Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.6
Maciej Smolak
The article consists of two parts. In the first part the author presents the characteristics of syllogistic reasoning, in the second part describes a set of exercises that are useful in teaching and developing the skill of syllogistic reasoning. The exercises belong to the teaching tools called interactive teaching methods and are of varying level of difficulty.
{"title":"Kształtowanie umiejętności wnioskowania sylogistycznego","authors":"Maciej Smolak","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.6","url":null,"abstract":"The article consists of two parts. In the first part the author presents the characteristics of syllogistic reasoning, in the second part describes a set of exercises that are useful in teaching and developing the skill of syllogistic reasoning. The exercises belong to the teaching tools called interactive teaching methods and are of varying level of difficulty.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42578230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.10
Birden Güngören Bulgan
{"title":"Critics of Human Rights from a Historical Perspective","authors":"Birden Güngören Bulgan","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48096696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.2
B. Weber
Humans are mainly rational beings and children seem to be “defective creatures”. In contrast to that popular and reduced concept of childhood, thinkers like Kant, Arendt and Lévinas explored the more complex anthropological concept of child in its Otherness. They regard childhood as a necessary aspect of the society. Kant in his essay What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? calls for the early encouragement of reason.
{"title":"Początki są zawsze trudne? O dzieciństwie, polityce i filozofii","authors":"B. Weber","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.2","url":null,"abstract":"Humans are mainly rational beings and children seem to be “defective creatures”. In contrast to that popular and reduced concept of childhood, thinkers like Kant, Arendt and Lévinas explored the more complex anthropological concept of child in its Otherness. They regard childhood as a necessary aspect of the society. Kant in his essay What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? calls for the early encouragement of reason.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47584459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.14746/fped.2012.1.1.1
Piotr W. Juchacz, Anna Malitowska
O „Filozofii Publicznej i Edukacji Demokratycznej”
论“公共哲学与民主教育”
{"title":"O „Filozofii Publicznej i Edukacji Demokratycznej”","authors":"Piotr W. Juchacz, Anna Malitowska","doi":"10.14746/fped.2012.1.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/fped.2012.1.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"O „Filozofii Publicznej i Edukacji Demokratycznej”","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46881810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.13
K. Kiedrowski
Speculation, i.e. thinking based on the pure concepts is characteristic of philosophical branch called metaphysics. In this paper I’m trying to show the main ideas and assumptions of contemporary Polish metaphysical conception by Leszek Nowak – negativistic unitarian metaphysics. It contains three blocks of statements: metaphilosophical, methodological and subject ones. Unitarian metaphysics is being developed systemically, with the application of the method of idealization and concretization, and deductive one. The most important ideas of this conception are: atributivism (attributes are the conclusive base (arche) of reality), negativism (reality is first of all negative) and plurality-of-worlds (there are many worlds).
{"title":"Negatywistyczna metafizyka unitarna Leszka Nowaka jako przykład współczesnego namysłu metafizycznego","authors":"K. Kiedrowski","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.13","url":null,"abstract":"Speculation, i.e. thinking based on the pure concepts is characteristic of philosophical branch called metaphysics. In this paper I’m trying to show the main ideas and assumptions of contemporary Polish metaphysical conception by Leszek Nowak – negativistic unitarian metaphysics. It contains three blocks of statements: metaphilosophical, methodological and subject ones. Unitarian metaphysics is being developed systemically, with the application of the method of idealization and concretization, and deductive one. The most important ideas of this conception are: atributivism (attributes are the conclusive base (arche) of reality), negativism (reality is first of all negative) and plurality-of-worlds (there are many worlds).","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48653993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.5
M. Reinicke
This article presents the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion ® (KMDD ®) and explains the integration of the KMDD ® in ethics lessons. In this paper, some special learning effects of this inclusive teaching and learning method are shown. Furthermore, it investigates the questions of how to achieve more knowledge in ethics lessons by dialogue and how to realize better moral development, particularly by handling of differentiation. Moral education of all participants who are involved in the learning process (learners and teacher alike) is a crucial task of every true inclusion. True inclusion means building optimal learning conditions in keeping with the free will of all participants. Because our society is transforming constantly in both global and demographic aspects, coping with these challenges is mandatory.
{"title":"Inclusion as a Moral Challenge: the Potential of the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion® (KMDD®)","authors":"M. Reinicke","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.5","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents the Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion ® (KMDD ®) and explains the integration of the KMDD ® in ethics lessons. In this paper, some special learning effects of this inclusive teaching and learning method are shown. Furthermore, it investigates the questions of how to achieve more knowledge in ethics lessons by dialogue and how to realize better moral development, particularly by handling of differentiation. Moral education of all participants who are involved in the learning process (learners and teacher alike) is a crucial task of every true inclusion. True inclusion means building optimal learning conditions in keeping with the free will of all participants. Because our society is transforming constantly in both global and demographic aspects, coping with these challenges is mandatory.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44720599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.3
E. Nowak
In this chapter I focus on the relevance of moral emotions in our „perception of something as moral issue” as well as „in the application of moral norms, but also in their grounding…”1. Referring to the statements of philosophy (from Aristotle to Habermas) and developmental psychology (from Piaget to Ekman) I highlight that affectivity needs to be already promoted in the early education. There is a lack of the professional emotional education in the Polish schooling system. Finally I propose a simple training for both teachers and students, in order to strength their skills of understanding facial emotional expressions of others. Mutual respect, trust, and better communicational relationships in the classroom will follow, and, last but not least, the learning processes in pupils will be facilitated too.
