Pub Date : 2024-01-12DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2024.2303322
Luca Manucci
{"title":"They shall not pass? The role of supply-side factors in the electoral breakthrough of VOX and Chega","authors":"Luca Manucci","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2024.2303322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2024.2303322","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"54 41","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139533145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-11DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2023.2299827
Nicola Guerra
{"title":"Ideologies and narratives of Italian foreign fighters in the Russian-Ukrainian war","authors":"Nicola Guerra","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2023.2299827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2023.2299827","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":" 30","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139627059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-20DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2023.2294842
Nicola Guerra
{"title":"The Russian-Ukrainian war has shattered the European far right. The opposing influences of Steve Bannon and Aleksandr Dugin","authors":"Nicola Guerra","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2023.2294842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2023.2294842","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"97 24","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138954077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-07DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2023.2288867
M. Dinçer
{"title":"The role of Azerbaijan as the EU’s energy supplier: a secondary alternative partner in natural gas","authors":"M. Dinçer","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2023.2288867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2023.2288867","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"49 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138592327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-24DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2023.2287245
Zsolt Boda
{"title":"Shrinking space: the changing political opportunities of advocacy groups in illiberal governance","authors":"Zsolt Boda","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2023.2287245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2023.2287245","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"66 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139238976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2023.2263175
George Spencer Terry
ABSTRACTRussia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine caught many by surprise. This is especially true among those on the centre and far-right of the political spectrum who had previously referred to Russia as a patron of social conservatism and a paradigm of strong leadership and independent actorship in the sphere of international relations. Such a view had been especially prevalent among the right-wing parties in Italy. This article seeks to elucidate how the Italian right has rearticulated its relationship with Russia in the first 100 days after the onset of full-scale war with Ukraine through a critical engagement with the concepts of discursive rupture, legitimacy, and empty signifiers in its logic. By arguing that Russia’s previous position as a referent sign of social conservatism and traditionalism has become unfixed in this post-war paradigm, this article posits that those electorally viable actors of the Italian right who were once amenable to Russia in the past will not employ it as a discursive reference for legitimacy in the future, while those on the fringes of the political spectrum will redouble their legitimation of Russia. These findings carry broader implications within the milieu of the European right, as other political actors grapple with analogous challenges of redefining their positions towards Russia.KEYWORDS: ItalyRusso-Ukrainian warRussiaright-wing political partiesdiscursive rupturelegitimacy Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
{"title":"Rearticulating the Italian right’s perception of Russia: legitimacy and rupture in the post-invasion landscape","authors":"George Spencer Terry","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2023.2263175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2023.2263175","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTRussia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine caught many by surprise. This is especially true among those on the centre and far-right of the political spectrum who had previously referred to Russia as a patron of social conservatism and a paradigm of strong leadership and independent actorship in the sphere of international relations. Such a view had been especially prevalent among the right-wing parties in Italy. This article seeks to elucidate how the Italian right has rearticulated its relationship with Russia in the first 100 days after the onset of full-scale war with Ukraine through a critical engagement with the concepts of discursive rupture, legitimacy, and empty signifiers in its