Pub Date : 2023-03-17eCollection Date: 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad004
Juan Diego Bogotá, Zakaria Djebbara
Time plays a significant role in science and everyday life. Despite being experienced as a continuous flow, computational models of consciousness are typically restricted to a sequential temporal structure. This difference poses a serious challenge for computational phenomenology-a novel field combining phenomenology and computational modelling. By analysing the temporal structure of the active inference framework, we show that an integrated continuity of time can be achieved by merging Husserlian temporality with a sequential order of time. We also show that a Markov blanket of the present moment integrates past and future moments of both subjective temporality and objective time in an asynchronous manner. By applying the integrated continuity, it is clear that active inference makes use of both subjective temporality and objective time in an integrated fashion. We conclude that active inference, on a temporal note, qualifies as a computational model for phenomenological investigations.
{"title":"Time-consciousness in computational phenomenology: a temporal analysis of active inference.","authors":"Juan Diego Bogotá, Zakaria Djebbara","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad004","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niad004","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Time plays a significant role in science and everyday life. Despite being experienced as a continuous flow, computational models of consciousness are typically restricted to a sequential temporal structure. This difference poses a serious challenge for computational phenomenology-a novel field combining phenomenology and computational modelling. By analysing the temporal structure of the active inference framework, we show that an integrated continuity of time can be achieved by merging Husserlian temporality with a sequential order of time. We also show that a Markov blanket of the present moment integrates past and future moments of both subjective temporality and objective time in an asynchronous manner. By applying the integrated continuity, it is clear that active inference makes use of both subjective temporality and objective time in an integrated fashion. We conclude that active inference, on a temporal note, qualifies as a computational model for phenomenological investigations.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niad004"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10022603/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9200051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-04eCollection Date: 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac019
Nathan C Higgins, Alexandra N Scurry, Fang Jiang, David F Little, Claude Alain, Mounya Elhilali, Joel S Snyder
Current theories of perception emphasize the role of neural adaptation, inhibitory competition, and noise as key components that lead to switches in perception. Supporting evidence comes from neurophysiological findings of specific neural signatures in modality-specific and supramodal brain areas that appear to be critical to switches in perception. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to study brain activity around the time of switches in perception while participants listened to a bistable auditory stream segregation stimulus, which can be heard as one integrated stream of tones or two segregated streams of tones. The auditory thalamus showed more activity around the time of a switch from segregated to integrated compared to time periods of stable perception of integrated; in contrast, the rostral anterior cingulate cortex and the inferior parietal lobule showed more activity around the time of a switch from integrated to segregated compared to time periods of stable perception of segregated streams, consistent with prior findings of asymmetries in brain activity depending on the switch direction. In sound-responsive areas in the auditory cortex, neural activity increased in strength preceding switches in perception and declined in strength over time following switches in perception. Such dynamics in the auditory cortex are consistent with the role of adaptation proposed by computational models of visual and auditory bistable switching, whereby the strength of neural activity decreases following a switch in perception, which eventually destabilizes the current percept enough to lead to a switch to an alternative percept.
{"title":"Adaptation in the sensory cortex drives bistable switching during auditory stream segregation.","authors":"Nathan C Higgins, Alexandra N Scurry, Fang Jiang, David F Little, Claude Alain, Mounya Elhilali, Joel S Snyder","doi":"10.1093/nc/niac019","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niac019","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Current theories of perception emphasize the role of neural adaptation, inhibitory competition, and noise as key components that lead to switches in perception. Supporting evidence comes from neurophysiological findings of specific neural signatures in modality-specific and supramodal brain areas that appear to be critical to switches in perception. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to study brain activity around the time of switches in perception while participants listened to a bistable auditory stream segregation stimulus, which can be heard as one integrated stream of tones or two segregated streams of tones. The auditory thalamus showed more activity around the time of a switch from segregated to integrated compared to time periods of stable perception of integrated; in contrast, the rostral anterior cingulate cortex and the inferior parietal lobule showed more activity around the time of a switch from integrated to segregated compared to time periods of stable perception of segregated streams, consistent with prior findings of asymmetries in brain activity depending on the switch direction. In sound-responsive areas in the auditory cortex, neural activity increased in strength preceding switches in perception and declined in strength over time following switches in perception. Such dynamics in the auditory cortex are consistent with the role of adaptation proposed by computational models of visual and auditory bistable switching, whereby the strength of neural activity decreases following a switch in perception, which eventually destabilizes the current percept enough to lead to a switch to an alternative percept.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niac019"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/8f/57/niac019.PMC9899071.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10672204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-04eCollection Date: 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1093/nc/niac018
Dylan Ludwig
Conscious experiences form a relatively diverse class of psychological phenomena, supported by a range of distinct neurobiological mechanisms. This diversity suggests that consciousness occupies a variety of different functional roles across different task domains, individuals, and species; a position I call functional pluralism. In this paper, I begin to tease out some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) visual processing. Consolidating research from across the cognitive sciences, I discuss semantic and spatiotemporal processing as specific points of comparison between the functional capabilities of the visual system in the presence and absence of conscious awareness. I argue that consciousness contributes a cluster of functions to visual processing; facilitating, among other things, (i) increased capacities for semantically processing informationally complex visual stimuli, (ii) increased spatiotemporal precision, and (iii) increased capacities for representational integration over large spatiotemporal intervals. This sort of analysis should ultimately yield a plurality of functional markers that can be used to guide future research in the philosophy and science of consciousness, some of which are not captured by popular theoretical frameworks like global workspace theory and information integration theory.
