Mass-market standardized fine print altering the rights of consumers is greatly expanding in today’s digital environment. Mass-market boilerplate impacts access to justice when it deletes rights to redress of grievances. Such deletion of rights leads to normative degradation because it undermines agreement, the basis of justifiable contractual enforcement, and it leads to democratic degradation because it undermines the basis of civil society and the Rule of Law. A brief comparison of US and Canadian common-law suggests that Canada’s legal system is less willing to allow these inroads into access to justice.
{"title":"Access to Justice and Abuses of Contract","authors":"M. Radin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2735011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2735011","url":null,"abstract":"Mass-market standardized fine print altering the rights of consumers is greatly expanding in today’s digital environment. Mass-market boilerplate impacts access to justice when it deletes rights to redress of grievances. Such deletion of rights leads to normative degradation because it undermines agreement, the basis of justifiable contractual enforcement, and it leads to democratic degradation because it undermines the basis of civil society and the Rule of Law. A brief comparison of US and Canadian common-law suggests that Canada’s legal system is less willing to allow these inroads into access to justice.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":"33 1","pages":"177-195"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2735011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47764413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-03-06DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V33I2.4846
Cléa Iavarone-Turcotte
Le present article porte sur une idee qui semble aujourd’hui etre sur toutes les levres. Une idee du reste avancee aussi bien par des observateurs du monde judiciaire (professeurs, journalistes) que par des acteurs qui en sont parties prenantes (avocats, juges, ministres de la Justice) et qui, partant, trouve echo non seulement au sein de la societe civile, mais egalement a l’interieur du cercle ferme, etanche, que constitue l’appareil judiciaire. Cette idee, c’est celle de placer le citoyen au coeur du systeme de justice civile. Dans l’optique de mieux comprendre cette proposition, qu’elle rebaptise « l’idee de recentrage », l’auteure s’emploie a la contextualiser. Elle mene cet exercice de contextualisation en deux temps. Ainsi, elle se penche d’abord sur les contextes d’emergence de l’idee de recentrage, avant de mettre au jour ses fondements justificatifs ou sa philosophie sous-jacente. This article looks into an idea which, today, seems to be on everyone’s lips. An idea put forward by observers of the legal world (academics, journalists) as well as by actors and decision makers taking part in it, and that is, thus, echoed not only in civil society, but also within the legal community’s inner circle. This idea is the following: to put the citizen at the very heart of the civil justice system. To assist in understanding this idea, which she calls “recentring”, the author provides the context in which it emerged. She does so in a two-step process: she first examines the background against which this recentring was first proposed; she then identifies its underlying justification, or the philosophy on which it is based.
这篇文章讨论的是一个似乎在今天每个人嘴边的想法。先进了_日依然还是世界的观察员出席司法(教师、记者),由利益攸关者,属(律师、法官、司法部长)和回声,因而觉得不仅在公民社会,但又圆的里面坚定了天花板,是司法系统。这一理念是将公民置于民事司法体系的核心。为了更好地理解这个提议，她将其重新命名为“重新聚焦的想法”，作者试图将其置于背景中。她分两个阶段进行语境化练习。因此，在揭示其基本基础或潜在哲学之前，它首先研究了重新聚焦概念出现的背景。这篇文章着眼于一个想法，今天，似乎每个人都在谈论这个想法。法律界的观察员(学者、记者)以及参与其中的行动者和决策者提出了一个想法，因此，这个想法不仅在民间社会中得到呼应，而且也在法律界的核心圈子中得到呼应。这个想法是这样的:把公民放在民事司法系统的核心。为了帮助理解这个她称之为“重新聚焦”的想法，作者提供了它产生的背景。她这样做是在一个两步的过程中:她首先审查最初提出重新集中的背景;她同身受its动心辩解,然而基于the philosophy on which it is。
{"title":"« PLACER LE CITOYEN AU CŒUR DU SYSTÈME » : ORIGINE ET FONDEMENTS D’UNE IDÉE POPULAIRE","authors":"Cléa Iavarone-Turcotte","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V33I2.4846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V33I2.4846","url":null,"abstract":"Le present article porte sur une idee qui semble aujourd’hui etre sur toutes les levres. Une idee du reste avancee aussi bien par des observateurs du monde judiciaire (professeurs, journalistes) que par des acteurs qui en sont parties prenantes (avocats, juges, ministres de la Justice) et qui, partant, trouve echo non seulement au sein de la societe civile, mais egalement a l’interieur du cercle ferme, etanche, que constitue l’appareil judiciaire. Cette idee, c’est