Neuroscience of Consciousness最新文献

Historically, voluntary action and volition more generally have been investigated through the lens of meaningless decisions. Importantly, these findings have been used in the debate about key notions like free will and moral responsibility. However, more recent claims have challenged the possibility of generalizing findings from a meaningless context to a more meaningful one. The current study investigates the markers of volition, specifically comparing meaningful and meaningless decisions. In an effort to maximize their monetary gain, 50 participants repeatedly deliberated between two options, making either rewarded choices-hard-deliberation decisions (where the options differed along two dimensions) or easy-deliberation decisions (where the options differed along a single dimension)-or unrewarded choices, a.k.a. arbitrary decision. This enabled us to contrast rewarded and unrewarded decisions as well as the degree of deliberation between easy- and hard-deliberation choices. We found evidence that rewarded and unrewarded decisions differed along several measures related to volition: participants reported a higher sense of volition, exhibited a stronger Readiness Potential, had increased temporal binding (mostly inconclusive), and demonstrated increased Effort Exerted in the rewarded condition. In contrast, we found evidence for similarity across these measures between easy-deliberation and hard-deliberation conditions. Our results suggest that it is not the complexity of the deliberation process prior to the action that makes it more volitional, but rather that the decision serves a meaningful goal. Our study also introduced a new implicit measure of volition- effort exerted-that well aligned with other measures of volition and should therefore prove useful in future studies.

The immersive environments of virtual reality (VR) have potential to engender a vast range of experiences. Although participants recognize these experiences as artificial, the consequences can still be profound. Compared to VR, lucid dreams-characterized by awareness that one is dreaming-potentially allow for even more expansive explorations of immersive multisensory experience. Furthermore, lucid dreaming could conceivably enhance the impact of a prior VR experience, producing more profound effects than the VR experience alone. As an initial step along those lines, we attempted to induce lucid dreams about a VR experience called Ripple, with the goal of documenting the impact of the combination. In prior research, Ripple by itself was shown to reduce self-other boundaries and enhance interconnectedness. We recruited four frequent lucid dreamers to experience Ripple on two occasions, followed by an overnight session with sounds from Ripple presented quietly during polysomnographically verified rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. Three participants experienced lucid dreams about Ripple that night, and all four reported dreams containing elements of Ripple. The lucid dreams were validated in real time by physiological signals from the dreamers to indicate their concurrent experience of lucidity in the dream, followed by signals of dreaming about the VR experience. On this basis, we can confirm that it was possible in these circumstances for people to have lucid dreams recapitulating elements of the prior VR experience. Our findings also showcase how the synergistic combination of VR and lucid dreaming could be strongly beneficial.

The context for our paper comes from the neurophenomenology (NPh) research programme initiated by Francisco Varela at the end of the 1990s. Varela's working hypothesis was that, to be successful, a consciousness research programme must progress by relating first-person phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their third-person counterparts in neuroscience through "mutual constraints". Leveraging Bayesian mechanics, in particular deep parametric active inference, we demonstrate the potential for epistemically advantageous mutual constraints between phenomenological, computational, behavioural, and physiological vocabularies. Specifically, the dual information geometry of Bayesian mechanics serves to establish, under certain conditions, generative passage between lived experience and its physiological instantiation. This paper argues for the epistemological necessity of such a passage and the inclusion of trained reflective awareness in neurophenomenological empirical approaches. In particular, it showcases incremental explanatory gains for the scientist that arise from incorporating the participants' epistemic insights, shifting the focus from the contents of experience (i.e. what a subject experiences in a given experimental set-up) to the how of experience (i.e. the activities of consciousness that allow for a meaningful world to appear to us as such in lived experience). The explanatory power of the resulting 'meta-Bayesian' framework, deep computational NPh, arises from the disciplined circulation between first and third-person perspectives enabled by the formalism of deep parametric active inference, where parametric depth refers to a property of generative models that can form beliefs about the parameters of their own modelling process. Hence, this computational formalism contributes to understanding consciousness by bridging phenomenological descriptions and physiological instantiations, whilst also highlighting the significance of trained first-person investigation in experimental protocols.

This commentary engages with recent work on computational functionalist theories of consciousness through a structural lens. We address three key aspects: the role of subjective experience in theory building, the hypothesis regarding local lateral connectivity in sensory areas, and the implications of "silent units" for consciousness. We argue that while their structural turn is welcome, many of their insights were previously predicted by Integrated Information Theory. We question the coherence of these claims within the functionalist paradigm and emphasize the importance of distinguishing genuine predictions from post-hoc accommodations in consciousness science.

