Neuroscience of Consciousness最新文献

A recent advancement in consciousness science has been the introduction of a multidimensional framework of consciousness. This framework has been applied to global states of consciousness, including psychedelic states and disorders of consciousness, and the consciousness of non-human animals. The multidimensional framework enables a finer parsing of both various states of consciousness and forms of animal consciousness, paving the way for new scientific investigations into consciousness. In this paper, the multidimensional model is expanded by constructing temporal profiles. This expansion allows for the modelling of changes in consciousness across the life cycles of organisms and the progression over time of disorders of consciousness. The result of this expansion is 2-fold: (i) it enables new modes of comparison, both across stages of development and across species; (ii) it proposes that more attention be given to the various types of fluctuations that occur in patients who are suffering from disorders of consciousness.

Modern medicine has been shaken by the surge of psychedelic science that proposes a new approach to mitigate mental disorders, such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. Clinical trials to investigate whether psychedelic substances can treat psychiatric conditions are now underway, yet less discussion gravitates around their use in neurological disorders due to brain injury. One suggested implementation of brain-complexity enhancing psychedelics is to treat people with post-comatose disorders of consciousness (DoC). In this article, we discuss the rationale of this endeavour, examining possible outcomes of such experiments by postulating the existence of an optimal level of complexity. We consider the possible counterintuitive effects of both psychedelics and DoC on the functional connectivity of the default mode network and its possible impact on selfhood. We also elaborate on the role of computational modelling in providing complementary information to experimental studies, both contributing to our understanding of the treatment mechanisms and providing a path towards personalized medicine. Finally, we update the discourse surrounding the ethical considerations, encompassing clinical and scientific values.

Trance states include various practices characterized by a modulation of consciousness, but with their own specific characteristics and induction techniques. They have been very seldom scientifically studied, and their phenomenological similarities and differences are poorly documented. This paper will focus on two types of Western trances developed after the leaders were trained in traditional shamanic communities: the auto-induced cognitive trance (AICT) and the Mahorikatan^® trance (MT). Twenty-five AICT and 26 MT participants who were able to self-induce the trance state completed questionnaires about their trance practice (e.g. context of the first trance episode, frequency of practice, and consequences on personal life) and the phenomenological characteristics (i.e. emotional, physical, and cognitive) of the trance episodes they experienced. These characteristics were compared to explore similarities and differences between the two trance states. AICT and MT are characterized by the expression of different emotions, modification of various perceptions, a feeling of unicity (i.e. being completely oneself), and an expansion of consciousness. AICT participants commonly reported body movements, vocalizations, as well as increased creativity, visions of entities and/or places, and feeling of interaction with the environment. MT participants commonly reported a feeling of body dissolution. Most participants in both groups reported positive effects of their trance practice on their personal life. These results helped characterize AICT and MT, as well as their similarities and differences. Further studies should continue to explore the characteristics of such trance states, as well as their potential clinical applications.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae001.].

In daily life, we can not only estimate confidence in our inferences ('I'm sure I failed that exam'), but can also estimate whether those feelings of confidence are good predictors of decision accuracy ('I feel sure I failed, but my feeling is probably wrong; I probably passed'). In the lab, by using simple perceptual tasks and collecting trial-by-trial confidence ratings visual metacognition research has repeatedly shown that participants can successfully predict the accuracy of their perceptual choices. Can participants also successfully evaluate 'confidence in confidence' in these tasks? This is the question addressed in this study. Participants performed a simple, two-interval forced choice numerosity task framed as an exam. Confidence judgements were collected in the form of a 'predicted exam grade'. Finally, we collected 'meta-metacognitive' reports in a two-interval forced-choice design: trials were presented in pairs, and participants had to select that in which they thought their confidence (predicted grade) best matched their accuracy (actual grade), effectively minimizing their quadratic scoring rule (QSR) score. Participants successfully selected trials on which their metacognition was better when metacognitive performance was quantified using area under the type 2 ROC (AUROC2) but not when using the 'gold-standard' measure m-ratio. However, further analyses suggested that participants selected trials on which AUROC2 is lower in part via an extreme-confidence heuristic, rather than through explicit evaluation of metacognitive inferences: when restricting analyses to trials on which participants gave the same confidence rating AUROC2 no longer differed as a function of selection, and likewise when we excluded trials on which extreme confidence ratings were given. Together, our results show that participants are able to make effective metacognitive discriminations on their visual confidence ratings, but that explicit 'meta-metacognitive' processes may not be required.

