Pub Date : 2022-09-09DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000353
S. Haslanger
Abstract The terms ‘structural injustice’ and ‘systemic injustice’ are commonly used, but their meanings are elusive. In this paper, I sketch an ontology of social systems that embeds accounts of social structures, relations, and practices. On this view, structures may be intrinsically problematic, or they may be problematic only insofar as they interact with other structures in the system to produce injustice. Because social practices that constitute structures set the backdrop for agency and identity, socially fluent agents reproduce the systems, often unknowingly and unintentionally. The account aims to capture how agents both depend on and enact structures, and do so in ways that, as Ta-Nehisi Coates says, ‘land on the body’.
{"title":"Systemic and Structural Injustice: Is There a Difference?","authors":"S. Haslanger","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000353","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The terms ‘structural injustice’ and ‘systemic injustice’ are commonly used, but their meanings are elusive. In this paper, I sketch an ontology of social systems that embeds accounts of social structures, relations, and practices. On this view, structures may be intrinsically problematic, or they may be problematic only insofar as they interact with other structures in the system to produce injustice. Because social practices that constitute structures set the backdrop for agency and identity, socially fluent agents reproduce the systems, often unknowingly and unintentionally. The account aims to capture how agents both depend on and enact structures, and do so in ways that, as Ta-Nehisi Coates says, ‘land on the body’.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"1 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46704437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-30DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000304
Lucas Scripter
Abstract A common idea about assessing meaning in life is that one draws up a list of those various positive values that one has achieved and subtracts from it one's negative deeds in life. The resulting balance is the meaningfulness of one's existence. I call this the ledger theory. Drawing on the work of Raimond Gaita and Julian Barnes's novel The Sense of an Ending, I argue for a phenomenology of remorse that gives us reason to reject the ledger theory. Even those agents whose lives have been exceptionally meaningful in some respects may remain haunted by their past. Certain sorts of misdeeds – those that involve significant, irreparable damage – leave life marred in such a way that the negative remains, even in the face of all the meaningful deeds of life.
{"title":"Remorse and the Ledger Theory of Meaning","authors":"Lucas Scripter","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000304","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A common idea about assessing meaning in life is that one draws up a list of those various positive values that one has achieved and subtracts from it one's negative deeds in life. The resulting balance is the meaningfulness of one's existence. I call this the ledger theory. Drawing on the work of Raimond Gaita and Julian Barnes's novel The Sense of an Ending, I argue for a phenomenology of remorse that gives us reason to reject the ledger theory. Even those agents whose lives have been exceptionally meaningful in some respects may remain haunted by their past. Certain sorts of misdeeds – those that involve significant, irreparable damage – leave life marred in such a way that the negative remains, even in the face of all the meaningful deeds of life.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"81 - 102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49597049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-11DOI: 10.1017/s003181912200033x
Yuval Avnur
Some philosophers are purists, thinking that the problems of philosophy float above the world of changing empirical circumstances. In Reality+, David Chalmers demonstrates the untenability of this purism by showing that technology raises new philosophical questions and changes old ones. The book is also successful as a relatively accessible, entertaining, and not entirely Eurocentric introduction to the problems of philosophy. It is a sprawlingwork coveringmany different topics, and a kind of manifesto which argues for Chalmers’s sometimes controversial views, some of which are developed more fully in his earlier work, and which together form a general approach to reality in a technological age. Most strikingly, he proposes a ‘structuralist’ account of reality that can solve the traditional problem of global skepticism about the external world. This claim is the central, recurring theme of the book that holds the disparate parts together. Unsurprisingly, since it targets one of philosophy’s enduring problems, it the most philosophically problematic claim in the book. According to Chalmers, you and theworld you seemaywell be part of a simulation – he thinks that there is at least a 25% chance of this (p. 101). His reasoning for this surprising estimate resembles Bostrom (2003)1, but goes beyond it in some details. Throughout the history of the universe, there will probably be many advanced civilizations with the technology to create trillions of detailed simulations containing ‘sims,’ or simulated beings that resemble you. And some of these civilizations are enough like ours in their needs and interests to want to do so (pp. 90, 138-39). Of course, some may not bother. But if even one out of a million such civilizations does so, that one could well create trillions of sims, which would vastly outnumber the non-sims in the universe. Accordingly, you’re probably a sim because most conscious beings in the universe are (Ch. 5). A crucial step is his argument is that simulated beings can be conscious, just like you. His argument for this, though, could have used more discussion, and objections to it considered more fully. Still, one need not agree with all of Chalmers’s arguments (nor his estimate of the chances) to appreciate the main upshot: the simulation scenario is a real possibility. The closer our technology gets to producing a