celle de placer le citoyen au coeur du systeme de justice civile. Dans l’optique de mieux comprendre cette proposition, qu’elle rebaptise « l’idee de recentrage », l’auteure s’emploie a la contextualiser. Elle mene cet exercice de contextualisation en deux temps. Ainsi, elle se penche d’abord sur les contextes d’emergence de l’idee de recentrage, avant de mettre au jour ses fondements justificatifs ou sa philosophie sous-jacente. This article looks into an idea which, today, seems to be on everyone’s lips. An idea put forward by observers of the legal world (academics, journalists) as well as by actors and decision makers taking part in it, and that is, thus, echoed not only in civil society, but also within the legal community’s inner circle. This idea is the following: to put the citizen at the very heart of the civil justice system. To assist in understanding this idea, which she calls “recentring”, the author provides the context in which it emerged. She does so in a two-step process: she first examines the background against which this recentring was first proposed; she then identifies its underlying justification, or the philosophy on which it is based.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":"33 1","pages":"141-176"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44465469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-03-06DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V33I2.4930
W. Lucy
After elucidating and defending an account of access to justice that is consistent with most uses of that notion in academic and policy discourse, this essay examines some arguments that attempt to show the value of access to justice. It shows that one such argument (from non-domination) does a better job of illustrating access to justice’s normative significance than two frequently invoked competitors (the arguments from the rule of law and equality). In an era in which access to justice seems genuinely in peril, it is vital to appreciate the normative cost of its restriction or denial.
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Pub Date : 2017-03-06DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V33I2.4843
Katie Spillane
Around the globe, clinical legal education [CLE] narratives resonate with a desire to promote social justice and the vindication of human rights. Yet scholarship exploring CLE’s accomplishment of these aims is scant and generally focuses only on student outcomes. This literature appears to be based not on theory and results, but hope: the hope that changed students will change the world. To invest on hope alone is unwise, particularly when all stakeholders face financially precarious times. In this context, this article argues that the existing focus on student outcomes is disproportionate and unhelpful. The existing narrow focus on student outcomes marginalizes other stakeholders and creates significant blind spots in program evaluation. This article proposes a broader analysis that would ask what value systems and power distribution CLE programs themselves create or reinforce, focusing on both the immediate impact of CLE programming and reinforcing the values human rights education seeks to inculcate by incorporating these into the structure of CLE programs themselves. Aux quatre coins du monde, le discours sur l’enseignement juridique clinique est empreint d’une soif de promouvoir la justice sociale et de defendre les droits de la personne. Pourtant, les travaux des universitaires portant sur l’atteinte de ces objectifs sont rares et se concentrent generalement sur les resultats touchant les etudiants. Ces ecrits semblent fondes non pas sur des theories et des resultats mais sur l’espoir : l’espoir que des etudiants transformes transformeront le monde. Miser sur l’espoir seul est une erreur, surtout quand tous les intervenants sont aux prises avec la precarite financiere. Dans ce contexte, l’auteure de cet article soutient que les efforts actuels cibles sur les resultats touchant les etudiants sont disproportionnes et inutiles. Ce ciblage etroit marginalise les autres intervenants et cree de gros angles morts dans l’evaluation des programmes. Dans son article, l’auteure propose une analyse elargie qui pose la question de savoir quels systemes de valeurs et quelle repartition des pouvoirs les programmes d’enseignement juridique clinique creent ou renforcent, l’accent etant mis sur les repercussions immediates de ces programmes et sur le renforcement des valeurs que l’education aux droits de la personne humaine semble inculquer par l’integration de ces valeurs dans la structure meme des programmes en question.
