Applied Biosafety最新文献

Introduction: Brucella melitensis and Bacillus anthracis are zoonoses transmitted from animals and animal products. Scientific information is provided in this article to support biosafety precautions necessary to protect laboratory workers and individuals who are potentially exposed to these pathogens in the workplace or other settings, and gaps in information are also reported. There is a lack of information on the appropriate effective concentration for many chemical disinfectants for this agent. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling of contaminated materials. B. melitensis is reported to have the highest number of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) to date in laboratory workers.

Methods: A literature search was conducted to identify potential gaps in biosafety and focused on five main sections including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, LAIs, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies.

Results: Scientific literature currently lacks information on the effective concentration of many chemical disinfectants for this agent and in the variety of matrices where it may be found. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of PPE during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling contaminated materials.

Discussion: Clarified vulnerabilities based on specific scientific evidence will contribute to the prevention of unwanted and unpredictable infections, improving the biosafety processes and procedures for laboratory staff and other professionals such as veterinarians, individuals associated with the agricultural industry, and those working with susceptible wildlife species.

Introduction: Lack of evidence-based information regarding potential biological risks can result in inappropriate or excessive biosafety and biosecurity risk-reduction strategies. This can cause unnecessary damage and loss to the physical facilities, physical and psychological well-being of laboratory staff, and community trust. A technical working group from the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), World Health Organization (WHO), and Chatham House collaborated on the Biosafety Research Roadmap (BRM) project. The goal of the BRM is the sustainable implementation of evidence-based biorisk management of laboratory activities, particularly in low-resource settings, and the identification of gaps in the current biosafety and biosecurity knowledge base.

Methods: A literature search was conducted for the basis of laboratory design and practices for four selected high-priority subgroups of pathogenic agents. Potential gaps in biosafety were focused on five main sections, including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Categories representing miscellaneous, respiratory, bioterrorism/zoonotic, and viral hemorrhagic fever pathogens were created within each group were selected for review.

Results: Information sheets on the pathogens were developed. Critical gaps in the evidence base for safe sustainable biorisk management were identified.

Conclusion: The gap analysis identified areas of applied biosafety research required to support the safety, and the sustainability, of global research programs. Improving the data available for biorisk management decisions for research with high-priority pathogens will contribute significantly to the improvement and development of appropriate and necessary biosafety, biocontainment and biosecurity strategies for each agent.

Introduction: The 6th edition of the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories includes Appendix L on sustainability that describes a series of considerations for biocontainment facilities. But many biosafety practitioners may not be familiar with sustainability options that are available, feasible, and safe for laboratory settings as training in this realm is not common.

Methods: With a particular focus on consumable products used in containment laboratory operations, a comparative assessment was made regarding sustainability activities employed in the healthcare setting, where significant advances have been achieved.

Results: Table 1 has been created that describes various consumables that result in waste as part of normal laboratory operations, and the biosafety and infection prevention considerations have been highlighted along with options regarding waste elimination or minimization that have been successfully employed.

Conclusion: Even if a containment laboratory has already been designed, constructed, and is in operation, sustainability opportunities exist for the reduction of environmental impacts without compromising safety.

Introduction: Emergency preparedness is not a novel topic. What has been novel is the fast pace at which organizations, including academic institutions, have had to adapt to infectious disease outbreaks since 2000.

Objective: The goal of this article is to highlight the various environmental health and safety (EHS) team activities during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic to ensure that on-site personnel was safe, the research could be conducted, and critical business operations such as academics, laboratory animal care, environmental compliance, and routine healthcare functions could continue during the pandemic.

Methods: The response framework is presented by discussing first the lessons learned in preparedness and emergency response during outbreaks that occurred since 2000, namely Influenza virus, Zika virus, and Ebola virus. Then, how the response to the COVID-19 pandemic was activated, and the effects of ramping down research and business activities.

Results: Next, the contributions of each EHS unit are presented, namely, environmental, industrial hygiene and occupational safety, research safety and biosafety, radiation safety, supporting healthcare activities, disinfection, and communications and training.

Discussion: Lastly, a few lessons learned are shared with the reader for moving toward normalcy.

Introduction: Yale University designed and constructed a temporary field hospital for 100 COVID-19 symptomatic patients. Conservative biocontainment decisions were made in design and operational practices. Objectives of the field hospital included the safe flow of patients, staff, equipment and supplies, and obtaining approval by the Connecticut Department of Public Health (CT DPH) for opening as a field hospital.

Methods: The CT DPH regulations for mobile hospitals were used as primary guidance for the design, equipment, and protocols. References for BSL-3 and ABSL-3 design from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Tuberculosis isolation rooms from the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) were also utilized. The final design involved an array of experts throughout the university.

Results and conclusion: Vendors tested and certified all High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters and balanced the airflows inside the field hospital. Yale Facilities designed and constructed positive pressure access and exit tents within the field hospital, established appropriate pressure relationships between zones, and added Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value 16 exhaust filters. The BioQuell ProteQ Hydrogen Peroxide decontamination unit was validated with biological spores in the rear sealed section of the biowaste tent. A ClorDiSys Flashbox UV-C Disinfection Chamber was also validated. Visual indicators were placed the doors of the pressurized tents and spaced throughout the facility to verify airflows. The plans created to design, construct and operate the field hospital provide a blueprint for recreating and reopening a field hospital in the future if ever needed at Yale University.

