Pub Date : 2019-06-02DOI: 10.14746/fped.2018.7.2.2019.8.1.7
Shaogang Yang, Zhuo Liu
Forensic psycholinguistics is an emerging interdisciplinary subject that makes use of the psychological methods to analyze the linguistic phenomena in legal activities and therefore it is of the multiple and cross-disciplinary nature. In ancient Chinese culture there were written expressions with thoughts of forensic psycholinguistics and its practices. In Western countries the research started from European societies at the end of 19th century when Münsterberg and Cattell and some other scholars acted as the pioneers of this domain. After the WWII the research center of forensic psycholinguistics gradually moved to the United States where the research of legal psychology and the use of psychological methods greatly facilitate the study and practices of forensic psycholinguistics. Its study object aims at the linguistic behavior in such legal activities as legislation, judicial, the obeying of the law and transgression, and its task should be the research on the behavior of the legal language in both levels of consciousness and unconsciousness. The construction of the system for forensic psycholinguistics should start from the perspectives of linguistic psychology of legislation, judicial, the enforcement and obeying of the law and the legal publicity so that a cross-cultural emerging subject with its values of practical application could be created.
{"title":"On the construction of the system for forensic psycholinguistics","authors":"Shaogang Yang, Zhuo Liu","doi":"10.14746/fped.2018.7.2.2019.8.1.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/fped.2018.7.2.2019.8.1.7","url":null,"abstract":"Forensic psycholinguistics is an emerging interdisciplinary subject that makes use of the psychological methods to analyze the linguistic phenomena in legal activities and therefore it is of the multiple and cross-disciplinary nature. In ancient Chinese culture there were written expressions with thoughts of forensic psycholinguistics and its practices. In Western countries the research started from European societies at the end of 19th century when Münsterberg and Cattell and some other scholars acted as the pioneers of this domain. After the WWII the research center of forensic psycholinguistics gradually moved to the United States where the research of legal psychology and the use of psychological methods greatly facilitate the study and practices of forensic psycholinguistics. Its study object aims at the linguistic behavior in such legal activities as legislation, judicial, the obeying of the law and transgression, and its task should be the research on the behavior of the legal language in both levels of consciousness and unconsciousness. The construction of the system for forensic psycholinguistics should start from the perspectives of linguistic psychology of legislation, judicial, the enforcement and obeying of the law and the legal publicity so that a cross-cultural emerging subject with its values of practical application could be created.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44517277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-02DOI: 10.14746/fped.2018.7.2.2019.8.1.5
Gang Deng
Postmodernism, which emerged in the 1960s, involves a wide range of fields and carries out all-round critical reflections on the foundation, tradition and other aspects of the development of modern civilization. Postmodern morality came into being with the popularity of postmodernism in western countries. It features obvious “de-universality” and provides a new mirror for reflections on modern morality. Its progressive significance cannot be ignored. However, some postmodern moral concepts are becoming increasingly relativistic, even going to extremes, bringing about disturbances to society. Tracing the root of moral relativism back to ancient times based on the great history of its development, this study first sorts out the same gene of ancient Western moral relativism – using “skepticism” as a weapon against authority and dogmatism, and points out that the key of using moral relativism lies in seeking the proper limit of “skepticism”. Then it draws forth the fact that postmodern morality started with “skepticism” and prevailed because of its “relativism”, pointing out that some postmodern morality moved toward moral relativism because of persistence in “skepticism”, while some fall into a state of moral nihility by radicalising “skepticism”. If a craftsman wants to do good work, he must first sharpen his tools. This study concludes with suggestions on how to use the “skepticism” of postmodern morality.
{"title":"The origins of postmodern moral relativism","authors":"Gang Deng","doi":"10.14746/fped.2018.7.2.2019.8.1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/fped.2018.7.2.2019.8.1.5","url":null,"abstract":"Postmodernism, which emerged in the 1960s, involves a wide range of fields and carries out all-round critical reflections on the foundation, tradition and other aspects of the development of modern civilization. Postmodern morality came into being with the popularity of postmodernism in western countries. It features obvious “de-universality” and provides a new mirror for reflections on modern morality. Its progressive significance cannot be ignored. However, some postmodern moral concepts are becoming increasingly relativistic, even going to extremes, bringing about disturbances to society. Tracing the root of moral relativism back to ancient times based on the great history of its development, this study first sorts out the same gene of ancient Western moral relativism – using “skepticism” as a weapon against authority and dogmatism, and points out that the key of using moral relativism lies in seeking the proper limit of “skepticism”. Then it draws forth the fact that postmodern morality started with “skepticism” and prevailed because of its “relativism”, pointing out that some postmodern morality moved toward moral relativism because of persistence in “skepticism”, while some fall into a state of moral nihility by radicalising “skepticism”. If a craftsman wants to do good work, he must first sharpen his tools. This study concludes with suggestions on how to use the “skepticism” of postmodern morality.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49633333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.11
Paweł Skuczyński
The aim of this article is to discuss different approaches to the phenomena of crisis, which are reconstructed from chosen philosophical and social sciences theories. Latest popularity of the notion of legal or constitutional crisis in jurisprudence establishes the point of departure. Using this notion in legal context opens a problem of adopting in this field more general and well-grounded perspectives on crises. Subsequently, I present the concept of crises in works of Edmund Husserl, Hannah Arendt, Reinhart Koselleck and Niklas Luhmann. Each of aforementioned sections is concluded with an explication of the concept of crises in perspective of adequate theory. My final task is to draw some most important consequences for understanding constitutional crisis, as well as the need for general theory of legal crises.