{"title":"Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy by David J. Chalmers (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022).","authors":"Yuval Avnur","doi":"10.1017/s003181912200033x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s003181912200033x","url":null,"abstract":"Some philosophers are purists, thinking that the problems of philosophy float above the world of changing empirical circumstances. In Reality+, David Chalmers demonstrates the untenability of this purism by showing that technology raises new philosophical questions and changes old ones. The book is also successful as a relatively accessible, entertaining, and not entirely Eurocentric introduction to the problems of philosophy. It is a sprawlingwork coveringmany different topics, and a kind of manifesto which argues for Chalmers’s sometimes controversial views, some of which are developed more fully in his earlier work, and which together form a general approach to reality in a technological age. Most strikingly, he proposes a ‘structuralist’ account of reality that can solve the traditional problem of global skepticism about the external world. This claim is the central, recurring theme of the book that holds the disparate parts together. Unsurprisingly, since it targets one of philosophy’s enduring problems, it the most philosophically problematic claim in the book. According to Chalmers, you and theworld you seemaywell be part of a simulation – he thinks that there is at least a 25% chance of this (p. 101). His reasoning for this surprising estimate resembles Bostrom (2003)1, but goes beyond it in some details. Throughout the history of the universe, there will probably be many advanced civilizations with the technology to create trillions of detailed simulations containing ‘sims,’ or simulated beings that resemble you. And some of these civilizations are enough like ours in their needs and interests to want to do so (pp. 90, 138-39). Of course, some may not bother. But if even one out of a million such civilizations does so, that one could well create trillions of sims, which would vastly outnumber the non-sims in the universe. Accordingly, you’re probably a sim because most conscious beings in the universe are (Ch. 5). A crucial step is his argument is that simulated beings can be conscious, just like you. His argument for this, though, could have used more discussion, and objections to it considered more fully. Still, one need not agree with all of Chalmers’s arguments (nor his estimate of the chances) to appreciate the main upshot: the simulation scenario is a real possibility. The closer our technology gets to producing a","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"107 - 111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49024934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-11DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000341
John M. Gingerich
there are other people, is that one is ignorant about whether there are other people of the sort that are conscious. We never put it that way, of course, because it never occurs to us to think that a non-conscious thing could be a person, as Chalmers is suggesting. It is as if the terms have been changed, and we are meant to take solace in how our old skeptical statements sound under these new meanings. The only way to take solace is to equivocate. Anyone who was ever worried about this:
{"title":"Games: Agency as Art by C Thi Nguyen (Oxford University Press, 2020).","authors":"John M. Gingerich","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000341","url":null,"abstract":"there are other people, is that one is ignorant about whether there are other people of the sort that are conscious. We never put it that way, of course, because it never occurs to us to think that a non-conscious thing could be a person, as Chalmers is suggesting. It is as if the terms have been changed, and we are meant to take solace in how our old skeptical statements sound under these new meanings. The only way to take solace is to equivocate. Anyone who was ever worried about this:","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"111 - 118"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49005939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-28DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000250
Kevin Lynch
Abstract According to the pragmatic hypothesis testing theory, how much evidence we require before we believe something varies depending on the expected costs of falsely believing and disbelieving it. This theory has been used in the self-deception debate to explain our tendencies towards self-deceptive belief formation. This article argues that the application of this theory in the self-deception debate has overlooked the distinction between belief and acceptance, and that the theory in all likelihood models acceptance rather than belief, in which case it is probably not relevant to the explanation of self-deception. It is suggested, however, that doxastic error costs might be relevant to explaining some types of self-deception, though they feature in an evolutionary explanation of it rather than a psychological one.