Introduction: The widespread transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus has increased scientific and societal interest in air cleaning technologies, and their potential to mitigate the airborne spread of microorganisms. Here we evaluate room scale use of five mobile air cleaning devices.

Methods: A selection of air cleaners, containing high efficiency filtration, was tested using an airborne bacteriophage challenge. Assessments of bioaerosol removal efficacy were undertaken using a decay measurement approach over 3 h, with air cleaner performance compared with bioaerosol decay rate without an air cleaner in the sealed test room. Evidence of chemical by-product emission was also checked, as were total particle counts.

Results: Bioaerosol reduction, exceeding natural decay, was observed for all air cleaners. Reductions ranged between devices from <2-log per m³ room air for the least effective, to a >5-log reduction for the most efficacious systems. One system generated detectable ozone within the sealed test room, but ozone was undetectable when the system was run in a normally ventilated room. Total particulate air removal trends aligned with measured airborne bacteriophage decline.

Discussion: Air cleaner performance differed, and this could relate to individual air cleaner flow specifications as well as test room conditions, such as air mixing during testing. However, measurable reductions in bioaerosols, beyond natural airborne decay rate, were observed.

Conclusion: Under the described test conditions, air cleaners containing high efficiency filtration significantly reduced bioaerosol levels. The best performing air cleaners could be investigated further with improved assay sensitivity, to enable measurement of lower residual levels of bioaerosols.

Introduction: The health and safety issues encountered by biosafety professionals in the daily conduct of their work is rarely limited solely to potentially infectious pathogens. A basic understanding of the other types of hazards inherent to laboratories is necessary. As such, management of the health and safety program at an academic health institution sought to ensure crosscutting competency for its technical staff, including staff members within the biosafety program.

Methods: Using a focus group approach, a team of safety professionals from a variety of specialties developed a list of 50 basic health and safety items that any safety specialist should know, inclusive of basic but important information about biosafety that was considered imperative for staff members to understand. This list was used as the basis for a formal cross-training effort.

Results: Staff responded positively to the approach and the associated cross-training, and overall compliance with an array of health and safety expectations was experienced across the institution. Subsequently, the list of questions has been shared broadly with other organizations for their own consideration and use.

Discussion/conclusion: The codification of the basic knowledge expectations for technical staff within a health and safety program at an academic health institution, which includes the biosafety program technical staff, was warmly received and helped establish what information was expected to be known and what issues warranted input from other specialty areas. The cross-training expectations served to expand the health and safety services provided despite resource limitations and organizational growth.

Introduction: In response to a series of biosafety incidents in 2014, the White House directed two high-level expert committees to analyze biosafety and biosecurity in U.S. laboratories and make recommendations for work with select agents and toxins. Overall, they recommended 33 actions to address areas related to national biosafety, including promoting a culture of responsibility, oversight, outreach and education, applied biosafety research, incident reporting, material accountability, inspection processes, regulations and guidelines, and determining the necessary number of high-containment laboratories in the United States.

Methods: The recommendations were collected and grouped into categories previously defined by the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel and the Fast Track Action Committee. Open-source materials were examined to determine what actions had been taken to address the recommendations. The actions taken were compared against the reasoning provided in the committee reports to determine if the concerns were sufficiently addressed.

Results: In this study, we found that 6 recommendations were not addressed and 11 were insufficiently addressed out of 33 total recommended actions.

Discussion and conclusion: Further work is needed to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity in U.S. laboratories handling regulated pathogens (biological select agents and toxins [BSAT]). These carefully considered recommendations should now be enacted, including determining if there is sufficient high-containment laboratory space for response to a future pandemic, developing a sustained applied biosafety research program to improve our understanding of how high-containment research should be performed, bioethics training to educate the regulated community on the consequences of unsafe practices in BSAT research, and the creation of a no-fault incident reporting system for biological incidents, which may inform and improve biosafety training.

Significance: The work presented in this study is significant because previous incidents that occurred in Federal laboratories highlighted shortcomings in the Federal Select Agent Program and the Select Agent Regulations. Progress was made on implementing recommendations to address the shortcomings, but efforts were lost or forgotten over time. The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a brief window of interest in biosafety and biosecurity, and an opportunity to address these shortcomings to increase readiness for future disease emergencies.

Introduction: Carcasses from animal experiments with RG-3 pathogens should be decontaminated onsite in Austria.

Objective: The aim of this study was to find out if the use of pass-through autoclaves for the decontamination of animal carcasses (up to 40 kg of weight) could serve as a routine method for smaller laboratories, as the installation of special carcass decontamination plants may be cost prohibitive.

Methods: Biological indicators (BIs) were implanted into the carcasses of animals of different sizes and species with a novel method using stainless steel pipes. The bodies were placed in autoclavable plastic bags and equipped with thermal probes by insertion through the rectum. Subsequently a factory default autoclave cycle for liquids was performed, which holds a core temperature of 121°C for 20 min.

Results: The weight of the carcasses ranged from 1 to 42 kg, the duration of the individual cycles reached from 2.2 to 17.23 h. Decontamination was successful every single time as shown by the BIs. The application through the natural orifices with the help of the application tools seems to offer a reliable alternative for implanting the BIs into the carcasses without creating new openings. Insulation properties did not pose substantial challenges to the process. Limitations on the packaging procedure were identified in carcasses larger than 30 kg.

Conclusion: Based on the results of this study, using pass-through autoclaves represents an option as a routine method for the decontamination of animal carcasses up to at least 40 kg.