Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.8
T. Woś
The article discusses the issue of the Constitutional Court’s and other courts’ application of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet in the practice of issuing rulings. Based on the analysis of the case law, it presents the Constitutional Court’s standpoint concerning the role of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet in the Polish system of law and its application in the Constitutional Court’s case law. At the same time, it discusses other courts’ application of this principle, i.e. its influence on the decision-making processes of the application of law by the Supreme Court, courts of appeal and administrative courts. The analysis of the case law show that the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet plays a special role in the Polish system of law. In their decisions, both the Constitutional Court and other courts concerned emphasise that the Polish system of law, like other contemporary systems of law, is based on this principle, and its violence would lead to unpredictable results in the practice of issuing rulings. There are no major differences between the application of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet by the Constitutional Court and other courts concerned. In cases involving the ignorance of the law, both the Constitutional Court and other courts commonly recognise and apply, within the scope of their competence, the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet. Administrative law takes a particular stance on the application of this principle. In the Supreme Administrative Court’s judicature, a jurisdictional approach has been adopted that recognises that the operation of this principle is reduced in administrative procedure. In turn, the study of the case law of provincial administrative courts shows that these courts still have not adopted a uniform jurisdictional pattern in this respect.
{"title":"Trybunalskie i sądowe stosowanie zasady „ignorantia iuris nocet” na gruncie praktyki orzeczniczej w Polsce","authors":"T. Woś","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.8","url":null,"abstract":"The article discusses the issue of the Constitutional Court’s and other courts’ application of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet in the practice of issuing rulings. Based on the analysis of the case law, it presents the Constitutional Court’s standpoint concerning the role of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet in the Polish system of law and its application in the Constitutional Court’s case law. At the same time, it discusses other courts’ application of this principle, i.e. its influence on the decision-making processes of the application of law by the Supreme Court, courts of appeal and administrative courts. The analysis of the case law show that the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet plays a special role in the Polish system of law. In their decisions, both the Constitutional Court and other courts concerned emphasise that the Polish system of law, like other contemporary systems of law, is based on this principle, and its violence would lead to unpredictable results in the practice of issuing rulings. There are no major differences between the application of the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet by the Constitutional Court and other courts concerned. In cases involving the ignorance of the law, both the Constitutional Court and other courts commonly recognise and apply, within the scope of their competence, the principle of ignorantia iuris nocet. Administrative law takes a particular stance on the application of this principle. In the Supreme Administrative Court’s judicature, a jurisdictional approach has been adopted that recognises that the operation of this principle is reduced in administrative procedure. In turn, the study of the case law of provincial administrative courts shows that these courts still have not adopted a uniform jurisdictional pattern in this respect.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43193631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.12
Grażyna Skąpska
This paper debates abusive constitutionalism and constitutionalism abused as ways to introduce a fundamental change of political system. Abusive constitutionalism consists in a change of a democratic regime in a less democratic one with the help of democratic means, i.e. democratically legitimized change of the existing constitution, or proclamation of a new constitution, as it recently happened in Hungary. An example of abused constitutionalism presents contemporary Poland. There the fundamental change of democratic regime happens notwithstanding the still binding constitution, as in an oblivion of it, by the means of ordinary laws proclaimed in a rush process by the ruling parliamentary majority. The whole process is steered in an informal way by the chairman of the ruling party. The important context of abusive constitutionalism, and of constitutionalism abused, as I am going to argue, presentst he crisis of liberal constitutionalism, the loss of its motivational force as a moral sign-post in the public sphere. Instead, one observes a retreat to some primordial and emotionally laden conceptualizations of a politically organized community (a Gemeinschaft) where emotions, primary bonds, foundational myths are more important than law and liberal constitution. Such a retreat results from the past but also presents a reaction to the growing complexity of the contemporary world, and involved risks.