logic. By arguing that Russia’s previous position as a referent sign of social conservatism and traditionalism has become unfixed in this post-war paradigm, this article posits that those electorally viable actors of the Italian right who were once amenable to Russia in the past will not employ it as a discursive reference for legitimacy in the future, while those on the fringes of the political spectrum will redouble their legitimation of Russia. These findings carry broader implications within the milieu of the European right, as other political actors grapple with analogous challenges of redefining their positions towards Russia.KEYWORDS: ItalyRusso-Ukrainian warRussiaright-wing political partiesdiscursive rupturelegitimacy Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135883639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-08DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2023.2244382
Anna Franco
ABSTRACTThe war in Ukraine has threatened our idea of peace and democracy. The European Union has been caught unprepared and, to show its opposition to Russia, has developed strict economic sanctions. A path to a possible candidacy of Ukraine to the EU is now open. However, the enlargement process has been silenced for a while and still, there are critiques due to ‘nasty’ member states that do not comply with the rule of law. Information online does not help in understanding the accession iter and the current situation. On the list of potential members, at pole position, we find the Western Balkans, which have been long pushed to join the EU and have already developed a huge network of international and European organizations. I will run a Social Network Analysis to outline the position of possible new member countries in the Eurozone according to the media.KEYWORDS: Social network analysisEuropean unionenlargementWestern Balkansmember statesEU-Balkan youth forum Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
{"title":"Positioning candidate countries in the Euro-sphere: internet responses to European enlargement","authors":"Anna Franco","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2023.2244382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2023.2244382","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe war in Ukraine has threatened our idea of peace and democracy. The European Union has been caught unprepared and, to show its opposition to Russia, has developed strict economic sanctions. A path to a possible candidacy of Ukraine to the EU is now open. However, the enlargement process has been silenced for a while and still, there are critiques due to ‘nasty’ member states that do not comply with the rule of law. Information online does not help in understanding the accession iter and the current situation. On the list of potential members, at pole position, we find the Western Balkans, which have been long pushed to join the EU and have already developed a huge network of international and European organizations. I will run a Social Network Analysis to outline the position of possible new member countries in the Eurozone according to the media.KEYWORDS: Social network analysisEuropean unionenlargementWestern Balkansmember statesEU-Balkan youth forum Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135250713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-03DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2023.2244390
Max Steuer
ABSTRACTThe study of constitutional courts (CCs) of post-communist Europe typically entailed the belief in CCs’ transformative potential for the consolidation of democracy. Recently, this belief has been questioned, albeit the knowledge of why at least some CCs in the region failed to prevent the rise of non-democratic regimes remains limited. This article addresses this gap via the cases of Hungary and Slovakia, which have taken a different trajectory post-2010: the Slovak CC (SCC) remains an independent institution, while the Hungarian CC (HCC) has been packed by the executive. By combining contextual case law analysis of judgments referring to democracy and semi-structured interviews, the article shows that, during critical moments, the HCC did not perceive itself as responsible for Hungarian democracy, which resulted in its self-marginalisation. The SCC was largely spared from similarly critical moments, which, however, facilitated particular self-perceptions of its responsibility (or lack thereof). These findings offer empirical support for institutionalist scholarship that emphasizes the impact of ideas in calibrating the self-perceptions of political institutions and their positioning in the political system. Constitutional courts remain inseparable from the political regimes they are located in.KEYWORDS: Constitutional courtsilliberalizationdemocracy protectionHungarySlovakiacontextual case law analysis Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For example, in an article titled ‘Constitutional courts and parliamentary democracy’, Stone Sweet (Citation2002) mentions the term ‘democracy’ merely twice.2 Dworkin’s ‘conceptions’ are preferred over ‘meanings’ as the subjective articulations of ‘understandings’ of the concept. On ‘meanings’ versus ‘understandings’, see Osterberg-Kaufmann