Pub Date : 2023-09-05DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000207
Adrian Bardon
Abstract This essay aims to review and clarify an emerging consensus among philosophers of time: that belief in the passage of time is not a matter of illusion but rather the result of a variety of cognitive error. I argue that this error is best described in terms of psychological projection, properly understood. A close analysis of varieties of projection reveals how well this phenomenon accounts for belief in dynamic temporal passage and the objective becoming of events. A projectivist account of belief in the passage of time is, in actuality, already predominant in contemporary philosophy of time; but the language of illusion still used by many theorists is hampering recognition of the nature of the solution as well as the recent progress towards consensus.
{"title":"The Passage of Time is Not an Illusion: It's a Projection","authors":"Adrian Bardon","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000207","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay aims to review and clarify an emerging consensus among philosophers of time: that belief in the passage of time is not a matter of illusion but rather the result of a variety of cognitive error. I argue that this error is best described in terms of psychological projection, properly understood. A close analysis of varieties of projection reveals how well this phenomenon accounts for belief in dynamic temporal passage and the objective becoming of events. A projectivist account of belief in the passage of time is, in actuality, already predominant in contemporary philosophy of time; but the language of illusion still used by many theorists is hampering recognition of the nature of the solution as well as the recent progress towards consensus.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"485 - 506"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46005111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-05DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000219
Renee Rushing
Abstract There has been recent discussion of a puzzle posed by emotions that are backward looking. Though our emotions commonly diminish over time, how can they diminish fittingly if they are an accurate appraisal of an event that is situated in the past? Agnes Callard (2017) has offered a solution by providing an account of anger in which anger is both backwards looking and resolvable, yet her account depends upon contrition to explain anger's fitting diminishment. My aim is to explain how anger can fittingly diminish even when there is lack of contrition. I propose a permissivism about fittingness by showing that both anger and compassion are fitting responses to blameworthy behaviour. I argue that anger is rendered fitting because it accurately appraises the behaviour, whereas compassion becomes fitting as a valuational response to what the behaviour reveals about the lived experience of the offender. I then respond to some worries my account raises, and I clarify details of my account to show that it is not unrealistic to the way some of our anger actually does diminish. I end with a proposal that our anger can fittingly diminish through the act of forgiveness when compassion is not a forthcoming affective response.
{"title":"Fitting Diminishment of Anger: A Permissivist Account","authors":"Renee Rushing","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000219","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There has been recent discussion of a puzzle posed by emotions that are backward looking. Though our emotions commonly diminish over time, how can they diminish fittingly if they are an accurate appraisal of an event that is situated in the past? Agnes Callard (2017) has offered a solution by providing an account of anger in which anger is both backwards looking and resolvable, yet her account depends upon contrition to explain anger's fitting diminishment. My aim is to explain how anger can fittingly diminish even when there is lack of contrition. I propose a permissivism about fittingness by showing that both anger and compassion are fitting responses to blameworthy behaviour. I argue that anger is rendered fitting because it accurately appraises the behaviour, whereas compassion becomes fitting as a valuational response to what the behaviour reveals about the lived experience of the offender. I then respond to some worries my account raises, and I clarify details of my account to show that it is not unrealistic to the way some of our anger actually does diminish. I end with a proposal that our anger can fittingly diminish through the act of forgiveness when compassion is not a forthcoming affective response.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"433 - 450"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48014402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-19DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000190
Bin Zhao
Abstract Depending on whether we are somewhat tolerant of nearby error-possibilities or not, the safety condition on knowledge is open to a strong reading and a weak reading. In this paper, it is argued that induction and conjunction introduction constitute two horns of a dilemma for the safety account of knowledge. If we opt for the strong reading, then the safety account fails to account for inductive knowledge. In contrast, if we opt for the weak reading, then the safety account fails to accommodate knowledge obtained via the method of conjunction introduction.
