Pub Date : 2023-06-08DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2023.2218139
P. Moreira
Abstract From a label that used to mean an ideological family in favor of customs and tradition, the meaning of “conservatism” has been recently changing to encompass more nationalistic and populistic connotations. Given this shift, I use two works to discuss what it means to label something as “conservative” and to talk about the nature and function of political labels in general. On the one hand, I use David McIlwain’s recent work on Strauss and Oakeshott as a gateway to discuss the meaning of this label and of political labels in general. McIlwain’s is critical of the idea that Strauss and Oakeshott are conservatives and he separates them as much as possible from conservatism’s “conventional” senses: reactionism, traditionalism, and free-market liberalism. In this essay, I argue that the significance of Strauss’ and Oakeshott’s conservatism is not found in any straightforward defense of reactionist, traditionalist, or free-market policies. Rather, Strauss and Oakeshott were ideological innovators who offered new concepts that enabled conservatives to redraw the limits of the conservative family – to conflate several disparate opponents as enemies of conservatism, and to exclude other conservatives as not being part of the conservative family. Then, and on the one hand, I look at how Oakeshott’s notion of “rationalism” entails a critique of religious defenses of conservatism. On the other hand, I describe how Strauss’ notion of “historicism” entails a criticism of Oakeshott’s style of contextualist conservatism. Finally, I use the ideas of this essay to look at a recent attempt at ideological innovation, i.e. Yoram Hazony’s Conservatism that tries to take conservatism in a nationalist direction. I show that Hazony’s conservative nationalism does not succeed. Contrarily to Strauss and Oakeshott, Hazony creates concepts that do not innovate conservatism, and that are absent in his critiques of other conservatives and of the opponents of conservatism.
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Pub Date : 2023-06-08DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2023.2218142
Richard Cassleman
Abstract There is an age-old debate regarding Augustine’s pessimism which has garnered much attention in recent years: Does Augustine have any hope for temporal politics or not? The traditional interpretation holds him to be a political pessimist, while recent scholarship has mounted a counter-offensive rooted in an Augustinian hope for the political realm. This essay offers a new contribution to the debate by directly linking Augustine’s treatment of just war to these recent debates. The literature on Augustinian pessimism and optimism is impressive, but its treatment of war is often obscured by the long shadow of Reinhold Niebuhr’s Augustinian realism. My argument is that any account of pessimism in Augustine must grapple with the substantial emphasis he places on the themes of war and peace, especially his statements permitting warfare for Christians. With a proper understanding of Augustinian just war, we can better comprehend the value Augustine places on political participation. I argue that Augustine’s endorsement of certain just wars outlines a lower boundary of political action that Augustine’s pessimism never eliminates. However, because this type of participation involves killing, it is inherently sorrowful. I also analyze Augustine’s tragic rhetoric on war which limits the upper boundary of political hope.
