Perspectives on Political Science最新文献_第9页

Unalienable Rights and Some Libertarians 不可剥夺权利与一些自由主义者

Q4 Social Sciences

Perspectives on Political Science

Pub Date : 2021-10-14 DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2021.1982608

C. J. Wolfe

Abstract The idea that all human beings are endowed with unalienable rights is a core element of America’s public philosophy going back to the Declaration of Independence. But it is increasingly clear that many Americans have abandoned the idea that some rights are unalienable- especially, I would argue, libertarians. Given the prevalence of libertarianism in our culture, an important question is whether all libertarians logically ought to reject unalienable rights given their philosophical anthropology. What I propose to do in this article is three things: First, I will introduce and give a definition for “unalienable rights” by reviewing the recent proceedings of the State Department’s Commission on Unalienable Rights. Second, I will show why the concept of unalienable rights is generally incompatible with the libertarian philosophical anthropology. Third, I will survey the writings of specific libertarian philosophers, economists, and law professors to consider whether they believe in unalienable rights. This will allow us to better understand the status of unalienable rights in America today.

摘要所有人都被赋予不可剥夺的权利，这是美国公共哲学的核心要素，可以追溯到《独立宣言》。但越来越明显的是，许多美国人已经放弃了一些权利是不可剥夺的想法，尤其是我认为的自由主义者。鉴于自由意志主义在我们文化中的盛行，一个重要的问题是，鉴于他们的哲学人类学，是否所有自由意志主义者都应该在逻辑上拒绝不可剥夺的权利。我在这篇文章中建议做三件事：首先，我将通过回顾国务院不可剥夺权利委员会最近的会议记录，介绍并给出“不可剥夺的权利”的定义。其次，我将展示为什么不可剥夺权利的概念通常与自由主义哲学人类学不兼容。第三，我将调查特定自由主义哲学家、经济学家和法学教授的著作，以考虑他们是否相信不可剥夺的权利。这将使我们更好地了解当今美国不可剥夺权利的现状。

引用次数: 0

Reason and Politics: The Nature of Political Phenomena 理性与政治:政治现象的本质

Q4 Social Sciences

Perspectives on Political Science

Pub Date : 2021-10-11 DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2021.1981099

Paul T. Wilford

In the opening paragraph of Reason and Politics, Mark Blitz announces the work’s scope, presupposition, and purpose: to explore “the nature of basic political phenomena,” in accord with “the classical view that the political phenomena are the heart of human affairs,” in order to illuminate human nature. This formulation of the project’s intention is helpfully supplemented by a concluding retrospective description of the work as the defense of a philosophic standpoint “which tries to understand practical and theoretical activity by linking what we project in advance and take for granted with the nature of things seen primarily in classical terms.” Blitz’s account of human activity as the pursuit of the good shaped, informed, and inflected (but not wholly determined) by the particular regime in which one lives aims to account for the two conspicuous phenomena that might appear to justify alternative philosophical approaches, namely “the possibility of novelty and of the difference between human things and what we can see through modern physical science.” The simplicity of the introductory formulation of the book’s aim thus belies the magnitude of the work’s ambition: a defense of classical philosophy that confronts and refutes (by accounting for) the rival theories of the human being offered by modern philosophy and by historicism. In the course of this remarkable study, we learn that self-knowledge in our “post-modern” condition requires seeing ourselves in light of both ancient politics and ancient philosophy; the former is the historical moment that provides the essential touchstone for serious trans-historical comparison of human experience and the latter is the way of seeing and thinking most suited to grasping the nature of things. What was first politically and philosophically proves to be not merely a temporal beginning but an archē—“classical” because exemplary, exemplary because architectonic. In Blitz’s estimation, the historically oldest forms of politics and political philosophy provide the trans-historical standard for judging all historical phenomena: “The understanding of goodness, justice, and virtue that forms the best classical lives and regimes is the standard by which the other regimes should be measured.” Contrary to the prevailing prejudice in favor of the new, modern, or up-to-date, therefore, Blitz contends that “what is first is fullest and broadest, and is the ground of proper experience and understanding of the just, virtuous, beautiful, free, powerful, and so on.” By beginning “with the classics” or by working “one’s way back to them so that one can begin with them,” one is able to arrive “at the root experiences that are the clue to the fullest experience” and that are therefore most illustrative of human nature, which must be seen in light of both what is common to all and what is rare, namely the outstanding excellence exhibited by a few. Accordingly, engaging in “historical discussion” is necessary to disclose the f