{"title":"The Pragmatic Hypothesis Testing Theory of Self-Deception and the Belief/Acceptance Distinction","authors":"Kevin Lynch","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000250","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the pragmatic hypothesis testing theory, how much evidence we require before we believe something varies depending on the expected costs of falsely believing and disbelieving it. This theory has been used in the self-deception debate to explain our tendencies towards self-deceptive belief formation. This article argues that the application of this theory in the self-deception debate has overlooked the distinction between belief and acceptance, and that the theory in all likelihood models acceptance rather than belief, in which case it is probably not relevant to the explanation of self-deception. It is suggested, however, that doxastic error costs might be relevant to explaining some types of self-deception, though they feature in an evolutionary explanation of it rather than a psychological one.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"29 - 53"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56753751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-27DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000262
Henk Jasper van Gils-Schmidt
Abstract Harry G. Frankfurt has put the problem of volitional conflict at the center of philosophical attention. If you care fundamentally about your career and your family, but these cares conflict, this conflict undermines the coherency of your decision standard and thereby your ability to choose and act autonomously. The standard response to this problem is to argue that you can overcome volitional conflict by unifying your foundational motivational states. As Frankfurt puts it, the ‘totality of things that an agent cares about’ plus his ‘ordering of how important to him they are effectively specifies his answer to the question of how to live’ (The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 23). In this paper, I critically assess the three main reasons given for such a coherency requirement: 1) we can do only one action at a time; 2) our motivational states come with normative pressure towards coherency; and 3) conflicting motivational states provide us with an incoherent decision-making framework. I conclude that these reasons do not ground a coherency requirement for practical deliberation and argue that we can autonomously express ourselves as volitionally conflicted by acting on our conflicting motivational states over the course of multiple actions.
{"title":"Is Practical Deliberation Bound by a Coherency Requirement? Foundational Normative States, Volitional Conflict, and Autonomy","authors":"Henk Jasper van Gils-Schmidt","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000262","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Harry G. Frankfurt has put the problem of volitional conflict at the center of philosophical attention. If you care fundamentally about your career and your family, but these cares conflict, this conflict undermines the coherency of your decision standard and thereby your ability to choose and act autonomously. The standard response to this problem is to argue that you can overcome volitional conflict by unifying your foundational motivational states. As Frankfurt puts it, the ‘totality of things that an agent cares about’ plus his ‘ordering of how important to him they are effectively specifies his answer to the question of how to live’ (The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 23). In this paper, I critically assess the three main reasons given for such a coherency requirement: 1) we can do only one action at a time; 2) our motivational states come with normative pressure towards coherency; and 3) conflicting motivational states provide us with an incoherent decision-making framework. I conclude that these reasons do not ground a coherency requirement for practical deliberation and argue that we can autonomously express ourselves as volitionally conflicted by acting on our conflicting motivational states over the course of multiple actions.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"55 - 79"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43408059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-27DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000274
Christoph Schuringa
Abstract Hegel conceives of human beings as both natural and spirited. On Robert Pippin's influential reading, we are natural by being ‘ontologically’ like other animals, but spirited through a ‘social-historical achievement’. I contest both the coherence of this reading and its fidelity to Hegel's texts. For Hegel the human being is the truth of the animal. This means that spirit's self-production is not, as Pippin claims, an achievement that an animal confers on itself, but the realization of what the human being is. I end by specifying Aristotelian features of Hegel's account whose neglect by Pippin can help explain what goes wrong in his reading, and provide the outlines of a reading that is both coherent and faithful to Hegel's texts.
{"title":"Hegel on spirited animals","authors":"Christoph Schuringa","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000274","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hegel conceives of human beings as both natural and spirited. On Robert Pippin's influential reading, we are natural by being ‘ontologically’ like other animals, but spirited through a ‘social-historical achievement’. I contest both the coherence of this reading and its fidelity to Hegel's texts. For Hegel the human being is the truth of the animal. This means that spirit's self-production is not, as Pippin claims, an achievement that an animal confers on itself, but the realization of what the human being is. I end by specifying Aristotelian features of Hegel's account whose neglect by Pippin can help explain what goes wrong in his reading, and provide the outlines of a reading that is both coherent and faithful to Hegel's texts.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"485 - 508"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46100903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-14DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000195
R. Moran
Abstract The ordinary human concerns with the past and the future can be seen both as forms of suffering (anxiety toward the future, regret toward the past, etc.) and as illusory because they involve the failure to appreciate the primary reality of the present. In this lecture I argue that while there are certainly ways of being occupied with past or future times that we have reason to criticize, such criticism cannot base itself on any metaphysical claim to the singular or exclusive reality of the present. The task of developing useful forms of describing and assessing the different ways we can go wrong in temporalizing our lives is hindered rather than helped by the suggestion that our concerns with the past and with the future are as such forms of attachment to the Unreal.
