Abstract There is today much interest in research of neuronal substrata in metaphor processing. It has been suggested that the right hemisphere yields a key role in the comprehension of figurative language (non-literal) and, particularly, in metaphors. Figurative language is included in pragmatics, a branch of linguistics that researches the use of language, in opposition to the study of the system of language. There lingers, though, an open debate in respect to the identification of the specific aspects concerning semantics, as opposed to those dominated by pragmatics. Can studies from neuronal correlates clarify questions that relate to semantics/pragmatics representation? I shall analyze neuroscientific developments about implicit language to attempt to understand, in section 2, scientific techniques available and more suitable to the phenomenology of the act of understanding an implicit, figurative or implicated message in a certain language game. To do so, I shall start by reviewing the studies in philosophy of language, and accommodate the development of the research in pragmatics underlying metaphor, particularly, in Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein. Finally, I discuss the possibility of interpretative capabilities being socioculturally grounded. I expect this methodological analysis to contribute to the enlightenment of the problem of phenomenology of intersubjective pragmatics, and to its future experimental paradigms.
{"title":"Anatomia da Linguagem: Podemos Compreender Jogos de Linguagem a Partir de Redes Corticais?","authors":"Inês Hipólito","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2017-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2017-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is today much interest in research of neuronal substrata in metaphor processing. It has been suggested that the right hemisphere yields a key role in the comprehension of figurative language (non-literal) and, particularly, in metaphors. Figurative language is included in pragmatics, a branch of linguistics that researches the use of language, in opposition to the study of the system of language. There lingers, though, an open debate in respect to the identification of the specific aspects concerning semantics, as opposed to those dominated by pragmatics. Can studies from neuronal correlates clarify questions that relate to semantics/pragmatics representation? I shall analyze neuroscientific developments about implicit language to attempt to understand, in section 2, scientific techniques available and more suitable to the phenomenology of the act of understanding an implicit, figurative or implicated message in a certain language game. To do so, I shall start by reviewing the studies in philosophy of language, and accommodate the development of the research in pragmatics underlying metaphor, particularly, in Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein. Finally, I discuss the possibility of interpretative capabilities being socioculturally grounded. I expect this methodological analysis to contribute to the enlightenment of the problem of phenomenology of intersubjective pragmatics, and to its future experimental paradigms.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"109 - 84"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74940167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
“O ser começa entre as minhas mãos de homem. / o ser ,/ todas as mãos, / qualquer palavra que se diga no mundo, / o trabalho da tua morte, / Deus, que não trabalha. // Mas o não ser também começa entre as minhas mãos de homem. // O não-ser, / todas as mãos, / a palavra que se diz fora do mundo, / as férias da tua morte, / a fadiga de Deus, / a mãe que nunca terá filho, / meu não morrer ontem. // Mas as minhas mãos de homem onde começam?” (Juarroz, 1998: 12)
{"title":"Rosto e Mãos: Em torno de Deleuze, Derrida e Schiele","authors":"F. Silva","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2017-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2017-0006","url":null,"abstract":"“O ser começa entre as minhas mãos de homem. / o ser ,/ todas as mãos, / qualquer palavra que se diga no mundo, / o trabalho da tua morte, / Deus, que não trabalha. // Mas o não ser também começa entre as minhas mãos de homem. // O não-ser, / todas as mãos, / a palavra que se diz fora do mundo, / as férias da tua morte, / a fadiga de Deus, / a mãe que nunca terá filho, / meu não morrer ontem. // Mas as minhas mãos de homem onde começam?” (Juarroz, 1998: 12)","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"143 - 173"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75060248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Resumo Autores como os físicos Léon Rosenfeld, Gerald Holton e Franco Selleri, bem como o filósofo Miguel Reale perceberam já que, no interior da mecânica quântica, o princípio da complementaridade de Niels Bohr pode ser aproximado á noção filosófica de dialéctica (numa perspectiva não hegeliana, entretanto). Além de buscar contribuir para robustecer tal linha de interpretaoção do famoso principío bohriano, neste paper tentaremos compreender dialecticamente a relaoção de Louis de Broglie e a de desigualdade de Werner Heisenberg. Por fim, argumentaremos a favor de um enfoque realista do principío em causa.
