God must create the best. But there is no best. Therefore, there is no God. Various philosophers—among them Stephen Grover and William Rowe—have endorsed more elaborate versions of this argument. Dean Zimmerman (in “Resisting Rowe’s No-Best-World Argument for Atheism”) has subjected their defenses of the argument to careful scrutiny—scrutiny that was in fact so careful that there remains very little to say about the argument. This essay contains my attempt to supply that very little.
{"title":"Improvable Creations","authors":"Peter van Inwagen","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i2.78723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i2.78723","url":null,"abstract":"God must create the best. But there is no best. Therefore, there is no God. Various philosophers—among them Stephen Grover and William Rowe—have endorsed more elaborate versions of this argument. Dean Zimmerman (in “Resisting Rowe’s No-Best-World Argument for Atheism”) has subjected their defenses of the argument to careful scrutiny—scrutiny that was in fact so careful that there remains very little to say about the argument. This essay contains my attempt to supply that very little.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84692522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the time of Descartes, various versions of a modal argument have been proffered for substance dualism. Until recently, the premise most frequently attacked is one that moves from conceivability to metaphysical possibility. However, more recently, a new criticism has surfaced, viz., an argument from contingent physicalism. The purpose of this article is to show that what I take to be the most sophisticated contingent physicalist criticism fails as a defeater of the modal argument. After stating and clarifying my version of the modal argument, I present arguments from contingent physicalist Trenton Merricks that are intended explicitly to be defeaters of premise (2) of the modal argument. Along the way, I give reasons for thinking that these arguments fail as defeaters of (2) and that Merricks’ contingent physicalism is false.
{"title":"The Modal Argument and a Rejoinder to Contingent Physicalism","authors":"J. Moreland","doi":"10.14428/thl.v7i2.67923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v7i2.67923","url":null,"abstract":"Since the time of Descartes, various versions of a modal argument have been proffered for substance dualism. Until recently, the premise most frequently attacked is one that moves from conceivability to metaphysical possibility. However, more recently, a new criticism has surfaced, viz., an argument from contingent physicalism. The purpose of this article is to show that what I take to be the most sophisticated contingent physicalist criticism fails as a defeater of the modal argument. After stating and clarifying my version of the modal argument, I present arguments from contingent physicalist Trenton Merricks that are intended explicitly to be defeaters of premise (2) of the modal argument. Along the way, I give reasons for thinking that these arguments fail as defeaters of (2) and that Merricks’ contingent physicalism is false.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81508614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Molinism, which says that God has middle knowledge, offers one of the most impressive and popular ways of combining libertarian creaturely freedom with full providential control by God. The aim of this paper is to explain, motivate, and defend a heretofore overlooked version of Molinism that I call ‘Modest Molinism’. In Section 1, I explain Modest Molinism and make an initial case for it. Then, in Sections 2 and 3, I defend Modest Molinism against Dean Zimmerman’s anti-Molinist argument, which is directed at all versions of Molinism, including Modest Molinism. Zimmerman’s anti-Molinist argument combines two distinct and separable challenges to Molinism that I call the ‘Irrelevance Objection’ and the ‘Extreme Manipulation Objection’. Despite the fact that Zimmerman intertwines these two objections, they require separate treatment. Thus, Section 2 will raise concerns about Zimmerman’s Irrelevance Objection and Section 3 will focus on concerns about Zimmerman’s Extreme Manipulation Objection.
