Abstract The paper discusses the relationship between “atonement” and “reconciliation” in systematic theology, claiming that Hegel’s concept of reconciliation (Versöhnung) continues to influence contemporary English-speaking theology. It is argued that the so-called theories of atonement often tacitly assume “Hegel’s camel”, an idea consisting of three propositions as follows: (i) atonement is a consistent umbrella concept that pertains to the systematic explanation of the entire work of Christ, (ii) atonement contains both an overarching rational insight and a moral code of conduct that provide an apology for the truth of Christian faith, (iii) Anselm of Canterbury has seminal importance when this rational atonement is explained. The paper complements the author’s historical-critical discussion of “reconciliation” undertaken in St. Andrews Encyclopedia of Theology.
{"title":"Hegel’s Camel. From the History of Reconciliation to the Theory of Atonement","authors":"R. Saarinen","doi":"10.1515/nzsth-2022-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2022-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The paper discusses the relationship between “atonement” and “reconciliation” in systematic theology, claiming that Hegel’s concept of reconciliation (Versöhnung) continues to influence contemporary English-speaking theology. It is argued that the so-called theories of atonement often tacitly assume “Hegel’s camel”, an idea consisting of three propositions as follows: (i) atonement is a consistent umbrella concept that pertains to the systematic explanation of the entire work of Christ, (ii) atonement contains both an overarching rational insight and a moral code of conduct that provide an apology for the truth of Christian faith, (iii) Anselm of Canterbury has seminal importance when this rational atonement is explained. The paper complements the author’s historical-critical discussion of “reconciliation” undertaken in St. Andrews Encyclopedia of Theology.","PeriodicalId":51975,"journal":{"name":"NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SYSTEMATISCHE THEOLOGIE UND RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47617559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nachruf auf Christoph Schwöbel","authors":"Elisabeth Gräb-Schmidt, F. Hermanni","doi":"10.1515/nzsth-2022-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2022-0019","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51975,"journal":{"name":"NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SYSTEMATISCHE THEOLOGIE UND RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46009154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Summary With the current discussion about posthumanism, the traditional concept of man has become questionable. This also poses severe challenges for theology. In addition to theological anthropology, Christology is particularly affected by this. When it is no longer possible to answer unequivocally what it means to be human, it becomes even more controversial than before how the figure of the Deus-homo should be interpreted. The paper at hand presents a thought experiment in order to check whether it is possible to develop a Christology if one adopts central ideas of recent posthumanist scholarship. Taking Anselm’s famous remoto Christo argument as a model, the thought experiment avoids referring to the concept of man. After three major types of Christology haven been tested, the experiment yields the result that only a very abstract Christology is possible without resorting to explicitly anthropological assumptions. Rather, Christology can be seen as a reason why Christian theologians should reject posthumanism altogether. God has a human face, not a posthuman one.
{"title":"Remoto homine","authors":"Hendrik Klinge","doi":"10.1515/nzsth-2022-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2022-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Summary With the current discussion about posthumanism, the traditional concept of man has become questionable. This also poses severe challenges for theology. In addition to theological anthropology, Christology is particularly affected by this. When it is no longer possible to answer unequivocally what it means to be human, it becomes even more controversial than before how the figure of the Deus-homo should be interpreted. The paper at hand presents a thought experiment in order to check whether it is possible to develop a Christology if one adopts central ideas of recent posthumanist scholarship. Taking Anselm’s famous remoto Christo argument as a model, the thought experiment avoids referring to the concept of man. After three major types of Christology haven been tested, the experiment yields the result that only a very abstract Christology is possible without resorting to explicitly anthropological assumptions. Rather, Christology can be seen as a reason why Christian theologians should reject posthumanism altogether. God has a human face, not a posthuman one.","PeriodicalId":51975,"journal":{"name":"NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SYSTEMATISCHE THEOLOGIE UND RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48856247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Zusammenfassung Die zunehmende Verbreitung und Weiterentwicklung sogenannter künstlicher Intelligenz hat neue Fragen der Zurechenbarkeit und Verantwortung erzeugt. In diesem Zusammenhang ist der Vorschlag gemacht worden, das neue Rechtsinstrument der ‚elektronischen Person‘ zu schaffen. Damit sind grundlegende Fragen des menschlichen Selbstverständnisses berührt, es verbinden sich aber auch viele Missverständnisse mit jenem Vorschlag, sowohl bei denen, die den Vorschlag befürworten, als auch aufseiten derer, die ihn kritisch sehen. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Problematik aus juristischer und ethisch-theologischer Perspektive und gelangt zu einer abwägenden Einschätzung bezüglich der Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der elektronischen Person.
