Neuroscience of Consciousness最新文献

The search for neural correlates of emotional consciousness has gained momentum in the last decades. Nonetheless, disagreements concerning the mechanisms that determine the experiential qualities of emotional consciousness-the "what is it like" to feel an emotion-as well as on their neural correlates have far-reaching consequences on how researchers study and measure emotion, sometimes leading to seemingly irresolvable impasses. The current paper lays out in a balanced way the viewpoint of both cognitive and precognitive approaches to emotional consciousness on the basis of commonalities and differences between the claims of some relevant theories of emotions. We examine the sufficiency of the existing evidence in support of the proposed theories of emotional consciousness by going through the methodological specificity of the study of emotional consciousness and its unique challenges and highlighting what can and cannot be imported by advances in research on perceptual consciousness. We propose that there are three key experimental contrasts that are each equally necessary in the search for the neural correlates of emotional consciousness and each contrast alone coming with its own limitations. We conclude by acknowledging some of the most promising avenues in the field, which may help go beyond the current limitations and collaboratively piece together the puzzle of emotional consciousness.

Consciousness is a property of advanced brains and as such a biological feature. Explaining biological features is somewhat different from explaining physical phenomena; in the former case, the key is to first define its functional role (the reason why it was selected) and then to outline the evolutionary trajectory leading to its presence. In the case of consciousness, there are reasonable models for both. Further research is required to substantiate these models, but they offer, arguably, the best explanatory framework.

Conscious experience represents one of the most elusive problems of empirical science, namely neuroscience. The main objective of empirical studies of consciousness has been to describe the minimal sets of neural events necessary for a specific neuronal state to become consciously experienced. The current state of the art still does not meet this objective but rather consists of highly speculative theories based on correlates of consciousness and an ever-growing list of knowledge gaps. The current state of the art is defined by the limitations of past stimulation techniques and the emphasis on the observational approach. However, looking at the current stimulation technologies that are becoming more accurate, it is time to consider an alternative approach to studying consciousness, which builds on the methodology of causal explanations via causal alterations. The aim of this methodology is to move beyond the correlates of consciousness and focus directly on the mechanisms of consciousness with the help of the currently focused brain stimulation techniques, such as geodesic transcranial electric neuromodulation. This approach not only overcomes the limitations of the correlational methodology but will also become another firm step in the following science of consciousness.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad003.].

Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system.

Perceptual decision-making is often conceptualized as the process of comparing an internal decision variable to a categorical boundary or criterion. How the mind sets such a criterion has been studied from at least two perspectives. One idea is that the criterion is a fixed quantity. In work on subjective phenomenology, the notion of a fixed criterion has been proposed to explain a phenomenon called "subjective inflation"-a form of metacognitive mismatch in which observers overestimate the quality of their sensory representation in the periphery or at unattended locations. A contrasting view emerging from studies of perceptual decision-making is that the criterion adjusts to the level sensory uncertainty and is thus sensitive to variations in attention. Here, we mathematically demonstrate that previous empirical findings supporting subjective inflation are consistent with either a fixed or a flexible decision criterion. We further lay out specific task properties that are necessary to make inferences about the flexibility of the criterion: (i) a clear mapping from decision variable space to stimulus feature space and (ii) an incentive for observers to adjust their decision criterion as uncertainty changes. Recent work satisfying these requirements has demonstrated that decision criteria flexibly adjust according to uncertainty. We conclude that the fixed-criterion model of subjective inflation is poorly tenable.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 3.0 is among the leading theories of consciousness in contemporary neuroscience. The core of the theory relies on the calculation of a scalar mathematical measure of consciousness, Φ, which is inspired by the phenomenological axioms of the theory. Here, we show that despite its widespread application, Φ is not a well-defined mathematical concept in the sense that the value it specifies is non-unique. To demonstrate this, we introduce an algorithm that calculates all possible Φ values for a given system in strict accordance with the mathematical definition from the theory. We show that, to date, all published Φ values under consideration are selected arbitrarily from a multitude of equally valid alternatives. Crucially, both [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are often predicted simultaneously, rendering any interpretation of these systems as conscious or not, non-decidable in the current formulation of IIT.

Studies of consciousness are hindered by the complexity of the brain, but it is possible to study the consciousness of a sensation, namely pain. Three systems are necessary to experience pain: the somatosensory system conveys information about an injury to the thalamus where an awareness of the injury but not the painfulness emerges. The thalamus distributes the information to the affective system, which modulates the intensity of the pain, and to the cognitive system that imparts attention to the pain. Imaging of patients in pain and those experiencing placebo and hypnosis-induced analgesia shows that two essential cortical circuits for pain and attention are located within the anterior cingulate cortex. The circuits are activated when a high-frequency input results in the development of a long-term potentiation (LTP) at synapses on the apical dendrites of pyramidal neurons. The LTP acts via α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid (AMPA) and N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors, and an anterior cingulate cortex-specific type-1 adenylate cyclase is necessary for both the LTP and the pain. The apical dendrites form an extensive network such that the input from serious injuries results in the emergence of a local field potential. Using mouse models, I propose experiments designed to test the hypothesis that the local field potential is necessary and sufficient for the consciousness of pain.

Alterations of the sense of self induced by meditation include an increased sense of boundarylessness. In this study, we investigated behavioural and functional magnetic resonance imaging correlates of trait self-boundarylessness during resting state and the performance of two experimental tasks. We found that boundarylessness correlated with greater self-endorsement of words related to fluidity and with longer response times in a math task. Boundarylessness also correlated negatively with brain activity in the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus during mind-wandering compared to a task targeting a minimal sense of self. Interestingly, boundarylessness showed quadratic relations to several measures. Participants reporting low or high boundarylessness, as compared to those in between, showed higher functional connectivity within the default mode network during rest, less brain activity in the medial prefrontal cortex during self-referential word processing, and less self-endorsement of words related to constancy. We relate these results to our previous findings of a quadratic relation between boundarylessness and the sense of perspectival ownership of experience. Additionally, an instruction to direct attention to the centre of experience elicited brain activation similar to that of meditation onset, including increases in anterior precentral gyrus and anterior insula and decreases in default mode network areas, for both non-meditators and experienced meditators.

The idea that human agents voluntarily control their actions, including their spontaneous movements, strongly implies an anticipatory awareness of action. That is, agents should be aware they are about to act before actually executing a movement. Previous research has identified neural signals that could underpin prospective conscious access to motor preparation, including the readiness potential and the beta-band event-related desynchronization. In this study, we ran two experiments to test whether these two neural precursors of action also tracka subjective feeling of readiness. In Experiment 1, we combined a self-paced action task with an intention-probing design where participants gave binary responses to indicate whether they felt they had been about to move when a probe was presented. In Experiment 2, participants reported their feeling of readiness on a graded scale. We found that the feeling of readiness reliably correlates with the beta-band amplitude, but not with the readiness potential.