et al. (Citation2020).3 Since only one keyword is used, the difficulties associated with correct results based on the search of compound terms (Sebők et al., Citation2023, pp. 9–11) do not arise.4 The complete dataset covering cases referring to democracy in connection with other fundamentals (such as fundamental rights and political participation) and separate opinions (not analyzed here due to space restrictions) is part of a broader project (Steuer, Citation2019b, pp. 51–52 [Figures 5 and 6]). The total number of opinions included in the dataset (available upon request from the author) is 220 for Hungary and 231 for Slovakia, meaning that the opinions related to the separation of powers represent 17.7 per cent of all Hungarian and 13.4 per cent of all Slovak CC opinions from the dataset.5 Indeed, readers versed in the two CCs’ case law may be surprised by not seeing some of the well-known cases in the empirical analysis, for example, the SCC’s interpretation of the presidential appointment powers of the attorney general. This is because the keyword search did not flag them as referring to democracy.6 Not unlike
摘要对后共产主义欧洲的宪法法院的研究通常包含了对宪法法院巩固民主的变革潜力的信念。最近,这种信念受到了质疑,尽管人们对该地区至少有一些CCs未能阻止非民主政权崛起的原因仍然知之甚少。本文通过匈牙利和斯洛伐克的案例来解决这一差距,这两个国家在2010年后采取了不同的发展轨迹:斯洛伐克的CC (SCC)仍然是一个独立的机构,而匈牙利的CC (HCC)则由行政部门负责。通过结合对涉及民主和半结构化访谈的判决的上下文判例法分析,文章表明,在关键时刻,HCC不认为自己对匈牙利民主负有责任,这导致了它的自我边缘化。SCC在很大程度上幸免于类似的关键时刻,然而,这促进了对其责任(或缺乏责任)的特定自我认知。这些发现为制度主义学术提供了实证支持,制度主义学术强调思想在校准政治制度的自我认知及其在政治体系中的定位方面的影响。宪法法院仍然与其所在的政治体制密不可分。关键词:宪法法院自由化民主保护匈牙利斯洛伐克语境判例法分析披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。注1例如,在一篇名为“宪法法院和议会民主”的文章中,斯通·斯威特(Citation2002)仅两次提到“民主”一词德沃金的“概念”比“意义”更受欢迎,因为它是对概念的“理解”的主观表述。关于“意义”与“理解”,参见Osterberg-Kaufmann等人(Citation2020)由于只使用了一个关键字,因此不会出现基于复合词搜索的正确结果(Sebők等人,Citation2023, pp. 9-11)完整的数据集涵盖了涉及民主与其他基本原则(如基本权利和政治参与)和独立意见(由于篇幅限制,此处未进行分析)的案例,是一个更广泛项目的一部分(Steuer, Citation2019b, pp. 51-52[图5和6])。数据集中包含的意见总数(应作者要求提供)为匈牙利220条,斯洛伐克231条,这意味着与权力分立有关的意见占数据集中匈牙利所有意见的17.7%,占斯洛伐克所有CC意见的13.4%事实上,精通两个最高法院判例法的读者可能会感到惊讶,因为在实证分析中没有看到一些众所周知的案例,例如,最高法院对总统任命司法部长权力的解释。这是因为关键词搜索并没有将它们标记为与民主有关与Richard Albert (citation, 2010, pp. 228-235)通过“融合的力量”的概念不同,尽管以一种不那么微妙的方式论点的实质是,有了这样的解释,法令将比州和地区州政府一级的主要立法更受保护,这是“在代议制民主中不可接受的”(PL. ÚS 17/2014, p. 43)虽然最高法院在其第四个任期内确实加强了程序保障,但在这一任期的最初几年,这样做的缓慢进一步消除了几乎不受约束的快速立法的障碍,即使在宪法修正案的情况下也是如此(Šipulová & Steuer, Citation2023)在PL. ÚS 10/05中,参考文献出现在复制请愿人关于三个政府部门之间的“宪法控制与合作”的判例法文本中(第134页),但“法治下的民主国家”的原则被强调了几次(尽管没有任何连贯的模式)。在PL. ÚS 102/2011中,请愿者(第66页)提到第二章中出现的“请求法院和民主”。ÚS 28/96(上文讨论过),两次在法官的辩护中。一个新奇之处是,在转型后的民主国家,司法的确切形态是立法机构通过“试错”进行“探索”的过程:“(立法机构)对它在以前的监管中发现的弱点作出反应”(第107页)。第二,更次要的参考文献(第137页)将法院嵌入“法律和民主的规范空间”,以证明公开司法决定的透明度的必要性例如,在匈牙利,与COVID-19大流行有关的宪法审查案件并不表明对关键政治概念的参与,而是似乎在寻找理由,以消除对行政部门的宪法限制(关于对COVID-19相关判例法的类似早期评估,见Szente & Gárdos-Orosz, Citation2021,第169-170页)。
{"title":"Judicial self-perceptions and the separation of powers in varied political regime contexts: the constitutional courts in Hungary and Slovakia","authors":"Max Steuer","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2023.2244390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2023.2244390","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe study of constitutional courts (CCs) of post-communist Europe typically entailed the belief in CCs’ transformative potential for the consolidation of democracy. Recently, this belief has been questioned, albeit the knowledge of why at least some CCs in the region failed to prevent the rise of non-democratic regimes remains limited. This article addresses this gap via the cases of Hungary and Slovakia, which have taken a different trajectory post-2010: the Slovak CC (SCC) remains an independent institution, while the Hungarian CC (HCC) has been packed by the executive. By combining contextual case law analysis of judgments referring to democracy and semi-structured interviews, the article shows that, during critical moments, the HCC did not perceive itself as responsible for Hungarian democracy, which resulted in its self-marginalisation. The SCC was largely spared from similarly critical moments, which, however, facilitated particular self-perceptions of its responsibility (or lack thereof). These findings offer empirical support for institutionalist scholarship that emphasizes the impact of ideas in calibrating the self-perceptions of political institutions and their positioning in the political system. Constitutional courts remain inseparable from the political regimes they are located in.KEYWORDS: Constitutional courtsilliberalizationdemocracy protectionHungarySlovakiacontextual case law analysis Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For example, in an article titled ‘Constitutional courts and parliamentary democracy’, Stone Sweet (Citation2002) mentions the term ‘democracy’ merely twice.2 Dworkin’s ‘conceptions’ are preferred over ‘meanings’ as the subjective articulations of ‘understandings’ of the concept. On ‘meanings’ versus ‘understandings’, see Osterberg-Kaufmann et al. (Citation2020).3 Since only one keyword is used, the difficulties associated with correct results based on the search of compound terms (Sebők et al., Citation2023, pp. 9–11) do not arise.4 The complete dataset covering cases referring to democracy in connection with other