{"title":"Modest Molinism","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i2.77783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i2.77783","url":null,"abstract":"Molinism, which says that God has middle knowledge, offers one of the most impressive and popular ways of combining libertarian creaturely freedom with full providential control by God. The aim of this paper is to explain, motivate, and defend a heretofore overlooked version of Molinism that I call ‘Modest Molinism’. In Section 1, I explain Modest Molinism and make an initial case for it. Then, in Sections 2 and 3, I defend Modest Molinism against Dean Zimmerman’s anti-Molinist argument, which is directed at all versions of Molinism, including Modest Molinism. Zimmerman’s anti-Molinist argument combines two distinct and separable challenges to Molinism that I call the ‘Irrelevance Objection’ and the ‘Extreme Manipulation Objection’. Despite the fact that Zimmerman intertwines these two objections, they require separate treatment. Thus, Section 2 will raise concerns about Zimmerman’s Irrelevance Objection and Section 3 will focus on concerns about Zimmerman’s Extreme Manipulation Objection.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"291 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79473924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Résumé : Dean Zimmerman défend l’affirmation œcuménique selon laquelle il est possible que toutes les personnes humaines survivent à la mort biologique du corps quelle que soit la théorie plausible de l’identité personnelle adoptée. Dans cet article, je présente certains principes à propos de la survie qui sont pertinents pour n’importe quelle théorie plausible de l’identité personnelle et pertinents pour une survie qui nous intéresserait. Appliqués à certains cas particuliers d’êtres humains, ces principes rendent l’affirmation œcuménique soit fausse, soit difficile à croire rationnellement. Mots-clés : Dean Zimmerman, Identité personnelle, Survie Not Everyone Will Get Out Alive: On Dean Zimmerman's “Personal Identity and the Survival of Death” Abstract: Dean Zimmerman defends the ecumenical claim that it is possible for all human persons to survive the biological death of the body regardless of the plausible theory of personal identity adopted. In this paper, I present some principles about survival that are relevant to any plausible theory of personal identity and relevant to any survival of interest. When applied to some particular cases of human beings, these principles make the ecumenical claim either false or difficult to believe rationally. Keywords: Dean Zimmerman, Personal Identity, Survival
摘要:迪恩·齐默尔曼(Dean Zimmerman)为一个普世的主张辩护，即所有人都有可能在身体的生物死亡后幸存下来，而不管采用的个人身份理论是什么。在这篇文章中，我提出了一些关于生存的原则，这些原则与任何看似合理的个人身份理论有关，也与我们感兴趣的生存有关。当应用于人类的特定情况时，这些原则使普世主张要么是错误的，要么难以理性地相信。关键词:Dean Zimmerman)、个人身份、生存Not Will Get Out Alive:你看Dean Zimmerman’s个人身份和“生存”“死亡”摘要:Dean Zimmerman defends that it is the ecumenical赢得尽可能for all human lagon生物死亡of the body to live the貌似合理的飞行器of the theory of Personal身份收养。在这篇论文中，我提出了一些关于生存的原则，这些原则与任何合理的个人身份理论有关，也与任何生存利益有关。When applied to具有一些情况中of human beings, these原理中不见,make the ecumenical赢得假黄金困难crois rationally摄氏度的水。关键词:Dean Zimmerman，个人身份，生存
{"title":"Tout le monde ne s’en sortira pas vivant","authors":"Yann Schmitt","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i2.77753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i2.77753","url":null,"abstract":"Résumé : Dean Zimmerman défend l’affirmation œcuménique selon laquelle il est possible que toutes les personnes humaines survivent à la mort biologique du corps quelle que soit la théorie plausible de l’identité personnelle adoptée. Dans cet article, je présente certains principes à propos de la survie qui sont pertinents pour n’importe quelle théorie plausible de l’identité personnelle et pertinents pour une survie qui nous intéresserait. Appliqués à certains cas particuliers d’êtres humains, ces principes rendent l’affirmation œcuménique soit fausse, soit difficile à croire rationnellement.\u0000Mots-clés : Dean Zimmerman, Identité personnelle, Survie\u0000 \u0000Not Everyone Will Get Out Alive:\u0000On Dean Zimmerman's “Personal Identity and the Survival of Death”\u0000Abstract: Dean Zimmerman defends the ecumenical claim that it is possible for all human persons to survive the biological death of the body regardless of the plausible theory of personal identity adopted. In this paper, I present some principles about survival that are relevant to any plausible theory of personal identity and relevant to any survival of interest. When applied to some particular cases of human beings, these principles make the ecumenical claim either false or difficult to believe rationally.\u0000Keywords: Dean Zimmerman, Personal Identity, Survival","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85043915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Should an omnipotent being be able to limit its own power? Along with Swinburne, Dean Zimmerman answers in the affirmative. My intuitions push in the opposite direction. The ability to limit one's own power constitutes a vulnerability. In this paper, I argue that a great deal hangs on this issue. If God cannot revoke His own omnipotence, then only a necessarily existent being can ever create anything truly ex nihilo. Moreover, if God cannot revoke His own omnipotence, then it turns out that theism entails idealism. No wonder that Zimmerman resists. I prefer to take the plunge and endorse idealism!