{"title":"Die elektronische Person","authors":"Constantin Plaul, Sönke Ahrens","doi":"10.1515/nzsth-2022-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2022-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Zusammenfassung Die zunehmende Verbreitung und Weiterentwicklung sogenannter künstlicher Intelligenz hat neue Fragen der Zurechenbarkeit und Verantwortung erzeugt. In diesem Zusammenhang ist der Vorschlag gemacht worden, das neue Rechtsinstrument der ‚elektronischen Person‘ zu schaffen. Damit sind grundlegende Fragen des menschlichen Selbstverständnisses berührt, es verbinden sich aber auch viele Missverständnisse mit jenem Vorschlag, sowohl bei denen, die den Vorschlag befürworten, als auch aufseiten derer, die ihn kritisch sehen. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Problematik aus juristischer und ethisch-theologischer Perspektive und gelangt zu einer abwägenden Einschätzung bezüglich der Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der elektronischen Person.","PeriodicalId":51975,"journal":{"name":"NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SYSTEMATISCHE THEOLOGIE UND RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49352001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Summary Plato and Aristotle understood phenomena to be knowable to the extent that they participate in the reality of the unchangeable, and this attitude was appropriated by the church fathers as a way of exploring the world’s dependence on its Creator. Luther’s insistence on the world’s sinfulness and on salvation as one-sidedly dependent on divine agency has been criticized as a rejection of this understanding of the inherent goodness of the world, thus paving the way for the secularized world view of modernity. Among these critics is Erich Przywara in his works up to and including his book Analogia Entis from 1932. However, in 1952 Przywara published an article where he found Luther’s theology of exchange to be a close parallel to his own doctrine of analogia entis, the implication being that Luther is closer to a Catholic understanding of the world’s relationship with God than mainstream post-Enlightenment Protestantism, and this article is an attempt to substantiate that claim.
{"title":"The significance of participation in transcendence in Luther and Przywara","authors":"Knut Alfsvåg","doi":"10.1515/nzsth-2022-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2022-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Summary Plato and Aristotle understood phenomena to be knowable to the extent that they participate in the reality of the unchangeable, and this attitude was appropriated by the church fathers as a way of exploring the world’s dependence on its Creator. Luther’s insistence on the world’s sinfulness and on salvation as one-sidedly dependent on divine agency has been criticized as a rejection of this understanding of the inherent goodness of the world, thus paving the way for the secularized world view of modernity. Among these critics is Erich Przywara in his works up to and including his book Analogia Entis from 1932. However, in 1952 Przywara published an article where he found Luther’s theology of exchange to be a close parallel to his own doctrine of analogia entis, the implication being that Luther is closer to a Catholic understanding of the world’s relationship with God than mainstream post-Enlightenment Protestantism, and this article is an attempt to substantiate that claim.","PeriodicalId":51975,"journal":{"name":"NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SYSTEMATISCHE THEOLOGIE UND RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67224233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This essay proposes an ethics of spirituality as a post-secular question by tracing the legacy of Schleiermacher in Charles Taylor’s account. Given the recent interest in spirituality as a matter of each individual’s perspective and orientation, it is important to explore whether spirituality involves an ethics of spirituality. This question resonates with the ethics of belief in James-Clifford debates and its recent discussions on the non-propositional aspect of belief and its ethical implications for oneself and others. The paper addresses how Schleiermacher and Taylor suggest the ethics of spirituality that demands authentic spirituality and reciprocal communication and recognition, while revealing differences concerning interactions with the institutional church, civil religion, and the civic-cultural frame of rationality and utility.