{"title":"Pode Sustentar-se o Argumento de Que Exista uma Dialéctica Quântica da Natureza?","authors":"Lino Machado","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2017-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2017-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Resumo Autores como os físicos Léon Rosenfeld, Gerald Holton e Franco Selleri, bem como o filósofo Miguel Reale perceberam já que, no interior da mecânica quântica, o princípio da complementaridade de Niels Bohr pode ser aproximado á noção filosófica de dialéctica (numa perspectiva não hegeliana, entretanto). Além de buscar contribuir para robustecer tal linha de interpretaoção do famoso principío bohriano, neste paper tentaremos compreender dialecticamente a relaoção de Louis de Broglie e a de desigualdade de Werner Heisenberg. Por fim, argumentaremos a favor de um enfoque realista do principío em causa.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"3 1","pages":"110 - 142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75770580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In spite of the relevance of a scientific representation of the world for naturalism, it is surprising that philosophy of science is less involved in the debate on naturalism than expected. Had the viewpoint of philosophy of science been duly considered, naturalism could not have overlooked the established lesson, according to which there is no well-defined recipe for what science must or must not be. In the present paper I address some implications of this lesson for (some forms of) naturalism, arguing that a radically naturalistic outlook fails to pay sufficient attention to some of the main lessons that philosophy of science has taught us concerning the nature of scientific theories. One of these lessons is that real scientific theories are far more normative than ordinary scientific naturalism is ready to accept, a circumstance that at a minimum is bound to force most naturalization strategies to re-define their significance.
{"title":"Is Science Really What Naturalism Says it is?","authors":"Federico Laudisa","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2017-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2017-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In spite of the relevance of a scientific representation of the world for naturalism, it is surprising that philosophy of science is less involved in the debate on naturalism than expected. Had the viewpoint of philosophy of science been duly considered, naturalism could not have overlooked the established lesson, according to which there is no well-defined recipe for what science must or must not be. In the present paper I address some implications of this lesson for (some forms of) naturalism, arguing that a radically naturalistic outlook fails to pay sufficient attention to some of the main lessons that philosophy of science has taught us concerning the nature of scientific theories. One of these lessons is that real scientific theories are far more normative than ordinary scientific naturalism is ready to accept, a circumstance that at a minimum is bound to force most naturalization strategies to re-define their significance.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"135 5","pages":"1 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/kjps-2017-0001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72370375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
O último livro de J. L. Pio Abreu, O bailado da alma (Lisboa: Dom Quixote, 2014) é um livro provocador. Ele provoca o pensamento e provoca o encontro. É um livro que exalta o acontecimento! Essa é a primeira dimensão que gostava de sublinhar neste livro: a glori! cação do acontecimento, a procura da sincronia entre os corpos, a descrição, como que em regime de consagração, dos movimentos uníssonos do cérebro. O livro está genuinamente interessado pela questão do encontro, do encontro dos corpos e das almas, da sincronia rítmica das danças. Aliás, o livro é percorrido por uma tipologia da dança desde o ballet clássico até ao tango, passando pelas danças de roda. Toda uma profusão de estilos e ritmos que marcam a cadência dos encontros.
J. L. Pio Abreu的最后一本书《灵魂的舞蹈》(里斯本:Dom Quixote, 2014)是一本挑衅性的书。它激发思想，激发相遇。这是一本颂扬这一事件的书!这是我想在这本书中强调的第一个维度:荣耀!对事件的解释，对身体之间同步性的探索，对大脑统一运动的描述，就像在一种神圣的状态中一样。这本书真正感兴趣的是相遇的问题，身体和灵魂的相遇，舞蹈的节奏同步。事实上，这本书涵盖了一种舞蹈类型，从古典芭蕾到探戈，通过轮舞。丰富的风格和节奏标志着会议的节奏。
{"title":"Sobre O Bailado da Alma de Pio Abreu. À Procura da Alma Perdida. Ensaio Filosófico-Científico-Artístico Sobre as Danças e Outras Desventuras","authors":"C. Nabais","doi":"10.1515/KJPS-2017-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/KJPS-2017-0007","url":null,"abstract":"O último livro de J. L. Pio Abreu, O bailado da alma (Lisboa: Dom Quixote, 2014) é um livro provocador. Ele provoca o pensamento e provoca o encontro. É um livro que exalta o acontecimento! Essa é a primeira dimensão que gostava de sublinhar neste livro: a glori! cação do acontecimento, a procura da sincronia entre os corpos, a descrição, como que em regime de consagração, dos movimentos uníssonos do cérebro. O livro está genuinamente interessado pela questão do encontro, do encontro dos corpos e das almas, da sincronia rítmica das danças. Aliás, o livro é percorrido por uma tipologia da dança desde o ballet clássico até ao tango, passando pelas danças de roda. Toda uma profusão de estilos e ritmos que marcam a cadência dos encontros.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"16 1","pages":"174 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72561407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract According to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts to a revolutionary alternative to standard views about cognition. To emphasize the impact, they claim that this ‘radicalization’ should be applied to all enactivist friendly views, including, another current and potentially revolutionary approach to cognition: predictive processing. In this paper, we will show that this is not the case. After introducing the problem (section 2), we will argue (section 3) that ‘radicalizing’ predictive processing does not add any value to this approach. After this (section 4), we will analyze whether or not radical Enactivism can count as a revolution within cognitive science at all and conclude that it cannot. Finally, in section 5 we will claim that cognitive science is better off when embracing heterogeneity.