{"title":"Pojęcie kryzysu w filozofii i naukach społecznych a kryzysy prawne","authors":"Paweł Skuczyński","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.11","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to discuss different approaches to the phenomena of crisis, which are reconstructed from chosen philosophical and social sciences theories. Latest popularity of the notion of legal or constitutional crisis in jurisprudence establishes the point of departure. Using this notion in legal context opens a problem of adopting in this field more general and well-grounded perspectives on crises. Subsequently, I present the concept of crises in works of Edmund Husserl, Hannah Arendt, Reinhart Koselleck and Niklas Luhmann. Each of aforementioned sections is concluded with an explication of the concept of crises in perspective of adequate theory. My final task is to draw some most important consequences for understanding constitutional crisis, as well as the need for general theory of legal crises.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44591581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.5
A. Bator
The paper analyses the sources of diversity in opinions about the acceptability of direct application of constitution by courts in the so-called confrontational version (a judicial review: the refusal of application of the parliamentary act which is incoherent with a constitution). I claim that such differences result from diverging assumptions accepted within analytic jurisprudence. More precisely speaking, the above differences stem from the three alternative approaches within analytic legal theory: a traditional, a modern, and a postmodern (postanalytic) one. Polish legal thought is dominated by the modern approach, what influence also a debate on the direct applicability of constitution. The modern approach hardly accepts a situation in which a legal professional (a judge) needs to face new social and political challenges. The more adequate in this respect seems to be the postanalytic approach. Thus, arguments which refuse the judge’s right to directly and autonomously apply the constitution against the parliamentary law (which are put forth by some representatives of both legal doctrine and judiciary), are based mainly upon the modern version of the analytic legal theory. Alternatively, the postanalytic perspective offers theoretical foundations for the acceptability of direct and autonomous judicial application of the constitution. As for the traditional version of analytic theory, it possesses some explanatory force towards Polish political practice of the day. Since it supports claims which question any form of judicial activism. This approach seems to undermine any reasons for the existence of independent constitutional judiciary, the direct application of constitution byordinary courts included.
{"title":"Ewolucja analitycznej teorii prawa a bezpośrednie stosowanie konstytucji","authors":"A. Bator","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.5","url":null,"abstract":"The paper analyses the sources of diversity in opinions about the acceptability of direct application of constitution by courts in the so-called confrontational version (a judicial review: the refusal of application of the parliamentary act which is incoherent with a constitution). I claim that such differences result from diverging assumptions accepted within analytic jurisprudence. More precisely speaking, the above differences stem from the three alternative approaches within analytic legal theory: a traditional, a modern, and a postmodern (postanalytic) one. Polish legal thought is dominated by the modern approach, what influence also a debate on the direct applicability of constitution. The modern approach hardly accepts a situation in which a legal professional (a judge) needs to face new social and political challenges. The more adequate in this respect seems to be the postanalytic approach. Thus, arguments which refuse the judge’s right to directly and autonomously apply the constitution against the parliamentary law (which are put forth by some representatives of both legal doctrine and judiciary), are based mainly upon the modern version of the analytic legal theory. Alternatively, the postanalytic perspective offers theoretical foundations for the acceptability of direct and autonomous judicial application of the constitution. As for the traditional version of analytic theory, it possesses some explanatory force towards Polish political practice of the day. Since it supports claims which question any form of judicial activism. This approach seems to undermine any reasons for the existence of independent constitutional judiciary, the direct application of constitution byordinary courts included.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42020490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.9
Bartosz Liżewski
This article is devoted to the problem of the obligations of a human and citizen in the Polish constitution. This matter is shown from the philosophy and legal point of you. The aim of the article is to show what influence the philosophy of human rights had on regulating the obligations of human and citizen in the European and Polish law. The main idea is, that the constructions of the provisions in the Polish constitution is the reflection of the European philosophy on human rights. This philosophy is based on the individualization and personalization on the human. Therefore the freedoms and rights are underlined and its obligations are limited. The provisions on the Constitution of the Republic of Poland which concern the obligations agree this philosophy. In the opinion of the author of this article these solutions are not good. All the provisions regulating the obligations of a human and citizen can be called the obligations towards the country. They include, loyalty to the Republic of Poland, observing the Polish law, paying taxis, defending the country and protecting the environment. The authors of the constitution omitted the obligations towards the family and local communities.