{"title":"The Ethics of Spirituality as a Post-Secular Question","authors":"Eunyoung Hwang","doi":"10.1515/nzsth-2022-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2022-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay proposes an ethics of spirituality as a post-secular question by tracing the legacy of Schleiermacher in Charles Taylor’s account. Given the recent interest in spirituality as a matter of each individual’s perspective and orientation, it is important to explore whether spirituality involves an ethics of spirituality. This question resonates with the ethics of belief in James-Clifford debates and its recent discussions on the non-propositional aspect of belief and its ethical implications for oneself and others. The paper addresses how Schleiermacher and Taylor suggest the ethics of spirituality that demands authentic spirituality and reciprocal communication and recognition, while revealing differences concerning interactions with the institutional church, civil religion, and the civic-cultural frame of rationality and utility.","PeriodicalId":51975,"journal":{"name":"NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SYSTEMATISCHE THEOLOGIE UND RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43264424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Summary In this paper, I aim to retrieve insights from the philosophy of the polymath Charles Sanders Peirce, which he referred to as pragmaticism. What Peirce is perhaps best known as is being the father of pragmatism. In order to differentiate his project from other thinkers such as William James and John Dewey, who likewise referred to their projects as pragmatism, he renamed his pragmatism to pragmaticism.Peirce’s pragmaticism has much to offer theologians, especially concerning theological method. I demonstrate this claim by showing the usefulness of three of Peirce’s pragmaticist concepts. The first section of this paper briefly explicates the foundational concepts of pragmaticism, which are the pragmatic(ist) maxim, the semiotic nature of understanding, and fallibilism. The second section of this paper provides a sketch of the benefits these three concepts have for theological method.
{"title":"Towards a Doctrinal Pragmaticism: Charles S. Peirce and the Nature of Doctrine","authors":"Andrew Hollingsworth","doi":"10.1515/nzsth-2022-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2022-0011","url":null,"abstract":"Summary In this paper, I aim to retrieve insights from the philosophy of the polymath Charles Sanders Peirce, which he referred to as pragmaticism. What Peirce is perhaps best known as is being the father of pragmatism. In order to differentiate his project from other thinkers such as William James and John Dewey, who likewise referred to their projects as pragmatism, he renamed his pragmatism to pragmaticism.Peirce’s pragmaticism has much to offer theologians, especially concerning theological method. I demonstrate this claim by showing the usefulness of three of Peirce’s pragmaticist concepts. The first section of this paper briefly explicates the foundational concepts of pragmaticism, which are the pragmatic(ist) maxim, the semiotic nature of understanding, and fallibilism. The second section of this paper provides a sketch of the benefits these three concepts have for theological method.","PeriodicalId":51975,"journal":{"name":"NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SYSTEMATISCHE THEOLOGIE UND RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42669861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Zusammenfassung Der traumatische Wiederholungszwang ist kein primum movens, sondern eine reaktive dialektische Bewegung. Sie hat zwar die Menschheitsgeschichte eröffnet; aber deren Verlauf lässt sich aus ihr nicht deduzieren. Hösles Verdacht, dass meine Philosophie des Traums genau dies versucht, entspringt seiner Neigung, meine dialektische Konzeption dualistisch zu lesen. Während mir eine Fundierung negativer Dialektik von der Psychoanalyse aus vorschwebt, bleibt er bei der positiven Dialektik des objektiven Idealismus. Daraus ergeben sich auch unterschiedliche Vorstellungen über die Leistungsfähigkeit der Mentalarchäologie, die ich betreibe.