fundamentals (such as fundamental rights and political participation) and separate opinions (not analyzed here due to space restrictions) is part of a broader project (Steuer, Citation2019b, pp. 51–52 [Figures 5 and 6]). The total number of opinions included in the dataset (available upon request from the author) is 220 for Hungary and 231 for Slovakia, meaning that the opinions related to the separation of powers represent 17.7 per cent of all Hungarian and 13.4 per cent of all Slovak CC opinions from the dataset.5 Indeed, readers versed in the two CCs’ case law may be surprised by not seeing some of the well-known cases in the empirical analysis, for example, the SCC’s interpretation of the presidential appointment powers of the attorney general. This is because the keyword search did not flag them as referring to democracy.6 Not unlike","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135738658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-03DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2023.2244392
Daniel Bogéa
ABSTRACTHow can high courts resist elected leaders with antidemocratic agendas? In this article, I present the Brazilian case as an example of the multiple resources and strategies available in the judicial toolbox to drive interbranch relations in contexts of democratic erosion. While the autonomy of the Brazilian Supreme Court stands out in Latin America, it became a recurring target of right-wing radicals since the ascension of would-be authoritarian Jair Bolsonaro. In this article, I address a preemptive resistance strategy adopted by the court's leadership from the presidential elections of 2018 up to the middle of the pandemic. I establish the rise and fall of ‘preemptive dialogue’as a strategic move, drawing data on off-bench behaviour from a major Brazilian newspaper’s coverage, official statements, and court insertions in social media platforms. While this strategic move was consistent with the historical trajectory of the court’s ‘accommodation’ pattern in interbranch relations, its downfall signals a break with the past. Likewise, it advances the need of adaptive judicial tactics considering the diffusion of court-curbing within electoral democracies with dissimilar historical backgrounds. The conclusion emphasizes the relevance of the case to comparativists addressing judicial resistance in contexts of democratic backsliding.KEYWORDS: Judicial resistanceinstitutional dialogueoff-bench judicial strategiescourt-curbing AcknowledgmentsI am grateful to the anonymous reviewers and the editors of this symposium for their comments. Previous versions were presented in the ECPR 2023 Workshop on Judicial Resistance and the LASA 2023 Conference. I thank all the participants on those occasions, as well as Katarína Šipulová, Øyvind Stiansen, Benjamin Holgado, Eugenia Artabe, Campbell MacGillivray, Diana Kisakye, David Kosař, and Surbhi Karwa, for their comments and suggestions.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 Even if politically constrained during the authoritarian regimes of 1930–1937 (see Gaspari, Citation2019) and 1964–1985 (see Vale, Citation1976; Recondo, Citation2018; Torres, Citation2021). Osiel (Citation1995) claims that, from a comparative perspective, even under the military dictatorship, the STF was able to be more consequential than its counterpart in Argentina.2 Moreover, one could expect that under such circumstances, a would-be authoritarian would ‘rely on informal means of interference such as harsh rhetoric, defamation of judges on social media, or joining demonstrations against these institutions’ (Llanos & Weber, Citation2022).3 Tomini et al. (Citation2023, p. 4) show indeed that judges and courts can perform the important role of active institutional resistors in contexts of democratic backsliding, as they ‘can overturn laws or decisions taken by the government and challenge an attempted abuse of power.’ Here, however, my focus is located in the strategies and actions of ju
{"title":"‘Dialogue’ as strategic judicial resistance? The rise and fall of ‘preemptive dialogue’ by the Brazilian Supreme Court","authors":"Daniel Bogéa","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2023.2244392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2023.2244392","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTHow can high courts resist elected leaders with antidemocratic agendas? In this article, I present the Brazilian case as an example of the multiple resources and strategies available in the judicial toolbox to drive interbranch relations in contexts of democratic erosion. While the autonomy of the Brazilian Supreme Court stands out in Latin America, it became a recurring target of right-wing radicals since the ascension of would-be authoritarian Jair Bolsonaro. In this article, I address a preemptive resistance strategy adopted by the court's leadership from the presidential elections of 2018 up to the middle of the pandemic. I establish the rise and fall of ‘preemptive dialogue’as a strategic move, drawing data on off-bench behaviour from a major Brazilian newspaper’s coverage, official statements, and court insertions in social media platforms. While this strategic move was consistent with