by testimonial injustice, since the people best placed to offer relevant testimony will be subject to testimonial injustice, pushing the disagreement into one about the bearing of certain epistemic sources on the original debate. I take issue with this last step, but I build on the argument to bring attention to unappreciated and worrying ways in which prejudices can make a disagreement deep in ways that can be hidden from one or more of the participants and from observers. Finally, I revisit some of the ways that deep disagreement has been thought to be problematic for the proper functioning of a democracy, and I examine whether the kinds of hidden deep disagreements I argue for in the paper make these problems any worse, concluding that they likely do.KEYWORDS: Deep disagreementepistemic injusticetestimonial injusticedemocracypolitical polarisation AcknowledgmentsThis publication was made possible through funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 870883.My thanks to audience members at the 2022 European Epistemology Network meeting, hosted by the Cogito Epistemology Research Centre at the University of Glasgow, particularly to Thirza Lagewaard, Guido Melchior, Chris Ranalli and Mona Simion, as well as to anonymous readers for this journal.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Though if I regard you as an epistemic peer with respect to the issues under contention, there are tricky and widely discussed questions about whether and how I need to change my confidence in my original verdict while we wait for this further evidence. The restaurant example comes from Christensen (Citation2007, 193), and the horse race from Elga (Citation2007, 486–487).2. Such ‘faultless’ disagreements have often been thought to call into question the objectivity of the domain under dispute (for example, matters of taste), and to call for some kind of relativistic treatment, though it’s contested what exactly this involves. See, for example, Wright (Citation1992) and the papers in Wright (Citation2023), and MacFarlane (Citation2014, chapter 7).3. Lynch calls the kinds of cases we’re interested in ‘epistemic disagreements’ instead of the more standard ‘deep disagreements’.4. Reflecting my primary focus in section 5 below, this sketches de Ridder’s point rather than Lynch’s, though I do say a little about the latter below too.5. For Fricker, epistemic injustice involves a person being wronged disti
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Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2250186
G. Clay, Ruth Boeker
ABSTRACT This introductory article outlines how this special issue contributes to existing scholarship that calls for a rethinking and re-evaluation of common assumptions about early modern philosophy. One way of challenging existing narratives is by questioning what role systems or systematicity play during this period. Another way of rethinking early modern philosophy is by considering assumptions about the role of philosophy itself and how philosophy can effect change in those who form philosophical beliefs or engage in philosophical argumentation. A further way of advancing early modern scholarship is by examining the tight links between early modern views on metaphysics and epistemology, on the one hand, and moral, social, and political philosophy, on the other hand. Moreover, there are ongoing debates whether and how the traditional distinction between rationalism and empiricism, which has been questioned for several reasons, should be replaced. It has been proposed to replace it with a distinction between experimental and speculative philosophy, but this distinction cannot easily accommodate early modern debates concerning moral, social, and political philosophy. In addition to highlighting several ways how early modern philosophy has and can be rethought, we summarize how the papers in this special issue contribute to these ongoing efforts.
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