{"title":"Augustine’s Just War: Balancing Political Pessimism and Optimism","authors":"Richard Cassleman","doi":"10.1080/10457097.2023.2218142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2023.2218142","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is an age-old debate regarding Augustine’s pessimism which has garnered much attention in recent years: Does Augustine have any hope for temporal politics or not? The traditional interpretation holds him to be a political pessimist, while recent scholarship has mounted a counter-offensive rooted in an Augustinian hope for the political realm. This essay offers a new contribution to the debate by directly linking Augustine’s treatment of just war to these recent debates. The literature on Augustinian pessimism and optimism is impressive, but its treatment of war is often obscured by the long shadow of Reinhold Niebuhr’s Augustinian realism. My argument is that any account of pessimism in Augustine must grapple with the substantial emphasis he places on the themes of war and peace, especially his statements permitting warfare for Christians. With a proper understanding of Augustinian just war, we can better comprehend the value Augustine places on political participation. I argue that Augustine’s endorsement of certain just wars outlines a lower boundary of political action that Augustine’s pessimism never eliminates. However, because this type of participation involves killing, it is inherently sorrowful. I also analyze Augustine’s tragic rhetoric on war which limits the upper boundary of political hope.","PeriodicalId":55874,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Political Science","volume":"52 1","pages":"151 - 160"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45966799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-14DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2023.2200130
B. Frost
Montesquieu famously states in The Spirit of the Laws (Bk. 11, ch. 13) that “One can never leave the Romans; thus it is even today in their capital one leaves the new palaces to go in search of the ruins; thus it is that the eye that has rested on flower-strewn meadows likes to look at rocks and mountains.” Nathaniel K. Gilmore has taken this injunction to heart. His book presents, in as comprehensive and thorough a way as possible in the confines of a single volume, Montesquieu’s understanding and appreciation (as well as his criticisms) of that most remarkable and illustrative of all ancient republics. The book is punctuated with verve and wit (essential ingredients for anyone who writes on the Baron de La Brède), and his scholarship is phenomenal—it is hard to find a single source, past or present, that deals with Rome in a significant way that Gilmore has not researched, cited, and discussed (and he is never shy, when appropriate, from taking issue with their primary or secondary conclusions and offering, respectfully, his own). Gilmore’s ambitious aim is to “restore Rome to its proper place at the peak of Montesquieu’s thought and Montesquieu’s thought to its proper place in the history of classical study” (3–4). In this he largely succeeds. All afficionados of Montesquieu will certainly want to read this book, and future scholars will probably be required to familiarize themselves with Gilmore’s arguments and interpretation. As the subject of the book is Montesquieu’s understanding of the spirit of Rome, one might expect the entirety of the work to be a detailed evaluation and discussion of what could easily be classified as his most neglected work, namely Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness [Grandeur] of the Romans and Their Decline [Décadence]. But this is not the case per se. Gilmore helpfully reminds us that when Considerations was first published in 1734, it did not receive much fanfare: compared to Persian Letters, it was a flop. After making some “minor” alterations to the text, Montesquieu then republished Considerations in 1748, the same year he published The Spirt of the Laws. Gilmore persuasively argues, therefore, that these two books should be seen as “two parts of a single whole,” or again, that the two books are “partners” (20–21). To say somewhat the same thing in different terms, Considerations is at the very least a prolegomena to The Spirit of the Laws, and that only by studying the former would we be in a position to understand or to appreciate fully the latter (and vice versa).Why Considerations is relatively neglected today remains a mystery: certainly such luminaries as d’Alembert, Rousseau, Gibbon, and Tocqueville (among others) did not think so, considering it as a “masterpiece” (20). In order to demonstrate this partnership, what Gilmore does in the opening chapter is to trace the nine times Montesquieu references Considerations in The Spirit of the Laws. Each helps to illuminate and to bolster his point.
