Pub Date : 2019-10-01DOI: 10.1332/251569119x15675896226897
William B. Hankins, G. Hoover
Using a panel of US states over the period 1985–2010, we examine how Democratic governors affect economic freedom compared to Republican governors. Economic freedom is measured using the Economic Freedom of North America Index. Given the emphasis that this index places on smaller government, we expect that having a Democratic governor leads to less economic freedom. However, using a regression discontinuity approach, we find that Democratic governors do not reduce economic freedom compared to Republican governors elected by a similar margin. An implication of this result is that governors must appeal to the median voter when making policy.
{"title":"Do Democratic governors lower economic freedom? A regression discontinuity approach","authors":"William B. Hankins, G. Hoover","doi":"10.1332/251569119x15675896226897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119x15675896226897","url":null,"abstract":"Using a panel of US states over the period 1985–2010, we examine how Democratic governors affect economic freedom compared to Republican governors. Economic freedom is measured using the Economic Freedom of North America Index. Given the emphasis that this index places on smaller\u0000 government, we expect that having a Democratic governor leads to less economic freedom. However, using a regression discontinuity approach, we find that Democratic governors do not reduce economic freedom compared to Republican governors elected by a similar margin. An implication of this\u0000 result is that governors must appeal to the median voter when making policy.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1332/251569119x15675896226897","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46564033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-27DOI: 10.1332/251569119x15675896589688
Erwin Dekker, Anabela S Rodrigues
This article provides an analysis of the effectiveness of cultural policy in Brazil under the Rouanet Law for the period 1993–2016. We find that the law, which provides tax incentives for donations to and sponsorships of the cultural sector, has exacerbated existing socio-economic inequalities, regional inequalities and inequalities between artistic genres. The gifts have predominantly gone to already successful projects, sometimes even already profitable projects. On the flip side, the gifts have primarily come from large, mostly partially state-owned, enterprises and act as the equivalent of a tax cut for these organisations. From the evidence, it is not clear that any particular market failure is alleviated through the Rouanet Law; instead, it seems that the system of indirect support led to strong control over the cultural sector by big business in Brazil. We use these findings to criticise much of the literature on cultural policy, which tends to take Western well-developed institutions for granted. We argue that this literature is ill-suited to capture the economy of Brazil and other ‘limited-access states’ because of its implicit assumption of a pre-existing ‘open-access state’.
{"title":"The political economy of Brazilian cultural policy: a case study of the Rouanet Law","authors":"Erwin Dekker, Anabela S Rodrigues","doi":"10.1332/251569119x15675896589688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119x15675896589688","url":null,"abstract":"This article provides an analysis of the effectiveness of cultural policy in Brazil under the Rouanet Law for the period 1993–2016. We find that the law, which provides tax incentives for donations to and sponsorships of the cultural sector, has exacerbated existing socio-economic\u0000 inequalities, regional inequalities and inequalities between artistic genres. The gifts have predominantly gone to already successful projects, sometimes even already profitable projects. On the flip side, the gifts have primarily come from large, mostly partially state-owned, enterprises\u0000 and act as the equivalent of a tax cut for these organisations. From the evidence, it is not clear that any particular market failure is alleviated through the Rouanet Law; instead, it seems that the system of indirect support led to strong control over the cultural sector by big business\u0000 in Brazil. We use these findings to criticise much of the literature on cultural policy, which tends to take Western well-developed institutions for granted. We argue that this literature is ill-suited to capture the economy of Brazil and other ‘limited-access states’ because of\u0000 its implicit assumption of a pre-existing ‘open-access state’.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41572670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-30DOI: 10.1332/251569119X15537841204119
L. Infantino
{"title":"Benjamin Constant: his debts towards Adam Smith","authors":"L. Infantino","doi":"10.1332/251569119X15537841204119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119X15537841204119","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45003447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-30DOI: 10.1332/251569119X15526464720315
R. Holcombe, R. Gmeiner
{"title":"Term limits and state budgets","authors":"R. Holcombe, R. Gmeiner","doi":"10.1332/251569119X15526464720315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119X15526464720315","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1332/251569119X15526464720315","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48993998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-30DOI: 10.1332/251569118X15368236837875
