Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献
In response to needs of disk encryption standardization bodies, we provide the first tweakable ciphers that are proven to securely encipher their own keys. We provide both a narrowblock design StE and a wideblock design EtE. Our proofs assume only standard PRP-CCA security of the underlying tweakable ciphers.
{"title":"Ciphers that securely encipher their own keys","authors":"M. Bellare, David Cash, S. Keelveedhi","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046757","url":null,"abstract":"In response to needs of disk encryption standardization bodies, we provide the first tweakable ciphers that are proven to securely encipher their own keys. We provide both a narrowblock design StE and a wideblock design EtE. Our proofs assume only standard PRP-CCA security of the underlying tweakable ciphers.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77643023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent research demonstrates that malware can infect peripherals' firmware in a typical x86 computer system, e.g., by exploiting vulnerabilities in the firmware itself or in the firmware update tools. Verifying the integrity of peripherals' firmware is thus an important challenge. We propose software-only attestation protocols to verify the integrity of peripherals' firmware, and show that they can detect all known software-based attacks. We implement our scheme using a Netgear GA620 network adapter in an x86 PC, and evaluate our system with known attacks.
{"title":"VIPER: verifying the integrity of PERipherals' firmware","authors":"Yanlin Li, Jonathan M. McCune, A. Perrig","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046711","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046711","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research demonstrates that malware can infect peripherals' firmware in a typical x86 computer system, e.g., by exploiting vulnerabilities in the firmware itself or in the firmware update tools. Verifying the integrity of peripherals' firmware is thus an important challenge. We propose software-only attestation protocols to verify the integrity of peripherals' firmware, and show that they can detect all known software-based attacks. We implement our scheme using a Netgear GA620 network adapter in an x86 PC, and evaluate our system with known attacks.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74758256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose CL-PRE, a certificateless proxy re-encryption scheme for data sharing with cloud. In CL-PRE, a data owner encrypts shared data in cloud with an encryption key, which is further encrypted and transformed by cloud, and then distributed to legitimate recipients for access control. Uniquely, the cloud-based transformation leverages re-encryption keys derived from private key of data owner and public keys of receipts, and eliminates the key escrow problem with identity based cryptography and the need of certificate. While preserving data and key privacy from semi-trusted cloud, CL-PRE maximumly leverages cloud resources to reduce the computing and communication cost for data owner. We implement CL-PRE and evaluate its security and performance.
{"title":"Poster: a certificateless proxy re-encryption scheme for cloud-based data sharing","authors":"Xiaoxin Wu, Lei Xu, Xinwen Zhang","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093514","url":null,"abstract":"We propose CL-PRE, a certificateless proxy re-encryption scheme for data sharing with cloud. In CL-PRE, a data owner encrypts shared data in cloud with an encryption key, which is further encrypted and transformed by cloud, and then distributed to legitimate recipients for access control. Uniquely, the cloud-based transformation leverages re-encryption keys derived from private key of data owner and public keys of receipts, and eliminates the key escrow problem with identity based cryptography and the need of certificate. While preserving data and key privacy from semi-trusted cloud, CL-PRE maximumly leverages cloud resources to reduce the computing and communication cost for data owner. We implement CL-PRE and evaluate its security and performance.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81662513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wireless link signature is a physical layer authentication mechanism, which uses the multi-path effect between a transmitter and a receiver to provide authentication of wireless signals. We identify a new attack, called mimicry attack, against the wireless link signature scheme in [7]. It is assumed in the past that an attacker cannot "spoof" an arbitrary link signature and that the attacker will not have the same link signature at the receiver unless it is at exactly the same location as the legitimate transmitter. However, we show that an attacker can forge an arbitrary link signature as long as it knows the legitimate signal at the receiver's location, and the attacker does not have to be at exactly the same location as the legitimate transmitter in order to forge its link signature.
{"title":"Poster: mimicry attacks against wireless link signature","authors":"Yao Liu, P. Ning","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093497","url":null,"abstract":"Wireless link signature is a physical layer authentication mechanism, which uses the multi-path effect between a transmitter and a receiver to provide authentication of wireless signals. We identify a new attack, called mimicry attack, against the wireless link signature scheme in [7]. It is assumed in the past that an attacker cannot \"spoof\" an arbitrary link signature and that the attacker will not have the same link signature at the receiver unless it is at exactly the same location as the legitimate transmitter. However, we show that an attacker can forge an arbitrary link signature as long as it knows the legitimate signal at the receiver's location, and the attacker does not have to be at exactly the same location as the legitimate transmitter in order to forge its link signature.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83009854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scripting vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting (XSS), plague web applications today. Most research on defense techniques has focused on securing existing legacy applications written in general-purpose languages, such as Java and PHP. However, recent and emerging applications have widely adopted web templating frameworks that have received little attention in research. Web templating frameworks offer an ideal opportunity to ensure safety against scripting attacks by secure construction, but most of today's frameworks fall short of achieving this goal. We propose a novel and principled type-qualifier based mechanism that can be bolted onto existing web templating frameworks. Our solution permits rich expressiveness in the templating language while achieving backwards compatibility, performance and formal security through a context-sensitive auto-sanitization (CSAS) engine. To demonstrate its practicality, we implement our mechanism in Google Closure Templates, a commercially used open-source templating framework that is used in GMail, Google Docs and other applications. Our approach is fast, precise and retrofits to existing commercially deployed template code without requiring any changes or annotations.