在《理性与政治》的开篇，马克·布利茨宣布了这部作品的范围、前提和目的：根据“政治现象是人类事务的核心的经典观点”，探索“基本政治现象的本质”，以阐明人性。该项目意图的表述得到了对该作品的总结性回顾性描述的有益补充，该描述是对哲学立场的辩护，“哲学立场试图通过将我们预先计划并认为理所当然的东西与主要用古典术语看待的事物的性质联系起来，来理解实践和理论活动。“布利茨将人类活动描述为对美好事物的追求，这种美好事物是由一个人所生活的特定制度塑造的、知情的和有变化的（但并非完全决定的），目的是解释两个明显的现象，这两个现象似乎可以证明替代哲学方法的合理性，即“新奇的可能性，以及人类事物与我们通过现代物理科学所能看到的事物之间的差异。“因此，这本书目的的简单介绍掩盖了作品野心的巨大性：对古典哲学的辩护，它（通过解释）了现代哲学和历史主义提供的人类对立理论。在这一非凡的研究过程中，我们了解到，在我们的“后现代”条件下，自我认识需要从古代政治和古代哲学的角度来看待自己；前者是为人类经验的严肃跨历史比较提供重要试金石的历史时刻，后者是最适合把握事物本质的看待和思考方式。最初在政治和哲学上被证明不仅是一个时间上的开始，而且是一个拱形的——“经典”是因为典范，典范是因为建筑。根据布利茨的估计，历史上最古老的政治和政治哲学形式为判断所有历史现象提供了跨历史的标准：“对善、正义和美德的理解，形成了最好的古典生活和政权，是衡量其他政权的标准。”，因此，现代的或最新的，布利茨认为，“首先是最充分和最广泛的，是正确体验和理解正义、道德、美丽、自由、强大等等的基础。”通过“从经典开始”或通过“一个人回到经典的道路上，这样你就可以从它们开始”，你就能够“到达作为最充分体验线索的根本体验”因此，它们最能说明人性，必须从所有人的共同点和罕见点来看待人性，即少数人表现出的杰出品质。因此，有必要进行“历史讨论”，以揭示人类的全部可能性，这些可能性通过“从经典到现代的每一步比较”以及随后现代思想家之间的对话来展示。虽然布利茨没有为这种方法提出持续的方法论论点，但他的整个工作是从“基本现象”的“今天的意义”开始，并通过与它们过去的实例进行比较来探索它们现在的表现。关注相似术语的丰富内涵以及不同但重叠的习语之间的共鸣，可以发现我们今天的经历虽然与过去不同（甚至有很大不同），但并不像我们经常被“教导要相信”的那样新颖和前所未有。“1只有通过旨在恢复古典经验的历史研究——包括实践和理论——我们才能理性地思考政治的本质。因此，《理性与政治》是一部深刻的历史作品，目的是超越历史——超越细节的历史性，去看待自然的持久普遍性。然而，只有仔细关注教区的特殊之处，才能阐明什么是世界性的和普遍性的。

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引用次数: 0

The Paradox of the Person as the Paradox of Modernity 作为现代性悖论的人的悖论

Q4 Social Sciences

Perspectives on Political Science

Pub Date : 2021-10-02 DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2021.1973304

S. Mcguire

引用次数: 1

Politics and the Earthly City in Augustine’s City of God, Veronica Roberts Ogle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021, 201 pp., ISBN: 978-1-108-84259-4. 奥古斯丁上帝之城中的政治与尘世之城，维罗妮卡·罗伯茨·奥格尔，剑桥:剑桥大学出版社，2021年，201页，ISBN: 978-1-108-84259-4。

Q4 Social Sciences

Perspectives on Political Science

Pub Date : 2021-10-02 DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2021.1956273

Thomas P. Harmon

引用次数: 0

Lincoln and Shakespeare at Peoria 林肯和莎士比亚在皮奥里亚

Q4 Social Sciences

Perspectives on Political Science

Pub Date : 2021-09-28 DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2021.1983355

T. Richards

Abstract Abraham Lincoln famously studied Shakespeare yet, he rarely quoted the Bard. In his “Speech on the Kansas-Nebraska Act at Peoria, Illinois,” three times he quotes and at least twice he alludes to Shakespeare. Those references include, chronologically: Hamlet (3.3.97), two subtle references to Richard III and Henry IV Part 1, Macbeth (3.2.55), and a reference to either Macbeth or Hamlet. The importance of the Peoria Speech in Lincoln’s career is well attested. A careful analysis of these references, both as Lincoln used them, and in their original context, reveals Lincoln’s profound grasp of Shakespeare and (given Peoria’s significance) Shakespeare’s crucial influence on Lincoln’s thought and statesmanship.