D. Hebert
{"title":"The chairman's solution","authors":"D. Hebert","doi":"10.1332/251569118X15368236837875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569118X15368236837875","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49286125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-04-30DOI: 10.1332/251569119X15526582435555
Gideon Yaniv
{"title":"Failing to ring up sales: tax evasion by a cash-intensive business","authors":"Gideon Yaniv","doi":"10.1332/251569119X15526582435555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569119X15526582435555","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44005284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-31DOI: 10.1332/251569118x15388187616080
Nimai M. Mehta
This paper returns to Adam Smith's much maligned distinction of productive versus unproductive labour to flesh out a dimension of capital productivity that has been missed by the modern theory of production and welfare. The puzzle lies in Smith's use of a binary measurement scale to suggest opposing productivity, and household welfare outcomes obtained with a durable versus non-durable good. A durable good generates a permanent fund of labour savings and service spillovers over time. This dimension of productivity exists separate from, and beyond, any marginal productivity attributed to capital or labour services within the neoclassical production function. And, it forms the basis of improvements in household welfare that Smith described in the Wealth of Nations – in terms of continual net increases in the consumption-production possibility frontier enjoyed by the household, as a result of service spillovers obtained with a durable good over time. In contrast, no such spillovers are obtained with a non-durable good. A preference-bias for non-durable goods, instead, proves to be welfare-reducing – by having households under-invest and/or fail in maintaining the accumulated stock of durable-goods-as-capital. Both lead to a loss of production-consumption possibilities available within the household economy. An exploration of Smith's concern with 'unproductive labour' brings back into focus the broad set of behavioural traits and ethical-legal restraints that underlie economic progress and have been missed by neoclassical theory.
{"title":"The productive-unproductive puzzle in Adam Smith: what have we missed?","authors":"Nimai M. Mehta","doi":"10.1332/251569118x15388187616080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569118x15388187616080","url":null,"abstract":"This paper returns to Adam Smith's much maligned distinction of productive versus unproductive labour to flesh out a dimension of capital productivity that has been missed by the modern theory of production and welfare. The puzzle lies in Smith's use of a binary measurement scale to\u0000 suggest opposing productivity, and household welfare outcomes obtained with a durable versus non-durable good. A durable good generates a permanent fund of labour savings and service spillovers over time. This dimension of productivity exists separate from, and beyond, any marginal\u0000 productivity attributed to capital or labour services within the neoclassical production function. And, it forms the basis of improvements in household welfare that Smith described in the Wealth of Nations – in terms of continual net increases in the consumption-production possibility\u0000 frontier enjoyed by the household, as a result of service spillovers obtained with a durable good over time. In contrast, no such spillovers are obtained with a non-durable good. A preference-bias for non-durable goods, instead, proves to be welfare-reducing – by having households under-invest\u0000 and/or fail in maintaining the accumulated stock of durable-goods-as-capital. Both lead to a loss of production-consumption possibilities available within the household economy. An exploration of Smith's concern with 'unproductive labour' brings back into focus the broad set of behavioural\u0000 traits and ethical-legal restraints that underlie economic progress and have been missed by neoclassical theory.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49339990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-31DOI: 10.1332/251510818X15368388991035
A. Hoffer, R. Sobel
Many, but not all, US state governments have adopted 'preference policies' that give an advantage to in-state businesses (vendors) who submit bid proposals for state projects. Most preference policies are specified in terms of a specific percentage advantage, which means that an in-state vendor will be chosen even if they submit a higher bid than a lower-cost out-of-state vendor. Some states have broad policies that apply to all or virtually all state contracts, while others apply these policies selectively only to one or a few specific goods and services. We estimate the effects of these policies on the costs of government. We find that preference policies are associated with a $167 increase per person in state construction costs and a $176 increase per capita in capital expenditures. In addition, we find that states implementing preference policies experienced a one unit decline in their economic freedom scores.
