Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1332/251569120x16040852770342
Etienne Farvaque, H. Iqbal, Nicolas Ooghe
Were policy responses of the US states to the pandemic driven by partisan politics or by budgetary reasons? We show that balanced-budget rules also had an impact, mediated by the possibility of benefiting from the funds previously stored in budget stabilisation funds. State policymakers tried to square the circle by simultaneously respecting budget rules, limiting the economic impact of the social distancing measures, combating the pandemic and pandering to their political bases. Some fiscal rules have induced a trade-off between health and public finance, which may reignite the debate on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal rules.
{"title":"Health politics? Determinants of US states’ reactions to COVID-19","authors":"Etienne Farvaque, H. Iqbal, Nicolas Ooghe","doi":"10.1332/251569120x16040852770342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569120x16040852770342","url":null,"abstract":"Were policy responses of the US states to the pandemic driven by partisan politics or by budgetary reasons? We show that balanced-budget rules also had an impact, mediated by the possibility of benefiting from the funds previously stored in budget stabilisation funds. State policymakers tried to square the circle by simultaneously respecting budget rules, limiting the economic impact of the social distancing measures, combating the pandemic and pandering to their political bases. Some fiscal rules have induced a trade-off between health and public finance, which may reignite the debate on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal rules.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66317101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.1332/251569119x15682726799586
Carla Marchese
This article criticises the standard approach to intellectual property rights, interpreted as property rights conferring a monopolistic position, by showing that a public good is not a suitable basis for a private monopoly and that the bundle of rights included in an intellectual property right is so different from those enjoyed under a standard monopoly as to suggest that a different mechanism is at work, that is, a private power to tax has been granted. To highlight how this novel approach works, mainstream economic models of economic growth based on research and development, whether protected or not by intellectual property rights, are revisited. The theory of taxation is then recalled to show that taxes involved by intellectual property rights can range from an amount equal to the monopoly profit to Lindahl taxes. Finally, the principles of taxation elaborated by economic theory are examined for clues to improving the design of intellectual property rights.
{"title":"Do intellectual property rights involve a private power to tax","authors":"Carla Marchese","doi":"10.1332/251569119x15682726799586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119x15682726799586","url":null,"abstract":"This article criticises the standard approach to intellectual property rights, interpreted as property rights conferring a monopolistic position, by showing that a public good is not a suitable basis for a private monopoly and that the bundle of rights included in an intellectual property\u0000 right is so different from those enjoyed under a standard monopoly as to suggest that a different mechanism is at work, that is, a private power to tax has been granted. To highlight how this novel approach works, mainstream economic models of economic growth based on research and development,\u0000 whether protected or not by intellectual property rights, are revisited. The theory of taxation is then recalled to show that taxes involved by intellectual property rights can range from an amount equal to the monopoly profit to Lindahl taxes. Finally, the principles of taxation elaborated\u0000 by economic theory are examined for clues to improving the design of intellectual property rights.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48506809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.1332/251569119x15633560811750
Zhiyong An, Yilin Hou
This article examines the causal effect of debt decentralisation on the budget constraint of subnational governments. China’s debt decentralisation reform of 2011 authorised four provincial-level units to issue debt on their own, but not the remaining ones. Using data on the budgetary expenditure and revenue of Chinese subnational governments from 2009 to 2014, we estimate the effect of the reform with a difference-in-differences approach, with those four provincial units as the treatment group and the others as the control group. Our findings suggest that debt decentralisation can help harden the budget constraint of subnational governments.
{"title":"Centralised versus decentralised subnational debt and soft budget constraint: evidence from China","authors":"Zhiyong An, Yilin Hou","doi":"10.1332/251569119x15633560811750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119x15633560811750","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the causal effect of debt decentralisation on the budget constraint of subnational governments. China’s debt decentralisation reform of 2011 authorised four provincial-level units to issue debt on their own, but not the remaining ones. Using data on the budgetary\u0000 expenditure and revenue of Chinese subnational governments from 2009 to 2014, we estimate the effect of the reform with a difference-in-differences approach, with those four provincial units as the treatment group and the others as the control group. Our findings suggest that debt decentralisation\u0000 can help harden the budget constraint of subnational governments.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1332/251569119x15633560811750","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43489315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.1332/251569119x15675896755755
I. Murtazashvili, J. Murtazashvili
Externally assisted state-building efforts cost trillions but typically fail to produce states capable of providing public goods and services on their own. Drawing on the public choice literature and evidence from historical state-building processes, we argue that political self-sufficiency depends on political institutions that allow for self-governance, reasonably high levels of fiscal and administrative capacity, economic institutions that encourage wealth creation, and social institutions that reinforce political and economic freedom. Importantly, we do not expect that democracy is a critical determinant of political self-sufficiency. Our theory explains why state building in Afghanistan in the two decades since 2001 did not produce a more functional state. Despite massive international investment in blood and treasure, the state-building effort prioritised national elections over institutional reforms that encourage local self-governance, failed to establish meaningful constraints on national political decision-makers (especially the president) and disregarded customary private property rights and customary processes to adjudicate land disputes.