亚伯拉罕·林肯研究莎士比亚是出了名的，但他很少引用吟游诗人的话。在他“在伊利诺伊州皮奥里亚发表的关于堪萨斯-内布拉斯加法案的演讲”中，他三次引用莎士比亚，至少两次暗指莎士比亚。按时间顺序，这些引用包括：哈姆雷特（3.3.97），两个对理查三世和亨利四世的微妙引用，第一部分，麦克白（3.2.55），以及对麦克白或哈姆雷特的引用。皮奥里亚演说在林肯职业生涯中的重要性已得到充分证明。仔细分析这些参考文献，无论是在林肯使用它们的时候，还是在它们的原始背景下，都揭示了林肯对莎士比亚的深刻理解，以及（鉴于皮奥里亚的重要性）莎士比亚对林肯思想和政治家风度的关键影响。

引用次数: 1

Rawlsian Jurisprudence and the Limits of Democracy 罗尔斯法学与民主的局限

Q4 Social Sciences

Perspectives on Political Science

Pub Date : 2021-09-23 DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2021.1950488

S. G. Zeitlin

Abstract The present article analyses John Rawls’s advocacy of judicial review via a close reading of Rawls’s discussions of his “principles of paternalism” and his “four-stage sequence” in A Theory of Justice (1971). The article surveys Rawls’s political “principles of paternalism,” the limits, checks, and constraints he imposes on majority rule and civic participation, and finally the role Rawls assigns to courts, judges, and judicial review within his political conception of justice. Following upon this survey, this article contends that the particular relations of supremacy and domination (Herrschafts-Verhältnisse) at which Rawls’s political thought aims are judicial or juridical—the supremacy of judges over citizens, of courts over legislatures, and of the judiciary over participatory politics.

摘要本文通过细读罗尔斯在《正义论》（1971）中对其“家长主义原则”和“四阶段序列”的论述，分析了约翰·罗尔斯对司法审查的主张。本文考察了罗尔斯的政治“家长主义原则”，他对多数人统治和公民参与施加的限制、制约和约束，以及罗尔斯在其政治正义观中赋予法院、法官和司法审查的角色。根据这项调查，本文认为，罗尔斯政治思想的目标是司法或司法的至高无上和统治的特殊关系（Herrschafts Verhältnisse）——法官对公民的至高无上，法院对立法机构的至高无上，司法对参与政治的至高无上。

引用次数: 1

David Walsh’s The Sacramentality of the Person 大卫·沃尔什的《人的圣礼

Q4 Social Sciences

Perspectives on Political Science

Pub Date : 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2021.1973302

James Greenaway

Abstract David Walsh’s The Priority of the Person is a collection of essays that could have been entitled The Sacramentality of the Person. This review highlights the quality of sacredness that is pervasive explored throughout the book. Walsh, in reflections upon significant political, philosophical, and historical thinkers and topics, presents the person in his or her absolute, ineffable, inviolable value. Since the significance of personhood is discussed as the occasion of transcendence, we argue that The Priority of the Person effectively reveals a horizon of sacramentality in which it is the person who, by virtue of his or her very existence, makes present the hidden, but always emergent, quality of sacredness in our midst.

摘要:大卫·沃尔什的《人的优先地位》是一本可以被命名为《人的圣事》的散文集。这篇评论强调了贯穿全书的神圣性。在对重要的政治、哲学和历史思想家和话题的反思中，沃尔什展现了人的绝对、不可言喻、不可侵犯的价值。既然人格的意义是作为超越的场合来讨论的，我们认为《人格的优先地位》有效地揭示了圣礼的视界，在这个视界中，正是人格，凭借他或她的存在，在我们中间呈现了隐藏的，但总是出现的神圣品质。

引用次数: 1

David Walsh, The Priority of the Person: Political, Philosophical and Historical Discoveries 大卫·沃尔什，《人的优先权:政治、哲学和历史发现》