{"title":"Omnipotence","authors":"Samuel Lebens","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i2.77743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i2.77743","url":null,"abstract":"Should an omnipotent being be able to limit its own power? Along with Swinburne, Dean Zimmerman answers in the affirmative. My intuitions push in the opposite direction. The ability to limit one's own power constitutes a vulnerability. In this paper, I argue that a great deal hangs on this issue. If God cannot revoke His own omnipotence, then only a necessarily existent being can ever create anything truly ex nihilo. Moreover, if God cannot revoke His own omnipotence, then it turns out that theism entails idealism. No wonder that Zimmerman resists. I prefer to take the plunge and endorse idealism!","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89169771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rasmussen develops a new answer to the question, "Why does anything exist?" He begins by describing a puzzle about how anything can exist. The puzzle motivates the quest to explain things as far as one can. To solve the puzzle, Rasmussen describes a sequence of scenes in a story about existence. The story brings to light a three-pronged explanation of existence: (i) things exist because it is impossible for nothing to have existed, (ii) it is impossible for nothing to have existed because there is a foundational reality that cannot not exist, and (iii) such a foundation would have a certain nature—to be specified--that allows it to be foundational. Rasmussen considers how this theory of fundamental reality can incorporate other large scale theories, including Platonism, axiarchism, and naturalism.
{"title":"Why Does Anything Exist?","authors":"Joshua Rasmussen","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i2.77433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i2.77433","url":null,"abstract":"Rasmussen develops a new answer to the question, \"Why does anything exist?\" He begins by describing a puzzle about how anything can exist. The puzzle motivates the quest to explain things as far as one can. To solve the puzzle, Rasmussen describes a sequence of scenes in a story about existence. The story brings to light a three-pronged explanation of existence: (i) things exist because it is impossible for nothing to have existed, (ii) it is impossible for nothing to have existed because there is a foundational reality that cannot not exist, and (iii) such a foundation would have a certain nature—to be specified--that allows it to be foundational. Rasmussen considers how this theory of fundamental reality can incorporate other large scale theories, including Platonism, axiarchism, and naturalism.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90573727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay distinguishes between propositional belief and faith and considers the relationship between these two forms of belief, arguing that faith is not an entirely separate form of belief from propositional assent and that it does require a minimal cognitive content. The essay then goes on to consider beliefs about, and faith in, life after death and develops a metaphorical account of this faith using an Aristotelian concept of the soul as a form of life together with a theological understanding of the death of Jesus in the New Testament. It is argued that the truth claims of assertions about life after death are beyond evidential support, but there are strong reasons for doubting the literal truth of such assertions. Faith in life after death however can be considered rational and truth-seeking. The essay concludes that semantic agnosticism is the proper attitude towards belief in life after death and justifies this position against two possible objections.
{"title":"Belief, Doubt, and Faith in Life After Death","authors":"M. Hocknull","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.67393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.67393","url":null,"abstract":"This essay distinguishes between propositional belief and faith and considers the relationship between these two forms of belief, arguing that faith is not an entirely separate form of belief from propositional assent and that it does require a minimal cognitive content. The essay then goes on to consider beliefs about, and faith in, life after death and develops a metaphorical account of this faith using an Aristotelian concept of the soul as a form of life together with a theological understanding of the death of Jesus in the New Testament. It is argued that the truth claims of assertions about life after death are beyond evidential support, but there are strong reasons for doubting the literal truth of such assertions. Faith in life after death however can be considered rational and truth-seeking. The essay concludes that semantic agnosticism is the proper attitude towards belief in life after death and justifies this position against two possible objections.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78193578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While much has been written on the moral and metaphysical status of fetuses in Christian bioethics, little thought has been given to how we might characterize the afterlives of the unborn, especially of those human biological individuals who die before even developing a body that could theoretically be resurrected. In this paper, I therefore undertake an examination of questions surrounding the afterlife, specifically as it relates to early pregnancy loss. I first lay out what I call the “problem of weird heavens” that arises when we consider that significantly more unborn human beings have died than have been born in the history of humankind. I then go on to consider questions surrounding both the soteriological status of the embryo and the status of any resurrected “body” it might have. I conclude with the germs of an alternative approach mirrored on the idea of embryonic resorption and mystical union.
