Pub Date : 2023-04-01DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000432
Heather Douglas
Abstract Protecting science from politicization is an ongoing concern in contemporary society. Yet some political influences on science (e.g., setting public funding amounts) are fully legitimate. We need to have a clear account of when a political influence is politicization (an illegitimate political influence) in order to properly detect and address the problem. I argue in this paper that understanding how the space of scientific inquiry is distinctive from democratic politics can be the basis for defining politicization. Similarities between inquiry and democratic politics have long been noted, but there are important differences as well. I describe four norms that are importantly distinct for inquiry when compared with democratic politics, even if they can be seen as roughly similar. Although there are parallels between democratic political norms and norms for scientific inquiry, there are crucial differences as well. Eliding these differences creates politicization of inquiry. Even as we understand scientific inquiry as pursued within society and responsible to society, we pursue it in a distinctive space, guided by distinctive norms and practices.
{"title":"Differentiating Scientific Inquiry and Politics","authors":"Heather Douglas","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000432","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Protecting science from politicization is an ongoing concern in contemporary society. Yet some political influences on science (e.g., setting public funding amounts) are fully legitimate. We need to have a clear account of when a political influence is politicization (an illegitimate political influence) in order to properly detect and address the problem. I argue in this paper that understanding how the space of scientific inquiry is distinctive from democratic politics can be the basis for defining politicization. Similarities between inquiry and democratic politics have long been noted, but there are important differences as well. I describe four norms that are importantly distinct for inquiry when compared with democratic politics, even if they can be seen as roughly similar. Although there are parallels between democratic political norms and norms for scientific inquiry, there are crucial differences as well. Eliding these differences creates politicization of inquiry. Even as we understand scientific inquiry as pursued within society and responsible to society, we pursue it in a distinctive space, guided by distinctive norms and practices.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"123 - 146"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41952307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-14DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000025
J. Brennan
Abstract Many people believe that we should not be friends with others if they have bad enough moral and political beliefs. For instance, they think that we should not befriend KKK members or Nazis. However, not all errors in moral and political belief disqualify people from friendship. If so, then there is some line to be drawn somewhere which indicates when a person's beliefs are bad enough that we should not befriend them. This paper considers many candidate proposals for how and why to draw the line, including that beliefs might be extreme, be held irrationally, dehumanize others, are unreasonable, and more. However, upon inspection, each candidate proposal fails. They either provide the wrong kind of reason to reject people as friends, or they fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’ beliefs. There are various arguments in favour of rejecting people from friendship on the basis of their bad beliefs, but these arguments also fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’. Thus, this paper concludes there is a genuine puzzle: we should indeed blackball some people from friendship when their beliefs are bad enough, but we do not have even a rough specification of what counts as bad enough.
{"title":"Friendship and Blackballing for Bad Beliefs","authors":"J. Brennan","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many people believe that we should not be friends with others if they have bad enough moral and political beliefs. For instance, they think that we should not befriend KKK members or Nazis. However, not all errors in moral and political belief disqualify people from friendship. If so, then there is some line to be drawn somewhere which indicates when a person's beliefs are bad enough that we should not befriend them. This paper considers many candidate proposals for how and why to draw the line, including that beliefs might be extreme, be held irrationally, dehumanize others, are unreasonable, and more. However, upon inspection, each candidate proposal fails. They either provide the wrong kind of reason to reject people as friends, or they fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’ beliefs. There are various arguments in favour of rejecting people from friendship on the basis of their bad beliefs, but these arguments also fail to explain what counts as ‘bad enough’. Thus, this paper concludes there is a genuine puzzle: we should indeed blackball some people from friendship when their beliefs are bad enough, but we do not have even a rough specification of what counts as bad enough.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"191 - 214"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43112638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-31DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000420
D. DeVidi, Catherine Klausen, Christopher Lowry
Abstract People with significant cognitive disabilities and others who advocate on their behalf routinely state their claims in terms of enabling people to claim their full citizenship. Informed by the results of a study by one of the authors, we draw attention to some of these claims, and discuss what a just society ought to do so that members with significant cognitive disabilities see themselves – and are seen by others – as full, and therefore equal, citizens. Several political philosophers have sought to develop disability-inclusive accounts of justice, using three strategies: (1) defend a permissive understanding of who is owed justice by rejecting contribution to social cooperation as a necessary condition; (2) defend a permissive understanding of what counts as contribution; and (3) argue that some demands of justice are owed to all, while others are owed only to cooperators. We defend a version of the second strategy, arguing that the relevant notion of contribution requires that it be something the agent chooses to do because they know it to be valued by someone else, and we argue that the third strategy also has a role to play.