{"title":"Induction, Conjunction Introduction, and Safety","authors":"Bin Zhao","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000190","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Depending on whether we are somewhat tolerant of nearby error-possibilities or not, the safety condition on knowledge is open to a strong reading and a weak reading. In this paper, it is argued that induction and conjunction introduction constitute two horns of a dilemma for the safety account of knowledge. If we opt for the strong reading, then the safety account fails to account for inductive knowledge. In contrast, if we opt for the weak reading, then the safety account fails to accommodate knowledge obtained via the method of conjunction introduction.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"477 - 483"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41479437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01Epub Date: 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000049
Dominic Jc Wilkinson
Can metaphysics yield the consolations of philosophy? One possibility, defended by Derek Parfit, is that reflection on the nature of identity and time could diminish both fear of death and grief. In this paper, I assess the prospect of such consolation, focussing especially on attempts to console a grieving third party. A shift to a reductionist view of personal identity might mean that death is less threatening. However, there is some evidence to suggest that such a shift does not necessarily translate into less death anxiety. Moreover, applied to grief at loss of another, such a perspective may be misdirected. A temporally neutral perspective offers a theoretically powerful way of reducing the sense of loss at being separated in time from a loved one. However, it is unclear whether it is psychologically possible to achieve. Even if it were possible, it may not diminish the pain of separation. I identify a serious challenge to philosophical consolation for grief. The greater the consolation that is offered, the greater the risk of losing important attachments and the less it may be psychologically accessible.
{"title":"Grief and the inconsolation of philosophy.","authors":"Dominic Jc Wilkinson","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000049","DOIUrl":"10.1017/S0031819123000049","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Can metaphysics yield the consolations of philosophy? One possibility, defended by Derek Parfit, is that reflection on the nature of identity and time could diminish both fear of death and grief. In this paper, I assess the prospect of such consolation, focussing especially on attempts to console a grieving third party. A shift to a reductionist view of personal identity might mean that death is less threatening. However, there is some evidence to suggest that such a shift does not necessarily translate into less death anxiety. Moreover, applied to grief at loss of another, such a perspective may be misdirected. A temporally neutral perspective offers a theoretically powerful way of reducing the sense of loss at being separated in time from a loved one. However, it is unclear whether it is psychologically possible to achieve. Even if it were possible, it may not diminish the pain of separation. I identify a serious challenge to philosophical consolation for grief. The greater the consolation that is offered, the greater the risk of losing important attachments and the less it may be psychologically accessible.</p>","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"273-296"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7615737/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42397854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-16DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000098
Farbod Akhlaghi
Abstract The problem of creeping minimalism threatens the distinction between moral realism and meta-ethical expressivism, and between cognitivism and non-cognitivism more generally. The problem is commonly taken to be serious and in need of response. I argue that there are two problems of creeping minimalism, that one of these problems is more serious than the other, and that this more serious problem cannot be solved in a way that all parties can accept. I close by highlighting some important questions this raises for how to distinguish between theories, and noting some of the troubling consequences it may entail for realism and its rivals, in meta-ethics and beyond.
{"title":"The Problems of Creeping Minimalism","authors":"Farbod Akhlaghi","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000098","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The problem of creeping minimalism threatens the distinction between moral realism and meta-ethical expressivism, and between cognitivism and non-cognitivism more generally. The problem is commonly taken to be serious and in need of response. I argue that there are two problems of creeping minimalism, that one of these problems is more serious than the other, and that this more serious problem cannot be solved in a way that all parties can accept. I close by highlighting some important questions this raises for how to distinguish between theories, and noting some of the troubling consequences it may entail for realism and its rivals, in meta-ethics and beyond.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"327 - 343"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42276782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-16DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000074
L. Alcoff
Abstract ‘Cultural racism’ is central to understanding racism today yet has receded into the background behind the focus on attitudinal racism. Even the turn to structural racism is largely circumscribed to inclusion without substantive challenge to existing processes or profit margins. When portions of the racist public are targeted, it is often the least elite members of society. Without question, the concept of cultural racism requires some clarification, but it will help bring the continued influence of colonialism forward and reveal the alibis given in mainstream and elite circles that justify exclusion, resource extraction, and domination.
