Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law最新文献

State payers may face financial incentives to restrict use of high-cost medications. Yet, restrictions on access to high-value medications may have deleterious effects on population health. Direct-acting antivirals (DAAs), available since 2013, can cure chronic infection with hepatitis C virus (HCV). With prices upward of $90,000 for a treatment course, states have struggled to ensure access to DAAs for Medicaid beneficiaries and the incarcerated, populations with a disproportionate share of HCV. Advance purchase commitments (APCs), wherein a payer commits to purchase a certain quantity of medications at lower prices, offer payers incentives to increase access to high-value medications while also offering companies guaranteed revenue. This article discusses the use of subscription models, a type of APC, to support increased access to high-value DAAs for treating HCV. First, the authors provide background information about HCV, its treatment, and state financing of prescription medications. They then review the implementation of HCV subscription models in two states, Louisiana and Washington, and the early evidence of their impact. The article discusses challenges to evaluating state-sponsored subscription models, and it concludes by discussing implications of subscription models that target DAAs and other high-value, high-cost medicines.

Context: When nonretail pharmacy sales exceed 70% of sales, manufacturers of infused, injected, implanted, inhaled, or instilled (5i) drugs are required to calculate average manufacturer price (AMP) under a different methodology than that used for drugs predominantly distributed through retail channels. Specifically, the modified methodology includes pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) rebates in the calculation of AMP for 5i drugs. The modified methodology reduces manufacturers' Medicaid rebate liability and increases net costs to the Medicaid program.

Methods: The authors identified 15 5i drugs predominantly dispensed through the nonretail setting. Using 2013-2017 data from Medicaid, Medicare, SSR Health, and 340B program eligibility, they estimated differences in AMP, Medicaid rebates, and net Medicaid costs under both the standard and 5i AMP methodologies.

Findings: AMP was 42% lower, on average, under the 5i methodology than under the standard methodology. From 2013-2017, Medicaid rebates under the 5i methodology were 82% lower than under the standard methodology, resulting in manufacturers of these 15 drugs reducing their Medicaid rebate liability by $1.1 billion in five years.

Conclusions: Inclusion of PBM rebates in the calculation of AMP for 5i drugs significantly reduced Medicaid rebates, resulting in higher Medicaid spending. This may incentivize manufacturers to shift sales to nonretail channels. To remove this incentive, policy makers should consider excluding PBM rebates from the calculation of AMP for 5i drugs.

Context: To what extent does pharmaceutical revenue growth depend on new medicines versus increasing prices for existing medicines? Moreover, does using list prices, as is commonly done, instead of prices net of confidential rebates offered by manufacturers, which are harder to observe, change the relative importance of the sources of revenue growth?

Methods: This study uses data from SSR Health LLC to address these research questions using decomposition methods that analyze list prices, prices net of rebates, and sales for branded pharmaceutical products sold primarily through retail pharmacies.

Findings: From 2009 to 2019, retail pharmaceutical revenue growth was primarily driven by new products rather than by price increases on existing products. Failing to account for confidential rebates creates a more prominent role for price increases in explaining revenue growth, because list price inflation during this period was 10.9%, whereas net price inflation was 3.3%.

Conclusions: Policies that restrict price growth on existing medicines likely need to be coupled with policies that reduce launch prices to have a meaningful long-term impact on pharmaceutical revenue growth. Using pharmaceutical list prices is often an inadequate approximation for net prices because the role of rebates has increased and varies by drug class.

Some of the news about insulin is shocking. In the United States, people have died because they were rationing a life-saving medication discovered in the 1920s. How could this happen? Perhaps a better question is why anyone should be surprised. The insulin story both illustrates and challenges many understandings of the problems with insurance, treatment, payment, and politics in the US health care system. It particularly highlights consequences of structuring price discounts as rebates to health plans or government instead of as lower individual prices to patients. Perversely, this encourages higher list prices, which, for patients without insurance or with high cost sharing, make insulin less affordable than it would be without the rebates.