{"title":"Znieważający konstytucjonalizm i konstytucjonalizm znieważony. Refleksja socjologiczna na temat kryzysu liberalno-demokratycznego konstytucjonalizmu w Europie pokomunistycznej","authors":"Grażyna Skąpska","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.12","url":null,"abstract":"This paper debates abusive constitutionalism and constitutionalism abused as ways to introduce a fundamental change of political system. Abusive constitutionalism consists in a change of a democratic regime in a less democratic one with the help of democratic means, i.e. democratically legitimized change of the existing constitution, or proclamation of a new constitution, as it recently happened in Hungary. An example of abused constitutionalism presents contemporary Poland. There the fundamental change of democratic regime happens notwithstanding the still binding constitution, as in an oblivion of it, by the means of ordinary laws proclaimed in a rush process by the ruling parliamentary majority. The whole process is steered in an informal way by the chairman of the ruling party. The important context of abusive constitutionalism, and of constitutionalism abused, as I am going to argue, presentst he crisis of liberal constitutionalism, the loss of its motivational force as a moral sign-post in the public sphere. Instead, one observes a retreat to some primordial and emotionally laden conceptualizations of a politically organized community (a Gemeinschaft) where emotions, primary bonds, foundational myths are more important than law and liberal constitution. Such a retreat results from the past but also presents a reaction to the growing complexity of the contemporary world, and involved risks.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44345194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.2
T. Bekrycht
This paper addresses two key issues. The first involves an analysis of the connections between the ideas of republicanism, liberalism and constitutionalism. The second concerns the republican idea of self-determination and, consequently, the issue of the legitimation of law. The first section of the paper puts forward the thesis that constitutionalism can nowadays be understood as the idea of the legitimization of positive law, involving the synthesis of the two key values proclaimed by republicanism and liberalism, namely self-determination and negative freedom. The issue here is that the ideas of self-determination and negative freedom are both counterfactual, and the only area in which they can be synthesized is within the conceptual framework of positive law. The second section of the paper constitutes the justification of this thesis.
{"title":"Republikanizm i liberalizm w świetle idei konstytucjonalizmu. Uwagi o legitymizacji prawa","authors":"T. Bekrycht","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.2","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses two key issues. The first involves an analysis of the connections between the ideas of republicanism, liberalism and constitutionalism. The second concerns the republican idea of self-determination and, consequently, the issue of the legitimation of law. The first section of the paper puts forward the thesis that constitutionalism can nowadays be understood as the idea of the legitimization of positive law, involving the synthesis of the two key values proclaimed by republicanism and liberalism, namely self-determination and negative freedom. The issue here is that the ideas of self-determination and negative freedom are both counterfactual, and the only area in which they can be synthesized is within the conceptual framework of positive law. The second section of the paper constitutes the justification of this thesis.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45004106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.13
Sławomir Tkacz
The Constitutional Tribunal`s task is to examine the constitutionality of legal acts. The dispute over the Tribunal in Poland in 2016–2017 raises the question whether it still performs this function. The author addresses this issue in the light of the analysis of judgments issued by the Constitutional Tribunal in 2017. In conclusion, the Author indicates that due to the nature of the activities, the constitutional court will always be included in the political discourse in some extent. The answer to the question whether the Polish Constitutional Tribunal constitutes a barrier for the legislator’s actions depends in a large extent on the legislator himself. The latest defines the normative conditions of his activity as well as decides on the selection of the Tribunal`s judges. The study closes the remarks regarding the constitutional judiciary model in Poland in the future.
{"title":"Trybunał Konstytucyjny jako organ stojący na straży konstytucyjności. Uwagi na tle analizy orzecznictwa z 2017 r.","authors":"Sławomir Tkacz","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.13","url":null,"abstract":"The Constitutional Tribunal`s task is to examine the constitutionality of legal acts. The dispute over the Tribunal in Poland in 2016–2017 raises the question whether it still performs this function. The author addresses this issue in the light of the analysis of judgments issued by the Constitutional Tribunal in 2017. In conclusion, the Author indicates that due to the nature of the activities, the constitutional court will always be included in the political discourse in some extent. The answer to the question whether the Polish Constitutional Tribunal constitutes a barrier for the legislator’s actions depends in a large extent on the legislator himself. The latest defines the normative conditions of his activity as well as decides on the selection of the Tribunal`s judges. The study closes the remarks regarding the constitutional judiciary model in Poland in the future.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45609402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/fped.2018.7.1.4
R. Mańko
The purpose of this article is to analyse the relationship between adjudication and the concept of the political. By referring to the understanding of the concept of the political developed inter alia by Carl Schmitt and Chantal Mouffe, the article posits that not all judicial decisions (individual instances of adjudication) should be treated as belonging to the sphere of the political, but only those which fulfil jointly two premises: firstly, they are true decisions, involving at least some degree of discretionality (in the sphere of facts, or in the sphere of law, or in the sphere of the legal classification of facts), and secondly, involving a conflict which is structural for the community or society within which this adjudication is performed. Political adjudication should not be perceived as per se wrong, nonetheless it should be subject to a democratic scrutiny and sustained critique to with greater attention than apolitical adjudication, which merely involves the mechanical application of unambiguous legal rules to undisputed facts.