{"title":"The Persistent Power of Cultural Racism","authors":"L. Alcoff","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000074","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract ‘Cultural racism’ is central to understanding racism today yet has receded into the background behind the focus on attitudinal racism. Even the turn to structural racism is largely circumscribed to inclusion without substantive challenge to existing processes or profit margins. When portions of the racist public are targeted, it is often the least elite members of society. Without question, the concept of cultural racism requires some clarification, but it will help bring the continued influence of colonialism forward and reveal the alibis given in mainstream and elite circles that justify exclusion, resource extraction, and domination.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"249 - 271"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46396626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-16DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000104
I. Kidd
(p. 150). If we engage in this difficult task of attention and allow the world to move us, we will find that we are moved to act accordingly. Once one sees the terrified cow as needing reassurance, for example, the question of whether to have steak for dinner will simply not arise. I found this image of moral motivation very appealing, and it makes good sense of Murdoch’s idea that what we aim for ethically is obedience to reality, not freedom (Murdoch, 1999, pp. 331–2). Those sceptical of such a conception of moral motivation will not find much to persuade them here, but for those already drawn to this picture, it provides a helpful discussion of what that might look like. Philosophical discussions of attention are still in somewhat early days, at least within ethics, so this book is a welcome addition to those discussions. It also helpfully identifies many of the key questions that those interested in attention will have to answer. At various points, however, the answers to the questions or the reasons one might have for holding them were much less clear. At times the book reads more as a series of intersecting reflections on Murdoch, Weil, and attention rather than as a systematic account of attention, an argument for its role and significance, or an exegetical examination of the idea in Murdoch and Weil. Readers who are not already well acquainted with Murdoch andWeil may struggle here.Whilst in some respects this is a shortcoming, it is also an advantage, and some of the best parts of the book come in the more incidental passages. There’s a wonderful discussion of the role of fantasy in Madame Bovary, for example (p. 80), and the book endswith a delightful codameditating on effort and letting go in swimming and attention, two interests that Panizza shares with Murdoch. Overall, then, the book is well worth reading for those interested in Murdoch, Weil, and attention.
{"title":"Animals and Misanthropy by David E. Cooper (Routledge, 2018). ISBN 9781138295940","authors":"I. Kidd","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000104","url":null,"abstract":"(p. 150). If we engage in this difficult task of attention and allow the world to move us, we will find that we are moved to act accordingly. Once one sees the terrified cow as needing reassurance, for example, the question of whether to have steak for dinner will simply not arise. I found this image of moral motivation very appealing, and it makes good sense of Murdoch’s idea that what we aim for ethically is obedience to reality, not freedom (Murdoch, 1999, pp. 331–2). Those sceptical of such a conception of moral motivation will not find much to persuade them here, but for those already drawn to this picture, it provides a helpful discussion of what that might look like. Philosophical discussions of attention are still in somewhat early days, at least within ethics, so this book is a welcome addition to those discussions. It also helpfully identifies many of the key questions that those interested in attention will have to answer. At various points, however, the answers to the questions or the reasons one might have for holding them were much less clear. At times the book reads more as a series of intersecting reflections on Murdoch, Weil, and attention rather than as a systematic account of attention, an argument for its role and significance, or an exegetical examination of the idea in Murdoch and Weil. Readers who are not already well acquainted with Murdoch andWeil may struggle here.Whilst in some respects this is a shortcoming, it is also an advantage, and some of the best parts of the book come in the more incidental passages. There’s a wonderful discussion of the role of fantasy in Madame Bovary, for example (p. 80), and the book endswith a delightful codameditating on effort and letting go in swimming and attention, two interests that Panizza shares with Murdoch. Overall, then, the book is well worth reading for those interested in Murdoch, Weil, and attention.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"48 7","pages":"407 - 411"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41268717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-16DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000128
Matthew Congdon
Abstract This paper argues that Aristotelian ethical naturalism can combine two commitments that are often held to be incompatible: (a) a commitment to a strong form of ethical objectivity and (b) a thoroughgoing historicism about ethical value. The notions of species and life-form invoked by ethical naturalism do not, I argue, rely upon an ahistorical picture of human nature. I develop this idea by building upon Philippa Foot's defence of ethical naturalism in Natural Goodness. I go on to argue that linguistic changes in the ways we articulate the conditions of human flourishing can be understood, in some cases, as transforming those very conditions.
{"title":"Changing Our Nature: Ethical Naturalism, Objectivity, and History","authors":"Matthew Congdon","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000128","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper argues that Aristotelian ethical naturalism can combine two commitments that are often held to be incompatible: (a) a commitment to a strong form of ethical objectivity and (b) a thoroughgoing historicism about ethical value. The notions of species and life-form invoked by ethical naturalism do not, I argue, rely upon an ahistorical picture of human nature. I develop this idea by building upon Philippa Foot's defence of ethical naturalism in Natural Goodness. I go on to argue that linguistic changes in the ways we articulate the conditions of human flourishing can be understood, in some cases, as transforming those very conditions.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"297 - 326"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44434299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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