Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2162314
Griffin Klemick
Abstract I take up two questions raised by Luz Christopher Seiberth's meticulous reconstruction of Wilfrid Sellars's theory of intentionality. The first is whether we should regard Sellars as a transcendental phenomenalist in the most interesting sense of the term: as denying that even an ideally adequate conceptual structure would enable us to represent worldly objects as they are in themselves. I agree with Seiberth that the answer is probably yes, but I suggest that this is due not to Sellars's rejection of the Myth of the Given or appeal to image-models (as Seiberth maintains), but to his view of modality as categorial but as absent from the world an sich. The second is whether, as Richard Rorty complained, Sellars's appeal to picturing lands his theory of intentionality in intractable skepticism. Pace Seiberth, I argue that the transcendental role of picturing does not mitigate this problem, and I suggest that Sellars's most fruitful resource for doing so is not his semantic externalism, but his purely pragmatic response to skepticism.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2162312
Anke Breunig
ABSTRACT The article discusses two claims from Seiberth's book Intentionality in Sellars: A Transcendental Account of Finite Knowledge, both of which bear on the question of what it takes to be in touch with the world. Seiberth claims, first, that the philosophical method known as transcendental analysis, which Sellars adopts from Kant, is more basic than Sellars's other methodological commitments, including the method of providing a conceptual analysis of the manifest and the scientific image of man-in-the-world. I ask whether the results of transcendental analysis should be applied to the manifest image. Does Sellars think that the manifest image fulfills the transcendental conditions for any conceptual system that is a) about the world of which it is a part and that b) allows those using it to gain knowledge of that world? On Seiberth's reading of Sellars, the answer seems to be negative. Second, Seiberth claims that there is only one kind of vertical relation between the conceptual and the real, the non-semantic relation Sellars calls picturing. I contest that claim, arguing that Seiberth gives too strong an interpretation of Sellars's denial that meaning statements are relational statements connecting a word with an independently existing object. This precludes Seiberth from seeing that Sellars, just like Kant, is an empirical realist in a robust sense. I also argue that picturing provides a meagre substitute for what in my reading of Sellars we might call vertical 'semantical' relations between words and things after all.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2162316
Luz Christopher Seiberth
ABSTRACT I respond to objections from three rigorous readers challenging me to detail in what sense Sellars is a transcendental philosopher, as well as to defend the claim that ‘picturing’ is crucial to his account of intentionality. This further involves defending the tenability of transcendental phenomenalism and arguing against scepticism about picturing. Finally, this involves the question of whether the results of transcendental analyses undermine the legitimacy of the Manifest Image, and, consequently, to say what knowledge about phenomena can mean in the succession of conceptual frameworks.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2160782
Thomas J. Spiegel
ABSTRACT There is an unresolved stand-off between ontological naturalism and phenomenological thought regarding the question whether normativity can be reduced to physical entities. While the ontological naturalist line of thought is well established in analytic philosophy, the phenomenological reasoning for the irreducibility of normativity has been largely left ignored by proponents of naturalism. Drawing on the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Schütz, Stein and others, I reconstruct a phenomenological argument according to which natural science (as the foundation of naturalization projects) is itself a part of the essentially normative life-world to the effect that ontological naturalism faces a bootstrapping problem. I aim to demonstrate that this stand-off is grounded in a deep disagreement about the possibility of reduction. I close by arguing that this deep disagreement turns on the question which conception about the nature of (natural) science is true. This result pits a perfectionist model of science (implied by ontological naturalism) against a pragmatist conception of science (in favour of the phenomenological argument). The motivation is that transforming the disagreement about the controversial principle into a disagreement about conceptions of science may help to offer a foundation for different attempts at solving the stand-off.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2164935
Lucian Ionel
ABSTRACT In his Philosophy of Mind, Hegel treats human sensibility differently in the sections on anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. With the recent revival of Hegel’s work, there has been a lively debate about how to understand the progression from more primitive to more sophisticated human capacities. This paper differentiates three influential readings to that effect – the animals-first, the emancipatory, and the rational-first reading – and argues that they risk misconstruing mental development as a transition from one category of capacities to the other. The transition is rendered in terms of either accumulation, emancipation, or maturation. But this basic picture confuses the capacities characterizing us as a kind of animal, a kind of consciousness, and a conceptually self-conscious being. This paper explains how anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology articulate complementary, but irreducible categories of human capacities. The apparently more basic capacities are abstractable aspects of those that come later in the order of presentation. The distinct kinds of capacities do not stand separately on a three-step ladder of mental development but are aspects of one singular and synchronous development of the human mind. Their particular development is mutually dependent on each other but can be properly accounted for only in distinctive categorial terms.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2162313
Michael R. Hicks