{"title":"BEING THE CHANGE: SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EXTERNSHIP PROGRAM EVALUATION","authors":"Katie Spillane","doi":"10.22329/WYAJ.V33I2.4843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/WYAJ.V33I2.4843","url":null,"abstract":"Around the globe, clinical legal education [CLE] narratives resonate with a desire to promote social justice and the vindication of human rights. Yet scholarship exploring CLE’s accomplishment of these aims is scant and generally focuses only on student outcomes. This literature appears to be based not on theory and results, but hope: the hope that changed students will change the world. To invest on hope alone is unwise, particularly when all stakeholders face financially precarious times. In this context, this article argues that the existing focus on student outcomes is disproportionate and unhelpful. The existing narrow focus on student outcomes marginalizes other stakeholders and creates significant blind spots in program evaluation. This article proposes a broader analysis that would ask what value systems and power distribution CLE programs themselves create or reinforce, focusing on both the immediate impact of CLE programming and reinforcing the values human rights education seeks to inculcate by incorporating these into the structure of CLE programs themselves. Aux quatre coins du monde, le discours sur l’enseignement juridique clinique est empreint d’une soif de promouvoir la justice sociale et de defendre les droits de la personne. Pourtant, les travaux des universitaires portant sur l’atteinte de ces objectifs sont rares et se concentrent generalement sur les resultats touchant les etudiants. Ces ecrits semblent fondes non pas sur des theories et des resultats mais sur l’espoir : l’espoir que des etudiants transformes transformeront le monde. Miser sur l’espoir seul est une erreur, surtout quand tous les intervenants sont aux prises avec la precarite financiere. Dans ce contexte, l’auteure de cet article soutient que les efforts actuels cibles sur les resultats touchant les etudiants sont disproportionnes et inutiles. Ce ciblage etroit marginalise les autres intervenants et cree de gros angles morts dans l’evaluation des programmes. Dans son article, l’auteure propose une analyse elargie qui pose la question de savoir quels systemes de valeurs et quelle repartition des pouvoirs les programmes d’enseignement juridique clinique creent ou renforcent, l’accent etant mis sur les repercussions immediates de ces programmes et sur le renforcement des valeurs que l’education aux droits de la personne humaine semble inculquer par l’integration de ces valeurs dans la structure meme des programmes en question.","PeriodicalId":56232,"journal":{"name":"Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice","volume":"33 1","pages":"45-67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45021213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-03-06DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V33I2.4852
Tiho Mijatov, Tom Barraclough, Warren Forster
The purpose of this article is to bring clarity in thinking about access to justice. We examine the idea of access to justice in the reform of personal injury law in New Zealand. Our findings are applicable to law reform in any area of law involving vulnerable people. After tracing the legal history of “access to justice,” we isolate four separate conceptions of access to justice: equality before the law, a hybrid of judicial and non-judicially focused conceptions that we have called the multifactorial conception, and conceptions emphasizing either judicial or non-judicial elements. We identify key features of each conception, and its strengths and weaknesses, in order to improve the quality of dialogue in law reform efforts. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for law, which allow comparisons to be made between systems of law and law reform that aim to improve access to justice. Cet article a pour but d’apporter des eclaircissements dans la reflexion concernant l’acces a la justice. Les auteurs y etudient l’idee de l’acces a la justice dans la reforme du droit du prejudice personnel en Nouvelle-Zelande. Leurs conclusions sont applicables a la reforme du droit dans n’importe quel domaine touchant les personnes sans defense. Apres avoir reconstitue l’histoire juridique de l’« acces a la justice », les auteurs isolent quatre conceptions distinctes de cette notion : l’egalite en droit, une conception hybride comportant des elements judiciaires et non judiciaires et des conceptions privilegiant soit les elements judiciaires, soit les elements non judiciaires. Les auteurs cernent les principales caracteristiques de chacune de ces conceptions, leurs forces et leurs faiblesses afin d’ameliorer la qualite du dialogue dans les efforts de reforme du droit. Ils concluent en evoquant les repercussions de leurs conclusions pour le droit, ce qui permet l’etablissement de comparaisons utiles entre les systemes juridiques et une reforme du droit qui pretend favoriser l’acces a la justice.
