Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1909234
Thomas Stuart
ABSTRACT The “competitive strength” of a company in the digital economy is becoming increasingly more reliant on the data it has at its disposal. As such, personal data has been described as “the new oil of the internet and the new currency of the digital world”. The emergence of personal data as “currency” has reinvigorated the development of privacy and consumer protection laws However, competition law has sought to maintain a strict level of separation between what falls within the “scope” of antitrust enforcement and matters deemed “wholly or partially” unrelated to competition. In highlighting the anti-competitive effects created by the vast databases of personal and often sensitive information (Big Data) being acquired by today's dominant internet platforms. this paper seeks to argue that a more refined and comprehensive analysis of the competitive effects of data in merger review is lacking and is required as a matter of urgency.
{"title":"Too little too late?","authors":"Thomas Stuart","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1909234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1909234","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The “competitive strength” of a company in the digital economy is becoming increasingly more reliant on the data it has at its disposal. As such, personal data has been described as “the new oil of the internet and the new currency of the digital world”. The emergence of personal data as “currency” has reinvigorated the development of privacy and consumer protection laws However, competition law has sought to maintain a strict level of separation between what falls within the “scope” of antitrust enforcement and matters deemed “wholly or partially” unrelated to competition. In highlighting the anti-competitive effects created by the vast databases of personal and often sensitive information (Big Data) being acquired by today's dominant internet platforms. this paper seeks to argue that a more refined and comprehensive analysis of the competitive effects of data in merger review is lacking and is required as a matter of urgency.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1909234","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41863496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-02DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1921515
Giulia Schneider
ABSTRACT Economic operators active in the emerging European data space are currently struggling with two major hurdles: (i) the lack of legal certainty regarding the boundaries of lawfulness of data sharing practices under European competition law; (ii) the lack of coherence of the European competition framework with other European Union regulatory branches. This contribution addresses identified concerns, enquiring the relevance of data sharing agreements as research and development collaborations under art. 101 TFEU. The study considers the Commission’s Guidelines on horizontal cooperation in the light of the proposed Data Governance Act and the Digital Service Package. It identifies some criteria relevant for assessing the lawfulness of data sharing agreements under art. 101(1). These criteria encompass subjective (type of undertakings involves); objective (type of data shared); structural (degree of openness) and teleological features (public interest or commercial-oriented research) of data sharing arrangements.
{"title":"Data sharing for collaborative research under art. 101 TFEU: lessons from the proposed regulations for data markets","authors":"Giulia Schneider","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1921515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1921515","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Economic operators active in the emerging European data space are currently struggling with two major hurdles: (i) the lack of legal certainty regarding the boundaries of lawfulness of data sharing practices under European competition law; (ii) the lack of coherence of the European competition framework with other European Union regulatory branches. This contribution addresses identified concerns, enquiring the relevance of data sharing agreements as research and development collaborations under art. 101 TFEU. The study considers the Commission’s Guidelines on horizontal cooperation in the light of the proposed Data Governance Act and the Digital Service Package. It identifies some criteria relevant for assessing the lawfulness of data sharing agreements under art. 101(1). These criteria encompass subjective (type of undertakings involves); objective (type of data shared); structural (degree of openness) and teleological features (public interest or commercial-oriented research) of data sharing arrangements.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1921515","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44313297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-02DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1921513
Prateek Bhattacharya
ABSTRACT The Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) journey with “control” has been the subject of much discussion in Indian competition law circles. As we witness an increase in reliance on technology as well as a consolidation in conventional industries, both catalyzed by the Covid-19 pandemic, there is a marked increase of activity in the Indian merger market. It is therefore crucial for businesses contemplating mergers and acquisitions, to have a clear sense of the hurdles they need to cross, particularly if the merger activity in question falls in the same or a related industry. The CCI would thus need to provide clarity on what constitutes control, and when transacting parties should approach the CCI. The CCI must also be transparent about control transactions resulting in anti-competitive effects. This paper proposes that the CCI provide guidance on what amounts to control, from the perspectives of both notifiability and competitive effects, to resolve the CCI’s control quandary.