ABSTRACT Luz Seiberth's interpretation of Sellars as a transcendental philosopher promises to change the way we read Sellars. Nonetheless, I dispute two of his central claims: that by depicting ”picturing” as as a transcendental imposition we can see it as addressing a ”vertical” constraint that Kant does not detect; and that Sellars's transcendental philosophy commits him to a Kantian ”necessitarianism” about categorical strucure. Ultimately, I conclude, Seiberth's focus on Sellars's relationship to Kant in particular distorts his understanding of Sellars's peculiar version of a transcendental methodology.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2162315
Luz Christopher Seiberth
The key question I pursue in this book can be captured as follows: How can reference to the world be justified in a non-relational conception of intentionality? The overarching context of this project is given by the wide-scope concern to understand what it takes to think ourselves as part of a world we can in fact have knowledge about, while acknowledging that all our con-jectures are fallible. My main contention in taking up the challenges voiced in these questions is that the concept of intentionality is the beating heart of Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy. How so? The concept of intentionality has not only a rich medieval history, it has also been given a deep treatment in the tradition downstream from Kant, a depth not recognised properly in contemporary analytic philosophy. I set out to demonstrate Sellars’ thinking to belong to this very tradition. His account of intentionality gives life to two intersecting tasks inherent in ‘the attempt to take both man and science seriously’ (Sellars 1968, SM I §1; Sellars 1970, I §87). On my reading, Sellars’ philosophical project comes to light when seen as a transcendental phenomenalism, indebted to a transcendental methodology in which picturing is the linchpin of finite knowledge
我在本书中所追求的关键问题可以概括如下:如何在意向性的非关系概念中证明对世界的指称是正当的?这个项目的总体背景是通过广泛的关注来理解，在承认我们所有的猜想都是错误的同时，我们需要什么才能将自己视为我们实际上可以了解的世界的一部分。在接受这些问题中提出的挑战时，我的主要论点是，意向性的概念是威尔弗里德·塞拉斯哲学的核心。所以如何?意向性的概念不仅有丰富的中世纪历史，而且在康德之后的传统中也得到了深入的处理，这种深度在当代分析哲学中没有得到适当的承认。我开始证明塞拉斯的思想属于这一传统。他对意向性的描述赋予了“认真对待人和科学的尝试”中固有的两个交叉任务以生命(Sellars 1968, SM I§1;Sellars 1970, I§87)。在我的阅读中，塞拉斯的哲学项目被视为一种先验现象主义，得益于一种先验的方法论，在这种方法论中，图像是有限知识的关键
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Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2108101
Uku Tooming
ABSTRACT According to inferentialism about self-knowledge of desire, the basic way in which we come to know what we want is through inference. In this paper, I argue that in a wide range of cases of knowing one’s desire, inference is insufficient. In particular, I look at two inferentialist models, one proposed by Krista Lawlor and the other by Alex Byrne and look at the challenges that they face in securing safe self-ascriptions. In response to these difficulties, I argue that we can explain how inferentially based self-ascriptions can be safe when we consider the agent’s role in sustaining their desires through attending and elaborating on the content of desire through imagination.
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Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2148229
Ian MacLean-Evans
Strawser’s Spinoza and the Philosophy of Love is a long-needed investigation into what Spinoza has to say about love, how Spinoza’s views of love are historically situated, and how Spinoza’s views of love may have implications for how we ought to live today. To date, this aspect of Spinoza’s thought has not been the subject of a comprehensive book-length study, despite love being an important element of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Strawser’s contribution in this book is thus both novel and needed in Spinoza scholarship, and holds within it many important observations about contemporary applications of Spinoza’s approach to interacting with others. Strawser claims his central argument is that Spinoza should be considered ‘predominantly a philosopher of love’ (2). To make this case, Strawser does not principally concern himself with Spinoza’s approval of the ‘intellectual love of God’. This might surprise Spinoza scholars who may assume he would focus on it, given the high esteem Spinoza offers of such. Rather, Strawser focuses on what he calls Spinoza’s theory of noble love. Strawser’s reading of noble love is principally developed in the book’s Introduction, and it is the ‘guide (of) the remaining study’ (17). The introduction is, then, the central portion of the book, and it is an impressive and vital resource for anyone looking at Spinoza’s moral philosophy generally, since it finds so much ethical weight in Spinoza’s philosophy of love. Yet, as we will see, the Introduction does not save a disagreement I have with some of Strawser’s later critique of Spinoza’s speciesism in Chapter 4 of the book. On Strawser’s reading, noble love is the kind of love that is expressed by nobility (generositas) whereby rational people aim to join together with other people in friendship and to increase their wellbeing. Strawser rightly justifies a reading of noble love by referring to Spinoza’s identification of love (amor) with nobility (generositas) through a number of passages, though most directly
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Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2148230
Mihail Evans
Mind recently published a review by Simon Glendinning of Michael L. Morgan’s Levinas’ Ethical Politics which solely focused on the final chapter, a lengthy and robust engagement of the existing literature. It can be that with certain books it is perhaps better to give them time to digest rather than participating in a rush to speak. Equally, there might be particular points that do need to be observed immediately. Geschlecht III is a very different sort of publication to Morgan’s but it is conceivably one that is also in need of a notice of an unusual type, focusing solely on certain aspects of its presentation. Geschlecht III is edited by Geoffrey Bennington, Katie Chernoweth and Rodrigo Therozo and translated by the latter pair. It is to be commended as a scholarly edition which finds a worthy place alongside the other fine productions of the Derrida Seminars Translation Project. There are, however, certain elements which are in need of remarking. A preface is written by Therozo. The
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