{"title":"The functions of consciousness in visual processing.","authors":"Dylan Ludwig","doi":"10.1093/nc/niac018","DOIUrl":"10.1093/nc/niac018","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Conscious experiences form a relatively diverse class of psychological phenomena, supported by a range of distinct neurobiological mechanisms. This diversity suggests that consciousness occupies a variety of different functional roles across different task domains, individuals, and species; a position I call <i>functional pluralism</i>. In this paper, I begin to tease out some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) visual processing. Consolidating research from across the cognitive sciences, I discuss semantic and spatiotemporal processing as specific points of comparison between the functional capabilities of the visual system in the presence and absence of conscious awareness. I argue that consciousness contributes a cluster of functions to visual processing; facilitating, among other things, (i) increased capacities for semantically processing informationally complex visual stimuli, (ii) increased spatiotemporal precision, and (iii) increased capacities for representational integration over large spatiotemporal intervals. This sort of analysis should ultimately yield a plurality of functional markers that can be used to guide future research in the philosophy and science of consciousness, some of which are not captured by popular theoretical frameworks like global workspace theory and information integration theory.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niac018"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/ff/46/niac018.PMC9825248.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10520976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Traditional contrastive analysis has been the foundation of consciousness science, but its limitations due to the lack of a reliable method for measuring states of consciousness have prompted the exploration of alternative approaches. Structuralist theories have gained attention as an alternative that focuses on the structural properties of phenomenal experience and seeks to identify their neural encoding via structural similarities between quality spaces and neural state spaces. However, the intertwining of philosophical assumptions about structuralism and structuralist methodology may pose a challenge to those who are skeptical of the former. In this paper, I offer an analysis and defense of structuralism as a methodological approach in consciousness science, which is partly independent of structuralist assumptions on the nature of consciousness. By doing so, I aim to make structuralist methodology more accessible to a broader scientific and philosophical audience. I situate methodological structuralism in the context of questions concerning mental representation, psychophysical measurement, holism, and functional relevance of neural processes. At last, I analyze the relationship between the structural approach and the distinction between conscious and unconscious states.