{"title":"The political economy of state building","authors":"I. Murtazashvili, J. Murtazashvili","doi":"10.1332/251569119x15675896755755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119x15675896755755","url":null,"abstract":"Externally assisted state-building efforts cost trillions but typically fail to produce states capable of providing public goods and services on their own. Drawing on the public choice literature and evidence from historical state-building processes, we argue that political self-sufficiency\u0000 depends on political institutions that allow for self-governance, reasonably high levels of fiscal and administrative capacity, economic institutions that encourage wealth creation, and social institutions that reinforce political and economic freedom. Importantly, we do not expect that democracy\u0000 is a critical determinant of political self-sufficiency. Our theory explains why state building in Afghanistan in the two decades since 2001 did not produce a more functional state. Despite massive international investment in blood and treasure, the state-building effort prioritised national\u0000 elections over institutional reforms that encourage local self-governance, failed to establish meaningful constraints on national political decision-makers (especially the president) and disregarded customary private property rights and customary processes to adjudicate land disputes.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1332/251569119x15675896755755","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43175402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.1332/251569119x15675896226897
William B. Hankins, G. Hoover
Using a panel of US states over the period 1985–2010, we examine how Democratic governors affect economic freedom compared to Republican governors. Economic freedom is measured using the Economic Freedom of North America Index. Given the emphasis that this index places on smaller government, we expect that having a Democratic governor leads to less economic freedom. However, using a regression discontinuity approach, we find that Democratic governors do not reduce economic freedom compared to Republican governors elected by a similar margin. An implication of this result is that governors must appeal to the median voter when making policy.
{"title":"Do Democratic governors lower economic freedom? A regression discontinuity approach","authors":"William B. Hankins, G. Hoover","doi":"10.1332/251569119x15675896226897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119x15675896226897","url":null,"abstract":"Using a panel of US states over the period 1985–2010, we examine how Democratic governors affect economic freedom compared to Republican governors. Economic freedom is measured using the Economic Freedom of North America Index. Given the emphasis that this index places on smaller\u0000 government, we expect that having a Democratic governor leads to less economic freedom. However, using a regression discontinuity approach, we find that Democratic governors do not reduce economic freedom compared to Republican governors elected by a similar margin. An implication of this\u0000 result is that governors must appeal to the median voter when making policy.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1332/251569119x15675896226897","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46564033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-27DOI: 10.1332/251569119x15675896589688
Erwin Dekker, Anabela S Rodrigues
This article provides an analysis of the effectiveness of cultural policy in Brazil under the Rouanet Law for the period 1993–2016. We find that the law, which provides tax incentives for donations to and sponsorships of the cultural sector, has exacerbated existing socio-economic inequalities, regional inequalities and inequalities between artistic genres. The gifts have predominantly gone to already successful projects, sometimes even already profitable projects. On the flip side, the gifts have primarily come from large, mostly partially state-owned, enterprises and act as the equivalent of a tax cut for these organisations. From the evidence, it is not clear that any particular market failure is alleviated through the Rouanet Law; instead, it seems that the system of indirect support led to strong control over the cultural sector by big business in Brazil. We use these findings to criticise much of the literature on cultural policy, which tends to take Western well-developed institutions for granted. We argue that this literature is ill-suited to capture the economy of Brazil and other ‘limited-access states’ because of its implicit assumption of a pre-existing ‘open-access state’.
{"title":"The political economy of Brazilian cultural policy: a case study of the Rouanet Law","authors":"Erwin Dekker, Anabela S Rodrigues","doi":"10.1332/251569119x15675896589688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119x15675896589688","url":null,"abstract":"This article provides an analysis of the effectiveness of cultural policy in Brazil under the Rouanet Law for the period 1993–2016. We find that the law, which provides tax incentives for donations to and sponsorships of the cultural sector, has exacerbated existing socio-economic\u0000 inequalities, regional inequalities and inequalities between artistic genres. The gifts have predominantly gone to already successful projects, sometimes even already profitable projects. On the flip side, the gifts have primarily come from large, mostly partially state-owned, enterprises\u0000 and act as the equivalent of a tax cut for these organisations. From the evidence, it is not clear that any particular market failure is alleviated through the Rouanet Law; instead, it seems that the system of indirect support led to strong control over the cultural sector by big business\u0000 in Brazil. We use these findings to criticise much of the literature on cultural policy, which tends to take Western well-developed institutions for granted. We argue that this literature is ill-suited to capture the economy of Brazil and other ‘limited-access states’ because of\u0000 its implicit assumption of a pre-existing ‘open-access state’.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41572670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-30DOI: 10.1332/251569119X15537841204119
L. Infantino
{"title":"Benjamin Constant: his debts towards Adam Smith","authors":"L. Infantino","doi":"10.1332/251569119X15537841204119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119X15537841204119","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45003447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-30DOI: 10.1332/251569119X15526464720315
R. Holcombe, R. Gmeiner
{"title":"Term limits and state budgets","authors":"R. Holcombe, R. Gmeiner","doi":"10.1332/251569119X15526464720315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119X15526464720315","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1332/251569119X15526464720315","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48993998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-30DOI: 10.1332/251569118X15368236837875
D. Hebert
{"title":"The chairman's solution","authors":"D. Hebert","doi":"10.1332/251569118X15368236837875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569118X15368236837875","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49286125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-30DOI: 10.1332/251569119X15526582435555
Gideon Yaniv
{"title":"Failing to ring up sales: tax evasion by a cash-intensive business","authors":"Gideon Yaniv","doi":"10.1332/251569119X15526582435555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119X15526582435555","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44005284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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