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Pub Date : 2017-03-06DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V33I2.4845
S. Baglay
This article reviews and analyzes recent Canadian jurisprudence on immigration-related torts, situating it in the context of the contrasting logic of immigration and tort law. Immigration law’s focus on the absolute power of the state to control admission directs courts away from the recognition of the duty of care. In contrast, tort law theory does not preclude the possibility of private law duties to non-citizens, especially in light of the absence of other effective remedies to address the power imbalance between the host state and the non-citizen. The article examines how these two narratives were negotiated in cases of alleged negligence in immigration processing. It problematizes certain aspects of the current construction of the duty of care towards non-citizens and offers some suggestions for a more nuanced understanding of the factors considered under the Anns/Cooper test . Dans cet article, l’auteure examine et analyse la jurisprudence canadienne recente des delits civils relatifs a l’immigration en la situant dans le contexte de la logique d’opposition du droit de l’immigration et du droit de la responsabilite civile delictuelle. Le droit de l’immigration, qui est centre sur le pouvoir absolu de l’Etat de controler l’admission d’immigrants, fait oublier aux tribunaux la reconnaissance du devoir de diligence. En revanche, la theorie du droit de la responsabilite civile delictuelle n’ecarte pas la possibilite d’obligations de droit prive envers des non-nationaux, surtout en l’absence d’autres recours applicables pour resoudre le desequilibre de pouvoir entre l’Etat d’accueil et le non-national. Dans cet article, l’auteure etudie la maniere dont ces deux discours ont ete concilies dans des cas de negligence presumee dans le traitement de demandes d’immigration. L’auteure definit le probleme que posent certains aspects de l’interpretation actuelle du devoir de diligence envers des non-nationaux et presente quelques idees permettant une comprehension nuancee des facteurs pris en compte dans la cause type Anns/Cooper .
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Pub Date : 2017-03-06DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V33I2.4842
Kirsten Anker
One of the key elements of reconciliation identified in the recent final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada [TRC] is the revitalization of Indigenous law and legal traditions. Indeed, the practices of the TRC itself have attempted to embody this principle. However, a concern about state-sponsored reconciliation is that the recognition of Indigenous legal traditions is an empty gesture without a robust engagement with them. This article offers one possible method for outsiders to engage with Indigenous traditions in a way that goes beyond lip service and beyond the limitations of superficial forms of recognition in which equivalence is too quickly assumed. By paying attention to the ways that Indigenous principles and practices are embedded in a network of ideas about the world, a picture of a whole “legal sensibility” emerges that, through comparison, shows the dominant legal sensibility to be one alternative among many. In this way, reconciliation is approached as a process of “unsettling” what is taken for 4granted in mainstream understandings of reconciliation and law. Un des principaux elements de la reconciliation etablis dans le recent rapport final de la Commission de verite et reconciliation du Canada [CVR] est la revitalisation du droit autochtone et des traditions juridiques autochtones. A vrai dire, la CVR elle-meme a tente d’integrer ce principe dans ses pratiques. Cependant, une des craintes relatives a la reconciliation chapeautee par l’Etat est que la reconnaissance des traditions juridiques autochtones soit un geste vain si elle n’est pas accompagnee d’un engagement ferme. Dans cet article, l’auteure presente un moyen possible de permettre aux profanes d’integrer les traditions autochtones en depassant les vœux pieux et les limites des formes superficielles de reconnaissance dans lesquelles l’equivalence est trop vite supposee. Lorsqu’on est attentif aux facons dont on integre les principes et pratiques autochtones a une conception du monde, l’image d’une « sensibilite juridique » tout entiere se degage qui, par la comparaison, montre que la sensibilite juridique dominante n’est qu’une sensibilite parmi de nombreuses autres. Ainsi, la reconciliation est abordee comme une demarche consistant a « decoloniser » ce qui est tenu pour acquis dans la conception habituelle de la reconciliation et du droit.