{"title":"Orzekanie w polu polityczności","authors":"R. Mańko","doi":"10.14746/fped.2018.7.1.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/fped.2018.7.1.4","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to analyse the relationship between adjudication and the concept of the political. By referring to the understanding of the concept of the political developed inter alia by Carl Schmitt and Chantal Mouffe, the article posits that not all judicial decisions (individual instances of adjudication) should be treated as belonging to the sphere of the political, but only those which fulfil jointly two premises: firstly, they are true decisions, involving at least some degree of discretionality (in the sphere of facts, or in the sphere of law, or in the sphere of the legal classification of facts), and secondly, involving a conflict which is structural for the community or society within which this adjudication is performed. Political adjudication should not be perceived as per se wrong, nonetheless it should be subject to a democratic scrutiny and sustained critique to with greater attention than apolitical adjudication, which merely involves the mechanical application of unambiguous legal rules to undisputed facts.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42184637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.6
Agnieszka Bielska-Brodziak, Sławomir Tkacz
The paper discusses the possibilities for using legislative materials in the process of establishing a catalogue of legal principles and determining their content. The starting point for the analysis was the conviction that the catalogue of legal principles and their content are established through discourse. One element of this discourse is the legislator’s voice in the form of „traces” left in various places. The interpreter may refer to both the legislator’s expressions in texts of normative acts and to expressions presented in legislative materials. Until recently, given their insufficient availability, legislative materials were seldom used in the discourse on legal principles. Through an analysis of legislative materials developed for the 2016 amendment of the Code of Criminal Proceedings, the authors show that these materials can be a source of valuable information on the legislative intent. The paper concludes with the following observation: the currently available access opportunities offered by information technologies mean that expanding the context that shapes the catalogue and content of the various principles through the use of legislative materials appears necessary.
{"title":"Zasady prawa w świetle materiałów legislacyjnych","authors":"Agnieszka Bielska-Brodziak, Sławomir Tkacz","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.6","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses the possibilities for using legislative materials in the process of establishing a catalogue of legal principles and determining their content. The starting point for the analysis was the conviction that the catalogue of legal principles and their content are established through discourse. One element of this discourse is the legislator’s voice in the form of „traces” left in various places. The interpreter may refer to both the legislator’s expressions in texts of normative acts and to expressions presented in legislative materials. Until recently, given their insufficient availability, legislative materials were seldom used in the discourse on legal principles. Through an analysis of legislative materials developed for the 2016 amendment of the Code of Criminal Proceedings, the authors show that these materials can be a source of valuable information on the legislative intent. The paper concludes with the following observation: the currently available access opportunities offered by information technologies mean that expanding the context that shapes the catalogue and content of the various principles through the use of legislative materials appears necessary.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43810108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-10DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.10
Paweł Sut
The aim of this article is to consider the hypothesis: relations between law and intimacy should be described and reflected also on the basis of concepts emerging in social sciences and philosophy. Traditional methods and categories of jurisprudence are not enough here. Relations between the law and intimacy are „hidden”, for example, in art. 47 and art. 18 Polish Constitution. Particularly interesting is art. 18 with the following text: „Marriage as a union of a woman and a man, family, motherhood and parenthood are under the protection and care of the Republic of Poland”. This provision is the cause of a legal dispute over the admissibility of the institutionalization of partnerships in Poland. The problem of the institutionalization of partnerships concerns, in my opinion, the relations between law and intimacy. These relations should be considered on the basis of the results of sociological and philosophical research. To solve the dispute about the admissibility of the institutionalization of partnerships in the Polish Constitution, works of, among others, Michel Foucault and Anthony Giddens may be valuable. M. Foucault’s ideas have a huge impact on the contemporary scientific understanding of sexuality. A. Giddens created the transformation of intimacy concept. The concept is consistent with the axiology of modern legal culture.