Recent years have seen growing interest in the use of metrics inspired by complexity science for the study of consciousness. Work in this field has shown remarkable results in discerning conscious from unconscious states, and in characterizing states of altered conscious experience following psychedelic intake as involving enhanced complexity. Here, we study the relationship between complexity and a different kind of altered state of consciousness: meditation. We provide a scoping review of the growing literature studying the complexity of neural activity in meditation, disentangling different families of measures, short-term (state) from long-term (trait) effects, and meditation styles. Beyond families of measures used, our review uncovers a convergence toward identifying higher complexity during the meditative state when compared to waking rest or mind-wandering and decreased baseline complexity as a trait following regular meditation practice. In doing so, this review contributes to guide current debates and provides a framework for understanding the complexity of neural activity in meditation, while suggesting practical guidelines for future research.

People vary in their capacity for phenomenological control, which enables them to align their perceptual experiences with their intentions and goals. The Phenomenological Control Scale was developed to measure this trait, and we developed and validated a Japanese version of this scale (PCS-J) based on preregistered online surveys (n = 261; retest n = 152). The PCS-J demonstrated sufficient internal consistency and test-retest reliability. Given the known association between hypnotic susceptibility and positive schizotypy, the convergent validity of the PCS-J was supported by a weak positive correlation with positive schizotypy. The discriminant validity of the PCS-J was demonstrated by the absence of a correlation with negative schizotypy. The PCS-J would be useful for research on perception, phenomenological control, and their individual differences in Japanese samples, as well as for intercultural studies.

Autonomous sensory meridian response (ASMR) is a sensory-emotional phenomenon characterized by distinct tingling sensations and a sense of relaxation induced by specific auditory and visual stimuli. Although ASMR is recognized as a cross-modal experience, psychological and physiological mechanisms behind ASMR remain only partially understood. Across two experiments, we investigated these mechanisms. Experiment 1 showed that ASMR videos with combined audiovisual content elicited stronger tingling sensations than those with auditory-only content, suggesting an additive effect through sensory processing. In Experiment 2, we measured responses to ASMR and nature videos using finger photoplethysmography (PPG) and found that both types of videos reduced pulse rates compared to rest. Notably, ASMR videos caused a greater reduction in pulse rate than nature videos. These findings are discussed in relation to autonomic nervous system activation, cross-modal interactions, and the social grooming hypothesis, which posits that ASMR may replicate comforting effects of social bonding behaviors, such as grooming.

The scope of unconscious integration is widely debated. Here, we examined this question, focusing specifically on deciphering the relations between two associatively related objects, in a set of five behavioral and electrophysiological experiments. Participants were presented with masked pairs of related and unrelated objects and were asked to judge their relatedness. When the masked pairs were visible, we found both a behavioral priming effect and a difference in the magnitude of the electrophysiological N400 component for unrelated compared with related pairs. In sharp contrast, when the pairs were invisible (validated using both subjective and objective awareness measures), no convincing evidence was found for relatedness processing: with electroencephalography, no difference in N400 amplitude nor above-chance decoding of pair relations was found in two separate experiments. Based on these results, we conclude that the data do not support unconscious relatedness processing, suggesting that consciousness might have a prominent role in enabling relational integration beyond the single object level, which is in line with leading theories of consciousness.

Recent experimental evidence, briefly reviewed here, points to intraneuronal microtubules as a functional target of inhalational anesthetics. This finding is consistent with the general hypothesis that the biophysical substrate of consciousness is a collective quantum state of microtubules and is specifically predicted by the Orchestrated Objective Reduction theory of Penrose and Hameroff. I also review experimental evidence that functionally relevant quantum effects occur in microtubules at room temperature, and direct physical evidence of a macroscopic quantum entangled state in the living human brain that is correlated with the conscious state and working memory performance. Having established the physical and biological plausibility of quantum microtubule states related to consciousness, I turn to consider potential practical advantages of a quantum brain and enormous theoretical advantages of a quantum consciousness model. In particular, I explain how the quantum model makes panprotopsychism a viable solution to physicalism's hard problem by solving the phenomenal binding or combination problem. Postulating a quantum physical substrate of consciousness solves the binding problem in principle but appears to leave us with an epiphenomenalism problem, meaning that consciousness seems to have no causal power to confer a fitness advantage, so its evolution remains as an inexplicable mystery. I propose that, contrary to a certain (zombie) intuition, the quantum approach can also solve this problem in a nontrivial way. The Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch OR) theory of Penrose and Hameroff embodies these advantages of a quantum model and also accounts for nonalgorithmic human understanding and the psychological arrow of time.

This paper examines the constraints that the free-energy principle (FEP) places on possible model of consciousness, particularly models of attentional control and imaginative experiences, including episodic memory and planning. We first rehearse the classical and quantum formulations of the FEP, focusing on their application to multi-component systems, in which only some components interact directly with the external environment. In particular, we discuss the role of internal boundaries that have the structure of Markov blankets, and hence function as classical information channels between components. We then show how this formal structure supports models of attentional control and imaginative experience, with a focus on (i) how imaginative experience can employ the spatio-temporal and object-recognition reference frames employed in ordinary, non-imaginative experience and (ii) how imaginative experience can be internally generated but still surprising. We conclude by discussing the implementation, phenomenology, and phylogeny of imaginative experience, and the implications of the large state and trait variability of imaginative experience in humans.