{"title":"Enactivism, Radical Enactivism and Predictive Processing: What is Radical in Cognitive Science?","authors":"K. Gärtner, Robert W. Clowes","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2017-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2017-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts to a revolutionary alternative to standard views about cognition. To emphasize the impact, they claim that this ‘radicalization’ should be applied to all enactivist friendly views, including, another current and potentially revolutionary approach to cognition: predictive processing. In this paper, we will show that this is not the case. After introducing the problem (section 2), we will argue (section 3) that ‘radicalizing’ predictive processing does not add any value to this approach. After this (section 4), we will analyze whether or not radical Enactivism can count as a revolution within cognitive science at all and conclude that it cannot. Finally, in section 5 we will claim that cognitive science is better off when embracing heterogeneity.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"108 1","pages":"54 - 83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85686158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
objects (like an ideal pendulum) do not have the same properties as concrete physical systems and Frigg approves of that idea and concedes that a property is not instantiated by a real object in the same way as by a fictional one. In the latter case, according to Frigg, in keeping with a game of make-believe, one has to imagine that the model object has properties, whereas, in the target system, one deals with real properties. In short, Frigg does not accept similarities between objects which are ontologically different, but bases his idea on similarities between properties which are ontologically different. One should not presuppose the notion of “similar properties”, it has to be constructed or at least established. 43 Frigg, 2010b, 273.
{"title":"Scientific Models and Games of Make-Believe: A Modal-Logical Perspective","authors":"Matthieu Gallais","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2016-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0018","url":null,"abstract":"objects (like an ideal pendulum) do not have the same properties as concrete physical systems and Frigg approves of that idea and concedes that a property is not instantiated by a real object in the same way as by a fictional one. In the latter case, according to Frigg, in keeping with a game of make-believe, one has to imagine that the model object has properties, whereas, in the target system, one deals with real properties. In short, Frigg does not accept similarities between objects which are ontologically different, but bases his idea on similarities between properties which are ontologically different. One should not presuppose the notion of “similar properties”, it has to be constructed or at least established. 43 Frigg, 2010b, 273.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"96 1","pages":"109 - 73"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83535914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, first of all, I want to try a new defense of the utterance approach as to the relationship between fictional and nonfictional works on the one hand and between fictional and nonfictional utterances on the other hand, notably the idea that the distinction between fictional and nonfictional works is derivative on the distinction between fictional and nonfictional utterances of the sentences that constitute a text. Moreover, I want to account for the second distinction in minimally contextualist semantic terms. Finally, I want to hold that what makes a fictional utterance, hence a fictional work, properly fictional is the contextually pre-semantic fact that its utterer entertains an act of make-believe, where such an act is accounted for in metarepresentational terms. This ultimately means that the fiction/nonfiction distinction is not clarified in terms of the fictional works/nonfictional works distinction, for things rather go the other way around.