{"title":"Preference policies: perpetual costs of distributive politics","authors":"A. Hoffer, R. Sobel","doi":"10.1332/251510818X15368388991035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251510818X15368388991035","url":null,"abstract":"Many, but not all, US state governments have adopted 'preference policies' that give an advantage to in-state businesses (vendors) who submit bid proposals for state projects. Most preference policies are specified in terms of a specific percentage advantage, which means that an in-state\u0000 vendor will be chosen even if they submit a higher bid than a lower-cost out-of-state vendor. Some states have broad policies that apply to all or virtually all state contracts, while others apply these policies selectively only to one or a few specific goods and services. We estimate the\u0000 effects of these policies on the costs of government. We find that preference policies are associated with a $167 increase per person in state construction costs and a $176 increase per capita in capital expenditures. In addition, we find that states implementing preference policies\u0000 experienced a one unit decline in their economic freedom scores.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44801228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-31DOI: 10.1332/251569118X15388187137839
Ryan H. Murphy
Recent research has explored the determinants of economic freedom, an important measure of institutional quality. Concurrently, some scholars have posited a negative relationship between the quality of economic institutions and democracy, specifically at very high levels of democracy. This paper disaggregates the Polity IV index into a vector of 20 dummy variables to explore how differing degrees of democracy and autocracy may impact economic freedom, thereby leaving open the possibility for levels of democracy modestly less than perfect democracy to have better effects on economic freedom. This paper will also consider the Vreeland re-estimate of the Polity IV index, the Grundler-Kreiger measure of democracy, the use of a quadratic term, and quantile regression. The weak evidence that is found points to a modest positive relationship between democracy and economic freedom, with little evidence that marginally less democracy will subsequently lead to more economic freedom.
{"title":"Imperfect democracy and economic freedom","authors":"Ryan H. Murphy","doi":"10.1332/251569118X15388187137839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569118X15388187137839","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research has explored the determinants of economic freedom, an important measure of institutional quality. Concurrently, some scholars have posited a negative relationship between the quality of economic institutions and democracy, specifically at very high levels of democracy.\u0000 This paper disaggregates the Polity IV index into a vector of 20 dummy variables to explore how differing degrees of democracy and autocracy may impact economic freedom, thereby leaving open the possibility for levels of democracy modestly less than perfect democracy to have better\u0000 effects on economic freedom. This paper will also consider the Vreeland re-estimate of the Polity IV index, the Grundler-Kreiger measure of democracy, the use of a quadratic term, and quantile regression. The weak evidence that is found points to a modest positive relationship between\u0000 democracy and economic freedom, with little evidence that marginally less democracy will subsequently lead to more economic freedom.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1332/251569118X15388187137839","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42484573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-10-31DOI: 10.1332/251569118X15402013042785
Francesco Forte, G. Brady
This paper examines the influence of Frank Knight on James Buchanan during the latter's time as a student at the University of Chicago through to the successive periods of his life. We maintain that Knight's approach to economics and politics – in which individual freedom, (institutional) rules of the game and ethical rules are all paramount in explaining behaviours in both the market and the public sector – strongly influenced Buchanan's interdisciplinary intellectual enterprise. In this context, we stress Knight's influence on Buchanan's catallactic approach to both the formation of rules at the constitutional level and ordinary level, as well as for the behaviour of individuals interacting in the market and public sector. In this inheritance, the relevance of ethical values for economic progress and protection of a good, free society increased during Buchanan's last period of scientific research, with positive and normative levels always carefully distinguished, as in the Frank Knight tradition.
{"title":"James M. Buchanan: from Chicago to Virginia and Knight's influence on Buchanan","authors":"Francesco Forte, G. Brady","doi":"10.1332/251569118X15402013042785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/251569118X15402013042785","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the influence of Frank Knight on James Buchanan during the latter's time as a student at the University of Chicago through to the successive periods of his life. We maintain that Knight's approach to economics and politics – in which individual freedom, (institutional)\u0000 rules of the game and ethical rules are all paramount in explaining behaviours in both the market and the public sector – strongly influenced Buchanan's interdisciplinary intellectual enterprise. In this context, we stress Knight's influence on Buchanan's catallactic approach to both\u0000 the formation of rules at the constitutional level and ordinary level, as well as for the behaviour of individuals interacting in the market and public sector. In this inheritance, the relevance of ethical values for economic progress and protection of a good, free society increased during\u0000 Buchanan's last period of scientific research, with positive and normative levels always carefully distinguished, as in the Frank Knight tradition.","PeriodicalId":53126,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42763740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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