加拿大真相与和解委员会(Truth and reconciliation Commission of Canada, TRC)最近的最后报告指出，和解的关键要素之一是恢复原住民法律和法律传统的活力。事实上，储税券本身的做法就试图体现这一原则。然而，对国家支持的和解的担忧是，承认土著法律传统是一种空洞的姿态，没有与他们进行强有力的接触。这篇文章为外来者提供了一种可能的方法，以一种超越口头上的服务和超越肤浅的承认形式的限制的方式与土著传统接触，在这种形式中，等价性被过快地假设。通过关注土著原则和实践嵌入世界观念网络的方式，一幅完整的“法律敏感性”的画面浮现出来，通过比较，表明占主导地位的法律敏感性是众多选择中的一种。通过这种方式，和解被视为一种“扰乱”主流对和解和法律的理解中理所当然的东西的过程。加拿大法律与和解委员会(CVR)是加拿大法律与和解委员会(CVR)的成员，也是加拿大法律与和解委员会(CVR)的成员。一个非常可怕的事实是，一个非常可怕的事实是，一个完整的原则与实践是一致的。继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承，继承在这篇文章中，l ' autree提出了一种可能的方法，即对世俗的渗透和对传统的固有性的整合，对传统的固有性和对传统的固有性的整合，对传统的固有性和对传统的固有性的整合，对传统的固有性的整合，对传统的固有性的整合，对传统的固有性的整合，对传统的固有性的整合，对传统的固有性的整合，对传统的固有性的整合，对传统的固有性的整合，对传统的固有性的整合，以及对传统的固有性的整合。lorsqou ' s est attentif aux facfacons不on整合的原则和实践一个概念的世界，我的形象，我的感性的法律，我的形象，我的感性的法律，我的整体自由，我的比较，我的感性的法律支配，我的感性的法律，我的nombreuses作家。在印度，和解是一种与“非殖民化”相一致的统一政策，因为和解是一种与“和解与权利”相一致的概念。
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Pub Date : 2017-01-29DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V33I1.4814
Kerry Sloan
Metis ideas of territory are complex, varied and often not well understood. Metis perspectives on intersections of territory and community are likewise not appreciated by Canadian courts. This is evident in the difficulties of Metis rights claimants in British Columbia, where misconceptions about Metis history and traditional use areas have resulted in courts questioning the existence of historic Metis communities in the province. The leading case on Metis rights in Canada, R v Powley, requires claimants to prove there is a historic Metis community in an area where claimed rights are exercised. In BC, courts following Powley in three cases – R v Howse, R v Nunn and R v Willison – have held there are no historic Metis communities in the Kootenays, the south Okanagan, or the Kamloops/Shuswap area. Although these regions comprise only a portion of lands within provincial boundaries, the BC government takes the position there are no Metis communities in the province capable of meeting the Powley test , and thus asserts there can be no Metis Aboriginal rights holders in BC. To challenge this position, and in order to illustrate the multiplicity and richness of Metis legal understandings of territory and community, the author braids family history, narrative, legal analysis and the perspectives of 23 Metis people from the southern BC interior who were involved in or affected by the Howse, Nunn and Willison cases. The author suggests that expansive and nuanced Metis understandings of communities and territories cannot be encompassed by the Powley/Willison definition of a Metis community as “... a group of Metis with a distinctive collective identity, living together in the same geographic area and sharing a common way of life”. While the court’s definition posits history, territory and community as separable, Metis views suggest these concepts are interlinked and mutually constitutive. Les idees des Metis au sujet du territoire sont complexes, diversifiees et souvent mal comprises. Dans la meme veine, les tribunaux canadiens ne comprennent