{"title":"Competition Commission of India’s “control” conundrum – practice, precedent, and proposals","authors":"Prateek Bhattacharya","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1921513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1921513","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) journey with “control” has been the subject of much discussion in Indian competition law circles. As we witness an increase in reliance on technology as well as a consolidation in conventional industries, both catalyzed by the Covid-19 pandemic, there is a marked increase of activity in the Indian merger market. It is therefore crucial for businesses contemplating mergers and acquisitions, to have a clear sense of the hurdles they need to cross, particularly if the merger activity in question falls in the same or a related industry. The CCI would thus need to provide clarity on what constitutes control, and when transacting parties should approach the CCI. The CCI must also be transparent about control transactions resulting in anti-competitive effects. This paper proposes that the CCI provide guidance on what amounts to control, from the perspectives of both notifiability and competitive effects, to resolve the CCI’s control quandary.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1921513","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42639215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-29DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1921516
Rhonda L. Smith, A. Duke
ABSTRACT There is no simple prescription for defining the relevant product market for pharmaceuticals. As price is usually the key variable, the price inelastic demand for pharmaceuticals complicates the market definition process. It unsurprising then that when, as in relation to pharmaceuticals, demand is relatively price inelastic the process of defining the product dimension of a market is more complex. In relation to pharmaceuticals, the question is therefore whether a change in some other variable would cause substitution and so constrain decision-making and, if so, how to best identify such constraints. By reference to approaches adopted in several key cases, this article considers alternative approaches that can be used to identify the product dimension of pharmaceutical markets, including the use of natural events/experiments, the use of consumption data as well as qualitative indicators. The article concludes with a suggested alternative approach based on functionality, response to product quality variation and context.
{"title":"Pharmaceuticals and market definition: a cautionary tale","authors":"Rhonda L. Smith, A. Duke","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1921516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1921516","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT There is no simple prescription for defining the relevant product market for pharmaceuticals. As price is usually the key variable, the price inelastic demand for pharmaceuticals complicates the market definition process. It unsurprising then that when, as in relation to pharmaceuticals, demand is relatively price inelastic the process of defining the product dimension of a market is more complex. In relation to pharmaceuticals, the question is therefore whether a change in some other variable would cause substitution and so constrain decision-making and, if so, how to best identify such constraints. By reference to approaches adopted in several key cases, this article considers alternative approaches that can be used to identify the product dimension of pharmaceutical markets, including the use of natural events/experiments, the use of consumption data as well as qualitative indicators. The article concludes with a suggested alternative approach based on functionality, response to product quality variation and context.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1921516","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43785688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-29DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1921514
Johannes Persch
ABSTRACT This paper investigates what role fundamental rights can play in the interpretation of EU antitrust law, in particular Art. 102 TFEU. It spells out the difficulties that derive from the fact that antitrust law and fundamental rights are of equal ranking in the EU legal order. It concludes that nevertheless as a matter of systemic and teleological interpretation, EU antitrust law is open for fundamental rights considerations. However, recourse to fundamental rights should be taken only when companies possess regulatory power. This approach sheds light on social media platforms’ recent increased engagement in content moderation. It suggests that for dominant platforms with regulatory power, any discrimination based on political beliefs is prima facie abusive behaviour under Art. 102 TFEU. However, such conduct may be justified by the pursuit of legitimate goals and companies should be granted a wide margin of appreciation in that regard.