{"title":"Europejska filozofia praw człowieka a konstytucyjna formuła obowiązków człowieka i obywatela","authors":"Bartosz Liżewski","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.9","url":null,"abstract":"This article is devoted to the problem of the obligations of a human and citizen in the Polish constitution. This matter is shown from the philosophy and legal point of you. The aim of the article is to show what influence the philosophy of human rights had on regulating the obligations of human and citizen in the European and Polish law. The main idea is, that the constructions of the provisions in the Polish constitution is the reflection of the European philosophy on human rights. This philosophy is based on the individualization and personalization on the human. Therefore the freedoms and rights are underlined and its obligations are limited. The provisions on the Constitution of the Republic of Poland which concern the obligations agree this philosophy. In the opinion of the author of this article these solutions are not good. All the provisions regulating the obligations of a human and citizen can be called the obligations towards the country. They include, loyalty to the Republic of Poland, observing the Polish law, paying taxis, defending the country and protecting the environment. The authors of the constitution omitted the obligations towards the family and local communities.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47326860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/fped.2018.7.1.7
Justyna Holocher
The liberal principal in dubio pro libertate is the philosophical foundation of the theory of constitutional rule of law and constitutes an incorporation of moral principles into the law and order. It is perceived as a circumstance to confirm the legitimacy for the thesis of passing from rule of law to the constitutional rule of law on the philosophical and dogmatic planes. It influences the process of constitutionalization, and especially the rules governing the judicial interpretation, forming thus the legal theory of interpretation built upon the argumentative nature of the law and its weight-based application which is essentially a matter of selecting the rule applicable as the parameter of control of constitutionality. It bolsters up constitutionalism conceived as a set of legislative measures aimed at limiting the legislative authority and jurisprudence by attaching a particular importance to the liberty arguments whose value will be eventually referred to the good of the individual.
{"title":"Wolność jako zasada neokonstytucjonalna","authors":"Justyna Holocher","doi":"10.14746/fped.2018.7.1.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/fped.2018.7.1.7","url":null,"abstract":"The liberal principal in dubio pro libertate is the philosophical foundation of the theory of constitutional rule of law and constitutes an incorporation of moral principles into the law and order. It is perceived as a circumstance to confirm the legitimacy for the thesis of passing from rule of law to the constitutional rule of law on the philosophical and dogmatic planes. It influences the process of constitutionalization, and especially the rules governing the judicial interpretation, forming thus the legal theory of interpretation built upon the argumentative nature of the law and its weight-based application which is essentially a matter of selecting the rule applicable as the parameter of control of constitutionality. It bolsters up constitutionalism conceived as a set of legislative measures aimed at limiting the legislative authority and jurisprudence by attaching a particular importance to the liberty arguments whose value will be eventually referred to the good of the individual.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43396772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.14
Adam Sulikowski
The author assumes that modern, Western constitutionalism, with its emphasis on individual rights, is not the only form of constitutionalism, understood as ideas of restrictions imposed on government activities, practiced throughout history. In the author’s opinion, the current crisis of the dominant paradigm of constitutionalism is caused by the contradictions of liberal democracy. In this aspect, the author’s analysis is based on the concepts of Antonio Gramsci, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau and Claude Lefort. In the author’s opinion, the described crisis may lead to permanent transformations and the emergence of new forms and paradigms of constitutionalism.
