Abstract In this paper, I examine an evolutionary approach to the action selection problem and illustrate how it helps raise an objection to the predictive processing account. Clark examines the predictive processing account as a theory of brain function that aims to unify perception, action, and cognition, but - despite this aim - fails to consider action selection overtly. He off ers an account of action control with the implication that minimizing prediction error is an imperative of living organisms because, according to the predictive processing account, action is employed to fulfill expectations and reduce prediction error. One way in which this can be achieved is by seeking out the least stimulating environment and staying there (Friston et al. 2012: 2). Bayesian, neuroscientific, and machine learning approaches into a single framework whose overarching principle is the minimization of surprise (or, equivalently, the maximization of expectation. But, most living organisms do not find, and stay in, surprise free environments. This paper explores this objection, also called the “dark room problem”, and examines Clark’s response to the problem. Finally, I recommend that if supplemented with an account of action selection, Clark’s account will avoid the dark room problem.
{"title":"How and why actions are selected: action selection and the dark room problem","authors":"E. Venter","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2016-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I examine an evolutionary approach to the action selection problem and illustrate how it helps raise an objection to the predictive processing account. Clark examines the predictive processing account as a theory of brain function that aims to unify perception, action, and cognition, but - despite this aim - fails to consider action selection overtly. He off ers an account of action control with the implication that minimizing prediction error is an imperative of living organisms because, according to the predictive processing account, action is employed to fulfill expectations and reduce prediction error. One way in which this can be achieved is by seeking out the least stimulating environment and staying there (Friston et al. 2012: 2). Bayesian, neuroscientific, and machine learning approaches into a single framework whose overarching principle is the minimization of surprise (or, equivalently, the maximization of expectation. But, most living organisms do not find, and stay in, surprise free environments. This paper explores this objection, also called the “dark room problem”, and examines Clark’s response to the problem. Finally, I recommend that if supplemented with an account of action selection, Clark’s account will avoid the dark room problem.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"21 1","pages":"19 - 45"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84295292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract While many philosophers speak of ‘pluralism’ within philosophy of biology, there has been little said about what such pluralism amounts to or what its underlying assumptions are. This has provoked so me anxiety about whether pluralism is compatible with their commitment to naturalism (Cussins 1992). This paper surveys three prominent pluralist positions (Sandra Mitchell and Michael Dietrich’s (2006) ‘integrative pluralism’, and both Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (1993) and Beth Preston’s (1998) pluralist analyses of functional explanations in evolutionary biology) and demonstrates how all three are committed to a form of pragmatism. This analysis both clarifies the justification and grounding of pluralism and allows these pluralisms to avoid the criticisms of Cussins. I close by making some more general points about pluralism and its relationship to history and integration.
{"title":"Pluralism, Pragmatism and Functional Explanations","authors":"Jamie Shaw","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2016-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While many philosophers speak of ‘pluralism’ within philosophy of biology, there has been little said about what such pluralism amounts to or what its underlying assumptions are. This has provoked so me anxiety about whether pluralism is compatible with their commitment to naturalism (Cussins 1992). This paper surveys three prominent pluralist positions (Sandra Mitchell and Michael Dietrich’s (2006) ‘integrative pluralism’, and both Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (1993) and Beth Preston’s (1998) pluralist analyses of functional explanations in evolutionary biology) and demonstrates how all three are committed to a form of pragmatism. This analysis both clarifies the justification and grounding of pluralism and allows these pluralisms to avoid the criticisms of Cussins. I close by making some more general points about pluralism and its relationship to history and integration.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"1 - 18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73453168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Vagueness is a linguistic phenomenon as well as a property of physical objects. Fuzzy set theory is a mathematical model of vagueness that has been used to define vague models of computation. The prominent model of vague computation is the fuzzy Turing machine. This conceptual computing device gives an idea of what computing under vagueness means, nevertheless, it is not the most natural model. Based on the properties of this and other models of vague computing, an attempt is made to formulate a basis for a philosophy of a theory of fuzzy computation.
{"title":"A (Basis for a) Philosophy of a Theory of Fuzzy Computation","authors":"A. Syropoulos","doi":"10.2478/kjps-2018-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/kjps-2018-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Vagueness is a linguistic phenomenon as well as a property of physical objects. Fuzzy set theory is a mathematical model of vagueness that has been used to define vague models of computation. The prominent model of vague computation is the fuzzy Turing machine. This conceptual computing device gives an idea of what computing under vagueness means, nevertheless, it is not the most natural model. Based on the properties of this and other models of vague computing, an attempt is made to formulate a basis for a philosophy of a theory of fuzzy computation.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"1 1","pages":"181 - 201"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88837660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Presentation of the Dossier ‘Models and Fictions’","authors":"F. B. Rua","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2016-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"39 1","pages":"25 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76622081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophical Inter Views is an internal project of the Science-Art-Philosophy Lab of the Centre for the Philosophy of Sciences of the University of Lisbon (CFCUL). Scienti! c Coordinators: Catarina Pombo Nabais (CFCUL) catarinapombonabais@ gmail.com; Diogo Silva da Cunha (CFCUL) cunhadiogo15@gmail.com; João Pinheiro ( CFCUL) joaopinheiro@hotmail.com. Project’s homepage: http://cfcul.fc.ul.pt/projectos/philosophical-inter-views/index.php Diogo Silva da Cunha (Centro de Filoso! a das Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa) cunhadiogo15@gmail.com
《哲学访谈》是里斯本大学哲学科学中心科学-艺术-哲学实验室的内部项目。Scienti !c协调员:Catarina Pombo Nabais (CFCUL) catarinapombonabais@gmail.com;迪奥戈·席尔瓦·达库尼亚(CFCUL) cunhadiogo15@gmail.com;jo o Pinheiro (CFCUL) joaopinheiro@hotmail.com。项目主页:http://cfcul.fc.ul.pt/projectos/philosophical-inter-views/index.php Diogo Silva da Cunha (Centro de Filoso!)a das Ciências a里斯本大学)cunhadiogo15@gmail.com
{"title":"Interview with Shahid Rahman","authors":"Diogo Silva da Cunha","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2016-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical Inter Views is an internal project of the Science-Art-Philosophy Lab of the Centre for the Philosophy of Sciences of the University of Lisbon (CFCUL). Scienti! c Coordinators: Catarina Pombo Nabais (CFCUL) catarinapombonabais@ gmail.com; Diogo Silva da Cunha (CFCUL) cunhadiogo15@gmail.com; João Pinheiro ( CFCUL) joaopinheiro@hotmail.com. Project’s homepage: http://cfcul.fc.ul.pt/projectos/philosophical-inter-views/index.php Diogo Silva da Cunha (Centro de Filoso! a das Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa) cunhadiogo15@gmail.com","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"115 1","pages":"85 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90733473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Alfredo Ferrarin, The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015","authors":"Ilaria D'Angelo","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2016-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"26 1","pages":"154 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83480668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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