Q4 Social Sciences

Perspectives on Political Science

Pub Date : 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2021.1973303

V. Ogle

In his latest book, The Priority of the Person: Political, Philosophical and Historical Discoveries, David Walsh offers a collection of essays that flesh out his personalist vision.1 Separated into three parts, “The Political Discovery,” “The Philosophical Discovery,” and “The Historical Discovery,” the book celebrates what Walsh views as the greatest modern insight, the priority of the person, from a variety of angles. The result is a thoughtful and original series of mediations on the theme, and a welcome invitation to share in Walsh’s wonder at the phenomenon of personhood. Though wide-ranging in topic, the central message of these essays is that persons are always beyond what can be written about them on the page. In his introductory chapter, Walsh argues that the priority of the person is a distinctly modern idea, discovered thanks to the turn toward the subject. Though he notes that the concept itself originated with the Greek prosōpon, and was taken up into Christianity for theological purposes, Walsh argues that it was not until the modern era that the move establishing the priority of the person was made. This was the break with the previously “instinctive subordination of the individual to the whole,” which he associates with liberalism, a political phenomenon founded on the conviction that the individual cannot be so subordinated (p. 3). Giving a historical overview of the political philosophers who paved the way for its emergence, Walsh shows how their endeavors were held back by their conception of human beings as individuals, a thin idea that failed to account for the relationality of personhood. Indeed, even today, Walsh argues, a philosophy of the person has yet to be fully worked out. Calling for such an eventuality, he spends the rest of the book fleshing out a history of why it has yet to be achieved. In section one, which follows the introductory chapter, Walsh zeroes in on the political discovery of the priority of the person. In arguing that the political discovery preceded the philosophical one, Walsh follows Hegel’s famous Owl of Minerva adage, suggesting that philosophy is always a reflection upon practices already in place. For Walsh, liberal democracy not only has a practical priority, but it also works better in practice than theory; indeed, he argues, liberal theorists still cannot account for the personhood they instinctively seek to protect. Ultimately, liberalism is noteworthy for its fundamental intuition, which is in accord with the true nature of the person. Indeed, for this reason, Walsh considers the emergence of liberalism in history to be almost fated, going so far as to suggest that democracy is prior to history. Because I found this claim especially puzzling, I will try to unpack its logic. Walsh, as I have said, argues that liberalism is a great achievement because it is rooted in a true conviction about the person. This, I think, is why he argues that “... so long as the democratic impulse lives within a

在他的新书《人的优先:政治、哲学和历史的发现》中，大卫·沃尔什提供了一系列文章，充实了他的个人主义观点这本书分为三个部分，“政治发现”、“哲学发现”和“历史发现”，从不同的角度颂扬沃尔什认为最伟大的现代洞察力，即人的优先地位。其结果是对这一主题进行了一系列深思熟虑的原创思考，并邀请我们分享沃尔什对人格现象的惊叹。虽然主题广泛，但这些文章的中心信息是，人们总是超越了纸上所能写的。在他的引言中，沃尔什认为，人的优先权是一个明显的现代观念，由于转向主题而被发现。尽管沃尔什指出，这个概念本身起源于希腊语prosōpon，并因神学目的被纳入基督教，但他认为，直到现代，确立个人优先地位的举动才出现。这打破了以前“个人本能地服从于整体”的观念，他将自由主义与自由主义联系在一起，自由主义是一种政治现象，建立在个人不能如此服从的信念之上(第3页)。沃尔什对为自由主义的出现铺平道路的政治哲学家进行了历史回顾，展示了他们的努力是如何被他们作为个体的人的概念所阻碍的，这是一个未能解释人格关系的单薄观念。沃尔什认为，事实上，即使在今天，人的哲学也尚未得到充分的研究。在呼吁实现这一目标的同时，他在书的其余部分详细阐述了为何这一目标尚未实现的历史。在引言之后的第一节中，沃尔什把注意力集中在政治上对人的优先地位的发现上。在论证政治发现先于哲学发现时，沃尔什遵循了黑格尔著名的密涅瓦猫头鹰(Owl of Minerva)格言，暗示哲学总是对已经存在的实践的反思。对沃尔什来说，自由民主不仅具有实际的优先权，而且在实践中比在理论中更有效;事实上，他认为，自由主义理论家仍然无法解释他们本能地寻求保护的人格。最终，自由主义值得注意的是它的基本直觉，它符合人的真实本性。的确，出于这个原因，沃尔什认为自由主义在历史上的出现几乎是命中注定的，甚至认为民主先于历史。因为我发现这种说法特别令人费解，所以我将尝试解开其逻辑。正如我所说，沃尔什认为自由主义是一项伟大的成就，因为它植根于对人的真正信念。我认为，这就是为什么他认为“……只要民主的冲动存在于一个人心中，它就实现了它的现实”(第72页)。因此，在反思自由主义时，他的兴趣似乎不在于某个特定政权功能的本质，而在于一种与人的尊严相一致的政府形式的出现。对沃尔什来说，人类能够进行自我管理是非常重要的，因为这让他们能够承担责任，而这是人格的内在导向。从这个角度来看，所有其他形式的政府都是幼稚化的。引人注目的是，沃尔什认为政治生活是建立在自我赠予的可能性之上的，同样的可能性使得人格如此特别。因此，通过赋予公民自治的责任，自由主义政权以一种新的方式实现了政治生活的基本意义。这并不是说自由主义政权是自我捐赠的典范，但它们是由自我捐赠的可能性所独有的。我想，这就是沃尔什所说的“成功无关紧要，因为它已经无关紧要了”的意思