{"title":"The Nature of Fiction/al Utterances","authors":"A. Voltolini","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2016-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, first of all, I want to try a new defense of the utterance approach as to the relationship between fictional and nonfictional works on the one hand and between fictional and nonfictional utterances on the other hand, notably the idea that the distinction between fictional and nonfictional works is derivative on the distinction between fictional and nonfictional utterances of the sentences that constitute a text. Moreover, I want to account for the second distinction in minimally contextualist semantic terms. Finally, I want to hold that what makes a fictional utterance, hence a fictional work, properly fictional is the contextually pre-semantic fact that its utterer entertains an act of make-believe, where such an act is accounted for in metarepresentational terms. This ultimately means that the fiction/nonfiction distinction is not clarified in terms of the fictional works/nonfictional works distinction, for things rather go the other way around.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"19 1","pages":"28 - 55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78694187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper critically analyzes the fiction-view of scientific modeling, which exploits presumed analogies between literary fiction and model building in science. The basic idea is that in both fiction and scientific modeling fictional worlds are created. The paper argues that the fiction-view comes closest to certain scientific thought experiments, especially those involving demons in science and to literary movements like naturalism. But the paper concludes that the dissimilarities prevail over the similarities. The fiction-view fails to do justice to the plurality of model types used in science; it fails to realize that a function like idealization only makes sense in science because models, unlike works of fiction, can be de-idealized; it fails to distinguish sufficiently between the make-believe (fictional) worlds created in fiction and the hypothetical (as-if) worlds envisaged in models. Representation characterized in the fiction-view as a license to draw inferences does not sufficiently distinguish between inferences in fiction from inferences in scientific modeling. To highlight the contrast the paper proposes to explicate representation in terms of satisfaction of constraints.
{"title":"Hypothetical, not Fictional Worlds","authors":"F. Weinert","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2016-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper critically analyzes the fiction-view of scientific modeling, which exploits presumed analogies between literary fiction and model building in science. The basic idea is that in both fiction and scientific modeling fictional worlds are created. The paper argues that the fiction-view comes closest to certain scientific thought experiments, especially those involving demons in science and to literary movements like naturalism. But the paper concludes that the dissimilarities prevail over the similarities. The fiction-view fails to do justice to the plurality of model types used in science; it fails to realize that a function like idealization only makes sense in science because models, unlike works of fiction, can be de-idealized; it fails to distinguish sufficiently between the make-believe (fictional) worlds created in fiction and the hypothetical (as-if) worlds envisaged in models. Representation characterized in the fiction-view as a license to draw inferences does not sufficiently distinguish between inferences in fiction from inferences in scientific modeling. To highlight the contrast the paper proposes to explicate representation in terms of satisfaction of constraints.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"49 1","pages":"110 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85920032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The question of fiction is omnipresent within the work of Paul Ricoeur throughout his prolific career. However, Ricoeur raises the questions of fiction in relation to other issues such the symbol, metaphor and narrative. This article sets out to foreground a traditional problem of fiction and logic, which is termed the existence of non-existent objects, in relation to the Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative. Ricoeur’s understanding of fiction takes place within his overall philosophical anthropology where the fictions and histories make up the very nature of identity both personal and collective. The existence of non-existent objects demonstrates a dichotomy between fiction and history, non-existent objects can exist as fictional objects. The very possibility of the existence of fictional objects entails ontological status considerations. What ontological status do fictional objects have? Ricoeur develops a concept of narrative configuration which is akin to the Kantian productive imagination and configuration frames the question historical narrative and fictional narrative. It is demonstrated that the ontological status of fictional objects can be best understood in a model of possible worlds.
{"title":"The question of Fiction – nonexistent objects, a possible world response from Paul Ricoeur","authors":"N. Fitzpatrick","doi":"10.1515/kjps-2016-0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2016-0020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The question of fiction is omnipresent within the work of Paul Ricoeur throughout his prolific career. However, Ricoeur raises the questions of fiction in relation to other issues such the symbol, metaphor and narrative. This article sets out to foreground a traditional problem of fiction and logic, which is termed the existence of non-existent objects, in relation to the Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative. Ricoeur’s understanding of fiction takes place within his overall philosophical anthropology where the fictions and histories make up the very nature of identity both personal and collective. The existence of non-existent objects demonstrates a dichotomy between fiction and history, non-existent objects can exist as fictional objects. The very possibility of the existence of fictional objects entails ontological status considerations. What ontological status do fictional objects have? Ricoeur develops a concept of narrative configuration which is akin to the Kantian productive imagination and configuration frames the question historical narrative and fictional narrative. It is demonstrated that the ontological status of fictional objects can be best understood in a model of possible worlds.","PeriodicalId":52005,"journal":{"name":"Kairos-Journal of Philosophy & Science","volume":"27 1","pages":"137 - 153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82186605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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