This article compares the pharmaceutical pricing policies employed by public and private insurers in the United States with seven price and spending control strategies employed in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Differences between American and European policies explain why American pharmaceutical prices and per capita spending are higher than in European nations. The article then analyzes two recent bills as examples of significant American reform ideas-H.R. 3, the Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act (introduced in 2019) and the Build Back Better Act (BBBA, introduced in 2021)-and compares them with European cost control strategies. Key drug price provisions of the BBBA were incorporated into the recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). H.R. 3 would have used an international (mostly European) price index to cap U.S. prices; the BBBA would cap Medicare prices at a discount from average U.S. market prices. Neither bill would employ the key cost control strategies that European nations do. Both bills would have significantly less impact on prices than legislation that employs European-style cost controls. This article proposes steps that Congress could take in line with European strategies to lower purchase prices and costs for patients. These measures would have to overcome political obstacles that currently stymie reform.

International reference prices (IRP), also called external reference prices, are widely used across developed nations. IRP uses the prices paid in other countries to either inform negotiations with the pharmaceutical industry or as a cap on market prices. The authors review the application of IRP to cap the prices of negotiated outcomes in the context of US proposals for changing the way prescription drug prices are established for the Medicare program. They examine the economic, political, and administrative issues associated with the use of IRP, and they summarize the evidence on the impacts of IRP.

The United States pays more for medical care than any other nation in the world, including for prescription drugs. These costs are inequitably distributed, as individuals from underrepresented racial and ethnic groups in the United States experience the highest costs of care and unequal access to high-quality, evidence-based medication therapy. Pharmacoequity refers to equity in access to pharmacotherapies or ensuring that all patients, regardless of race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, or availability of resources, have access to the highest quality of pharmacotherapy required to manage their health conditions. Herein the authors describe the urgent need to prioritize pharmacoequity. This goal will require a bold and innovative examination of social policy, research infrastructure, patient and prescriber characteristics, as well as health policy determinants of inequitable medication access. In this article, the authors describe these determinants, identify drivers of ongoing inequities in prescription drug access, and provide a framework for the path toward achieving pharmacoequity.

Context: Reforming the Medicare Part D program-which provides prescription drug coverage to 49 million beneficiaries-has emerged as a key policy priority.

Methods: The authors evaluate prescription drug claims from a 100% sample of Medicare Part D beneficiaries to evaluate the current spending distribution across different payers for different types of beneficiaries across different benefit phases. They then model how these estimates would change under a proposal to redesign the Medicare Part D standard benefit.

Findings: Spending patterns differ for beneficiaries who do and do not qualify for low-income subsidies. Part D plans face limited liability for total spending under the current standard benefit design, amounting to 36% of total spending for beneficiaries who do not receive low-income subsidies and 28% of total spending for those who do. Proposed reforms would increase plan liability and significantly change the distribution of liability across plans, drug manufacturers, and the federal government.

Conclusions: Though the original goal of the Part D program was to create a market of competing private plans that provide prescription drug coverage to Medicare beneficiaries, the standard benefit design that was included in the original legislation reflected significant political compromises. Reforming the standard benefit design to give plans more skin in the game could significantly affect competition in the market, with differential impact across drug classes and types of beneficiaries.

Payments from the pharmaceutical industry to US physicians are common. In determining which payments rise to the level of an illegal kickback under the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Inspector General (OIG) has stated in nonbinding guidance that influencing or "swaying" physician prescribing is key. OIG has highlighted as a compliance standard the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Code on Interactions with Health Professions, which stipulates that permissible payments are those that do not interfere with prescribing. However, recent evidence has shown that most payments influence physician prescribing, driving higher prescription drug costs by increasing use of brand-name and low-value drugs. This evidence implies that many payments that are currently commonplace could be subject to prosecution under AKS. Given that these payments increase costs to patients and the health care system, there is a public interest in curtailing them. This article proposes a range of actions available to stakeholders-including industry, providers, regulators, and payers-to mitigate the cost-increasing effect of industry payments to physicians.