Recent years have seen the rise of several theories saying that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a neural correlate of visual consciousness (NCC). Especially popular here are theories saying that the PFC is the 'content NCC' for vision, i.e. it contains those brain areas that are not only necessary for consciousness, but also determine 'what' it is that we visually experience (e.g. whether we experience green or red). This article points out how this "upper-deck" form of PFC theory is at odds with the character of visual experience: on the one hand, visual consciousness appears to contain copious amounts of content, with many properties (such as object, shape, or color) being simultaneously represented in many parts of the visual field. On the other hand, the functions that the PFC carries out (e.g. attention and working memory) are each dedicated to processing only a relatively small subset of available visual stimuli. In short, the PFC probably does not produce enough or the right kind of visual representations for it to supply all of the content found in visual experience, in which case the idea that the PFC is the content NCC for vision is probably false. This article also discusses data thought to undercut the idea that visual experience is informationally rich (inattentional blindness, etc.), along with theories of vision according to which "ensemble statistics" are used to represent features in the periphery of the visual field. I'll argue that these lines of evidence fail to close the apparently vast gap between the amount of visual content represented in the visual experience and the amount represented in the PFC.

Attributing a visual motion signal to its correct source-be that external object motion, self-motion, or some combination of both-seems effortless, and yet often involves disentangling a complex web of motion signals. Existing literature focuses on either translational motion (heading) or eye movements, leaving much to be learnt about the influence of a wider range of self-motions, such as active head rotations, on visual motion perception. This study investigated how active head rotations affect visual motion detection thresholds, comparing conditions where visual motion and head-turn direction were either congruent or incongruent. Participants judged the direction of a visual motion stimulus while rotating their head or remaining stationary, using a fixation-locked Virtual Reality display with integrated head-movement recordings. Thresholds to perceive visual motion were higher in both active-head rotation conditions compared to stationary, though no differences were found between congruent or incongruent conditions. Participants also showed a significant bias to report seeing visual motion travelling in the same direction as the head rotation. Together, these results demonstrate active head rotations increase visual motion perceptual thresholds, particularly in cases of incongruent visual and active vestibular stimulation.

To investigate mechanisms underlying loss of consciousness, it is important to extend methods established in humans to rodents as well. Perturbational complexity index (PCI) is a promising metric of "capacity for consciousness" and is based on a perturbational approach that allows inferring a system's capacity for causal integration and differentiation of information. These properties have been proposed as necessary for conscious systems. Measures based on spontaneous electroencephalography recordings, however, may be more practical for certain clinical purposes and may better reflect ongoing dynamics. Here, we compare PCI (using electrical stimulation for perturbing cortical activity) to several spontaneous electroencephalography-based measures of signal diversity and integrated information in rats undergoing propofol, sevoflurane, and ketamine anesthesia. We find that, along with PCI, the spontaneous electroencephalography-based measures, Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZ) and geometric integrated information (Φ^G), were best able to distinguish between awake and propofol and sevoflurane anesthesia. However, PCI was anti-correlated with spontaneous measures of integrated information, which generally increased during propofol and sevoflurane anesthesia, contrary to expectations. Together with an observed divergence in network properties estimated from directed functional connectivity (current results) and effective connectivity (earlier results), the perturbation-based results seem to suggest that anesthesia disrupts global cortico-cortical information transfer, whereas spontaneous activity suggests the opposite. We speculate that these seemingly diverging results may be because of suppressed encoding specificity of information or driving subcortical projections from, e.g., the thalamus. We conclude that certain perturbation-based measures (PCI) and spontaneous measures (LZ and Φ^G) may be complementary and mutually informative when studying altered states of consciousness.

Perceptual confidence reflects the ability to evaluate the evidence that supports perceptual decisions. It is thought to play a critical role in guiding decision-making. However, only a few empirical studies have actually investigated the function of perceptual confidence. To address this issue, we designed a perceptual task in which participants provided a confidence judgment on the accuracy of their perceptual decision. Then, they viewed the response of a machine or human partner, and they were instructed to decide whether to keep or change their initial response. We observed that confidence predicted participants' changes of mind more than task difficulty and perceptual accuracy. Additionally, interacting with a machine, compared to a human, decreased confidence and increased participants tendency to change their initial decision, suggesting that both confidence and changes of mind are influenced by contextual factors, such as the identity of a partner. Finally, variations in confidence judgments but not change of mind were correlated with pre-response pupil dynamics, indicating that arousal changes are linked to confidence computations. This study contributes to our understanding of the factors influencing confidence and changes of mind and also evaluates the possibility of using pupil dynamics as a proxy of confidence.