{"title":"Citizenship, Ability, and Contribution","authors":"D. DeVidi, Catherine Klausen, Christopher Lowry","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000420","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract People with significant cognitive disabilities and others who advocate on their behalf routinely state their claims in terms of enabling people to claim their full citizenship. Informed by the results of a study by one of the authors, we draw attention to some of these claims, and discuss what a just society ought to do so that members with significant cognitive disabilities see themselves – and are seen by others – as full, and therefore equal, citizens. Several political philosophers have sought to develop disability-inclusive accounts of justice, using three strategies: (1) defend a permissive understanding of who is owed justice by rejecting contribution to social cooperation as a necessary condition; (2) defend a permissive understanding of what counts as contribution; and (3) argue that some demands of justice are owed to all, while others are owed only to cooperators. We defend a version of the second strategy, arguing that the relevant notion of contribution requires that it be something the agent chooses to do because they know it to be valued by someone else, and we argue that the third strategy also has a role to play.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"165 - 190"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49473824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1017/s0031819122000389
M. Pritchard
{"title":"Gareth B. Matthews, The Child's Philosopher edited by Maughn Rollins Gregory and Megan Laverty (New York: Routledge, 2022).","authors":"M. Pritchard","doi":"10.1017/s0031819122000389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819122000389","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"118 - 121"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47769803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-20DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000316
Jonas Faria Costa
Abstract There seems to be a difference between drinking coffee alone at home and drinking coffee in a café. Yet, drinking coffee in a café is not a joint action. It is an individual action done in a social environment. The café, with each person minding their own business next to others, is what I call a gregarious state of affairs. Gregariousness refers to the warmth of the social world. It is the difference between studying alone at home and studying in the library. This light form of sociality is precisely what we were deprived of during the coronavirus lockdowns. Gregariousness cannot be explained as interaction or coordination, and neither can it be grasped solely as a normative aspect of the environment. This is why gregariousness cannot be explained using the concepts of strategic equilibrium, shared planning agency, joint commitment, we-intention, or second-person standpoint. In this paper, I will also provide a prospective theory of gregariousness. The aim of this paper is not to provide a definitive theory of gregariousness, nor to demonstrate that other theories of joint action are incorrect, but rather to draw attention to this aspect of the social world that has been largely neglected.
{"title":"On Gregariousness","authors":"Jonas Faria Costa","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000316","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There seems to be a difference between drinking coffee alone at home and drinking coffee in a café. Yet, drinking coffee in a café is not a joint action. It is an individual action done in a social environment. The café, with each person minding their own business next to others, is what I call a gregarious state of affairs. Gregariousness refers to the warmth of the social world. It is the difference between studying alone at home and studying in the library. This light form of sociality is precisely what we were deprived of during the coronavirus lockdowns. Gregariousness cannot be explained as interaction or coordination, and neither can it be grasped solely as a normative aspect of the environment. This is why gregariousness cannot be explained using the concepts of strategic equilibrium, shared planning agency, joint commitment, we-intention, or second-person standpoint. In this paper, I will also provide a prospective theory of gregariousness. The aim of this paper is not to provide a definitive theory of gregariousness, nor to demonstrate that other theories of joint action are incorrect, but rather to draw attention to this aspect of the social world that has been largely neglected.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"435 - 460"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46213430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-20DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000328
Ernesto V. Garcia
Abstract What should we think about ‘acts of conscience’, viz., cases where our personal judgments and public authority come into conflict such that principled resistance to the latter seems necessary? Philosophers mainly debate two issues: the Accommodation Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, should public authority accommodate claims of conscience?’ and the Justification Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, are we justified in engaging in acts of conscience – and why?’. By contrast, a third important topic – the Conduct Question, i.e., ‘How should we act, morally speaking, when engaging in acts of conscience?’ – has been mostly neglected. This paper aims to offer concrete guidance for persons wishing to engage in acts of conscience in morally virtuous ways. I argue that such agents are subject to two basic prima facie duties: (i) duties to oneself related to demands of integrity and (ii) duties to others related to demands of civility. I explain both duties in detail, arguing with regard to (i), that in light of what I call ‘the paradox of conscience’, we need to rethink our views about both ‘conscience’ and ‘integrity’; and with regard to (ii), that, building upon Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’, we should embrace at least seven general principles for undertaking acts of conscience in a morally conscientious manner.
{"title":"Rethinking Acts of Conscience: Personal Integrity, Civility, and the Common Good","authors":"Ernesto V. Garcia","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000328","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What should we think about ‘acts of conscience’, viz., cases where our personal judgments and public authority come into conflict such that principled resistance to the latter seems necessary? Philosophers mainly debate two issues: the Accommodation Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, should public authority accommodate claims of conscience?’ and the Justification Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, are we justified in engaging in acts of conscience – and why?’. By contrast, a third important topic – the Conduct Question, i.e., ‘How should we act, morally speaking, when engaging in acts of conscience?’ – has been mostly neglected. This paper aims to offer concrete guidance for persons wishing to engage in acts of conscience in morally virtuous ways. I argue that such agents are subject to two basic prima facie duties: (i) duties to oneself related to demands of integrity and (ii) duties to others related to demands of civility. I explain both duties in detail, arguing with regard to (i), that in light of what I call ‘the paradox of conscience’, we need to rethink our views about both ‘conscience’ and ‘integrity’; and with regard to (ii), that, building upon Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’, we should embrace at least seven general principles for undertaking acts of conscience in a morally conscientious manner.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"461 - 483"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42676253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：