{"title":"Why We Can’t Get Enough of Montesquieu","authors":"B. Frost","doi":"10.1080/10457097.2023.2200130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2023.2200130","url":null,"abstract":"Montesquieu famously states in The Spirit of the Laws (Bk. 11, ch. 13) that “One can never leave the Romans; thus it is even today in their capital one leaves the new palaces to go in search of the ruins; thus it is that the eye that has rested on flower-strewn meadows likes to look at rocks and mountains.” Nathaniel K. Gilmore has taken this injunction to heart. His book presents, in as comprehensive and thorough a way as possible in the confines of a single volume, Montesquieu’s understanding and appreciation (as well as his criticisms) of that most remarkable and illustrative of all ancient republics. The book is punctuated with verve and wit (essential ingredients for anyone who writes on the Baron de La Brède), and his scholarship is phenomenal—it is hard to find a single source, past or present, that deals with Rome in a significant way that Gilmore has not researched, cited, and discussed (and he is never shy, when appropriate, from taking issue with their primary or secondary conclusions and offering, respectfully, his own). Gilmore’s ambitious aim is to “restore Rome to its proper place at the peak of Montesquieu’s thought and Montesquieu’s thought to its proper place in the history of classical study” (3–4). In this he largely succeeds. All afficionados of Montesquieu will certainly want to read this book, and future scholars will probably be required to familiarize themselves with Gilmore’s arguments and interpretation. As the subject of the book is Montesquieu’s understanding of the spirit of Rome, one might expect the entirety of the work to be a detailed evaluation and discussion of what could easily be classified as his most neglected work, namely Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness [Grandeur] of the Romans and Their Decline [Décadence]. But this is not the case per se. Gilmore helpfully reminds us that when Considerations was first published in 1734, it did not receive much fanfare: compared to Persian Letters, it was a flop. After making some “minor” alterations to the text, Montesquieu then republished Considerations in 1748, the same year he published The Spirt of the Laws. Gilmore persuasively argues, therefore, that these two books should be seen as “two parts of a single whole,” or again, that the two books are “partners” (20–21). To say somewhat the same thing in different terms, Considerations is at the very least a prolegomena to The Spirit of the Laws, and that only by studying the former would we be in a position to understand or to appreciate fully the latter (and vice versa).Why Considerations is relatively neglected today remains a mystery: certainly such luminaries as d’Alembert, Rousseau, Gibbon, and Tocqueville (among others) did not think so, considering it as a “masterpiece” (20). In order to demonstrate this partnership, what Gilmore does in the opening chapter is to trace the nine times Montesquieu references Considerations in The Spirit of the Laws. Each helps to illuminate and to bolster his point.","PeriodicalId":55874,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Political Science","volume":"52 1","pages":"161 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41373103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-12DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2023.2196224
L. Trepanier
Abstract This article adopts the phenomenological approach of Merleau-Ponty to explore how the body is both a source of hope and betrayal for the protagonists’ aspirations in Philip Roth’s last four novels: Everyman, Indignation, The Humbling, and Nemesis. When the characters accept the reality of their bodies, it leads them to a sense of responsibility in their communities; when they reject the truth of their bodies, it leads them to social isolation and existential despair. From these novels, Roth’s characters point toward an understanding of community that is corporeal and, for it to be healthy, demands its members recognize the realities of it.
{"title":"The Paradoxes of the Body in Philip Roth’s Last Novels","authors":"L. Trepanier","doi":"10.1080/10457097.2023.2196224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2023.2196224","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article adopts the phenomenological approach of Merleau-Ponty to explore how the body is both a source of hope and betrayal for the protagonists’ aspirations in Philip Roth’s last four novels: Everyman, Indignation, The Humbling, and Nemesis. When the characters accept the reality of their bodies, it leads them to a sense of responsibility in their communities; when they reject the truth of their bodies, it leads them to social isolation and existential despair. From these novels, Roth’s characters point toward an understanding of community that is corporeal and, for it to be healthy, demands its members recognize the realities of it.","PeriodicalId":55874,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Political Science","volume":"52 1","pages":"130 - 144"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41749031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-12DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2023.2196223
Ryan R. Holston
Abstract This essay argues that Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein demonstrates an incipient awareness of the disconnect between the positivist view of human knowledge, which claims to provide a god’s-eye-view of a “reality” consisting solely of observable facts, and the sense that for human beings, genuine knowledge of reality must be identified with truths learned from within a concrete, historical life and the experiences of an embedded subject. Shelley thus anticipates more recent critics of scientism, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Eric Voegelin, who contend that despite science’s claims to ultimate explanatory power, there is something decidedly unreal about its account of human life as it is lived concretely over time. Echoing an ancient understanding of knowledge, such critics have questioned the “external” view of reality that is central to positivist epistemology. Similarly, Shelley’s novel suggests that she conceives of the real not as a realm of objectively observable and verifiable facts, but as a way of being and acting within the world—specifically, she sees it as a particular orientation of character that is habitually prepared to place restraints on the individual will.