{"title":"Kryzys nowoczesnego konstytucjonalizmu. Między liberalną sędziokracją a postliberalnym populizmem","authors":"Adam Sulikowski","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.14","url":null,"abstract":"The author assumes that modern, Western constitutionalism, with its emphasis on individual rights, is not the only form of constitutionalism, understood as ideas of restrictions imposed on government activities, practiced throughout history. In the author’s opinion, the current crisis of the dominant paradigm of constitutionalism is caused by the contradictions of liberal democracy. In this aspect, the author’s analysis is based on the concepts of Antonio Gramsci, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau and Claude Lefort. In the author’s opinion, the described crisis may lead to permanent transformations and the emergence of new forms and paradigms of constitutionalism.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48152586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.1
Maciej Pichlak
The objective of the paper is to present various forms of constitutionalism, with a special focus on constitutionalism understood as a form of reflection of political community. The paper adopts the perspective of reflexivity theory in order to reconstruct the basic alternatives in that regard, and also to reveal their potential advant ges and weaknesses. As it is demonstrated, it is precisely philosophical and sociological conceptions of reflexivity that are particularly suitable for understanding the specificities of constitutionalism – indeed, the latter, as a discourse about the foundations of the political and legal existence of a given community, inevitably assumes the form of reflection. The special focus within the paper is devoted to two key distinctions within the sphere of reflexivity theory, which impact the manner in which constitutional reflection is performed. The first of the distinctions concerns the relationship of reflection to tradition, while the second is done according to the criterion of the logical structure of reflexive cognizance. It is argued here that the dominant version of modern constitutionalism prescribes that constitutional reflexion be perceived as a closed process with the objective of emancipation from tradition. An alternative to this mainstream approach can be proposed in the form of capturing constitutionalism as reflexion with its foundation in tradition, at the same time dialogically mediated in other forms of social and political discourse.
{"title":"Konstytucjonalizm jako refleksja","authors":"Maciej Pichlak","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of the paper is to present various forms of constitutionalism, with a special focus on constitutionalism understood as a form of reflection of political community. The paper adopts the perspective of reflexivity theory in order to reconstruct the basic alternatives in that regard, and also to reveal their potential advant ges and weaknesses. As it is demonstrated, it is precisely philosophical and sociological conceptions of reflexivity that are particularly suitable for understanding the specificities of constitutionalism – indeed, the latter, as a discourse about the foundations of the political and legal existence of a given community, inevitably assumes the form of reflection. The special focus within the paper is devoted to two key distinctions within the sphere of reflexivity theory, which impact the manner in which constitutional reflection is performed. The first of the distinctions concerns the relationship of reflection to tradition, while the second is done according to the criterion of the logical structure of reflexive cognizance. It is argued here that the dominant version of modern constitutionalism prescribes that constitutional reflexion be perceived as a closed process with the objective of emancipation from tradition. An alternative to this mainstream approach can be proposed in the form of capturing constitutionalism as reflexion with its foundation in tradition, at the same time dialogically mediated in other forms of social and political discourse.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44756263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.3
K. Kaleta
The article discusses the nature and role of constituent power in contemporary constitutional democracies. It presents the genesis of the concept of constituent power (phrased by Joseph Emmanuel Sieyès within the distinction between «pouvoir constituant» and «pouvoir constitué»), different approaches to this concept framed in the XXth century legal science by such thinkers as H. Kelsen and C. Schmitt, and finally the contemporary interpretations of this concept. The author indicates and analyses two major issues relevant to the nature and role of constituent power in the contemporary constitutional democracy. Firstly, he examines the thesis that the democratic constituent power’s activity remains normatively undetermined. The search for internal normativity that might characterise constituent power in democracy determines such practical constitutional issues as discretion of the legislator within the process of making or amending the constitution. Secondly, the author points out that analysis of the role of pouvoir constituant» in contemporary constitutionalism should not be limited to analysis of the „constitutional moment” only; the significance of constituent power should not be seen just in the framework of the one-off act of making the constitution. Constituent power should remain an active participant of constitutional discourse which induces a search for new principles ensuring balance between constituent and constituted power in constitutional democracies.
{"title":"Władza konstytuująca jako przedmiot badań nauk prawnych","authors":"K. Kaleta","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.3","url":null,"abstract":"The article discusses the nature and role of constituent power in contemporary constitutional democracies. It presents the genesis of the concept of constituent power (phrased by Joseph Emmanuel Sieyès within the distinction between «pouvoir constituant» and «pouvoir constitué»), different approaches to this concept framed in the XXth century legal science by such thinkers as H. Kelsen and C. Schmitt, and finally the contemporary interpretations of this concept. The author indicates and analyses two major issues relevant to the nature and role of constituent power in the contemporary constitutional democracy. Firstly, he examines the thesis that the democratic constituent power’s activity remains normatively undetermined. The search for internal normativity that might characterise constituent power in democracy determines such practical constitutional issues as discretion of the legislator within the process of making or amending the constitution. Secondly, the author points out that analysis of the role of pouvoir constituant» in contemporary constitutionalism should not be limited to analysis of the „constitutional moment” only; the significance of constituent power should not be seen just in the framework of the one-off act of making the constitution. Constituent power should remain an active participant of constitutional discourse which induces a search for new principles ensuring balance between constituent and constituted power in constitutional democracies.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46432866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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