{"title":"Exploring the role of structuralist methodology in the neuroscience of consciousness: a defense and analysis.","authors":"Lukas Kob","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niad011","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Traditional contrastive analysis has been the foundation of consciousness science, but its limitations due to the lack of a reliable method for measuring states of consciousness have prompted the exploration of alternative approaches. Structuralist theories have gained attention as an alternative that focuses on the structural properties of phenomenal experience and seeks to identify their neural encoding via structural similarities between quality spaces and neural state spaces. However, the intertwining of philosophical assumptions about structuralism and structuralist methodology may pose a challenge to those who are skeptical of the former. In this paper, I offer an analysis and defense of structuralism as a methodological approach in consciousness science, which is partly independent of structuralist assumptions on the nature of consciousness. By doing so, I aim to make structuralist methodology more accessible to a broader scientific and philosophical audience. I situate methodological structuralism in the context of questions concerning mental representation, psychophysical measurement, holism, and functional relevance of neural processes. At last, I analyze the relationship between the structural approach and the distinction between conscious and unconscious states.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niad011"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10191193/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9851851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Given their recent success in counseling and psychiatry, the dialogue around psychedelics has mainly focused on their applications for mental health. Insights from psychedelic research, however, are not limited to treating mental health, but also have much to offer our current understanding of consciousness. The investigation of psychedelic states has offered new perspectives on how different aspects of conscious experience are mediated by brain activity; as such, much more has been learned about consciousness in terms of its phenomenology and potential mechanisms. One theory that describes how psychedelics influence brain activity is the "entropic brain theory" (EBT), which attempts to understand conscious states-normal and psychedelic-in terms of "brain entropy." Given its wide explanatory reach, this theory has several implications for current debates in consciousness research, namely the issue of whether consciousness exists in levels vs. dimensions; whether the psychedelic state is itself a "higher" level of consciousness; and if so, whether psychedelics could be used to treat disorders of consciousness. To understand how psychedelics could possibly treat a minimally conscious or vegetative patient, one must first understand EBT and how this theory intersects with these ongoing debates. Thus, this article offers a formal summary of EBT, distilling its core principles and their implications for a theoretical model of consciousness. In response to their proposed use in treating disorders of consciousness, we emphasize the importance of "set" and "setting" in ascertaining the therapeutic value of psychedelics for vegetative and/or minimally conscious patients.
{"title":"Psychedelics, entropic brain theory, and the taxonomy of conscious states: a summary of debates and perspectives.","authors":"Sidath Rankaduwa, Adrian M Owen","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niad001","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Given their recent success in counseling and psychiatry, the dialogue around psychedelics has mainly focused on their applications for mental health. Insights from psychedelic research, however, are not limited to treating mental health, but also have much to offer our current understanding of consciousness. The investigation of psychedelic states has offered new perspectives on how different aspects of conscious experience are mediated by brain activity; as such, much more has been learned about consciousness in terms of its phenomenology and potential mechanisms. One theory that describes how psychedelics influence brain activity is the \"entropic brain theory\" (EBT), which attempts to understand conscious states-normal and psychedelic-in terms of \"brain entropy.\" Given its wide explanatory reach, this theory has several implications for current debates in consciousness research, namely the issue of whether consciousness exists in levels vs. dimensions; whether the psychedelic state is itself a \"higher\" level of consciousness; and if so, whether psychedelics could be used to treat disorders of consciousness. To understand how psychedelics could possibly treat a minimally conscious or vegetative patient, one must first understand EBT and how this theory intersects with these ongoing debates. Thus, this article offers a formal summary of EBT, distilling its core principles and their implications for a theoretical model of consciousness. In response to their proposed use in treating disorders of consciousness, we emphasize the importance of \"set\" and \"setting\" in ascertaining the therapeutic value of psychedelics for vegetative and/or minimally conscious patients.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niad001"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/43/ef/niad001.PMC10072236.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9270710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The search for neural correlates of emotional consciousness has gained momentum in the last decades. Nonetheless, disagreements concerning the mechanisms that determine the experiential qualities of emotional consciousness-the "what is it like" to feel an emotion-as well as on their neural correlates have far-reaching consequences on how researchers study and measure emotion, sometimes leading to seemingly irresolvable impasses. The current paper lays out in a balanced way the viewpoint of both cognitive and precognitive approaches to emotional consciousness on the basis of commonalities and differences between the claims of some relevant theories of emotions. We examine the sufficiency of the existing evidence in support of the proposed theories of emotional consciousness by going through the methodological specificity of the study of emotional consciousness and its unique challenges and highlighting what can and cannot be imported by advances in research on perceptual consciousness. We propose that there are three key experimental contrasts that are each equally necessary in the search for the neural correlates of emotional consciousness and each contrast alone coming with its own limitations. We conclude by acknowledging some of the most promising avenues in the field, which may help go beyond the current limitations and collaboratively piece together the puzzle of emotional consciousness.