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引用次数: 0

Grateful Response 感恩的回应

Q4 Social Sciences

Perspectives on Political Science

Pub Date : 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2021.1973306

D. Walsh

Thinking, Aristotle reminded us, is best done in the company of friends. It is the way we share what concerns us most deeply and thereby gain a heightened awareness of its reality. The image of the philosopher alone with his thoughts is contrary to a central feature the intellectual life. That is, that it is continually carried on in the company of others. Even when we are apart we still carry the voice of the other within us. Conversation is ongoing as we consider what our friends might say, and measure our own thought in relation to an anticipated response.1 For all of these reasons I am deeply grateful for the careful reading my symposiast friends have given to The Priority of the Person. You have lightened the load and shortened the road as we walk along together. Readers affirm the task an author has undertaken by giving some assurance that it is worthy of reflection. That is no small contribution. Your generous and sympathetic reading sustains me in my effort to advance what you affirm is of merit within it. I deeply appreciate the considerable investment of time and attention you have made, one that enables us to carry on a conversation of greater seriousness and depth than most authors enjoy. Thank you for your kindness, especially that of the symposium editor, John von Heyking, as well as the forbearance of the editor of Perspectives, Dan Mahoney, who stands as the silent host of the affair. It is in the same spirit of hospitality that I attempt to address the observations and reservations that have been tenderly raised in the contributions. You have done me the great service of revealing how my work is perceived and in that way you have allowed me to see it in a different light, one more likely to reflect a wider public perception. You prompt me to defend and explain my intentions more clearly, not only to make the ideas that much more persuasive, but also to deepen their hold in my own mind. In the spirit of such collaboration I wish to sympathetically engage the perspective from which your friendly and perceptive observations have been made. While the result may not arrive at uniform agreement it will certainly aim at the concord that in Aristotle’s account is the highest goal of friendship. Even friendly disagreement is a form of mutual understanding. That at any rate is the inspiration that guides my response. I begin with the assumption of general consensus on the challenges that confront our contemporary world, marked as it is by a draining of spiritual authority from the premodern forms of meaning. If one thinks of the axial age as the one that gave us reason and revelation, along with the world religions, then we are clearly in a phase where their historical influence has ebbed.2 Science, and the adventitious appeal to human rights, have not managed to shape a comparable self-understanding for the civilization we inhabit. Militant ideologies, that sought to impose by force a meaning where none existed, may have receded with the