{"title":"Context-sensitive auto-sanitization in web templating languages using type qualifiers","authors":"M. Samuel, P. Saxena, D. Song","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046775","url":null,"abstract":"Scripting vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting (XSS), plague web applications today. Most research on defense techniques has focused on securing existing legacy applications written in general-purpose languages, such as Java and PHP. However, recent and emerging applications have widely adopted web templating frameworks that have received little attention in research. Web templating frameworks offer an ideal opportunity to ensure safety against scripting attacks by secure construction, but most of today's frameworks fall short of achieving this goal.\u0000 We propose a novel and principled type-qualifier based mechanism that can be bolted onto existing web templating frameworks. Our solution permits rich expressiveness in the templating language while achieving backwards compatibility, performance and formal security through a context-sensitive auto-sanitization (CSAS) engine. To demonstrate its practicality, we implement our mechanism in Google Closure Templates, a commercially used open-source templating framework that is used in GMail, Google Docs and other applications. Our approach is fast, precise and retrofits to existing commercially deployed template code without requiring any changes or annotations.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91233585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we propose a new unsupervised approach for identifying suspicious access to sensitive relational data. In the proposed method, a tree-like model encapsulates the characteristics of the result-set (i.e., data) that the user normally access within each possible context. During the detection phase, result-sets are examined against the induced model and a similarity score is derived.
{"title":"Poster: applying unsupervised context-based analysis for detecting unauthorized data disclosure","authors":"Ma'ayan Gafny, A. Shabtai, L. Rokach, Y. Elovici","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093488","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we propose a new unsupervised approach for identifying suspicious access to sensitive relational data. In the proposed method, a tree-like model encapsulates the characteristics of the result-set (i.e., data) that the user normally access within each possible context. During the detection phase, result-sets are examined against the induced model and a similarity score is derived.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79142195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Currently, none of the existing online social networks (OSNs) enables its users to make new friends without revealing their private information. This leaves the users in a vulnerable position when searching for new friends. We propose a solution which enables a user to compute her profile similarity with another user in a privacy-preserving way. Our solution is designed for a realistic OSN environment, where a pair of users is unlikely to be online at the same time.
{"title":"Poster: privacy-preserving profile similarity computation in online social networks","authors":"Arjan Jeckmans, Qiang Tang, P. Hartel","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2093495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2093495","url":null,"abstract":"Currently, none of the existing online social networks (OSNs) enables its users to make new friends without revealing their private information. This leaves the users in a vulnerable position when searching for new friends. We propose a solution which enables a user to compute her profile similarity with another user in a privacy-preserving way. Our solution is designed for a realistic OSN environment, where a pair of users is unlikely to be online at the same time.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82731443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aaron Johnson, P. Syverson, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson
We introduce a novel model of routing security that incorporates the ordinarily overlooked variations in trust that users have for different parts of the network. We focus on anonymous communication, and in particular onion routing, although we expect the approach to apply more broadly. This paper provides two main contributions. First, we present a novel model to consider the various security concerns for route selection in anonymity networks when users vary their trust over parts of the network. Second, to show the usefulness of our model, we present as an example a new algorithm to select paths in onion routing. We analyze its effectiveness against deanonymization and other information leaks, and particularly how it fares in our model versus existing algorithms, which do not consider trust. In contrast to those, we find that our trust-based routing strategy can protect anonymity against an adversary capable of attacking a significant fraction of the network.