{"title":"Embryonic Afterlives?","authors":"Amber L. Griffioen","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.65873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.65873","url":null,"abstract":"While much has been written on the moral and metaphysical status of fetuses in Christian bioethics, little thought has been given to how we might characterize the afterlives of the unborn, especially of those human biological individuals who die before even developing a body that could theoretically be resurrected. In this paper, I therefore undertake an examination of questions surrounding the afterlife, specifically as it relates to early pregnancy loss. I first lay out what I call the “problem of weird heavens” that arises when we consider that significantly more unborn human beings have died than have been born in the history of humankind. I then go on to consider questions surrounding both the soteriological status of the embryo and the status of any resurrected “body” it might have. I conclude with the germs of an alternative approach mirrored on the idea of embryonic resorption and mystical union.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90769490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
William Lane Craig’s “Neo-Apollinarian” christology aims to give us a model of Incarnation which seems not to imply any contradiction, and which fits well with the Bible and with at least the creed from the fourth ecumenical council. It is argued that the theory fails to achieve any of these goals.
威廉·莱恩·克雷格(William Lane Craig)的“新梦境论”基督论旨在为我们提供一种似乎没有任何矛盾的化身模型，这种模型与《圣经》以及至少与第四次大公会议的信条非常吻合。有人认为，该理论未能实现这些目标。
{"title":"Craig's Contradictory Christ","authors":"Dale Tuggy","doi":"10.14428/thl.v7i2.68363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v7i2.68363","url":null,"abstract":"William Lane Craig’s “Neo-Apollinarian” christology aims to give us a model of Incarnation which seems not to imply any contradiction, and which fits well with the Bible and with at least the creed from the fourth ecumenical council. It is argued that the theory fails to achieve any of these goals.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89126905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we embark on the complicated discussion about the nature of vice in Virtue Ethics through a twofold approach: first, by taking seriously the claim that virtues (and certain flavours of vices) are genuinely dispositional features possessed by agents, and secondly, by employing a pluralistic attitude borrowed from Battaly’s pluralism (2008). Through these lenses, we identify three varieties of viciousness: incontinence, indifference, and malevolence. The upshot is that the notion of vice is not as categorically homogeneous as that of virtue: some states of viciousness consist in interference of present virtuous dispositions, or mimicking of absent vicious ones, whereas others can be considered genuine dispositions themselves. Furthermore, this set-up can provide an interesting, albeit highly idealized story as to how, through the interference in one’s environment, one gets acquainted with vice in various degrees. Finally, this approach can be illuminating vis-à-vis Virtue Ethics in general; e.g. we can employ it to discuss more productively Johnston’s (2003) objection to Hursthouse’s (1999) account of moral conduct. Finally, this approach can be illuminating vis-a-vis Virtue Ethics in general; e.g. we can employ it to discuss more productively Johnston’s (2003) objection to Hursthouse’s (1999) account of moral conduct.
{"title":"Vices, Virtues, and Dispositions","authors":"L. Azzano, Andrea Raimondi","doi":"10.14428/thl.v7i2.67873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v7i2.67873","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we embark on the complicated discussion about the nature of vice in Virtue Ethics through a twofold approach: first, by taking seriously the claim that virtues (and certain flavours of vices) are genuinely dispositional features possessed by agents, and secondly, by employing a pluralistic attitude borrowed from Battaly’s pluralism (2008). Through these lenses, we identify three varieties of viciousness: incontinence, indifference, and malevolence. The upshot is that the notion of vice is not as categorically homogeneous as that of virtue: some states of viciousness consist in interference of present virtuous dispositions, or mimicking of absent vicious ones, whereas others can be considered genuine dispositions themselves. Furthermore, this set-up can provide an interesting, albeit highly idealized story as to how, through the interference in one’s environment, one gets acquainted with vice in various degrees. Finally, this approach can be illuminating vis-à-vis Virtue Ethics in general; e.g. we can employ it to discuss more productively Johnston’s (2003) objection to Hursthouse’s (1999) account of moral conduct.\u0000Finally, this approach can be illuminating vis-a-vis Virtue Ethics in general; e.g. we can employ it to discuss more productively Johnston’s (2003) objection to Hursthouse’s (1999) account of moral conduct.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80932407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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