{"title":"The role of fundamental rights in antitrust law – a special responsibility for undertakings with regulatory power under Art. 102 TFEU?","authors":"Johannes Persch","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1921514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1921514","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper investigates what role fundamental rights can play in the interpretation of EU antitrust law, in particular Art. 102 TFEU. It spells out the difficulties that derive from the fact that antitrust law and fundamental rights are of equal ranking in the EU legal order. It concludes that nevertheless as a matter of systemic and teleological interpretation, EU antitrust law is open for fundamental rights considerations. However, recourse to fundamental rights should be taken only when companies possess regulatory power. This approach sheds light on social media platforms’ recent increased engagement in content moderation. It suggests that for dominant platforms with regulatory power, any discrimination based on political beliefs is prima facie abusive behaviour under Art. 102 TFEU. However, such conduct may be justified by the pursuit of legitimate goals and companies should be granted a wide margin of appreciation in that regard.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1921514","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48797835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-22DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1916212
Patrick Actis Perinetto
ABSTRACT Generics represents the first instance in which the CJEU analysed the contentious pay-for-delay cases. The Court had to take position on the interplay between IPRs and competition law as well as on potential competition, on unlawful competition and on the general features of the competition law assessment. The answers provided are problematic in many respects. In particular, they risk to undermine the essence of the IPRs, by excluding any relevance of their validity within the competition law assessment. Following an illustration of the case-law concerning the relationship between competition and patent laws and a description of the relevant parts of Generics, this paper aims at discussing the reasons why the Court’s reasoning is hard to reconcile with (i) its own case-law concerning the application of regulatory provisions and of IPRs; (ii) the required assessment of the counterfactual and (iii) the relevance of only lawful competition within the competition law assessment.
{"title":"Generics (paroxetine), or the new unbearable lightness of patents in competition law","authors":"Patrick Actis Perinetto","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1916212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1916212","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Generics represents the first instance in which the CJEU analysed the contentious pay-for-delay cases. The Court had to take position on the interplay between IPRs and competition law as well as on potential competition, on unlawful competition and on the general features of the competition law assessment. The answers provided are problematic in many respects. In particular, they risk to undermine the essence of the IPRs, by excluding any relevance of their validity within the competition law assessment. Following an illustration of the case-law concerning the relationship between competition and patent laws and a description of the relevant parts of Generics, this paper aims at discussing the reasons why the Court’s reasoning is hard to reconcile with (i) its own case-law concerning the application of regulatory provisions and of IPRs; (ii) the required assessment of the counterfactual and (iii) the relevance of only lawful competition within the competition law assessment.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1916212","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46726390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-18DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1893960
Oliver Latham, Mikaël Hervé, Romain Bizet
ABSTRACT We present an economic model of competition in the ad tech “stack”. We use this model to understand how the complex web of conducts implemented by Google – and under scrutiny by both U.S. and European antitrust enforcers – can be rationalized as a profit-maximizing, exclusionary strategy. We show how vertical integration, linking of services across the stack and the use of complex auction models increases incentive and ability to foreclose rivals and why there might be incentives to limit data and ID sharing so as to undermine rival intermediaries. We show how these conducts can have negative effects on consumer welfare via an increase in the prices paid by online advertisers and a decline in incentives to invest in producing content. We discuss also the level of “take rate” charged by different intermediaries and explain how differences in the ability to price discriminate undermines the relevance of such comparisons.
{"title":"Antitrust concerns in Ad-Tech: formalizing the combined effect of multiple conducts and behaviours","authors":"Oliver Latham, Mikaël Hervé, Romain Bizet","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1893960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1893960","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We present an economic model of competition in the ad tech “stack”. We use this model to understand how the complex web of conducts implemented by Google – and under scrutiny by both U.S. and European antitrust enforcers – can be rationalized as a profit-maximizing, exclusionary strategy. We show how vertical integration, linking of services across the stack and the use of complex auction models increases incentive and ability to foreclose rivals and why there might be incentives to limit data and ID sharing so as to undermine rival intermediaries. We show how these conducts can have negative effects on consumer welfare via an increase in the prices paid by online advertisers and a decline in incentives to invest in producing content. We discuss also the level of “take rate” charged by different intermediaries and explain how differences in the ability to price discriminate undermines the relevance of such comparisons.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1893960","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42619197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-06DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1886441
L. Di Gaetano
ABSTRACT This paper contributes to the literature of price framing by analysing the effect of temporal price framing. We introduce in a homogeneous duopoly à la Bertrand, where firms compete with an advertised price that is expressed in a certain periodical frame (i.e. 4-week, daily) that could differ from the standard periodical price (for instance, monthly or yearly price). The model focuses on the effect of the perception of the periodical price by consumers and not on the confusion or complexity of the price frames that leads to a product differentiation. Indeed, on equilibrium the two firms choose the same standard and advertised price, but their profits are greater than the standard Bertrand case. This result gives an important insight regarding the 4-week billing antitrust case conducted by the Italian Antitrust Authority and concluded in January 2020.