{"title":"Kein primum movens. Replik","authors":"Christoph Türcke","doi":"10.1515/nzsth-2022-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2022-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Zusammenfassung Der traumatische Wiederholungszwang ist kein primum movens, sondern eine reaktive dialektische Bewegung. Sie hat zwar die Menschheitsgeschichte eröffnet; aber deren Verlauf lässt sich aus ihr nicht deduzieren. Hösles Verdacht, dass meine Philosophie des Traums genau dies versucht, entspringt seiner Neigung, meine dialektische Konzeption dualistisch zu lesen. Während mir eine Fundierung negativer Dialektik von der Psychoanalyse aus vorschwebt, bleibt er bei der positiven Dialektik des objektiven Idealismus. Daraus ergeben sich auch unterschiedliche Vorstellungen über die Leistungsfähigkeit der Mentalarchäologie, die ich betreibe.","PeriodicalId":51975,"journal":{"name":"NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SYSTEMATISCHE THEOLOGIE UND RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47829535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Summary How can the immense amount of suffering and waste inherent in the evolutionary process be reconciled with the existence of a perfectly good and omnipotent God? A widely embraced proposal in the area of “evolutionary theodicy” is the so-called “Only Way”-argument. This argument contends that certain valuable goods – in particular, creaturely independence and human freedom – can only come about through a genuinely indeterministic and partly uncontrolled process of evolution. In a previous article, I have argued that the “Only Way”-argument can be defeated by a “Twin Earth”-thought experiment: If God is omnipotent, he could have created – directly, without evolution – creatures that are molecule-for-molecule identical to those that he actually created through evolution. If the creatures that he actually created have freedom and independence, there is no valid reason to deny that the non-evolved “twin creatures” would also be free and independent. Recently, Eikrem and Søvik (ES) have suggested a way of blocking my Twin Earth-argument by appealing to the distinction between type-values and token-values (or type-goods and token-goods). While ES admit that the Twin Earth-argument shows the non-necessity of evolution for the existence of certain type-goods, they argue that an evolutionary creation can be justified by appeal to valuable token-goods (unique particulars) that could not have existed without evolution. In this article, I respond to ES’s token-goods argument by showing that it is incompatible with a basic presupposition of “Only Way” evolutionary theodicies, namely the claim that the evolutionary process is genuinely indeterministic and partly uncontrolled.
{"title":"Evolutionary Theodicy and the Type-Token Distinction: A Reply to Eikrem and Søvik","authors":"M. Wahlberg","doi":"10.1515/nzsth-2022-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2022-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Summary How can the immense amount of suffering and waste inherent in the evolutionary process be reconciled with the existence of a perfectly good and omnipotent God? A widely embraced proposal in the area of “evolutionary theodicy” is the so-called “Only Way”-argument. This argument contends that certain valuable goods – in particular, creaturely independence and human freedom – can only come about through a genuinely indeterministic and partly uncontrolled process of evolution. In a previous article, I have argued that the “Only Way”-argument can be defeated by a “Twin Earth”-thought experiment: If God is omnipotent, he could have created – directly, without evolution – creatures that are molecule-for-molecule identical to those that he actually created through evolution. If the creatures that he actually created have freedom and independence, there is no valid reason to deny that the non-evolved “twin creatures” would also be free and independent. Recently, Eikrem and Søvik (ES) have suggested a way of blocking my Twin Earth-argument by appealing to the distinction between type-values and token-values (or type-goods and token-goods). While ES admit that the Twin Earth-argument shows the non-necessity of evolution for the existence of certain type-goods, they argue that an evolutionary creation can be justified by appeal to valuable token-goods (unique particulars) that could not have existed without evolution. In this article, I respond to ES’s token-goods argument by showing that it is incompatible with a basic presupposition of “Only Way” evolutionary theodicies, namely the claim that the evolutionary process is genuinely indeterministic and partly uncontrolled.","PeriodicalId":51975,"journal":{"name":"NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SYSTEMATISCHE THEOLOGIE UND RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43030973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Heart of Wrath: Calvin, Barth, and Reformed Theories of Atonement","authors":"Andrew R. Hay","doi":"10.1515/nzsth-2022-4002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2022-4002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51975,"journal":{"name":"NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SYSTEMATISCHE THEOLOGIE UND RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44792364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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