{"title":"Mary Shelley, Promethean Character, and the Authority of Science","authors":"Ryan R. Holston","doi":"10.1080/10457097.2023.2196223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2023.2196223","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay argues that Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein demonstrates an incipient awareness of the disconnect between the positivist view of human knowledge, which claims to provide a god’s-eye-view of a “reality” consisting solely of observable facts, and the sense that for human beings, genuine knowledge of reality must be identified with truths learned from within a concrete, historical life and the experiences of an embedded subject. Shelley thus anticipates more recent critics of scientism, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Eric Voegelin, who contend that despite science’s claims to ultimate explanatory power, there is something decidedly unreal about its account of human life as it is lived concretely over time. Echoing an ancient understanding of knowledge, such critics have questioned the “external” view of reality that is central to positivist epistemology. Similarly, Shelley’s novel suggests that she conceives of the real not as a realm of objectively observable and verifiable facts, but as a way of being and acting within the world—specifically, she sees it as a particular orientation of character that is habitually prepared to place restraints on the individual will.","PeriodicalId":55874,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Political Science","volume":"52 1","pages":"119 - 129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41340613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-05DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2023.2192632
Richard Avramenko, Benjamin Rolsma
Abstract Historically, ambition has been considered a vice, if not a crime. Through an invocation of Alexis de Tocqueville’s reflections on “democratic ambition” this paper argues that the modern age has not only done away with this disapprobation, a particular sort of ambition is not only permitted, it is demanded. The paper thus asks two central questions: 1) how can we understand ambition in the democratic age and 2) how should we think of those who do not cleave to the demands of democratic ambition—i.e., those who refuse to be eaten up by the incessant longing for material well-being? We make the argument in three parts, each part focusing on a different implication of the necessity of ambition in democratic times. First, we highlight the danger of ambition unrestrained. Second, we explore how Tocqueville thought the most egregious ramifications of democratic ambition will be ameliorated, namely by the effects of land, commerce, and community. And, third, we explore the fate of the contented—i.e., those who deviate from democracy’s requirements for ambition—both those who cling to aristocratic ambitions and those who are insufficiently ambitious for material improvement.
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Pub Date : 2023-03-29DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2023.2183021
John von Heyking
{"title":"Self-Giving and the Constitution of Political Order: The Case of Liu Xiaobo","authors":"John von Heyking","doi":"10.1080/10457097.2023.2183021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2023.2183021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55874,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Political Science","volume":"52 1","pages":"51 - 59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45783363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-29DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2023.2183019
John von Heyking
This symposium includes essays that examine the nature of dissident activity against totalitarian regimes in both a Western and non-Western context.[1] The essays cover dissident activity in eastern Europe, Venezuela, and China. Liu compares especially with Vaclav Havel, the playwright whose leadership of Charter '77 inspired Liu to lead a similar effort with Charter '08. John McNerney focuses on Liu's anamnestic recovery and conversion of the person in his dissidence against the Chinese totalitarianism: "Xiaobo's odyssey can be understood in this way. [Extracted from the article] Copyright of Perspectives on Political Science is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)
{"title":"Symposium on Principles of Dissidence: Europe and Beyond","authors":"John von Heyking","doi":"10.1080/10457097.2023.2183019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2023.2183019","url":null,"abstract":"This symposium includes essays that examine the nature of dissident activity against totalitarian regimes in both a Western and non-Western context.[1] The essays cover dissident activity in eastern Europe, Venezuela, and China. Liu compares especially with Vaclav Havel, the playwright whose leadership of Charter '77 inspired Liu to lead a similar effort with Charter '08. John McNerney focuses on Liu's anamnestic recovery and conversion of the person in his dissidence against the Chinese totalitarianism: \"Xiaobo's odyssey can be understood in this way. [Extracted from the article] Copyright of Perspectives on Political Science is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)","PeriodicalId":55874,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Political Science","volume":"52 1","pages":"41 - 43"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45191562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-29DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2023.2183022
Francisco Plaza
Abstract Venezuela has suffered for more than twenty years from a totalitarian regime determined to systematically demolish all orders of national life. Beyond the material and institutional devastation, the true core of the destruction is of a spiritual order: the regime has corroded the national ethos. The task of recovering the soul of the nation is more urgent and arduous than the immense work of material and institutional reconstruction.