亚里士多德提醒我们，思考最好在朋友的陪伴下进行。这是我们分享我们最深切关注的问题的方式，从而提高对其现实的认识。哲学家独自思考的形象与知识分子生活的一个核心特征背道而驰。也就是说，它是在其他人的陪伴下不断进行的。即使我们分开了，我们内心仍然有对方的声音。当我们考虑朋友可能会说什么，并衡量我们自己的想法与预期反应的关系时，对话正在进行。1出于所有这些原因，我非常感谢我的专题讨论会朋友们对《人的优先权》的仔细阅读。当我们一起走的时候，你减轻了负担，缩短了道路。读者肯定了作者所承担的任务，并保证这是值得反思的。这是一个不小的贡献。你慷慨而富有同情心的阅读支持了我努力推进你所认为的有价值的东西。我非常感谢你投入了大量的时间和注意力，这使我们能够进行比大多数作者更严肃、更深入的对话。感谢你的好意，尤其是研讨会编辑约翰·冯·海金的好意，以及《透视》编辑丹·马奥尼的宽容，他是这件事的沉默主持人。正是本着同样的热情好客精神，我试图处理在发言中温和提出的意见和保留意见。你为我提供了巨大的服务，揭示了人们对我作品的看法，通过这种方式，你让我从不同的角度看待它，更可能反映更广泛的公众看法。你促使我更清楚地捍卫和解释我的意图，不仅使这些想法更有说服力，而且加深了它们在我心中的影响力。本着这种合作的精神，我希望以同情的态度，从你友好和敏锐的观察角度出发。虽然结果可能不会达成一致，但它肯定会以亚里士多德所说的友谊的最高目标为目标。即使是友好的分歧也是相互理解的一种形式。无论如何，这是指导我回应的灵感。我首先假设对我们当代世界面临的挑战达成普遍共识，因为它的特点是精神权威从前现代形式的意义中流失。如果有人认为轴心时代和世界宗教一起给了我们理性和启示，那么我们显然正处于它们的历史影响已经消退的阶段。2科学和对人权的偶然吸引力，未能为我们所居住的文明形成可比的自我理解。试图通过武力强加一种根本不存在的意义的激进意识形态，可能已经随着极权主义的动荡而消退。现在，我们只剩下前现代传统的碎片和失败系统的碎片，这些碎片似乎无法支持任何更广泛的一致性。让我们的时刻特别尖锐的是，唯一一种在更起码的层面上拼凑出连贯性的现代形式，自由民主，已经开始显示出其自身瓦解的迹象。自由主义政治的危机在极端党派主义中表现得很明显，这种极端党派主义免除了宪法的限制，这是最糟糕的时刻。这意味着抵抗极权主义的恢复力量现在似乎正在屈服于其中的极端主义分子。我的对话者充分而公正地注意到，对自由主义机构应对分裂力量的能力减弱的担忧。任何一个在仔细阅读亚历克西斯·德·托克维尔（Alexis de Tocqueville）和乔纳森·温斯文（Jonathan Wensveen）时磨练出政治敏感性的人，都必然会呼应《美国民主》第二卷的悲观预兆。然而，正如温斯文本人所指出的，托克维尔最终建议将自由实践作为一种克服放弃与温和专制安全斗争的倾向的方式。在这项众所周知的建议中，经常被忽视的是托克维尔设想其成功的机制。对贵族自豪感或坚忍的自我责任感的呼吁并不是他建议的全部。还有他在

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引用次数: 0

Recovering the Person: A Review of David Walsh’s The Priority of the Person: Political, Philosophical, and Historical Discoveries 恢复人:对大卫·沃尔什的《人的优先:政治、哲学和历史发现》的回顾

Q4 Social Sciences

Perspectives on Political Science

Pub Date : 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2021.1973305

J. Wensveen

Abstract In The Priority of the Person: Political, Philosophical, and Historical Discoveries, David Walsh attempts to showcase the discovery of the person as “the pivot around whom everything revolves”. In so doing, however, he not only rebuts the claims of traditionalists and progressive liberals that liberal democracy is either self-subverting or hopelessly incoherent, but also, the claims among many today that our being as members of a particular race, class, or gender trumps our being as persons. Accordingly, by bringing to our attention the “hidden liberal strength,” Walsh’s “personalist” project also brings to our attention the fact that, however preoccupied with the concept of ‘intersectionality’ we become, at the core of the liberal experiment lies not the recognition of the inviolability of one’s “group identity,” but rather, the recognition of “the person, each person,” as “prior to all else that is”.

在《人的优先:政治、哲学和历史的发现》一书中，大卫·沃尔什试图展示人的发现是“一切都围绕着他旋转的轴心”。然而，在这样做的过程中，他不仅反驳了传统主义者和进步自由主义者的说法，即自由民主要么是自我颠覆，要么是无可救药地不一致，而且还反驳了今天许多人的说法，即我们作为一个特定种族、阶级或性别的成员胜过我们作为一个人的存在。因此，通过让我们注意到“隐藏的自由主义力量”，沃尔什的“个人主义”计划也让我们注意到这样一个事实:无论我们变得多么专注于“交叉性”的概念，自由主义实验的核心并不在于承认一个人的“群体身份”的不可侵犯性，而是承认“个人，每个人”“先于其他所有人”。

引用次数: 1