{"title":"O uczuciach i emocjach na poważnie (nie tylko dla nauczycieli etyki)","authors":"E. Nowak","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.3","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter I focus on the relevance of moral emotions in our „perception of something as moral issue” as well as „in the application of moral norms, but also in their grounding…”1. Referring to the statements of philosophy (from Aristotle to Habermas) and developmental psychology (from Piaget to Ekman) I highlight that affectivity needs to be already promoted in the early education. There is a lack of the professional emotional education in the Polish schooling system. Finally I propose a simple training for both teachers and students, in order to strength their skills of understanding facial emotional expressions of others. Mutual respect, trust, and better communicational relationships in the classroom will follow, and, last but not least, the learning processes in pupils will be facilitated too.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":"27 19","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41245233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.4
T. Bekrycht
The subject of this article is the analysis of law’s and norm’s term ambiguity. The content of the article focuses on presentation of interrelationship between normative systems as positive law, nature law, ethic and customs. The author shows a difference between two fundamental law’s origins which shape individual normative orders. He also presents in details their mutual influence and discusses the place of positive law against a background of other normative orders.
{"title":"Prawo. O wieloznaczności pojęcia","authors":"T. Bekrycht","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.4","url":null,"abstract":"The subject of this article is the analysis of law’s and norm’s term ambiguity. The content of the article focuses on presentation of interrelationship between normative systems as positive law, nature law, ethic and customs. The author shows a difference between two fundamental law’s origins which shape individual normative orders. He also presents in details their mutual influence and discusses the place of positive law against a background of other normative orders.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45587633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.2
Christian Budnik
Trust is a pervasive phenomenon in our lives. We trust our family members and lovers, our physicians and teachers, our politicians and even strangers on the street. Trust has instrumental value for us, but at the same time it is often accompanied by risk. This is the reason why it is important to distinguish trust that is warranted or justified from blind trust. In order to answer the question how trust is justified, however, it is crucial to know exactly what is the fundamental nature of trust. In the paper, I reconstruct three accounts of trust that operate with the assumption that trust is fundamentally a mental state – the cognitivist account, the voluntaristic account and the affect-based account. I argue that all of these accounts make reference to deeply held intuitions about trust that are incompatible with each other. As a solution to this unfortunate dialectical situation, I suggest to give up the assumption that trust is primarily a mental state. Instead, I argue for a position according to which trust is best understood as a two-place predicate that characterizes a specific relationship in which we can stand to each other.
{"title":"Zaufanie a stosunki osobiste","authors":"Christian Budnik","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2015.4.1.2","url":null,"abstract":"Trust is a pervasive phenomenon in our lives. We trust our family members and lovers, our physicians and teachers, our politicians and even strangers on the street. Trust has instrumental value for us, but at the same time it is often accompanied by risk. This is the reason why it is important to distinguish trust that is warranted or justified from blind trust. In order to answer the question how trust is justified, however, it is crucial to know exactly what is the fundamental nature of trust. In the paper, I reconstruct three accounts of trust that operate with the assumption that trust is fundamentally a mental state – the cognitivist account, the voluntaristic account and the affect-based account. I argue that all of these accounts make reference to deeply held intuitions about trust that are incompatible with each other. As a solution to this unfortunate dialectical situation, I suggest to give up the assumption that trust is primarily a mental state. Instead, I argue for a position according to which trust is best understood as a two-place predicate that characterizes a specific relationship in which we can stand to each other.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43618953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-15DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.6
Tomasz Albiński
Although there is a disagreement about how Putnam’s argument should be understood, it is possible to point to several elements of this argument which are common for many different reconstructions. In this paper I have tried to show that not all of them are unquestionable. And I want to propose a new way in which self-refutation of statement „I am a brain in a vat” may be understood. A form of this reconstruction is neutral for controversy about metaphysical realism or skepticism – it differs from the argument suggested by Putnam’s text. But I think that a story about envatted brains is simply a story about a language.
{"title":"Mózgi w naczyniu","authors":"Tomasz Albiński","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2012.1.1.6","url":null,"abstract":"Although there is a disagreement about how Putnam’s argument should be understood, it is possible to point to several elements of this argument which are common for many different reconstructions. In this paper I have tried to show that not all of them are unquestionable. And I want to propose a new way in which self-refutation of statement „I am a brain in a vat” may be understood. A form of this reconstruction is neutral for controversy about metaphysical realism or skepticism – it differs from the argument suggested by Putnam’s text. But I think that a story about envatted brains is simply a story about a language.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47591913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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