pas les points de vue des Metis sur les liens entre le territoire et la communaute. C’est ce qui ressort des difficultes qu’eprouvent les defenseurs des droits des Metis en Colombie-Britannique, ou les perceptions erronees au sujet de l’histoire des Metis et des secteurs qu’ils utilisent a des fins traditionnelles ont incite les tribunaux a douter de l’existence de communautes metisses historiques dans la province. Selon l'arret cle concernant les droits des Metis au Canada, R. c. Powley, ceux qui revendiquent des droits sont tenus de prouver l’existence d’une communaute metisse historique dans un secteur ou les droits revendiques sont exerces. Dans la foulee de l’arret Powley, les tribunaux de la Colombie-Britannique ont conclu, dans les decisions R. c. Howse, R. c. Nunn et R. c. Willison, qu’il n’y a pas de communaute metisse historique dans les Kootenays, dans la region d’Okanagan-Sud ou dans celle de Kamloo
梅蒂斯人对领土的概念是复杂的、多样的，而且往往不能很好地理解。梅蒂斯人对领土和社区交叉点的看法同样不受加拿大法院的赞赏。这一点在不列颠哥伦比亚省梅蒂斯权利诉求者的困境中显而易见，对梅蒂斯历史和传统使用区域的误解导致法院质疑该省历史上梅蒂斯社区的存在。加拿大有关梅蒂斯权利的主要案件R v Powley要求索赔人证明在行使所要求权利的地区有一个历史上的梅蒂斯社区。在不列颠哥伦比亚省，跟随鲍利的法院在三个案件中——R诉豪斯、R诉纳恩和R诉威利森——都认为在库特奈、南奥肯那根或坎卢普斯/什斯瓦普地区没有历史上的梅蒂斯社区。虽然这些地区只占省边界内土地的一部分，但BC省政府的立场是，省内没有梅蒂斯社区能够满足Powley测试，因此声称BC省不可能有梅蒂斯土著权利持有人。为了挑战这一立场，为了说明梅蒂斯人对领土和社区的法律理解的多样性和丰富性，作者将家族历史、叙事、法律分析和来自BC省南部内陆的23名梅蒂斯人的观点编织在一起，这些人参与了豪斯、纳恩和威利森的案件或受到了他们的影响。作者认为，梅蒂斯人对社区和领土的广泛而细致的理解不能被鲍利/威利森对梅蒂斯社区的定义所包含，即“……一群具有独特集体身份的梅蒂斯人，生活在同一地理区域，共享共同的生活方式”。虽然法院的定义假定历史、领土和社区是可分离的，但梅蒂斯人的观点认为这些概念是相互联系和相互构成的。“地域”是指复杂的、多样化的和复杂的。加拿大人的法律体系，加拿大人的法律体系，加拿大人的法律体系，加拿大人的法律体系，加拿大人的法律体系，加拿大人的法律体系。在哥伦比亚-不列颠省，“解决困难”是为了保护梅蒂斯的权利，“认识错误”是为了保护梅蒂斯的历史，“利用”是为了保护梅蒂斯的利益，“利用”是为了保护传统的利益，“煽动”是为了保护社区的存在，“保护”是为了保护哥伦比亚-不列颠省的历史。加拿大联邦委员会主席r.c. Powley在《加拿大联邦委员会委员会关于联邦委员会的权利》一文中指出，联邦委员会关于联邦委员会的权利和历史的存在，以及联邦委员会关于联邦委员会的权利和历史的讨论。波利的法律制度，哥伦比亚不列颠法庭的法律制度，豪斯的法律制度，纳恩的法律制度，威利森的法律制度，库特奈斯的法律制度，奥卡纳根地区的法律制度，坎卢普斯的法律制度。哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在，哥伦比亚-大不列颠政府将不存在。我们肯定我们的矛盾，我们的丰富，我们的观念，我们的地域，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化，我们的文化。L 'auteur fait valoir que definition d 'une communaute metisse enoncee dans 'arret Powley/Willison，因此' ungroupe de Metis ayant one identite集体独特，充满活力的ensemble dla meme region et partant unmode de vie communites '， ne ' pelober ' perceptions ouvertes, cuvertes, cuvertes, suvertes, communites, suvertes, territoires。根据历史法庭的定义，根据领土和社区的定义，根据不同的概念，根据不同的价值点，根据不同的概念，根据相互依存和相互要素构成的概念。
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Pub Date : 2017-01-29DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V33I1.4815
Lindsay Borrows
Dabaadendiziwin is the Anishinaabe word which roughly translates to ‘humility’ in English. The late elder Basil Johnston said that we can talk of dabaadendiziwin /humility, but until we can look at the squirrel sitting on the branch and know we are no greater and no less than her, it is only then that we have walked with dabaadendiziwin /humility. Law places diverse peoples together in complicated situations. It challenges people to step outside of themselves and consider new ways of being. This paper advocates that