{"title":"Are 28 days a month? Price competition with consumer confusion","authors":"L. Di Gaetano","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1886441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1886441","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper contributes to the literature of price framing by analysing the effect of temporal price framing. We introduce in a homogeneous duopoly à la Bertrand, where firms compete with an advertised price that is expressed in a certain periodical frame (i.e. 4-week, daily) that could differ from the standard periodical price (for instance, monthly or yearly price). The model focuses on the effect of the perception of the periodical price by consumers and not on the confusion or complexity of the price frames that leads to a product differentiation. Indeed, on equilibrium the two firms choose the same standard and advertised price, but their profits are greater than the standard Bertrand case. This result gives an important insight regarding the 4-week billing antitrust case conducted by the Italian Antitrust Authority and concluded in January 2020.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1886441","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41830498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-28DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1886442
T. Wein
ABSTRACT Hardcore cartels risk receiving both administrative fines from the cartel authority and civil law claims for damages. There is a legal policy discussion that cartelist should also face criminal law consequences. Penalties must be at least as high as expected benefits to deter crimes. Sanctions by the German cartel office might indicate information on the profits We calculate the minimum level of fines required to deter cartel infringement for each case, and compare the figures to the actual penalties. The calculated minimum penalties would result in a considerable increase in fines, which would have to be covered either by compensation payments, or criminal sanctions. If custodial sentences were based on the probability of zero compensation payments, and the monetary loss of benefit, the result would sometimes equal an impractically long criminal sentence. It would be more effective to raise administrative sanctions to a sufficient level, especially against individuals.
{"title":"Cartel behaviour and efficient sanctioning by criminal sentences","authors":"T. Wein","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1886442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1886442","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Hardcore cartels risk receiving both administrative fines from the cartel authority and civil law claims for damages. There is a legal policy discussion that cartelist should also face criminal law consequences. Penalties must be at least as high as expected benefits to deter crimes. Sanctions by the German cartel office might indicate information on the profits We calculate the minimum level of fines required to deter cartel infringement for each case, and compare the figures to the actual penalties. The calculated minimum penalties would result in a considerable increase in fines, which would have to be covered either by compensation payments, or criminal sanctions. If custodial sentences were based on the probability of zero compensation payments, and the monetary loss of benefit, the result would sometimes equal an impractically long criminal sentence. It would be more effective to raise administrative sanctions to a sufficient level, especially against individuals.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1886442","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48540882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2021.1907080
S. Vezzoso
ABSTRACT The Paper offers some preliminary and cautious reflections specifically on the data-related obligations for gatekeepers that the 81-page Proposal for a Digital Markets Act tabled by the European Commission in December 2020 would introduce. First, it will be shown that the breadth and depth of the proposed data-related obligations reflect an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the extensive data governance/regulatory “plumbing” necessary to ensure open and fair markets in the digital sector. Second, it is important to underline how the asymmetrical data governance for gatekeepers that the DMA would introduce builds on and enhances important pieces of the EU data acquis. Finally, the extent to which the DMA ties in with the European Commission’s overall data strategy is also worth investigating going forward.
{"title":"The dawn of pro-competition data regulation for gatekeepers in the EU","authors":"S. Vezzoso","doi":"10.1080/17441056.2021.1907080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2021.1907080","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Paper offers some preliminary and cautious reflections specifically on the data-related obligations for gatekeepers that the 81-page Proposal for a Digital Markets Act tabled by the European Commission in December 2020 would introduce. First, it will be shown that the breadth and depth of the proposed data-related obligations reflect an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the extensive data governance/regulatory “plumbing” necessary to ensure open and fair markets in the digital sector. Second, it is important to underline how the asymmetrical data governance for gatekeepers that the DMA would introduce builds on and enhances important pieces of the EU data acquis. Finally, the extent to which the DMA ties in with the European Commission’s overall data strategy is also worth investigating going forward.","PeriodicalId":52118,"journal":{"name":"European Competition Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17441056.2021.1907080","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47480949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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