the historical trajectory of the court’s ‘accommodation’ pattern in interbranch relations, its downfall signals a break with the past. Likewise, it advances the need of adaptive judicial tactics considering the diffusion of court-curbing within electoral democracies with dissimilar historical backgrounds. The conclusion emphasizes the relevance of the case to comparativists addressing judicial resistance in contexts of democratic backsliding.KEYWORDS: Judicial resistanceinstitutional dialogueoff-bench judicial strategiescourt-curbing AcknowledgmentsI am grateful to the anonymous reviewers and the editors of this symposium for their comments. Previous versions were presented in the ECPR 2023 Workshop on Judicial Resistance and the LASA 2023 Conference. I thank all the participants on those occasions, as well as Katarína Šipulová, Øyvind Stiansen, Benjamin Holgado, Eugenia Artabe, Campbell MacGillivray, Diana Kisakye, David Kosař, and Surbhi Karwa, for their comments and suggestions.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 Even if politically constrained during the authoritarian regimes of 1930–1937 (see Gaspari, Citation2019) and 1964–1985 (see Vale, Citation1976; Recondo, Citation2018; Torres, Citation2021). Osiel (Citation1995) claims that, from a comparative perspective, even under the military dictatorship, the STF was able to be more consequential than its counterpart in Argentina.2 Moreover, one could expect that under such circumstances, a would-be authoritarian would ‘rely on informal means of interference such as harsh rhetoric, defamation of judges on social media, or joining demonstrations against these institutions’ (Llanos & Weber, Citation2022).3 Tomini et al. (Citation2023, p. 4) show indeed that judges and courts can perform the important role of active institutional resistors in contexts of democratic backsliding, as they ‘can overturn laws or decisions taken by the government and challenge an attempted abuse of power.’ Here, however, my focus is located in the strategies and actions of ju","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135696066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-03DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2023.2261189
Manuel Cevera-Marzal
ABSTRACTWhat is left-wing populism? Is it just populist rhetoric grafted onto a left-wing ideology? How can we distinguish the populist left from the socialist left, the communist left and the radical left? Is the difference between the populist left and the non-populist left one of degree or of nature? How can we explain the populist turn taken by part of the European left in the mid-2010s? What was the breeding ground for these new political forces? And what links do these European left-wing populist movements have with the similar forces that emerged ten years earlier in Latin America? In order to answer these questions, this article draws on a broad review of left-wing populism studies literature and on five years of fieldwork within two prototypical contemporary left-wing populist forces (Podemos and La France Insoumise). The result is a thick conception of the phenomenon and a set of six differences between populist and non-populist lefts.KEYWORDS: Left-wing populismparty politicsEuropePodemosLa France Insoumise Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
什么是左翼民粹主义?这只是嫁接在左翼意识形态上的民粹主义言论吗?我们如何区分民粹主义左翼、社会主义左翼、共产主义左翼和激进左翼?民粹主义左翼和非民粹主义左翼之间的区别是程度上的还是性质上的?我们如何解释2010年代中期部分欧洲左翼转向民粹主义?是什么孕育了这些新的政治力量?这些欧洲左翼民粹主义运动与十年前在拉丁美洲出现的类似力量有什么联系?为了回答这些问题,本文对左翼民粹主义研究文献进行了广泛的回顾,并对两个典型的当代左翼民粹主义力量(Podemos和La France Insoumise)进行了为期五年的实地考察。结果是对这一现象的一种粗浅的理解,以及民粹主义和非民粹主义左派之间的六种区别。关键词:左翼民粹主义政党政治欧洲我们党法国无损害披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。
{"title":"A populist turn in the European left. What is new, and what is not?","authors":"Manuel Cevera-Marzal","doi":"10.1080/23745118.2023.2261189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2023.2261189","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTWhat is left-wing populism? Is it just populist rhetoric grafted onto a left-wing ideology? How can we distinguish the populist left from the socialist left, the communist left and the radical left? Is the difference between the populist left and the non-populist left one of degree or of nature? How can we explain the populist turn taken by part of the European left in the mid-2010s? What was the breeding ground for these new political forces? And what links do these European left-wing populist movements have with the similar forces that emerged ten years earlier in Latin America? In order to answer these questions, this article draws on a broad review of left-wing populism studies literature and on five years of fieldwork within two prototypical contemporary left-wing populist forces (Podemos and La France Insoumise). The result is a thick conception of the phenomenon and a set of six differences between populist and non-populist lefts.KEYWORDS: Left-wing populismparty politicsEuropePodemosLa France Insoumise Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":53479,"journal":{"name":"European Politics and Society","volume":"2014 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135695964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}