{"title":"Piecing together the puzzle of emotional consciousness.","authors":"Tahnée Engelen, Rocco Mennella","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niad005","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The search for neural correlates of emotional consciousness has gained momentum in the last decades. Nonetheless, disagreements concerning the mechanisms that determine the experiential qualities of emotional consciousness-the \"what is it like\" to feel an emotion-as well as on their neural correlates have far-reaching consequences on how researchers study and measure emotion, sometimes leading to seemingly irresolvable impasses. The current paper lays out in a balanced way the viewpoint of both cognitive and precognitive approaches to emotional consciousness on the basis of commonalities and differences between the claims of some relevant theories of emotions. We examine the sufficiency of the existing evidence in support of the proposed theories of emotional consciousness by going through the methodological specificity of the study of emotional consciousness and its unique challenges and highlighting what can and cannot be imported by advances in research on perceptual consciousness. We propose that there are three key experimental contrasts that are each equally necessary in the search for the neural correlates of emotional consciousness and each contrast alone coming with its own limitations. We conclude by acknowledging some of the most promising avenues in the field, which may help go beyond the current limitations and collaboratively piece together the puzzle of emotional consciousness.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niad005"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10077334/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9272325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Consciousness is a property of advanced brains and as such a biological feature. Explaining biological features is somewhat different from explaining physical phenomena; in the former case, the key is to first define its functional role (the reason why it was selected) and then to outline the evolutionary trajectory leading to its presence. In the case of consciousness, there are reasonable models for both. Further research is required to substantiate these models, but they offer, arguably, the best explanatory framework.
{"title":"Describing and explaining consciousness.","authors":"Bjørn Grinde","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niad009","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Consciousness is a property of advanced brains and as such a biological feature. Explaining biological features is somewhat different from explaining physical phenomena; in the former case, the key is to first define its functional role (the reason why it was selected) and then to outline the evolutionary trajectory leading to its presence. In the case of consciousness, there are reasonable models for both. Further research is required to substantiate these models, but they offer, arguably, the best explanatory framework.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niad009"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10100310/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9316055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marek Havlík, Jaroslav Hlinka, Monika Klírová, Petr Adámek, Jiří Horáček
Conscious experience represents one of the most elusive problems of empirical science, namely neuroscience. The main objective of empirical studies of consciousness has been to describe the minimal sets of neural events necessary for a specific neuronal state to become consciously experienced. The current state of the art still does not meet this objective but rather consists of highly speculative theories based on correlates of consciousness and an ever-growing list of knowledge gaps. The current state of the art is defined by the limitations of past stimulation techniques and the emphasis on the observational approach. However, looking at the current stimulation technologies that are becoming more accurate, it is time to consider an alternative approach to studying consciousness, which builds on the methodology of causal explanations via causal alterations. The aim of this methodology is to move beyond the correlates of consciousness and focus directly on the mechanisms of consciousness with the help of the currently focused brain stimulation techniques, such as geodesic transcranial electric neuromodulation. This approach not only overcomes the limitations of the correlational methodology but will also become another firm step in the following science of consciousness.
{"title":"Towards causal mechanisms of consciousness through focused transcranial brain stimulation.","authors":"Marek Havlík, Jaroslav Hlinka, Monika Klírová, Petr Adámek, Jiří Horáček","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niad008","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Conscious experience represents one of the most elusive problems of empirical science, namely neuroscience. The main objective of empirical studies of consciousness has been to describe the minimal sets of neural events necessary for a specific neuronal state to become consciously experienced. The current state of the art still does not meet this objective but rather consists of highly speculative theories based on correlates of consciousness and an ever-growing list of knowledge gaps. The current state of the art is defined by the limitations of past stimulation techniques and the emphasis on the observational approach. However, looking at the current stimulation technologies that are becoming more accurate, it is time to consider an alternative approach to studying consciousness, which builds on the methodology of causal explanations via causal alterations. The aim of this methodology is to move beyond the correlates of consciousness and focus directly on the mechanisms of consciousness with the help of the currently focused brain stimulation techniques, such as geodesic transcranial electric neuromodulation. This approach not only overcomes the limitations of the correlational methodology but will also become another firm step in the following science of consciousness.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niad008"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10120840/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10014985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad003.].
[这更正了文章DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad003.]。
{"title":"Correction to: Feeling ready: neural bases of prospective motor readiness judgements.","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niad007","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1093/nc/niad003.].</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niad007"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/f4/37/niad007.PMC10052356.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9240420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system.
{"title":"When do parts form wholes? Integrated information as the restriction on mereological composition.","authors":"Kelvin J McQueen, Naotsugu Tsuchiya","doi":"10.1093/nc/niad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niad013","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial <i>restriction</i> on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under <i>no</i> or <i>all</i> conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system.</p>","PeriodicalId":52242,"journal":{"name":"Neuroscience of Consciousness","volume":"2023 1","pages":"niad013"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10237036/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9584951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}