{"title":"Trust-based anonymous communication: adversary models and routing algorithms","authors":"Aaron Johnson, P. Syverson, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046729","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a novel model of routing security that incorporates the ordinarily overlooked variations in trust that users have for different parts of the network. We focus on anonymous communication, and in particular onion routing, although we expect the approach to apply more broadly.\u0000 This paper provides two main contributions. First, we present a novel model to consider the various security concerns for route selection in anonymity networks when users vary their trust over parts of the network. Second, to show the usefulness of our model, we present as an example a new algorithm to select paths in onion routing. We analyze its effectiveness against deanonymization and other information leaks, and particularly how it fares in our model versus existing algorithms, which do not consider trust. In contrast to those, we find that our trust-based routing strategy can protect anonymity against an adversary capable of attacking a significant fraction of the network.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85316839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Computational soundness results show that under certain conditions it is possible to conclude computational security whenever symbolic security holds. Unfortunately, each soundness result is usually established for some set of cryptographic primitives and extending the result to encompass new primitives typically requires redoing most of the work. In this paper we suggest a way of getting around this problem. We propose a notion of computational soundness that we term deduction soundness. As for other soundness notions, our definition captures the idea that a computational adversary does not have any more power than a symbolic adversary. However, a key aspect of deduction soundness is that it considers, intrinsically, the use of the primitives in the presence of functions specified by the adversary. As a consequence, the resulting notion is amenable to modular extensions. We prove that a deduction sound implementation of some arbitrary primitives can be extended to include asymmetric encryption and public data-structures (e.g. pairings or list), without repeating the original proof effort. Furthermore, our notion of soundness concerns cryptographic primitives in a way that is independent of any protocol specification language. Nonetheless, we show that deduction soundness leads to computational soundness for languages (or protocols) that satisfy a so called commutation property.
{"title":"A composable computational soundness notion","authors":"V. Cortier, B. Warinschi","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046717","url":null,"abstract":"Computational soundness results show that under certain conditions it is possible to conclude computational security whenever symbolic security holds. Unfortunately, each soundness result is usually established for some set of cryptographic primitives and extending the result to encompass new primitives typically requires redoing most of the work. In this paper we suggest a way of getting around this problem. We propose a notion of computational soundness that we term deduction soundness. As for other soundness notions, our definition captures the idea that a computational adversary does not have any more power than a symbolic adversary. However, a key aspect of deduction soundness is that it considers, intrinsically, the use of the primitives in the presence of functions specified by the adversary. As a consequence, the resulting notion is amenable to modular extensions. We prove that a deduction sound implementation of some arbitrary primitives can be extended to include asymmetric encryption and public data-structures (e.g. pairings or list), without repeating the original proof effort. Furthermore, our notion of soundness concerns cryptographic primitives in a way that is independent of any protocol specification language. Nonetheless, we show that deduction soundness leads to computational soundness for languages (or protocols) that satisfy a so called commutation property.","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76288752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philip Marquardt, A. Verma, Henry Carter, Patrick Traynor
Mobile phones are increasingly equipped with a range of highly responsive sensors. From cameras and GPS receivers to three-axis accelerometers, applications running on these devices are able to experience rich interactions with their environment. Unfortunately, some applications may be able to use such sensors to monitor their surroundings in unintended ways. In this paper, we demonstrate that an application with access to accelerometer readings on a modern mobile phone can use such information to recover text entered on a nearby keyboard. Note that unlike previous emanation recovery papers, the accelerometers on such devices sample at near the Nyquist rate, making previous techniques unworkable. Our application instead detects and decodes keystrokes by measuring the relative physical position and distance between each vibration. We then match abstracted words against candidate dictionaries and record word recovery rates as high as 80%. In so doing, we demonstrate the potential to recover significant information from the vicinity of a mobile device without gaining access to resources generally considered to be the most likely sources of leakage (e.g., microphone, camera).
{"title":"(sp)iPhone: decoding vibrations from nearby keyboards using mobile phone accelerometers","authors":"Philip Marquardt, A. Verma, Henry Carter, Patrick Traynor","doi":"10.1145/2046707.2046771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2046707.2046771","url":null,"abstract":"Mobile phones are increasingly equipped with a range of highly responsive sensors. From cameras and GPS receivers to three-axis accelerometers, applications running on these devices are able to experience rich interactions with their environment. Unfortunately, some applications may be able to use such sensors to monitor their surroundings in unintended ways. In this paper, we demonstrate that an application with access to accelerometer readings on a modern mobile phone can use such information to recover text entered on a nearby keyboard. Note that unlike previous emanation recovery papers, the accelerometers on such devices sample at near the Nyquist rate, making previous techniques unworkable. Our application instead detects and decodes keystrokes by measuring the relative physical position and distance between each vibration. We then match abstracted words against candidate dictionaries and record word recovery rates as high as 80%. In so doing, we demonstrate the potential to recover significant information from the vicinity of a mobile device without gaining access to resources generally considered to be the most likely sources of leakage (e.g., microphone, camera).","PeriodicalId":72687,"journal":{"name":"Conference on Computer and Communications Security : proceedings of the ... conference on computer and communications security. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77975005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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