{"title":"Relacje prawo–intymność „ukryte” w Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (problem instytucjonalizacji małżeństw homoseksualnych w Polsce wobec nieokreśloności prawa)","authors":"Paweł Sut","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2018.7.1.10","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to consider the hypothesis: relations between law and intimacy should be described and reflected also on the basis of concepts emerging in social sciences and philosophy. Traditional methods and categories of jurisprudence are not enough here. Relations between the law and intimacy are „hidden”, for example, in art. 47 and art. 18 Polish Constitution. Particularly interesting is art. 18 with the following text: „Marriage as a union of a woman and a man, family, motherhood and parenthood are under the protection and care of the Republic of Poland”. This provision is the cause of a legal dispute over the admissibility of the institutionalization of partnerships in Poland. The problem of the institutionalization of partnerships concerns, in my opinion, the relations between law and intimacy. These relations should be considered on the basis of the results of sociological and philosophical research. To solve the dispute about the admissibility of the institutionalization of partnerships in the Polish Constitution, works of, among others, Michel Foucault and Anthony Giddens may be valuable. M. Foucault’s ideas have a huge impact on the contemporary scientific understanding of sexuality. A. Giddens created the transformation of intimacy concept. The concept is consistent with the axiology of modern legal culture.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":"220 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67364981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-31DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2012.1.2.5
Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp
The purpose of this article consists in presentation of Austrian fascism (austrofascism) embodied in the Federal State of Austria 1934–1938. The State represented an important episode in the history of European authoritarianism. In the following paper I address four issues: (1) philosophical, ideological, and doctrinal justification of Austrian fascism, (2) legal and constitutional principles of the regime of Engelbert Dollfuß and Kurt Schuschnigg, (3) relationship between the formal structure of Federal State and the socio-political reality. Finally, (4) I try to answer two interrelated questions concerning the nature of the austrofascist dictatorship and the legitimacy of considering austrofascism as a system of government in the context of phenomenon of fascism.
{"title":"Faszyzm austriacki (1934–1938) – założenia filozoficzno-ideowe, ustrojowe i praktyka polityczna","authors":"Ewa Czerwińska-Schupp","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2012.1.2.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2012.1.2.5","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article consists in presentation of Austrian fascism (austrofascism) embodied in the Federal State of Austria 1934–1938. The State represented an important episode in the history of European authoritarianism. In the following paper I address four issues: (1) philosophical, ideological, and doctrinal justification of Austrian fascism, (2) legal and constitutional principles of the regime of Engelbert Dollfuß and Kurt Schuschnigg, (3) relationship between the formal structure of Federal State and the socio-political reality. Finally, (4) I try to answer two interrelated questions concerning the nature of the austrofascist dictatorship and the legitimacy of considering austrofascism as a system of government in the context of phenomenon of fascism.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49650404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-31DOI: 10.14746/FPED.2012.1.2.13
Mateusz Bonecki
This paper presents two main topics which Jerzy Kmita addresses in his methodological writings. The first one involves the conception of “humanistic interpretation” which Kmita describes as a kind of reasoning and explanation applied within the humanities. The second consists in the so called “socioregulatory definition of culture”, according to which culture is identified with a set of intersubjective beliefs guiding and regulating human actions. Based on both methodological concepts, humanities may be defined as a range of academic disciplines which in the course of humanistic interpretation hypothetically ascribe cultural beliefs to social agents in order to explain their behavior.
{"title":"Jerzy Kmita – interpretacja humanistyczna i społeczno-regulacyjna koncepcja kultury","authors":"Mateusz Bonecki","doi":"10.14746/FPED.2012.1.2.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/FPED.2012.1.2.13","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents two main topics which Jerzy Kmita addresses in his methodological writings. The first one involves the conception of “humanistic interpretation” which Kmita describes as a kind of reasoning and explanation applied within the humanities. The second consists in the so called “socioregulatory definition of culture”, according to which culture is identified with a set of intersubjective beliefs guiding and regulating human actions. Based on both methodological concepts, humanities may be defined as a range of academic disciplines which in the course of humanistic interpretation hypothetically ascribe cultural beliefs to social agents in order to explain their behavior.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48220374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-31DOI: 10.14746/fped.2012.1.2.8
P. Makowski
The author sketches the most important aspects of Heraclitean theory of fire as the ‘principle’, ‘beginning’ or ‘origin’ (arché) of existing things. The presentation puts his concept of arché in the background of Heraclitean famous aphoristic dicta (‘everything flows’ – panta rhei, among others) and his theory of universal logos. Although the philosophy of Heraclitus is not very distinct from other theories by archaic philosophers of nature (Anaximander, Anaximenes, Thales, Parmenides, Empedocles), its specificity makes Heraclitus one of the most influential and inspiring figures of Ancient world.
{"title":"Ogień w filozofii Heraklita","authors":"P. Makowski","doi":"10.14746/fped.2012.1.2.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14746/fped.2012.1.2.8","url":null,"abstract":"The author sketches the most important aspects of Heraclitean theory of fire as the ‘principle’, ‘beginning’ or ‘origin’ (arché) of existing things. The presentation puts his concept of arché in the background of Heraclitean famous aphoristic dicta (‘everything flows’ – panta rhei, among others) and his theory of universal logos. Although the philosophy of Heraclitus is not very distinct from other theories by archaic philosophers of nature (Anaximander, Anaximenes, Thales, Parmenides, Empedocles), its specificity makes Heraclitus one of the most influential and inspiring figures of Ancient world.","PeriodicalId":52700,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42849235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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