{"title":"Post-Totalitarian Reconstruction: The Case of Venezuela","authors":"Francisco Plaza","doi":"10.1080/10457097.2023.2183022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2023.2183022","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Venezuela has suffered for more than twenty years from a totalitarian regime determined to systematically demolish all orders of national life. Beyond the material and institutional devastation, the true core of the destruction is of a spiritual order: the regime has corroded the national ethos. The task of recovering the soul of the nation is more urgent and arduous than the immense work of material and institutional reconstruction.","PeriodicalId":55874,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Political Science","volume":"52 1","pages":"60 - 65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47166959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-29DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2023.2183023
Christopher S. Morrissey
Abstract A typology of sacrifice is applied to the study of Roger Scruton’s religious philosophy, in order to contemplate the ways in which dissidence against totalitarianism can become a positive form of self-giving. The mimetic theory of René Girard can help us to see how totalitarianism creates a sacrificial crisis by demanding, on the one hand, that individuals sacrifice themselves for the regime, and yet, on the other hand, empties such sacrifices of the type of self-giving that makes a sacrifice not just efficacious but also nonviolent. The deprivations that a regime inflicts on its subjects, for example with respect to education and careers, are enforced forms of sacrifice. With respect to the self-giving enacted in visible dissidence, there is a performative dimension to such self-giving that brings both sacrifices and rewards of a public nature. In his novel, Notes from Underground, Scruton explores the private, underground world of people who are excluded even from such careers of public dissidence. The difficult question Scruton confronts is how any regenerative self-giving is possible among people who in their isolation and powerlessness have nothing to give. While Girard’s mimetic theory helps account for the systematic desecration at work in totalitarian cultures, the biblical typology of sacrifice offered by Moshe Halbertal in his disagreement with Girard offers improvements to such a theoretical framework. Halbertal’s typology of sacrifice better accounts for the instances of spiritual transcendence considered by Scruton in his novel, and also in Scruton’s posthumous final work, Wagner’s Parsifal: The Music of Redemption.
{"title":"“The Cloven Hoof under the Cassock”: Sacrifice Hidden in the Hebrew Bible and Roger Scruton","authors":"Christopher S. Morrissey","doi":"10.1080/10457097.2023.2183023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2023.2183023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A typology of sacrifice is applied to the study of Roger Scruton’s religious philosophy, in order to contemplate the ways in which dissidence against totalitarianism can become a positive form of self-giving. The mimetic theory of René Girard can help us to see how totalitarianism creates a sacrificial crisis by demanding, on the one hand, that individuals sacrifice themselves for the regime, and yet, on the other hand, empties such sacrifices of the type of self-giving that makes a sacrifice not just efficacious but also nonviolent. The deprivations that a regime inflicts on its subjects, for example with respect to education and careers, are enforced forms of sacrifice. With respect to the self-giving enacted in visible dissidence, there is a performative dimension to such self-giving that brings both sacrifices and rewards of a public nature. In his novel, Notes from Underground, Scruton explores the private, underground world of people who are excluded even from such careers of public dissidence. The difficult question Scruton confronts is how any regenerative self-giving is possible among people who in their isolation and powerlessness have nothing to give. While Girard’s mimetic theory helps account for the systematic desecration at work in totalitarian cultures, the biblical typology of sacrifice offered by Moshe Halbertal in his disagreement with Girard offers improvements to such a theoretical framework. Halbertal’s typology of sacrifice better accounts for the instances of spiritual transcendence considered by Scruton in his novel, and also in Scruton’s posthumous final work, Wagner’s Parsifal: The Music of Redemption.","PeriodicalId":55874,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Political Science","volume":"52 1","pages":"66 - 74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42825274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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