humility is an important legal principle to bring people together in a good way. It considers first, what is humility and why is it an important legal principle? Second, what processes are in place in both Canadian and Anishinaabe law to actively cultivate humility? And third, how can diverse peoples use these processes when interacting with one another in ways that foster greater harmony in this multi-juridical country? The examples show that Canadian colonial law has tried to account for the need to humble oneself to a position of being teachable through Charter analyses, diversifying the bench, and through Aboriginal rights doctrines of taking into account the “aboriginal perspective”, and reconciliation. The paper also considers how Anishinaabe law fosters humility through linguistic structure, leadership structure, ceremonial practices and akinoomaage (learning from the earth). This paper is a call for people to confront the challenge of working across legal orders, and replace timidity, fear and pride with courage, gratitude and humility. Le mot dabaadendiziwin est un mot anishinaabe qui signifie ni plus ni moins « humilite » en francais. Selon feu l’aine Basil Johnston, nous pouvons bien parler de « dabaadendiziwin » ou d’humilite, mais ce n’est que lorsque nous regardons l’ecureuil sur la branche et que nous savons que nous ne sommes ni plus grands ni plus petits que lui que nous comprenons parfaitement le sens de ce mot. La loi contraint des peuples diversifies a vivre ensemble des situations complexes. Elle oblige les personnes a elargir leurs horizons et a envisager de nouvelles facons d’etre. Dans ce texte, l’auteur affirme que l’humilite est un principe de droit important qui permet de rassembler des personnes d’une bonne facon. Dans ce contexte, il se demande d’abord en quoi consiste l’humilite et pourquoi elle constitue un principe de droit important. En deuxieme lieu, il examine les processus qui sont en place tant dans le droit canadien que dans la loi anishinaabe afin de promouvoir activement l’humilite. En troisieme lieu, l’auteur se demande comment des peuples diversifies peuvent utiliser ces processus dans le cadre de leurs interactions de facon a promouvoir une plus grande harmonie dans le pays multijuridique qu’est le notre. Les exemples qu’il donne illustrent comment les acteurs du droit colonial canadien ont tente de reconnaitre l’importance de l’humilite en veillant a ce que la loi puisse etre enseignee au
Dabaadendiziwin是阿尼什纳语，在英语中大致翻译为“谦卑”。已故的巴兹尔·约翰斯顿长老说，我们可以谈论dabaadendiziwin /谦卑，但直到我们能看着坐在树枝上的松鼠，知道我们并不比她伟大，也不比她小，只有那时我们才带着dabaadendiziwin /谦卑走路。法律使不同的民族在复杂的情况下团结在一起。它挑战人们走出自我，思考新的存在方式。本文主张谦恭是一项重要的法律原则，它能使人们以一种良好的方式走到一起。首先，它考虑了什么是谦卑，为什么它是一个重要的法律原则?其次，加拿大和加拿大的法律都有哪些程序来积极培养谦逊?第三，不同的民族在相互交往时如何利用这些过程，在这个多司法国家促进更大的和谐?这些例子表明，加拿大殖民法试图通过《宪章》分析、法官多样化以及考虑到“土著观点”和和解的土著权利理论来说明自己必须谦卑到可教的地位。本文还考虑了Anishinaabe法律如何通过语言结构、领导结构、仪式实践和akinoomaage(向地球学习)来培养谦逊。这篇文章呼吁人们面对跨法律秩序工作的挑战，用勇气、感激和谦卑取代胆怯、恐惧和骄傲。Le mot dabaadendiziwin est un mot anishinaable相当显著地在法国加上“humilite”运动。