{"title":"The Philosophical Retreat to the Here and Now: Notes on Living in Time","authors":"R. Moran","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000195","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The ordinary human concerns with the past and the future can be seen both as forms of suffering (anxiety toward the future, regret toward the past, etc.) and as illusory because they involve the failure to appreciate the primary reality of the present. In this lecture I argue that while there are certainly ways of being occupied with past or future times that we have reason to criticize, such criticism cannot base itself on any metaphysical claim to the singular or exclusive reality of the present. The task of developing useful forms of describing and assessing the different ways we can go wrong in temporalizing our lives is hindered rather than helped by the suggestion that our concerns with the past and with the future are as such forms of attachment to the Unreal.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"413 - 433"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48185786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000213
S. Chappell
David Wiggins was Fellow and Praelector in Philosophy at University College, Oxford, from 1981 to 1989. Needs, Values, Truth (NVT) was his third book. It collects three previously unpublished essays on broadly ethical and metaethical matters, with revised versions of six essays on the same kind of topics published over the years since 1973. (Though some go back a good deal further than 1973: a footnote on the first page of Essay VI reveals, slightly coyly, that at least its first three sections originated in the early 1960s.) Essay I is the longest, at 58 pages; it explores what is logically and ethically distinctive about claims of need. Essays II-V are all in different ways about truth in ethics, as contrasted with truth in other areas: how much there can be, and why, in ethics unlike some other domains, there is some determinacy but not complete determinacy. Essays VI-VII consider and refine an Aristotelian understanding of practical reason (and un-reason). Essay VIII is about free will. Essay IX addresses personal identity, the value of survival, and so in a way the meaning of life, which is also a central theme of Essay III. A tenth chapter, 37 pages long and divided into 4 main sections, does not deserve the relative neglect that is risked by its being titled ‘Postscript’. This characteristically self-critical closing chapter adds reflections and qualifications to Essays I-IX: its section 1 draws some threads together about ‘intuitionism’ in ethics, section 2 adds some further thoughts about needs, and sections 3–4 have more to say about truth, both as to its philosophical logic and as to its applicability (or otherwise) in ethics. Between Professor Wiggins’ first two books, Identity and SpatioTemporal Continuity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967) and Sameness and Substance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1980) there was (if I may) a certain continuity, to the extent that the second is almost an
David Wiggins于1981年至1989年在牛津大学学院担任哲学研究员和Praelector。《需要，价值观，真相》是他的第三本书。它收集了三篇以前未发表的关于广义伦理和元伦理问题的文章，以及自1973年以来发表的六篇关于同类主题的文章的修订版。（尽管有些人可以追溯到1973年：《随笔六》第一页的脚注略显腼腆地透露，至少前三节起源于20世纪60年代初。）《随笔一》是最长的，共58页；它探讨了需求主张在逻辑和伦理上的独特之处。与其他领域的真理相比，第二至第五篇文章对伦理学中的真理都有不同的看法：在伦理学中，与其他领域不同，有多少真理，以及为什么在伦理学中有一些确定性，但没有完全的确定性。论文VI-VII考虑并完善了亚里士多德对实践理性（和非理性）的理解。散文八是关于自由意志的。第九篇论述了个人身份、生存价值，因此在某种程度上论述了生命的意义，这也是第三篇的中心主题。第十章长达37页，分为4个主要部分，不应因其标题为“后记”而受到相对忽视。这一典型的自我批评的结束章为论文I-IX增加了反思和资格：第1节汇集了一些关于伦理学中“直觉主义”的线索，第2节增加了一些关于需求的进一步思考，第3-4节对真理有更多的看法，无论是对其哲学逻辑还是对其在伦理学中的适用性（或其他方面）。威金斯教授的前两本书《身份与时空连续性》（牛津：巴兹尔·布莱克威尔，1967年）和《相似性与物质》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛，1980年）之间存在某种连续性（如果可以的话），第二本书几乎是
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