根据封地l 'aine罗勒约翰斯顿,常识pouvons好讲德«dabaadendiziwin»ou d 'humilite,但是这既然值l 'ecureuil苏尔la布兰切等我们肥皂我们东北尤其是镍+芳镍+小,他是我们comprenons parfaitement le sens de ce非常贴切。人民的约束使生活的集合多样化，使复杂的情况多样化。让我们的人有更广阔的视野，让我们的人有新的视野。在这个文本中，作者肯定了一个原则，即“尊重”原则，“尊重”原则，“尊重”原则，“尊重”原则，“尊重”原则，“尊重”原则，“尊重”原则，“尊重”原则。在这样的情况下，我们将看到，要求“不符合原则”，“不符合原则”，“不符合原则”。在此期间，我们将审查这一过程，因为它将使我们的工作变得更加顺利，并使我们的工作变得更加顺利。在这三个方面，我们需要人民的意见，多样化的资源，利用程序，我们需要社会的相互作用，我们需要社会的相互作用，促进统一和大和谐，我们需要多领域的合作，我们需要多领域的合作。举例来说，我将做一些说明，评论说，我将做一些行为，殖民加拿大，我将做一些调查，我将做一些重要的事情，我将做一些重要的事情，我将做一些重要的事情，我将做一些重要的事情，我将做一些重要的事情，我将做一些重要的事情，我将做一些重要的事情，我将做一些重要的事情，我将做一些重要的事情，我将做一些重要的事情，我将做一些重要的事情。“我认为我的工作是平等的，我的工作是平等的，我的工作是平等的，我的工作是平等的，我的工作是平等的，我的工作是平等的，我的工作是平等的。”最后，我的导演要求所有的人都有勇气，我的导演要求所有的人都有勇气，我的导演要求所有的人都有勇气，我的导演要求所有的人都有勇气，我的导演要求所有的人都有勇气。
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Pub Date : 2017-01-29DOI: 10.22329/WYAJ.V33I1.4808
H. Askew
This article investigates educational strategies that law schools could implement to honour Recommendation #28 of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and foster strong intercultural interpretation and communication skills amongst new generations of legal professionals in relation to Indigenous legal viewpoints. The paper is divided into four sections: the first draws on Indigenous legal scholarship to explore definitions of Indigenous law; the second provides a case study of one method of learning Indigenous law based on the author’s personal experiences of being taught Annishinabe law at Neyaashiinigmiing (a reserve community on Georgian Bay); the third discusses some of the initiatives, opportunities and challenges involved in integrating Indigenous legal traditions into the curriculum of Canadian law schools; and fourth and final section highlights some of the concerns being raised as these initiatives develop, and the related need for the legal profession to proceed with caution and humility. Cet article porte sur les strategies d’education que les ecoles de droit pourraient mettre en œuvre pour donner suite a la recommandation n ° 28 de la Commission de verite et de reconciliation et promouvoir de fortes aptitudes en interpretation et communications interculturelles chez les nouvelles generations de professionnels du droit en ce qui concerne les points de vue juridiques autochtones. Le texte compte quatre sections : la premiere presente diverses definitions juridiques fondees sur la theorie du droit autochtone; la deuxieme traite d’une methode d’apprentissage du droit autochtone fondee sur l’experience que l’auteur a vecue lorsqu’il a fait l’apprentissage de la loi anishinaabe a Neyaashiinigmiing (communaute vivant sur une reserve indienne situee dans la baie Georgienne); la troisieme porte sur les initiatives, possibilites et defis lies a l’integration des traditions juridiques autochtones dans le programme des ecoles de droit canadiennes; enfin, la quatrieme et derniere section met en relief quelques-unes des preoccupations soulevees au fur et a mesure que ces initiatives prennent forme, et la necessite pour la profession juridique de faire preuve de prudence et d’humilite.
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